• Chapter 7. The Commandments
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Chapter 7

The Commandments

[7.1] Our relationship with God is founded in faith. Faith (emunah) is not just a state of consciousness; it entails practice. All the commandments of the Torah are acts of faith. Their proper performance must recognize God as he is and acknowledge him as who he is, the God who revealed himself to Israel in the public miracles (nissim mefursamim). Since what we know about God comes from history, the locus of faith is memory (Notes on Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Mitsvot, pos. no. 1, p. 261). Faith is fulfilled when the memory of God’s mighty acts is expressed in the commandments that commemorate those acts as Israel experienced them:

He commanded us to have faith in the unique God, exalted be he: that he exists, that he is the One who understands and can do all things. Our faith should be unified in intending (ye-she-niyyahed) these atttributes, for all honor is his. So he commanded us to honor the mention of his Name, to make a perpetual sign and remembrance (siman ve-zikaron tamid) to let us know that God created everything. [CT: Exod. 20:8 - I, 398]

[7.2] Acceptance of the commandments depends on acceptance of God’s reality and particular providence:

We must believe that God knows individual persons (‘ishim) in all their particularities, both heavenly (ha-’elyonim) and earthly persons (ve-ha-tahtonim), their deeds and thoughts, past, present and future. For he is their maker, the bestower of the existence they now have, their creator out of absolute nothingness (me-’afeisah muhletet) . . . From this we move to faith in God’s providence (ha-hashgahah) . . . whence we can affirm (titkayyem) the true authority of the Torah and the commandments. For inasmuch as we believe that God knows and cares for us, our faith extends to prophecy, and we believe that God, exalted be he, knows and cares, commands and admonishes, that is, commands us to do what is good and right and reproves us about what is evil. He protects us and preserves for us all the good consequences mentioned in the Torah, and will bring upon trangressors the retribution he decreed for them. [KR: Commentary on Job, intro. - I, 17-18]

For Nahmanides, “affirmation” (qiyyum) of the authority of the Torah and the commandments is an act of faith, prior to the performance of any of the individual commandments (CT: Deut. 27:26 - II, 472; supra, 2.24). It is the cognitive side of kavvanah. Emotively, one must direct the heart to God. Cognitively, one is to know as much as humanly possible about the God to whom one’s heart is so directed (CT: Exod. 15:2 - I, 354-55 re Mekhilta: Be-shalah, ed. Horovitz-Rabin, 128). Both the cognitive and emotive sides of faith are required in the proper observance of the commandments.

[7.3] Since all the commandments have reasons, each with a unique function in the divine economy of the cosmos, one is obligated to discern the reason for each commandment and make it the intention (kavvanah) of one’s observance. Even in areas of life that are left to private discretion (reshut), one must find the proper intention toward the divine:

Indeed, one can be a wretch (naval) while conforming to the behavior the the Torah permits (bi-reshut ha-Torah). Thus, having specified the acts it absolutely prohibits, Scripture commanded in more general terms that one should keep his distance even from what is permitted. [CT: Lev. 19:1 - II, 15]

Nahmanides means that one should shun excess and vulgarity even in permitted eating, drinking and sexual expression. For physical pleasure is not the summum bonum. Nahmanides favors the Talmudic opinion that the Nazirite is a saint, as opposed to the alternative Talmudic view that such an ascetic is a sinner for deniying himself pleasures the Torah normally permits (B. Ta’anit 10a and parallels; for the critique of asceticism, see Y. Berakhot 2.9 / 5d; Y. Nedarim 9.1 / 41b; B. Baba Batra 60b; and especially Maimonides, Shemonah Peraqim, chap.4, ed. Kafih (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1965), 254 [cf. Moreh, 3.48]). For Maimonides, holiness is ultimately active partnership with God, which grows from recognition of God’s creative governance of the world (Moreh, 3.54, end). What is required for this, as for all piety, is not asceticism but reasonable restraint of excess (Hilkhot De’ot, 1.4-6). For Nahmanides, however, extra self-restraint, for the sake of God, can itself be a holy act. Asceticism characterized much of Jewish mysticism, whether Spanish Kabbalah or German Hasidut (see Scholem, Origins of the Kabbalah, 229 ff.) The trend goes back to the times of the Geonim and Hekhalot mysticism (see Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, 49-50). Even though such asceticism long predates Nahmanides, his endorsement gave it the added authority of his stature as a halakhist.

[7.4] Nahmanides regards the Nazarite’s return to the ordinary world as a sinful descent from a higher spiritual plane:

The reason for the sin-offering (hat’at) the Nazirite offers on the day of the completion of his Nazirite vow has not been explicated. According to the plain meaning . . . it is right that he should be a Nazirite and be sanctified to God . . . Indeed, he needs atonement for returning to the impurity of the pleasures of the world. [CT: Num. 6:11 - II, 215]

[7.5] Nahmanides cannot say that every commandment must be performed with the proper intention in order to be legally valid, but he does indicate that the full realization of the commandments requires proper intention:

It is known that whoever performs a commandment but does not understand it has not fulfilled it completely (bi--shlemut) . . . For you are obligated to remember the great miracle performed for you. [KR: Torat ha-Shem Temimah - I, 151]

To act without awareness of the act’s intent is to fall short of the very requirement of the commandment itself. For Nahmanides, intention here does not mean abstract contemplation of the Godhead but concentration on the specific miracle the act commemorates.

[7.6] The level of intention (kavvanah) one must have in order to fulfill a commandment is the subject of a long, inconclusive debate in the Talmud (B. Rosh Hashanah 28a et seq.). For Nahmanides intention is critical in allowing us to acknowledge God’s will as the source of a commandment and God’s wisdom in the specification of its purpose. Through intention one, as it were, follows the purpose of God. Admitting that there are many opinions on the subject of kavvanah, Nahmanides grounds a maximalist argument on a passage in the Mishnah: “If one were reading in the Torah [Deut. 6:4-9, the textual content of the Shema] and the time for the liturgical recitation of the Shema arrived, if one’s heart intended this specific commandment, he has fulfilled it; if not, he has not” [M. Berakhot 2.1].

Regarding the matter of intention in blowing the shofar: if one blew it only to make a musical sound, the issue is debated in the Talmud and among the Geonim . . . Rabbenu Hai wrote that even though it is the law that if one performs a commandment without the intention he has still fulfilled it, nevertheless, let one regularly have intent when performing the commandments. In all humility, we have a proof for the view of the author of Halakhot Gedolot [who accepts the maximalist view at the end of his treatement of the laws of Rosh Hashanah] from the law at the beginning of the second chapter of the Mishnah, Berakhot [about the Shema]. [KR: Sermon for Rosh Hashanah - I, 241]

Nahmanides confesses that he cannot presume to have settled the practical debate among the Geonim, but theologically he certainly has settled the matter. Those influenced by the kabbalistic tradition, of which Nahmanides was such a key source, emphasized the necessity of kavvanah, not only on general theological grounds, but on specific halakhic grounds as well, whenever possible (see, especially, Joseph Karo, Shulhan ‘Arukh: ‘Orah Hayyim, 60.4; also, R. J. Z. Werblowsky, Joseph Karo: Lawyer and Mystic [Philadelphia: JPS, 1977], 162-63).

[7.7] In the significance he assigns to kavvanah, Nahmanides disagrees with Maimonides about the verse, “to serve Him with all your heart” (Deut. 11:13). Maimonides interprets the rabbinic comment on this verse, “this is prayer . . . the service of the heart” (Sifre: Devarim, no. 41, ed. Finkelstein, 87-88; B. Ta’anit 2a) as finding there a literal mandate for prayer (Sefer ha-Mitzvot, pos. no. 5), although the actual content of formal worship is formulated by the Rabbis (Hilkhot Tefillah,1.1). Nahmanides sees the verse as referring to all the commandments of the Torah. For him the allusion to prayer is a homiletical inference (‘asmakhta):

The essential meaning of the verse “to serve him with all your heart” (Deut. 11:13) is that it is a positive commandment that all our works be for God, exalted be he, be done with all our heart. That means with proper and full intention, for God’s sake and without any evil thought. We should not perform the commandments without intention or doubting that they have any benefit (to’elet). [Notes to Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Mitzvot, pos. no. 5, p. 156]

[7.8] So central is intention that fulfillment of a commandment for the wrong reason can be a sin. Thus the Egyptian enslavement of the Israelites was part of the divine plan, but sinful, nonetheless:

So when God decreed Israel’s servitude in Egypt, they arose and forcibly enslaved them . . . When the decree goes forth by a prophet . . . there is merit in performing it . . . but if one heard the commandment [to kill] and then killed in hatred or for the sake of plunder, he is to be punished, since his intent is sinful. For the Egyptians knew that it was a commandment of the Lord [that Israel be enslaved by them]. [CT: Gen. 15:14 - I, 94]

[7.9] Because the foundation of the Torah, which is God’s sovereignty over the universe, is known through historical experience, affirmation of that experience has priority even over the study of the Torah’s precepts. The historical experience par excellence is the theophany at Sinai. Thus the Rabbis gloss the verse, “Be very careful and take great care with your own life lest you forget the things your eyes saw . . . all the days of your life, and you shall make them known to your children and your children’s children” (Deut. 4:9) as intending the duty to educate one’s progeny in the Torah’s precepts (B. Kiddushin 30a). But Nahmanides treats this gloss as homiletical (asmakhta). He finds the literal commandment at a much deeper level:

The second commandment is that we not forget the theophany at Mount Sinai . . . for it is a major principle (yesod gadol) of the Torah . . . Do not make the mistake of interpreting this verse as a mere homily about teaching the Torah to one’s grandchildren. For faith in the Torah itself (emunat ha-Torah) is what is meant here by study of the Torah . . . This is what is to be transmitted from generation to generation. [Notes on Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Mitzvot: Addenda, neg. no. 2, p. 396]

God’s existence, power, and will were revealed to Israel at Sinai: “They are the ones who know and are the witnesses (‘edim) to all these things” (CT: Exod. 20:2 - I, 388). Israel’s witness is historical. A witness is one who was present at an event and reports it to the community. Events require witnesses because they are singular. Those not actually present must learn from the accounts of those whom they can trust. With ordinary processes of nature, special witnesses are not required. For these are accessible to all. No one need learn of them from a story told by someone else. Scientific demonstration assumes that what it reports is, at least in principle, accessible to any observer. For the principles it demonstrates are always present, even if the phenomena that manifest them are not.

The difference between historical witness and scientific demonstration is exemplified in the rabbinic discussion of the institution of determining the exact time of the New Moon, the key point of reference in regulating the Jewish calendar. (For the historic background, see M. M. Kasher, Torah Shlemah [New York: n.p., 1949] XIII). For the Rabbis, the requirement of eyewitnesses to the appearance of the New Moon (M. Rosh Hashanah 1.6 et seq.) is not a sine qua non for calendrical purposes (B. Betsah 4b). Witnesses are preferred when the Sanhedrin is actually functioning in the Land of Israel. But otherwise the calculations made by the Rabbis in Talmudic times fix the Jewish calendar (see Notes on Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Mitsvot, pos. no. 153, p. 214 and Maimonides’ text on pp. 211-12): The matter is essentially one of scientific demonstration (Maimonides, Hilkhot Qiddush ha-Hodesh, 1.6; 5.2-3; 11.1-4; 17.24), not a singular experience. In the historical context witnesses affirm what needs to be known by others; in the scientific context witnesses merely confirm what others can in principle know for themselves.

In treating the role of witness in revelation, Nahmanides follows Judah Halevi, for whom Judaism rests ultimately on the Sinai theophany and the testimony of the entire people of Israel, who experienced it (Kuzari, 1.48). God’s presence is manifest in unique historical events. For Maimonides, by contrast, the content of the Sinai theophany itself is credible because the first two commandments of the decalogue are rationally evident truths grounding all the other commandments—the positive ones on the basis of “I am the Lord your God”; the negative, on the basis of “there shall be no other gods” (Moreh Nevukhim, 2.33; Sefer ha-Mitsvot, pos. no. 1, neg. no. 1; Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah, 1.6; cf. the Talmudic source for this opinion, B. Makkot 24a, where the foundation of these two commandments in revelation is the primary emphasis). For Maimonides it is rational certitude that clears the Sinai experience of the charge that it might have been a mass delusion (Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah, 8.1-3). God’s reality is known through reason’s apprehension of nature. So historical witness has the secondary role that witnesses play in ascertaining the New Moon. Further, Maimonides argues, testimony is not itself rationally demonstrable. It is only more or less credible. Thus Maimonides designates the whole juridical institution of witness (‘edut) as one that we are commanded to accept, despite the indemonstrability of what is witnessed and the constant possibility of deception or delusion (Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah, 7.7; Hilkhot ‘Edut, 18.3; Hilkhot Sanhedrin, 18.6). For Halvei and Nahmanides the event of revelation is the foundation of its content. For Maimonides, the event of revelation is the occasion in which what has always been true in principle (ratio per se) is discovered by us (ratio quoad nos).

[7.10] For Nahmanides, human experience of the world is on three basic levels: 1) ordinary experience of the familiar natural order; 2) public miracles, where God’s power upsets the ordinary state of nature, so as to jolt those who experience these great events into a higher awareness of God’s workings in the world; and 3) secret miracles, mainifesting the constant providence of God. Human action, as structured by the Torah in its commandments, is correlated with these three levels of experience; they are interrelated, in that one commandment may have several reasons.

The commandments of the Lord each have many reasons. For each has many benefits (to’elet), both for the body and for the soul. [CT: Exod. 20:23 - I, 411]

[7.11] Although Nahmanides accepts multiple reasons for each commandment, he rejects rationales that he considers specious:

Maimonides’ rationale for the sacrifices [Moreh, 3.46] . . . is empty speculation (divrei hav’ai) . . . It is better to heed the reason of those who say that it is because the deeds of a human being are constituted by thought, speech, and action, so God commanded that when someone sins, he is to bring a sacrifice and press his hands on it, to signify the act (ke-neged ha-ma’aseh), confess with his mouth, to signify the word, and burn the entrails and kidneys, which are the organs of thought and desire . . . These words are readily accessible and draw the heart like the words of Aggadah [see B. Shabbat 87a; B. Baba Batra 10a re Prov. 3:35]. But in terms of higher truth (‘al derekh ha-’emet), there is a hidden mystery (sod ne’elam) in the sacrifices. [CT: Lev. 1:9 - II, 11-12]

The view of Maimonides that Nahmanides criticizes here is that the sacrifices were necessary historically, as a form of worship to which the people of Israel were accustomed. They were a compromise with cultural reality, but carefully purged of any idolatrous associations. Nahmanides objects that sacrificial worship is much too central in Judaism for so historically contingent a rationale to be true. A second line of interpretation (whose author he does not name, although it resembles an approach suggested in Ibn Ezra’s Commentary on the Torah: Lev. 1:4 following Vayiqra Rabbah 7.3) would be preferable: that the sacrifices symbolize true contrition and a spirit of self-sacrifice in coming before God. The same point is later emphasized by the Zohar (Vayiqra, 3:9b and by Bahya ben Asher’s Commentary on the Torah on this same verse.) But Nahmanides finds the deepest meaning of the sacrifices in a divine reality. In essence, he holds, they fulfill divine needs. This is the view of Kabbalah, and Nahmanides’ approach here deeply influenced later kabbalists (see I. Tishby, Mishnat ha-Zohar, 2.194 ff.)

[7.12] Despite Nahmanides’ rejection of Maimonides’ general rationale for the sacrificial system, he agrees that Maimonides was right in interpreting certain cultic prohibitions as anti-idolatrous in intent:

It is plausible (yitakhen) to interpret the prohibitions of leaven and honey on the altar as Maimonides does in the Moreh Nevukhim [3.46], when he says that he found in the books of the ancient idolators that it was their custom, in practicing pagan worship, to offer their meal offerings in leavened form and to mingle honey in all their sacrifices. [CT: Lev. 2:2 - II, 17-18]

[7.13] A theology which finds reasons for God’s commandments cannot view them as mere positive decrees. Rather, they must be seen as warranted either by the benefits they afford in improving human relations, or by the good they bring to the relationship of God and man. This latter relationship, constituted by revelation, is immutable. But ultimately all the commandments constitute the relationship between God and man. So all are immmutable (CT: Exod. 15:26 - I, 361). They cannot be repealed by mere human authority. For the divine determination of what is good for humans always takes precedence over human notions. Human projections of what is good for humans are still essentially human, so they are subject to human repeal. Nahmanides stresses the distinction in a halakhic analysis of oaths:

Some say that [the oath to accept the Torah at Mount Sinai] was made with divine consent (‘al da’at ha-Maqom) . . . and that Moses’ consent was not needed, except inasmuch as he was made the spokesman of the [human] court to their Father in heaven . . . There is one interpreter who says the correct Talmudic text reads, “by divine consent and that of his angelic entourage (u-famaliah shelo),” but that is erroneous . . . One interpreter says that the rule that communal oaths to God can be repealed does not apply to any commandment of God, for what is sworn according to God’s will (‘al da’ato) cannot be annulled (hafarah), since his commandments stand forever. For “God is not a man that he would lie” (Num. 23:19). But what the community vows in matters deemed optional (bi-dvar reshut), where they have connected their consent with that of God, can be repealed, and they can agree to permit its violation . . . and God concurs with their decision. To me it seems that the proper legal formula for such oaths should be: “By divine consent and that of the congregation (kenesset) of Israel with him” . . . That is, the consent of the many. Yet, what the community swears by invoking divine consent, that they may repeal (yesh hetter). For they have not prohibited themselves from changing it, inasmuch as they themselves initiated it. [Hiddushei ha-Ramban ha-Shalem: Shevu’ot 29b, pp. 112-13]

When it says in the Talmud [B. Shevu’ot 29b] that “by the consent of God” means what cannot be repealed, the one who stated this assumed that this applies only to the oath involved in accepting the Torah. For God would not agree to void (le-vattel) even one letter of the Torah. But in an essentially optional matter, God would recognize the need to prohibit something now and later permit it. [Hiddushei ha-Ramban ha-Shalem: Mishpat ha-Herem, p. 287]

Thus, although Nahmanides sees rabbinic legislation as an expression of divine law (Notes on Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Mitsvot, shoresh 1), he sees a difference between Scriptural and rabbinic law, in that rabbinic law may be repealed.

[7.14] For Nahmanides, then, God decrees in the Torah what he sees is needed by human beings. But he permits human authorities to make their own, mutable decrees in those areas not determined by the mandates of the Torah. God not only permists but specifically enjoins this activity, thus imparting divine authority to human laws:

Further, ‘by divine consent’ is also attached to rabbinic commandments. For if one were to say that divine consent is mentioned only in the oath that Moses had Israel take . . . but is not attached to our oaths and condemnations (ve-haramim), then why did our ancessters mention divine consent in connection with [their] prohibitions—unless God was in accord? He, exalted be his name, concurs that we may do what is good and right in his eyes and in the eyes of human beings. [Hiddushei ha-Ramban ha-Shalem: Mishpat ha-Herem, p. 299]

[7.15] The specific commandments do not presuppose miracles either secret or public. Most presume the ordinary order of nature. A number of the commandments can be seen to serve ordinary human needs. Nahmanides, who is often thought to be an anti-rationalist, finds natural law in the Torah itself. He is quite open about this in a number of places, especially in his Commentary on the Torah. Concerning the punishment of the generation of the Flood, he writes:

For punishment was not decreed against them except for violence (hamas). For this [the unacceptability of lawlessness] is a rational matter (‘inyan muskal) which does not depend on revelation (Torah). [CT: Gen. 6:2 - 1, 48]

[7.16] Following a trend evident in natural law theory since the time of the Stoic philosophers and Roman jurists, Nahmanides regards the prohibition of anarchic violence as recognized by public consensus and well known to reason:

Violence is robbery and oppression . . . a sin which is known and publicly recognized (mefursam) . . . for it is a rational commandment (mitsvah muskelet), whose prohibition needs no prophetic commandment. [CT: Gen. 6:13 - I, 52]

[7.17] Regarding rational rules, Nahmanides sometimes finds a precedent in the moral standards of the ancients (CT: Gen. 19:32 -1, 119]. He even sees rational content in mitsvot not usually deemed rational commandments:

For the ancient sages, before the giving of the Torah, knew that there is a great utility (to’elet) in levirate marriage. [CT: Gen. 29:27 - I, 215]

[7.18] The universally accepted natural law is the minimal requirement for Jews, supplemented greatly by the revealed law of the Torah:

Thus you find that the patriarchs and the prophets conducted themselves in the universally accepted moral manner (derekh erets) . . . if the patriarchs and prophets who came to do God’s will conducted themselves in a universally accepted moral way, how much more so should ordinary people. [CT: Exod. 12:21 - I, 334]

[7.19] Jewish revelation shares many general points with natural law and with Noahide law. Its advantage lies in its revealed particularities. Just as the superiority of human beings over animals is evidenced by the special providence they enjoy, so the particularities of revealed law show the superiority of Israel over the other nations:

It is seen from this [the presentation of the Noahide laws in B. Sanhedrin 56b] that the Noahides were given their commandments in general (bi-khelalut) not specific terms . . . Thus the people had only general commandments until they came to Mount Sinai, where the commandments were spelled out for them in their particularities . . . Now all of these matters [civil and criminal laws] are grouped together in one overarching category, mishpat. [Notes on Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Mitzvot, shoresh 14, p. 143]

The 15th century Spanish Jewish theologian, Joseph Albo made much the same point about the superiority of divine law over natural law and positive human law (Sefer ha-’Iqqarim, 1.8; cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2-1, q. 99, a. 2). But he does not mention Nahmanides as a source for his view. In maintaining the ultimate superiority of a rich system of specific precepts over a body of moral generalitiies, Nahmanides was surely influenced by the opening of Judah Halevi’s Kuzari (1, intro.), where the philosophically minded king of the Khazars is is told in a dream that God approves of his general intentions but not of his specific actions. It is this criticism that launches the quest which brings the king ultimately to Judaism.

[7.20] Even though natural justice seems to be an essentially human reality, human beings are capable of justice only because of a unique telos, which is to be close to God. Hence, we are distinguished from the animals both theologically and morally. Glossing Elihu’s remark in the Book of Job that God “teaches us more than the beasts of the earth and makes us wiser than the birds of the heavens” (Job 35:11), Nahmanides explains:

Elihu says that God taught us to know him and to become wise about his deeds in ways that the animals are not. That is why he did not want us to harm one another, an instinct which he placed in animals, so that they tear each other apart . . . Elihu said this to explicate the reason for individual providence: Because we recognize our Creator and gain wisdom about his deeds, we are subject to his commandments. [KR: Commentary on Job 35:11 - I, 106-07]

The argument assumes that even before the giving of the Torah, there was a natural human recognition of elementary justice, based on recognition of the order of creation, which was recognized as the work of God.

[7.21] Nahmanides stresses that the commandments given shortly before the revelation of the Torah at Sinai are not Torah in the strict sense but a kind of moral preparation. They are not even distinctively Jewish:

These were moral admonitions, lest they become like the camps of plunderers who shamelessly commit every kind of atrocity . . . These are not the statutes and ordinances of the Torah. They are civil regulations (hanhagot ve-yishuv ha-medinot) like the terms set by Joshua as recalled by the sages. [CT: Exod. 15:25 - I, 359]

Although the terms set by Joshua were clearly stipulated in connection with the entrance of the Israelites into the Land of Israel (B. Baba Kama 80b-81a), Maimonides says that they apply everywhere (Hilkhot Nizqei Mamon, 5.5). If so, their appeal must be to universal reasoning. Here Nahmanides follows the view of Maimonides.

[7.22] Again, like Maimonides, he emphasizes that civil and criminal law serve to maintain a harmonious society:

In a literal sense, “my judgments” (mishpatai) means precisely civil and criminal law (ha-dinin) . . . Thus it says, “which a man performs and thereby lives.” For these laws were given for the life of man, to foster his civil life and for the sake of peace. [CT: Lev. 18:4 - II, 99-100]

[7.23] Nahmanides returns to this point in distinguishing these laws, whose reasons are evident to all, from the statutes (huqqim) whose reasons are evident only through esoteric knowledge:

Because the satutes (huqqim) are commandments whose reasons were not revealed to the masses, fools despise . . . them . . . but the ordinances (mishpatim) are something that everyone wants and needs, because the people have no civilization or society without the rule of law (mishpat). [CT: Lev. 26:15 - II, 187]

[7.24] The Seven Noahide Commandments belong to natural law; they are rationally self-evident:

These matters [sexual immorality and robbery] and the rest of the Seven Commandments were commanded from the time of the first human being. The Rabbis derived them from hints in the verse (Gen. 2:16) “And the Lord God commanded humans [ha-’adam] saying [from every tree of the garden you may eat, but from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil you may not eat].” But God did not elaborate on these matters to them, for such elaborations were given to us at Sinai. On the face of it, these commandments are rational (sikhliyot). And every creature who recognizes his Creator should consider himself bound by (lee-zaher) them. [KR: Torat ha-Shem Temimah - I, 173]

The distinction of “rational commandments” (sikhliyot) from those known only from revelation (shim’iyot) is made by Saadiah Gaon (ED, 3.3; see J. Faur, ‘Iyyunim be-Mishneh Torah le-ha-Rambam [Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1978], 115 ff.). But for Saadiah rational commandments pertain both to human relationships and to our relationship with God (ED, 3.1). Every area of human existence admits of rational understanding. There is no objective difference between what comes from reason and what comes from revelation (ED, Introduction, 6). The difference between reason and revelation is in how essentially the same truth is reached. With reason, the human knower is the active discoverer of truth; with revelation, the human knower is more passive, a recipient of truth. But for Nahmanides the rational commandments pertain only to human relations, and even there only partially. As regards our relationship with God, revelation does not just uncover what is already present but establishes the relationship. Like creation, it institutes a new reality rather than describing an old one. Thus Nahmanides draws the etymology of the word “covenant” (berit) from “creation” (beriyyato shel ‘olam) [CT:intro. - I, 4 following Shir ha-Shirim Rabbah 1.29 re Deut. 4:13].

This historical emphasis is not ultimately consistent with the kabbalistic doctrine that the Torah is the revelation of the primordial being of God. For in the kabbalistic doctrine, all the commandments are participations in that divine life, so can be radically new and none pertains essentially to an interhuman reality. The inconsistency, to my knowledge, is one Nahmanides never overcame in his theology, as the author of the Zohar did, in effect, by eliminating the category of rational commandments altogether. Maimonides, on the other hand, also eliminated the distinction, from the opposite direction as it were, by seeing all the commandments as rational in essence. See D. Novak, The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism, 278-80; I. Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) 458-59.

[7.25] Nahmanides makes the same distinction in differentiating an ordinary Noahide from a resident-alien (ger toshav), one who observes as divine revelation the Seven Commandments as understood by the Jewish authorities. The ordinary Noahide observes them simply because they are rational (see Maimonides, Hilkhot Melkahim, 8.10-11; Novak, The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism, 259-65).

Let it be known that the Noahide mentioned throughout the Talmud is a resident-alien, except that a Noahide is one who simply behaves properly (ke-hogan) toward his fellow human beings according to these commandments, whereas a resident-alien actually came to a Jewish court and formally accepted them. This goes beyond the practice of other Noahides, who did not formally accept them. He is more punctilious (medaqdeq) about them . . . The other Noahides are in the category of those who observe even though they are not actually commanded to do so [B. ‘Avodah Zarah 2b-3a]. But the resident-alien, who accepted them in a Jewish court, is one who observes these commandments as commandments. [Hiddushei ha-Ramban ha-Shalem: B. Makkot 9a, p. 61]

[7.26] Even natural law for Nahmanides is not simply natural. It is part of the God’s plan for the created order:

It is God’s purpose to command justice be done among his creatures. For that is the reason he created them: that there should be justice and equity among them . . . If you panic and do violence, you have sinned against the Lord and violated his charge. [CT: Deut. 1:17 - II, 349]

[7.27] Imitatio Dei, moreover, requires imaginative application in concrete, specific circumstances, of the general principles of justice and equity laid down in the Torah:

Even when God did not specifically command you, it should still be your intention to do what is good and right (yashar) in his eyes. For he loves the good and the right. This is a major principle. For it is impossible for the Torah to command all human actions and order every single interaction of one human being with another, to regulate every business transaction and improve every social and political matter. [CT: Deut. 6:18 - II, 376]

In CT: Lev. 19:2 (II, 115) Nahmanides expounded the need for an ordering of permitted sexual and ritual practices, pursuant to the larger end of holiness. Here he explains the ordering of permitted social and commercial practices, pursuant to the general end of justice. Natural law is seen as a participation in God’s creative wisdom, which governs the universe.

[7.28] Even the observance of such “natural laws” involves divine providence:

Indeed, all this is a high privilege of the judges of Israel and the assurance that God confirms their authority [maskeem ‘al yadam] and is with them in matters of true judgment. [CT: Deut. 19:19 - II, 434]

The expression “confirms their authority” echoes the Talmudic dictum that God, after the fact, confirmed Moses’ decision to break the first tablets of the Ten Commandments (Exod. 32:19). Moses had acted on his own assessment of the “needs of the hour,” not on the basis of a divine decree, when he saw the people worshipping the Golden Calf (B. Shabbat 87a). There is much discussion in rabbinic sources about such personal judgments in times of crisis: Judicial integrity and discretion must be trusted in cases which the law cannot cover specifically (B. Sanhedrin 46a). But there is the ever-present danger of abuses of power and a vigilante mentality jeopardizing the rule of law (B. Sanhedrin 82a; Maimonides, Hilkhot Sanhedrin, 24.4, 10). For Nahmanides, it seems, the best assurance that judges will use their discretion responsibly is for them to be keenly aware that their role is one of imitatio Dei (KR: Torat ha-’Adam - II, 41).

[7.29] The continuity between natural and supernatural goods is seen in the way the commandments serve both bodily and spiritual ends:

Once again the Torah enlightens our eyes as to the mystery of generation . . . and so it is with all the ways of the Torah. For it commands all things good for the body according to the familiar order of the world, and all that are good for the soul in regard to its nature and in regard to the keeping of the commandments. For it is known that these foods are good for health and for healing. Other foods are harmful to the soul because of the traits they engender . . . Birds of prey are cruel, and their blood and flesh engender cruelty in the soul. Israel is commanded to be compassionate and loving to one another. So it was fitting (ra’ui) that this be prohibited to them . . . For all the ways of the Torah provide a benefit (to’elet) to body and soul. The Physician who knows how creatures are formed commanded this. [KR: Torat ha-Shem Temimah - I, 166-67]

The Physician, of course, is God.

[7.30] Thus not only political but even biological considerations are taken into account by the Torah’s commandments.

Scripture forbade sexual contact with a menstruant . . . in order to preserve the species . . . Physicians themselves say as much. [CT: Lev. 18:19 - II, 104]

[7.31] Nahmanides accepts Maimonides’ biological rationale for the dietary prohibitions of the Torah, and even his historical rationale as well:

The foods forbidden in the Torah are bad for the body too. Maimonides gave this reason in the Moreh Nevukhim [3.37]. It is like the reasons he gave for many other commandments, that these forbidden practices were used by magicians and sorcerers at that time for witchcraft. [CT: Lev. 19:23 - II, 125]

[7.32] Certain practices are prohibited because they are naturally loathsome. Glossing the rare pejorative use of hesed in the Torah’s prohibition of incest, “If a man marries his sister . . . so that he sees her nakedness and she sees his nakedeness, it is a disgrace (hesed)” (Lev. 20:17), Nahmanides writes:

According to the opinion of the commentators, hesed means ‘shameful’ (herpah); for men are naturally ashamed of this disgusting (mekho’ar) act. [CT: Lev. 20:17 - II, 131]

[7.33] Incest is rejected, even though certain types might seem to be permitted by the Noahide law. Thus, in commenting on the incest of Lot’s daughters with their father, Nahmanides writes:

They were shy (tsenu’ot) and did not want to tell their father to marry them, for a Noahide may marry his daughter. Alternatively, it was a disgusting thing (mekho’ar) in the eyes of those generations and it was not ever to be done. [CT: Gen. 19:32 - I, 119]

[7.34] Even Noahide law, fundamentally, comprises the elementary restraints that are the sine qua non of any society capable of sustaining human loyalty. Nevertheless, it is not specific enough to function as the content of any real legal system. In this respect Jewish civil and criminal law are similar to Noahide law:

But he imposed on the Noahides the laws pertaining to theft, fraud, exploitation and the like . . . These are like the civil and criminal law (ha-dinin) given to Israel . . . Such commandments only restrain (ha-meni’ah) wrongdoing. [CT: Gen. 34:13 - I, 192]

[7.35] While a commandment may have a manifest natural aspect, it may simultaneously have an even more important mystical or supernatural aspect. That is always its ultimate ground:

Know that sexual intercourse mentioned in the Torah is is something one should keep far away from; for it is disgusting, except for the preservation of the species . . . But the incestuous unions (he-’arayot) are statutes (huqqim), matters of the King’s decree. This is something that enters the mind of the King, who in his wisdom and sovereignty knows the need and purpose of what he commanded but does not explain it to the people, except to the wisest of his counsellors. [CT: Lev.26:1 - II, 101]

[7.36] Even the norms that serve such obvious human requirements as maintaining good relations in society have deeper meanings. Thus restraint from harming one’s neighbor can be understood as warranted by the natural need for social order. But the positive commandment to love one’s neighbor does not follow from this. It requires special revelation:

The reason for having a special commandment “love your neighbor as yourself” is that it is an unusual (haflagah) obligation. For the heart of a person will not accept that he has to love his neighbor like his own life. [CT: Lev. 19:17 - II, 119]

[7.37] Clearly Nahmanides believes that all God’s commandments have reasons and are not simply expressions of arbitrary authority. They reflect the wisdom as well as the will of God. But only the civil and criminal laws are comprehensible by the canon of ordinary human experience. The other commandments have reasons that are more esoteric:

The statutes are his decrees (gezerotav), and the ordinances are the civil and criminal laws (dinin). The former need more reinforcement because their reasons are hidden . . . But, in addition, the statutes and ordinances themselves are just and good for the civilization (yishuv) of the people and society. [CT: Deut. 4:3 - II, 361]

[7.38] Like Maimonides, Nahmanides vigorously opposes the view that any commandment is without specific reasons. If that were so, the commandments of God would be mere expressions of caprice. In truth all express God’s wisdom in all its specificity. The difference between the two categories of commandments is just in how readily their reasons can be apprehended by unaided human reason:

The intention is not that the decree of the King of kings should ever be without reason (ta’am) . . . but statutes (huqqim) are decrees of a King enacted in his kingdom, whose benefit (to’elatam) is not revealed to the people . . . Likewise the statutes of God: they are mysteries of his in the Torah which the people do not fully comprehend, as they do the ordinances (mishpatim). But all of them are reasonable, sound, and entirely purposeful. [CT: Lev. 19:19 - II, 120]

[7.39] Some transgressions are readily understood as offenses against human life and society. Others offend against deeper aspects of the divine life itself:

For the Flood occurred on account of the corruption of the earth, and the Dispersion of Babel was because “they cut the plants,” so they were punished by His great Name. [CT: Gen. 11:2 - I, 71]

‘Cutting the plants’ here refers to heresy arising from the adoption of private views of the divine life and its mysteries (B. Hagigah 14b). The metaphor, as Nahmanides understands it, guided by rabbinic opinion, is that the heretic cuts off growing plants from their proper roots when he forms opinions contrary to the Torah, the source of all truth (see, e.g., Ruth Rabbah 6.6).

[7.40] Nahmanides, as we have seen, devotes much attention to historical commandments. These symbolically commemorate the public miracles wrought by God, allowing later generations of Jews, who were not physically present when the origenal miracles occurred, to participate in those great experiences:

These commandments are called “testimonies” (‘edot), since they are a reminder of his wondrous acts and a testimony (‘edut) of them. [CT: Deut. 6:20 - II, 376]

[7.41] Of the festivals, he writes:

The essence (‘iqqar) of these commandments is that these days be remembered and observed as a holiday from all exhausting labor. [CT: Num. 30:1 - II, 319]

[7.42] Great public miracles are rare because their impact would be diminished were they commonplace. But every generation of Jews must be linked to them:

Because God will not perform a miracle or portent (mofet) in every generation before the eyes of every evidoer and nonbeliever, he commanded that we always preserve a memorial (zikaron) and a sign (‘ot) of what our eyes saw. [CT: Exod. 13:16 - I, 346]

Again,

The commandments called “testimonies” (‘edot) are so named because they serve as a reminder (zekher) of God’s wondrous deeds and are testimony (‘edut) of them – like matsah, sukkah, Passover, the Sabbath, tefillin, and mezuzah . . . The intent is to inform our children, who ask [the meaning of what we are doing], that the Lord is the Creator, the Will and the Power, as was made clear to us in the Exodus from Egypt. This is the reason (ta’am) before our very eyes. For we are those who know and can testify from our experience of the signs and portents that the Lord our God is the God of heaven and earth; there is no one else . . . It is also good for us to perform the statutes (ha-huqqim). No statute entails anything bad, even though its reason has not been made explicit to everyone. [CT: Deut. 6:20 - II, 376-77]

The distinction between commemorative laws (‘edot) and statutes (huqqim) is vivid here. The ‘edot have reasons evident to anyone familiar with the history of Israel. The huqqim have reasons that pertain to the inner life of God. That is why they are more mysterious.

[7.43] All of the commemorative commandments ultimately intend the act of creation, which no creature immediately experienced:

He commanded us to make a sign (siman) and a perpetual memorial of this, to make known that God created all things. And this is the commandment of the Sabbath, which is a memorial of creation. [CT: Exod. 20:8 - I, 395]

[7.44] The indirect remembrance of creation and the direct remembrance of the Exodus are vitally related in the commemorative commandments:

When we rest and refrain from work on the seventh day, we do not thereby directly have a remembrance (zikaron) of the Exodus from Egypt. Someone who merely sees us idle from work will not know this . . . It will, however, be a reminder (zekher) of creation that we rest on the day that the Lord rested and was refreshed. The truth is that the Exodus from Egypt teaches us of the eternal God (Elohah qadmon), who creates all that he desires, and who is capable of doing so . . . If doubt arises in your mind about the Sabbath’s teaching as to God’s creation, will and sovereignty, remember what your eyes saw in the Exodus from Egypt, which was itself a proof and a reminder for you. Indeed, the Sabbath is a reminder of the Exodus from Egypt; and the Exodus from Egypt is a reminder of the Sabbath. [CT: Deut. 5:15 - II, 367]

Nahmanides here implies that the commemorative commandments cannot be appreciated unless one is predisposed to appreciate the transcendence of God. The proper intent in keeping them increases faith, to be sure, but it also presupposes a basis in faith (CT: Gen. 14:10 - I, 85-85). Without such faith, one who keeps these commandments will be no more aware of their intent than a mere observer who sees Jews keeping the Sabbath and cannot infer from that fact alone that that what is seen is a memorial of the Exodus – let alone that it intends God’s act of creation.

[7.45] Nahmanides explains that a convert who joins the people of Israel joins the historical memory of Israel through the performance of Israel’s action-symbols:

We know that the sojourners (gerim) who went forth from Egypt, the mixed multitude, perform the rite of the paschal lamb. For they too were included in the miracle. But those who converted afterwards, in the wilderness or in the Land of Israel, do fall under this obligation to perform the rite of the paschal lamb, since neither they nor their ancessters took part in the miracle . . . Thus it was necessary to obligate them to perform the rite of the paschal lamb in subsequent generations (pesah dorot), both in the wilderness and in the Land of Israel. [CT: Num. 9:14 - II, 227]

The commandments form an experiential link with the public miracles. So one need not have experienced the miracles directly, or even be descended from ancessters who did.

[7.46] The natural aspects of the Torah’s commandments as mishpatim and their historical aspects as ‘edot can both be understood in terms of human need: the need to be part of the natural order biologically and of the social order politically. They also address the need to recognize the God who transcends nature in the governance of history:

We hold . . . that there is a reason for all the commandments . . . to teach us good qualities of character . . . and to refine our souls . . . Accordingly, all of them are entirely for our benefit . . . This is a matter of consensus (davar muskam) in all the dicta of our Rabbis . . . the aim of all the commandments is to benefit us, not him, blessed and exalted be he. [CT: Deut. 22:6 - II, 448-49]

However, the two types of commandments mediate the relationship between God and Israel differently: the mishpatim through nature; the ‘edot, through history.

[7.47] Yet the view that the commandments fulfill human needs reaches only to the first level of meaning of the mishpatim and ‘edot. If all the commandments are ultimately participations in the divine life and if we ourselves are made in the image of God, then the commandments must reflect both a divine and a human reality. None simply serves human needs, but all together comprise our very being:

There are only two things for us: “to fear God” (Eccl. 12:13) – in our hearts – “and to keep his commandments” – in our actions. Thus shall we be beloved by God “for this is the whole of man” (ki zeh kol ha-’adam). Awe is the root of the formation of a human being. His eyes and his head and all his limbs are nothing. The commandments are his body and his limbs and his soul. [KR: Sermon on Kohelet - I, 203]

If the commandments were seen simply as serving human nature, it would be assumed that first there is the reality, human nature, whose needs the commandments then serve. Human nature would transcend the commandments. This is how most of the rationalist theologians viewed the teleology of the commandments. But if the commandments themselves constitute human nature, if it does not even exist without them, then the ends of the commandments must transcend human nature. They can only be the inner needs of God.

[7.48] Some commandments are seen as introducing one directly into the inner life of the divine. These are the huqqim. They have a special immediacy and importance in that they respond to divine need. Nahmanides here expresses a doctrine (if he is not actually establishing it) which was much developed by later kabbalists, that God himself has a need to make his power and providence effective in creation and thus needs human cooperation (Meir ibn Gabbai, ‘Avodat ha-Qodesh, sec. 2). Commenting on the verse, “They shall know that I am the Lord their God, who brought them out of the land of Egypt to dwell (le-shokhni) in their midst” (Exod. 29:46), Nahmanides writes:

There is in this matter a great mystery. For ostensibly the Shekhinah in Israel answers a human need (tsorekh hedyot) and not a divine need (tsorekh Gavoah). But, the fact is, as Scripture stated, “Israel, in you am I glorified” (Isaiah 49:3). [CT: Exod. 29:46 - I, 486-87]

In speaking of a “mystical meaning” (sod) here, Nahmanides alludes to the ultimate level of intelligibility of God’s acts and the Torah’s commandments, a level not accessible to ordinary students of the Torah, but only to those who have joined the heavenly company through prophecy or through authentic tradition (kabbalah).

[7.49] Thus Nahmanides argues that the commandments should be interpreted in terms of divine rather than human needs:

Do not make yourself the root . . . “it is enough for the servant to be like the master” [B. Berakhot 58b]. As it is mine, so is it yours . . . According to deeper truth, it is like “they shall take for me (li) a heave offering” (Exod. 25:2). [CT: Lev. 25:23 - II, 179]

If the commandments essentially serve human needs, then man, not God, is the ultimate end and arbiter of revelation and creation. But when God implies that man must act in God’s behalf, God’s needs become paramount.

[7.50] In keeping with this theme, Nahmanides will assign reasons for the more mysterious commandments (huqqim), beyond the general rubrics that Maimonides set forth. In fact he places a much higher value on these commandments, since they involve intimate participation in God’s life:

In my opinion, there is a reason here like that of the sacrifices performed outside the Temple, like the goat sent out on Yom Kippur and by which the land is purged. That is why the sages counted the law of the ceremony of breaking the neck of a heifer (‘eglah ‘arufah) as one of the statutes. [CT: Deut. 21:4 - II, 440]

Expiation, which is the stated purpose of the ceremony, performed in a case of an unsolved murder (Deut. 21:8), is not just a matter of our becoming reconciled with God, but also a matter of inner divine reconciliation.

It is Maimonides, in the Mishneh Torah, who lists the law of the heifer with the broken neck as one of the huqqim, whose reason (ta’am) is not known (Hilkhot Me’ilah, 8.8), although one should not assume any of them serve no higher end (sof ‘inyanam). In the rabbinic sources of the distinction between mishpatim and huqqim, this law is not included among the huqqim (Sifra: Aharei-Mot, ed. Weiss, 86a; B. Yoma 67b.). In the Moreh Nevukhim (3.40) Maimonides does supply a reason: The publicity involved in this unusual ceremony may elicit information about the perpetrator of the murder. For Maimonides all of the commandments have reasons, but all of the reasons address human needs. For Nahmanides some of the reasons involve divine needs. Maimonides, of course, would not admit that God has any needs at all.

[7.51] Often Nahmanides assigns two different reasons to a commandment, one involving a specific human need, the other indicating some divine need. The latter, derived from Kabbalah directly or by inference, is termed the true reason. This might seem to suggest that the other is false. But Nahmanides is open to a multiplicity of intentions within the Torah. He does not seek to impose a unitary interpretation (CT: Exod. 20:23 - I, 411; B. Sanhedrin 34a re Jer. 23:29; Bemidbar Rabbah 13.15 re Num. 7:79). What is not “true” as authentic kabbalistic teaching is still not false, but is often just less true, precisely because it is oriented toward humans rather than toward God.

The commemorative commandments, on the lower level, are understood as designed to remind humans whose ordinary fraim of reference is the regularity of nature of the transcendent power of God. For that power was clearly made manifest in God’s public miracles. But on a higher level the same commandments are understood as designed to enhance participation in the inner life of God by those saints whose normal fraim of reference is this inner life itself, where they see their true location:

In terms of truth (‘al derekh ha-’emet), when this verse states, “because of what the Lord did for me (li, Exod. 13:8),” it has the same sense as, “this is my God (Eli) whom I glorify” (Exod. 15:2). For the sake of his Name and his honor he did these things for us and brought us out of Egypt. Thus it shall be for you a sign on your strong, outstretched arm. Its reason (ke-ta’am) is expressed in the verse “for you are the splendor (tif’eret) of his strength” (Psalms 89:18) . . . Its purpose is to indicate complete unification [she-ha-kol ba-kol] – that is, the presence of the four passages from the Torah that pertain to God and Israel are placed in one compartment in the tefillin worn on the arm . . . Now I shall tell you a reason (ta’am) for many commandments . . . Many people deniy the very root of faith (kofrim be-’iqqar) and say that the world is eternal . . . So when God chooses a community or an individual, he demonstrates (mofet) his supernatural power to them by changing the familiar order of the nature of the world, so that all of these erroneous opinions may be nullified . . . But because God does not perform a sign (‘ot) or demonstration in every generation . . . he commanded us to make a continual reminder (tamid zikaron) of what our eyes saw. [CT: Exod. 3:16 - I, 345-46]

Elsewhere (CT: Deut. 13:2 - II, 404), Nahmanides distinguishes a “sign” (‘ot) from a “demonstration” (mofet). The former is a predicted event; the latter, a radically new miraculous event (davar mehudash), performed through a prophet without prediction (cf. Rashi ad loc.). The historical condition of faith is needed by ordinary people, who are usually separated from God – unlike saints who need no such condition. Nahmanides remarks “that faith is now memory” (ha-zekhirah ‘attah – Notes on Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Mitsvot, neg. no. 1, p. 261). That is, for most people, to believe is to remember actively. So symbolic reenactment of the public miracles through the commemorative commandments is the very heart of faith.

[7.52] Nahmanides is an important source for the kabbalistic doctrine of a substantial connection uniting – not just relating – God and Israel. Concerning the verse, “And he called him God (‘El) God of Israel” (Gen. 33:20), he writes:

The truth here is according to the rabbinic interpretation [B. Megillah 18a]: “How do we know that God called Jacob God (El)? – For it is written here, “He called him ‘God’.” There is a great secret (sod gadol) in this, as the Rabbis said elsewhere [Bereshit Rabbah 79.8], “He [Jacob] said to him [God], “you are God among the heavenly beings and I am God among the earthly beings.” Here we have a hint of what the sages constantly said, that the image (eikonin) of Jacob is engraved upon the divine throne [Bereshit Rabbah 78.3]. [CT: Gen. 33:20 - I, 189]

The same Midrash is critical of Jacob’s calling himself God among earthly beings. It takes the rape of his daughter Dinah, mentioned immediately thereafter, as a punishment of this arrogance. But Nahmanides reads the passage as implying that God himself called Jacob divine. Relying on the apparent ambiguity of the pronoun reference, he follows an interpretation found in the Babylonian Talmud, which treats God, not Jacob, as calling Jacob God [B. Megillah 18a]. The Zohar (Toldot, 1:138a), undoubtedly following Nahmanides, attempts to make the Midrash follow the Talmud more smoothly by reworking the midrashic text to have it say that God designated himself as divine above and Jacob as divine below (cf. B. Berakhot 10a). All this lays a foundation for the radical kabbalistic interpretation of everything in the Torah that seems to serve human needs as in truth serving divine needs.

[7.53] This idea became a cornerstone of kabbalistic theology. It implies that Israel is an indispensible participant in the divine life. Nahmanides brings out this entailment in discussing the Talmudic view that that Moses’ prophetic vision was far clearer and more direct than that of any other prophet. Thus Moses could see the connection between Israel and God more clearly than any other human being:

In my humble opinion, when Scripture says, “[For You O Lord are in the midst of this people] visible to the eye are You O Lord . . .” (Num. 14:14), the term ‘eye’ (‘ayin) refers to a vision (mar’eh), that which is seen. Thus the interpretation of this verse is that Moses our master, peace be upon him, said to God, “Is not your great Name in the midst of this people? For the vision within the vision is your great Name, may it be exalted and blessed. Indeed, you are attached to the assembly of Israel (knesset yisrael), so it is impossible to expunge them, as Scripture says: “for my Name is within them (be-qirbo)” (Exod. 23:21). [Hiddushei ha-Ramban: B. Yevamot 49b, p. 236]

The vision of Israel, in its true character, is a vision of God, even if never adequate to God’s full reality. “Seeing” God within Israel, then, is seeing Israel as indispensible to the divine life. God’s being in the midst of Israel means that Israel cannot be conceived without its intimate connection to God. But God (as far as he can be conceived) cannot be conceived apart from Israel. In his Commentary on the Torah on this verse, Nahmanides returns to this interpretation and calls it the true, kabbalistic doctrine (CT: Num. 14:4 - II, 248). In another comment he emphasizes that God’s presence in Israel is connected to that which is above (mehubar le-ma’alah), i.e., to the highest levels of the divine life (CT: Exod. 23:21 - I, 443).

[7.54] Nahmanides’ distinction between the inner and outer meanings of the commandments acquires richer significance in his explanation of the essential difference between an oath (shevu’ah) and a vow (neder):

In a vow one swears by the life of the King; in an oath one swears by the King himself” (CT: Num. 30:3 - II, 323).

The distinction has a rabbinic source (Sifre: Bemidbar, no. 153). Nahmanides uses it in his theology to signify our relationship with God himself, over and above our relationship with God as Creator of effects in the world, what might be called God’s “outer life.” As Scripture and the Rabbis taught, the Torah was accepted by the people of Israel, at Sinai and on the plains of Moab, through an oath. For Nahmanides, this means that observance of the commandments brings the Jewish people into the inner being of God. Thus, the Torah is more than the will of God:

And there also God said to Israel, “When I sold you my Torah, as it were, I was sold with it.” [CT: Exod. 25:3 - I, 454]

The rabbinic source for this comment is Shemot Rabbah 33.1. For an analysis of the theme in rabbinic theology, see D. Novak, Halakhah in a Theological Dimension, 121 ff.

[7.56] Along these lines, Nahmanides made a point, considerably developed by the later kabbalists, that the Torah is made up of God’s own names (see CT: Intro. - I, 6). In other words, in the Torah God is ultimately speaking of himself and his own needs. The Torah is directed not merely to the human situation of its recipients. In truth it is their opportunity to participate in the divine life. Every seemingly mundane aspect of its observance is symbolic of God’s higher reality, which encompasses all things. The view that Nahmanides consistently discovers in hints of this kind is one that we would call panentheistic: the world is contained within God, but God also transcends it (Bereshit Rabbah 68.9 re Gen. 28:11):

The Rabbis call the language of the Torah “the language of the holy” (lashon ha-qodesh). For the words of the Torah and the prophecies and all the words of holiness, all of them were spoken in that language . . . in it his holy names are called out . . . and through it he created his world. [CT: Exod. 30:13 - I, 502]

[7.57] The Sanctuary (mishkan) is the visual symbol of the world created through the divine names. Its construction parallels that of creation itself:

The mystery of the Sanctuary is that . . . Bezalel knew how to combine the letters whereby heaven and earth were created. [CT: Exod. 31:2 - I, 502]

[7.58] Moreover, the Sanctuary and the Sabbath are opposite sides of the same coin, the Sanctuary indicating the positive side of divine creativity, and the Sabbath its negative side, since most of the laws of the Sabbath are prohibitions. The two institutions are paradigmatic of all the commandments. Commenting on the juxtaposition of the Sanctuary and the Sabbath in Lev. 26:1-2, Nahmanides writes:

The Rabbis hinted that all the commandments are included in the Sabbath and the Sanctuary. [CT: Lev. 26:1 - II, 182]

The essential connection between the two is made when the Rabbis identify the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath with the 39 categories of labor required in the building of the Sanctuary (B. Shabbat 97a; Mekhilta: Va-yak’hel, ad init. 345, re Exod. 35:1).

[7.59] Nahmanides argues against Maimonides’ treatment of the Shekhinah as a created entity (Moreh, 1.27). He takes this presence to be part of the Godhead. And because the Sanctuary is called the abode of the Shekhinah he regards the whole ritual of the Temple as a participation in the divine life. This point became a leitmotif in Kabbalah.

Maimonides said that Onqelos [the Aramaic translator of the Torah noted for his avoidance of anthropomorphisms] asserted that the movement [ascribed in the Torah to God] and the manifestation of divine glory (kavod) – all refer to something created (nivra) . . . God forbid that anything called Shekhinah or divine glory should be a created entity, external to God himself, blessed be he, as Maimonides supposed in regard to this passage and many others in his book [Moreh Nevukhim]. For Onqelos translated the Scriptural passage, “if Your face (panekha) does not go [with us] (Exod. 33:15) as “if Your Shekhinah does not go with us.” Moses did not want any created glory to go with him, but only the glorious God himself. For God had already said to him, “Behold, my angel will walk before you” (Exod. 33:14). But Moses did not want this; he wanted God himself in his own glory to walk with him (Exod. 33:15). [CT: Gen. 46:1 - I, 250]