




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## Eleven: The AAA Confronts Military and Intelligence Uses of Disciplinary Knowledge



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On the advisor question, it seemed impossible  
to hope that thousands of men could be found each year  
who would perform like Lawrence of Arabia.

SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN | ARPA, 1976



## ELEVEN THE AAA CONFRONTS MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE USES OF DISCIPLINARY KNOWLEDGE

America's twentieth-century wars periodically impacted the annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association in ways that mixed disciplinary, ethical, political, and economic concerns. Council meetings, the annual business meeting of the AAA, became the association's central venue for discussing issues pertinent to anthropology's engagement with specific wars, at times functioning as a disciplinary town hall, at other times as an intellectual boxing ring.

After the First World War and during the Second World War, the AAA council meetings hosted discussions on anthropological contributions to warfare (see Stocking 1968; D. H. Price 2000, 2008a). Cold War council meetings at times brought resolutions concerning anthropological interactions with military and intelligence organizations. The Korean War found the AAA advocating for increased funding for language study—while maintaining silence when Gene Weltfish was fired from Columbia while speaking out against the war (D. H. Price 2004b: 109–35). While AAA members served in the Korean War, fulfilling a variety of tasks, the association and the annual council meetings were not used to stage calls for supporting an anthropological wartime mobilization as they did during World War II, nor were these meetings a stage for the sort of protests that would come in the following decades. As the Vietnam War lengthened, the AAA council meetings increasingly became staging grounds for anthropologists' critiques of American militarism.

Two features of the association's bylaws played important roles in the council meetings. First, until the organization's constitution was amended in early 1970,

the association had a two-tier division of membership under which only “fellows” had voting rights at the council meetings (NAAA 1970 11[1]: 1; NAAA 1970 11[3]: 1). Although anyone could join the AAA as a member, section 3 of the bylaws defined a “fellow” as someone who had published “significant” anthropological contributions; had a BA, MA, or PhD in anthropology and was “actively engaged in anthropology”; had a doctorate in an “allied field and [was] engaged in anthropology,” or was a lifetime member of the AAA (AAA FN 1961 2[1]: 3).<sup>1</sup> Second, section 4 of the bylaws required that “new legislation may be proposed by the Executive Board or by five per cent of the Fellows in good standing, and must be circulated to the Council at least 30 days in advance of the annual meeting if it is to be acted upon at that time” (AAA FN 1961 2[1]: 6).

In 1961, Margaret Mead became the first anthropologist to use the council meeting to push the membership to critically address issues of militarization. Mead offered a resolution, unanimously approved, “calling for anthropological contributions to the search for disarmament and peace” (AAA FN 1961 2[1]: 1–3). Robert Suggs and William Carr complained that Mead distorted notions of war and peace in relation to disarmament, arguing that anthropologists had contributed to the Second World War without the association attempting to limit such work (see AAA FN 1962 3[7]: 3).<sup>2</sup> They maintained that anthropologists should not be held responsible for the uses of their work, arguing that “scientists *are* responsible for what they produce, *in terms of scientific standards*, but once the production is public domain, its use or abuse cannot be controlled nor can the scientist be held responsible for results of such use or abuse” (AAA FN 1963 4[8]: 1).<sup>3</sup>

While this early debate on anthropology, war, and peace indicated disciplinary fissures, borders, and arguments to come, AAA publications of the early 1960s still ran advertisements for counterinsurgency-related positions without member objections. These advertisements were from military-linked contractors like Operations Research Incorporated (AAA FN 1964 5[6]: 8) or the army’s Special Warfare School, seeking a psychological operations (PSYOPS) anthropologist (AAA FN 1965 [1]: 8). Until news of Project Camelot broke, such advertisements did not draw organized negative comments from members.

### *Camelot within the AAA: Ralph Beals’s Inquiry and the Road to an AAA Ethics Code*

After news of Project Camelot broke in late October 1965, Harold Conklin, Marvin Harris, Dell Hymes, Robert Murphy, and Eric Wolf mailed a statement titled “Government Involvement and the Future of Anthropological Field

Research” to anthropology departments across the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The statement warned that despite President Johnson’s assurances that damaging programs like Camelot would not continue, “the general climate of relations between the government and professional anthropological research is such that the possibility of continuing truly independent work is seriously threatened.” Anthropologists were experiencing increasing problems conducting fieldwork due to fears of governmental links, and the statement by Conklin and others called for anthropologists to learn more about the impacts of governmental research programs on anthropology (MHP 22; AAAFN 1965 6[10]: 1–2). This statement circulated widely, and the political stance staked out by these five anthropologists found support from the majority of AAA members in ways that future debates over the militarization of anthropology for the wars of Southeast Asia would not.

President Alexander Spoehr of the AAA met with the State Department’s deputy director of intelligence and research, George Denney, to discuss anthropologists’ concerns raised by Camelot. Camelot also dominated the 1965 AAA council meeting, with the Conklin group’s handbill framing the council’s discussions about using anthropology for counterinsurgency. An adopted resolution charged the Executive Board with gathering information on sponsors and anthropologists relating to “access to foreign areas, governmental clearance, at home and abroad, the people with whom we work, and the sponsoring agencies” (AAAFN 1965 6[10]: 1). Records from an executive session of the board at the 1965 AAA meetings included concerns over reports that American anthropologists in Latin America were suspected of being spies, and how “anti-American sentiment in the social sciences in all disciplines was rife everywhere and increasing” (RB 75, 11/17–21/65, 9).<sup>4</sup>

In early 1966, the AAA Executive Board appointed Ralph Beals to “lead the effort to implement the resolution on overseas research and ethics adopted by the Council last November 20th” (AAAFN 1966 7[2]: 1). With financial assistance from the Wenner-Gren Foundation, Beals was released from his teaching responsibilities at UCLA during the spring term in order to work on an AAA report exploring political and ethical issues raised by governmental uses of anthropological research (RB 76; AAAFN 1966 7[7]: 3).

Beals had served on the AAA’s Executive Committee in the 1940s. He had years of experience working with governmental agencies on a range of public policy programs. He had worked for the Institute of Social Anthropology in the 1940s and served as an adviser to the U.S. delegation attending the American Indianist Conference in 1939. Beals’s professional background prepared

him for his work on the committee; coming from a radical California family, his political background brought a sophisticated critique of power.<sup>5</sup>

Beals chaired the AAA's ad hoc Committee on Research Problems and Ethics, a group that consisted of him and the association's Executive Board (see *AAAFN* 1966 7[3]: 1). Operating essentially as a one-person committee, Beals used this freedom to quickly compile information and draft a detailed report that would have likely taken a committee of ten people years to negotiate. The resulting report would be commonly known as the Beals Report, but its full title is, "Background Information on Problems of Anthropological Research and Ethics" (*AAAFN* 1967 8[1]: 9–13).

Beals collected anecdotal accounts of the CIA's infiltration of U.S. foundations and college programs at Michigan State University and elsewhere. He and AAA Executive Secretary Stephen T. Boggs contacted and interviewed two dozen anthropologists, representing various geographic areas, and asked them to serve as resources for their region of expertise, calling them the "volunteer chairmen of world areas" (e.g., Irwin and Burke 1967; RB 75; RB 76) (see table 11.1). Some of these anthropologists declined his invitation, and only a few made significant contributions to the project. They collected information on fieldwork problems they had experienced relating to U.S. government activities (*AAAFN* 1966 7[3]: 1).

### *Elizabeth Bacon*

After Beals's project was announced by the AAA, several anthropologists wrote him, sharing information on encounters with military and intelligence agencies. John Hitchcock wrote that a fellow anthropologist working in Nepal told him that Nepalese governmental officials suspected anthropologists were engaging in espionage (RB 77, JH to RB 3/25/66). Peter Kunstadter described his involvement with two Department of Defense contracts: "The first was for holding a [1965] conference on the subjects of tribes, minorities, and central governments in Southeast Asia. The second was a [1965] contract for ethnological and ecological field research in Thailand." Kunstadter wrote that he had retained complete academic freedom and had produced no secret reports, and that all his work was publicly available (RB 75, PK to RB 4/5/66).<sup>6</sup>

The most in-depth correspondence relating to Beals's inquiry — a correspondence that stretched beyond the time frame of the Beals Report — was with anthropologist Elizabeth Bacon. Because most of this correspondence occurred while Beals was finishing, or after he had completed, his report for the AAA,

TABLE 11.1 Ralph Beals's List of Anthropologists Invited to Serve as Volunteer Chairmen for World Areas (Source: RB75 and RB76)

ANTHROPOLOGIST	AREA OF EXPERTISE
Richard N. Adams	Central America
Robert M. Adams	Iraq
Ethel M. Albert	South America
Jacques Amyot	Southeast Asia
Conrad M. Arensberg	India
Gerald D. Berreman	Himalayas
James B. Christensen	East and West Africa
Elizabeth Colson	Central Africa
Lambros Comitas	Caribbean
Harold G. Conklin	Philippines
William H. Davenport	Oceania
Henry Dobyns	Peru
Louis B. Dupree	Middle East (Afghanistan)
Lloyd Fallers	East Africa
Morton H. Fried	Taiwan
Clifford Geertz	Indonesia and North Africa
Joel Halpern	Yugoslavia
Robert F. Murphy	Brazil
Laura Nader	Mexico
Leopold J. Pospisil	New Guinea
Ruben E. Reina	Guatemala
Robert J. Smith	Japan
Eric R. Wolf	Austria

Bacon's impact on the report was limited. However, Bacon's descriptions of the methods used by intelligence agencies to contact anthropologists are included in the report and also influenced Beals's book *Politics of Social Research* (1969).

Elizabeth Bacon was a well-respected scholar; educated at the Sorbonne and Smith College in the 1920s and Yale in the 1930s, she earned her PhD at Berkeley in 1951. She was an itinerant academic, teaching at a variety of universities, including UCLA (1948–49), Washington University (1949–54), Cornell (1955–56), and Hofstra (1965–66), and later becoming a professor, then emeritus professor, at Michigan State University.

Bacon began fieldwork in Iran and Kazakhstan in the 1930s, and her war years in the OSS provided her with intelligence contacts, and knowledge about

intelligence agencies. Because of her OSS connections and her regular travels in south central Asia, she was contacted by the CIA multiple times, and she was aware of CIA personnel operating in her areas of research. She provided Beals with detailed accounts of how the CIA contacted and used anthropologists working in regions of interest to the agency.

Bacon wrote that Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan had long been “spy conscious,” adding that ethnographers were “particularly suspect.” She described the American academic presence in post-World War II Afghanistan, where a museum archaeological expedition included “an ethnographer and CIA agent.” She wrote that the CIA agent “found that he could not operate on his own, and a year later returned to Kabul under an institutional cover. He stayed four years, and returned later for a year on research grants to spell his successor while the latter was on leave” (RB 75, EB to RB 10/10/66).

Bacon wrote that in Afghanistan “an anthropologist went out as a CIA agent in 1959 and has been there off and on ever since. He works for a cover organization, is ‘on leave’ from a university where he once taught, and is research associate of a very reputable museum” (RB 75, EB to RB 10/10/66).<sup>7</sup> Anthropologists had become so synonymous with spying that when AID began operating in Afghanistan, Bacon recommended not calling the AID social scientists “anthropologists” because they would be assumed to be spies; when she was ignored, “the Afghan officials on the project ruled against employing an anthropologist” (RB 75, EB to RB 10/10/66).

Bacon reported that the CIA monitored anthropological research in Afghanistan and Iran. Anthropologists working independently from the CIA were at times contacted by the agency. When an “anthropologist returns from *Bona fide* field work, done without chores for CIA or any other intelligence agency, he is likely to be approached for an interview. . . . On two occasions, when emerging from the country where I had been working, I reported to American consular officials situations which I felt affected the amity of relations between the United States and the country involved. In both cases, my comments were acted on” (RB 75, EB to RB 10/10/66).

Bacon warned Beals that the CIA would be aware of his AAA report when it was released, noting that the

CIA regularly sends a recruiter to the annual meetings of the AAA.<sup>8</sup> (The recruiter this year—and perhaps the top man himself—will undoubtedly listen to your report with great interest.) There are individuals on the faculties of certain universities who, I think, do some recruiting among their own students, perhaps guiding

the student's interest toward a research project which would be useful to CIA. More often, however, it is my impression that when word gets about that an anthropologist is considering research in certain areas, someone connected with CIA pounces. If CIA already has someone in the locality, an attempt is made to deflect the prospective field worker to another locality. An individual or committee evaluates the desirability of the project from the CIA point of view; if it approves, assistance of various kinds is offered: helpful leads to officials in the prospective host country; funds to supplement bona fide research grants (in some cases the foundation grant may be only enough to obscure the source of most of the funds); cover affiliation with a reputable academic institution or with some other institution. At one time a CIA operative (not an anthropologist) had for his cover the position of regional officer for the Ford Foundation. The Ford Foundation was presumably unaware of this, although I think CIA had planted a man on the New York staff of the foundation. The Fulbright committee for the Middle East in Washington includes at least two CIA people. (RB 75, EB to RB 11/8/66)

Bacon described four distinct types of anthropologists conducting fieldwork with CIA ties: (1) anthropologists primarily interested in pursuing legitimate field research questions, with legitimate ties to universities and foundations, who agree independently to gather information needed by the CIA (Bacon said these individuals undertook CIA work due to patriotism or a "sense of adventure"); (2) those doing research who are "tempted by the CIA offer of funds"; (3) anthropologists who want to undertake fieldwork in a specific country and use CIA connections to become established in this country; and (4) thrill seekers who "enjoy the excitement and romance of engaging in espionage" (RB 75, EB to RB 11/8/66).

She observed that "many anthropologists" did not know what was "going on around them." She described one incident where a student completing his graduate work was recruited into the CIA by two of his professor's "favorite former students. He did not know that his professor abhorred the idea of using anthropology as a cover for espionage. His professor did not know that the two favorites worked for CIA" (RB 75, EB to RB 11/8/66).

Writing before the investigative journalistic exposés of *Ramparts*, the *New York Times*, and other media revealed CIA infiltration of foundations (see chapters 1 and 7), Bacon presented an accurate account of how such operations worked. She described how private foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, worked hand in hand with the CIA to sponsor area studies research of specific interest to the agency, writing that she knew of



a university area program for an area in which CIA was interested, but could find no links between CIA and that program. Recently I brought this up in conversation with someone who has been a part of the university program and who is knowledgeable in the matter of intelligence. He said that two of the top people in the program, who had in the past “been burned” by CIA (whatever that means), had wanted to insert into the terms of a Ford university grant a clause barring any CIA participation, and that the Ford Foundation had refused to accept the clause. This was before the Ford Foreign Area Program man in Pakistan got caught out. The separation of the Foreign Area Program from the Ford Foundation — the personnel moved a few blocks down Madison Avenue to a new office and “Ford Foundation” was dropped from the name — occurred just after the Pakistan debacle. Does this mean that the Ford Foundation is still engaging in fun and games? The move of McGeorge Bundy from the White House to head the Ford Foundation is of some interest. In Washington, Bundy’s chief bailiwick was the Security Council, which means that he had very close ties with CIA.

The point I am driving at is that a grant from even such a seemingly solid foundation as Ford could be suspect, although a Ford grant does not necessarily imply CIA commitment. And even if the area program were indirectly financed by CIA through some foundation, this does not mean that all members of the institution staff are knowingly working for CIA. It would be perfectly possible for an anthropologist on the staff of the Department of Anthropology at UCLA teaching courses on the Middle East, to be unaware of what was going on — at least in the beginning. How soon he became aware of the situation would depend on his sophistication in such matters. What he did then would depend on how much opportunity he had had to develop a code of ethics in this matter, and how strong the ethical drive was.

It is probable that a majority of anthropologists and other academics who do field work “for CIA” are doing the kind of research they would do in any event, and some are financed for work they would not otherwise be able to do. Their only contribution to CIA is to report on what they have observed. Some of them, however, undoubtedly do more. (RB 75, EB to RB 12/25/66)

According to Bacon, the CIA’s presence in Iran was so ubiquitous that the agency even played a role in parceling out regions of Iran for fieldwork — hoping to achieve a good distribution of data on the countryside; she assumed the Iranians knew about this arrangement and monitored these researchers. She observed that “normally when an anthropologist wants to do field work in a country, he seeks out everyone he can find who has had experience in the area and

gets all the information he can about the situation there. If one tries that for Iran, one bumps into CIA at every turn” (RB 75, EB to RB 12/25/66).

Bacon told of a CIA administrator calling on her when she was a professor at Washington University, using the name of a colleague by way of an introduction. He quizzed her about her background, and when Bacon asked why the administrator was so interested, he replied that he hoped she could provide the CIA with information when she returned from her next trip. Bacon wrote: “On my announcement that while I might give relevant information to someone in the State Department I would not trouble CIA, he wished me happy shopping and we parted. Had I realized at the time the growing extent of the CIA tentacles, I might have led him on and learned more. But I think that this is all that CIA expects of the average anthropologist going into the field, although it is always ready to recruit people for special jobs” (RB 75, EB to RB 12/25/66). Bacon explained that while the recent revelations about CIA infiltration of American society had provided valuable information, her “two years in the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS served as a post-graduate course in espionage. . . . The cultural divergence between those who returned to academia and those who remained in Washington was so gradual that it was a long time before I realized what was happening in CIA. But once I did realize this, I had the background to check details. *American Men of Science* and *Fellow Newsletter* can be very illuminating if you know what you are looking for” (RB 75, EB to RB 12/25/66).

In a letter to Beals, Bacon expressed concerns that UCLA’s Near East Studies Center might be operating with a CIA contract (RB 75, EB to RB 12/25/66). Beals followed up this correspondence with queries made to Carl York, of UCLA’s Office of Extramural Support, who made a “categorical denial” that UCLA had any classified contracts with the CIA or other intelligence agencies (RB 75, RB to CY 12/29/66; RB 75, CY to RB 1/4/67).

Bacon described being “offered CIA funds for field work” after “a friend in OIR asked me outright if I could use a specified sum from CIA and I said no thank you” (RB 75, EB to RB 1/19/67). She wrote that one of the indirect ways military and intelligence agencies recruited anthropologists into intelligence work was through HRAF contract work:

You undoubtedly know that the HRAF Handbook Series was financed by Psychological Warfare. The original outline provided by Washington included a couple of chapters that would have caused trouble but I think that all handbook editors omitted these. Everyone employed on the project, including many foreign nationals, knew that they were working on an Army subcontract and many project direc-

tors quite properly informed the Ambassadors of countries whose nationals were being employed. Since the work was open and straightforward, there was not difficulty. . . . What may be less well known is that at the end of the project, forms were sent out for distribution to American citizens on the staff asking if they would be interested in employment with Psychological Warfare. Thus the program was used as a recruitment device. How successful this was, I have no idea. I do not know of anyone who responded. (RB 75, EB to RB 1/19/67)

In February 1967, Bacon wrote Beals about two anthropologists working in Afghanistan whom she believed were CIA operatives, and she provided a five-page analysis listing six organizations she believed to be CIA fronts funding anthropological research. The organizations identified by Bacon were American Friends of the Middle East, the American University Field Staff (AUFs), the Asia Foundation, the Iran Foundation, the Field Foundation, and Operations and Policy Research, Inc. (RB 75, EB to RB 2/6/67).

Bacon wrote that American Friends of the Middle East “joins with the Asia Foundation in giving financial assistance to a student organization which the head of the CIA network for the area was using within a year of the organization’s founding.” She described the AUFs as “one of the most obvious covers thought up by CIA,” adding that their staff member “in Afghanistan for the last eight years has been an anthropologist, who proclaims himself as such at every step.” She wrote that she knew “the Asia Foundation was used as a cover for one CIA agent anthropologist. A senior sociologist, acting as a consultant to the foundation, did field work in a region not his own in West Pakistan during two periods when the Ford Foundation CIA man was busy at graduate school.” Bacon described the Iran Foundation as “headed by the head of the CIA network for Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan. Uses medical work as cover. Set up modern hospital school in Shiraz, Iran and is now active in helping establish a medical school at University of Ahwaz (both areas of CIA interest).” The foundation tracked research by scholars studying Iran and tried “to screen potential field workers according to their abilities and to prevent their getting in each other’s way in the field. Because one can do little in Iran without proper accreditation, their control of Persian officials to be approached is important. Presumably anyone who has been vetted by CIA gets full treatment in facilitating research. If CIA wishes to give financial assistance to a field worker, I think this is done through other channels. The chairman of the board of the foundation is on the Fulbright committee in Washington” (RB 75, EB to RB “Cover Organization memo,” 2/6/67). Bacon had little information on the Field Foundation, writing

that she had only been told by others that it was a CIA cover. She also had no direct evidence that Operations and Policy Research, Inc., had CIA ties, but that organization aroused her suspicions, and she speculated it was conducting psychological warfare operations (RB 75 EB to RB 2/6/67).<sup>9</sup>

Bacon described “new clues” revealing how private foundations with no direct ties to the government funded research projects, at times making inquiries in concert with American intelligence needs. She wrote Beals that she had recently

received a copy of a report on an important international research program. The list of members of the American committee included the name of an anthropologist who I thought had been “retired” to academia by CIA. Obviously my interpretation of retirement was incorrect. On checking this anthropologist in *American Men of Science*, I found a really impressive record which completely masked his nearly twenty years’ service in intelligence — first in MID [Military Intelligence Division], then in CIA. Clearly he had been set up to use his academic position for high level activities. On this committee he could exert influence in favoring projects and individuals sponsored by CIA.

Spotting his name reminded [me] that I had been told recently of the appointment of another CIA alumnus to a committee which awards grants for work in a certain area.

Even more recently I received the annual report of the Social Science Research Council. In reading over the lists of committee members, I noticed that in the committees for strategic areas there was usually one name of interest in this context. In some cases I know that the individual had a CIA background; in one case, I had been told that the individual was high up in CIA; in several cases the individual hailed from a university area program where I know there have been CIA ties. Indeed, as the result of a careful study of some of the key committees, I concluded that the center of gravity for CIA research on one area had shifted from one university to another.

Among grantees, I spotted two people whom I know have CIA ties, and a third who was with British intelligence before he came to the United States. His grant was for research in an area in which CIA is interested.

*This study of committee members gave me a new understanding of how CIA operates in academia. Most members of the committee are undoubtedly clean. Those individuals acting for CIA have solid academic reputations in their field of specialization. Some of them have never been employed by a governmental intelligence organization either in Washington or in the field. One I know of has probably played along with CIA out of ambition. That he has CIA ties I know. Years ago a CIA regional officer*

*called on me at his suggestion and he cooled noticeably toward me after I told the CIA man that I did not want to have anything to do with CIA.* (RB 75, EB to RB 4/10/67, emphasis added)

Bacon recognized that the addition of a single individual working in concert with the CIA to a selection committee could allow the agency to direct funding toward projects likely to collect information of use to the CIA or achieving other agency-desired outcomes.

### *Evaluating Bacon's Claims*

Bacon believed she had identified how the CIA used private foundations to fund research of interest to the agency through processes in which former CIA employees working for foundations or on grant selection committees influenced the selection of anthropological research. She claimed to have found opportunity, motive, and mechanisms for the CIA's intrusion into anthropology. It is difficult to read some of her pronouncements on the depth of CIA intrusion without wondering if she was just being paranoid; yet, several of her theorized connections can be verified. Because of revelations in the press and in congressional hearings in the decades after Bacon made these claims, we can evaluate the veracity of her comment that she had identified six foundations as CIA fronts.

Of the six foundations identified by Bacon in 1966, three were later verified as CIA fronts (American Friends of the Middle East in 1966, the Asia Foundation in 1967, and Operations and Policy Research, Inc., in 1967).<sup>10</sup> The other three foundations claimed by Bacon to have CIA connections (the AUFS, the Iran Foundation, and the Field Foundation) were not later documented to be CIA fronts, though AUFS and the Iran Foundation both had individuals linked to them who had reported CIA connections: Louis Dupree worked with AUFS for more than a decade, and CIA agent Donald Wilber was a member of the Iran Foundation's Board of Directors (Wilber 1986: 150, 186). Some have claimed CIA connections for the Field Foundation (most prominently, Alan Ogden in his 1977 testimony before the U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations), and while this remains a possibility, these claims remain unconfirmed and have established no documented links (see U.S. Senate 1977: 55).<sup>11</sup>

Beals questioned Bacon about her suspicions of the AUFS, in large part because the Crane Foundation (established by Crane Plumbing) had begun funding the organization two decades prior to the creation of the CIA (RB 75, RB to EB 2/20/67).<sup>12</sup> Bacon wrote that when reading Crane Foundation reports,

she noticed many names of supposedly “retired” CIA personnel appearing in the reports of committees and grant awardees (RB 75, EB to RB 4/10/67).

Bacon described how she was once invited to contribute to a book on Afghanistan in which “the other American contributors [were] affiliated with CIA. My first reaction was to avoid guilt by association then I decided that I couldn’t spend my whole life running away from things, and agreed to write the chapter” (RB 75, EB to RB 12/25/66). She did not identify the book or the contributors, but it was an HRAF-published volume edited by CIA agent Donald Wilber (see chapter 6).<sup>13</sup>

While Bacon’s letters to Beals detailed how the CIA established contacts with anthropologists, Beals’s report did not name any of the organizations identified by Bacon as having CIA links, nor did he describe how former OSS personnel working in academic settings helped steer funding to individuals and projects of interest to the CIA. Beals’s final report contained less direct critiques indicating that unseen, undocumented links between anthropological research likely existed.

### *The Beals Report and Growing Anthropological Demilitarization*

In May 1966, Ralph Beals and former AAA executive secretary Stephen T. Boggs met with Steven Ebbin, chief of staff to Senator Fred R. Harris (D-OK). Beals’s notes indicated that Ebbin said, in an off-the-record capacity, that it was his “opinion that little is done with any of the research, domestic or foreign. He cited a new man in education who asked about prior research, and asked to see it. No one could believe that he actually wished to see prior research, but when he insisted, he was taken to a warehouse in southwest Washington where great piles of research reports were stacked on the floor which have never been looked at after their completion” (RB 76, ACNA Notes 5/25/66). Ebbin said that few people in government knew what to do with research.

On June 27, 1966, Boggs and Beals testified before Senate hearings, chaired by Harris, on federal support for social science research and training. Boggs stressed the importance of governmental funding for social science research but supported Harris’s position that “any CIA involvement in university research projects abroad damages irreparably the effectiveness of such research and makes us liable to the charge that research is pressured by our government for desired findings” (AAAFN 1966 7[7]: 2). Boggs described how some in the underdeveloped world viewed American social science projects as primarily

meeting the needs of the United States rather than the needs of their country. He argued that revelations that Michigan State University was training CIA operatives working in Vietnam, and that MIT conducted CIA-funded research fed fears that other social science research projects had CIA links. He wrote that anthropologists did not want “to become the heir of the colonial administrator’s legacy of mistrust. Nothing would more surely doom the opportunity of carrying out any kind of social science research abroad. To avoid this, an absolutely impassable barrier must be established between the intelligence agencies of the U.S. Government and the universities, private foundations, and international voluntary organizations engaged in research” (*AAAFN* 1966 7[7]: 3).

In July 1966, the AAA’s Executive Board adopted Ralph Beals’s “Statement on Government Involvement in Research” as the association’s interim statement.<sup>14</sup> This report clarified that “except in times of clear and present national emergency, universities should not undertake activities which are unrelated to their normal teaching, research, and public service functions, or which can more appropriately be performed by other types of organizations” (*AAAFN* 1966 7[8]: 1). It condemned clandestine research and research that did not disclose sponsorship and declared that the “gathering of information and data which can never be made available to the public does not constitute scientific research and should not be so represented” (*AAAFN* 1966 7[8]: 1–2).

In November 1966, Ralph Beals submitted his “Statement on Problems of Anthropological Research and Ethics” (*SPARE*) to the AAA Council, where it was amended during a “spirited discussion” and adopted, by a vote of 727 to 59, and later mailed to fellows as a referendum (*AAAFN* 1967 8[4]: 1; *AAA*1967).<sup>15</sup> At this council meeting David and Kathleen Aberle ushered in a new era of meetings by introducing an antiwar resolution as a new business item. This was not the sort of generic statement against harmful weapons that Margaret Mead had introduced a few years earlier; the Aberles’ resolution opposed U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and was adopted by a significant majority (*AAAFN* 1966 7[10]: 2).

The Beals Report focused on three primary areas: “anthropology and government,” “sponsorships of anthropological research,” and “research in foreign areas.” It observed that *SORO*’s and Project Camelot’s use of anthropology had pressed AAA members to take action on these issues, but it stressed there were broader issues linking anthropologists to governmental agencies that also needed consideration by the association (*AAAFN* 1967 8[1]: 3).

The Executive Board worried that links to governmental agencies would limit American anthropologists’ safety and their ability to conduct fieldwork

in other countries (*AAAFN* 1967 8[1]: 3). In the Executive Board's discussion of Beals's draft report, Harold Conklin "suggested that the existence, and if possible the names, of foundations which had served as cover for the CIA should be included in the report," but the final document contained no such information (RB 75, Executive Board Minutes 5/20–21/66, 9).

Beals received much feedback from AAA members, with assistance from anthropologists he had written, and extensive interviews on "several university campuses." These interviews did not produce a uniform response. Some anthropologists were outraged by the rise of anthropological contacts with intelligence agencies; others believed the decision to work with military or intelligence agencies should be a matter of personal choice (*AAAFN* 1967 8[1]: 4).

Beals identified several governmental projects employing anthropologists that did not compromise fundamentals of research ethics or political power relations. His report criticized university-based anthropologists who failed to understand how their work could connect to military and intelligence agencies. While many anthropologists viewed their research as simply being the "pursuit of knowledge solely for its own sake," the report stressed that this work had policy applications, warning that ignoring these issues "plagued basic researchers in such fields as atomic physics" (*AAAFN* 1967 8[1]: 6). The Beals Report found that private agencies that contracted social science research with governmental agencies, "especially the Department of Defense," had recurrent problems with improper methodologies, excessive costs, government misrepresentation of the competence of personnel, deceiving the public about the purpose of research or the source of funds, and punishing whistle-blowers or dissenters on projects (*AAAFN* 1967 8[1]: 8).

Beals described growing suspicions that anthropologists were "engaged in non-anthropological activities, or that the information they are collecting will be used for non-scientific and harmful ends" (*AAAFN* 1967 8[1]: 11).<sup>16</sup> According to Beals, CIA agents had "posed as anthropologists or asserted that they were doing anthropological research, when in fact they were neither qualified as anthropologists nor competent to do basic anthropological studies" (*AAAFN* 1967 8[1]: 11). In other cases, actual anthropologists were using fieldwork as a cover for espionage, collecting intelligence for the CIA, either as direct CIA employees or by "accepting grants from certain foundations with questionable sources of income, or through employment by certain private research organizations" (*AAAFN* 1967 8[1]: 11).

Beals's report detailed instances of younger anthropologists who, after failing to secure grants for a particular research project, were "approached by obscure



foundations or have been offered supplementary support from such sources, only to discover later that they were expected to provide intelligence information, usually to the Central Intelligence Agency” (AAA FN 1967 8[1]: 11). Other anthropologists reportedly willingly entered into such working relationships, though the report acknowledged that little verification of such interactions was available.

Anthropologists reported being approached by U.S. embassy officials while conducting research abroad, or sometimes by intelligence personnel after returning to the United States, with requests to provide the government with information gathered while conducting fieldwork. Some anthropologists complied with these requests, but others refused to cooperate (AAA FN 1967 8[1]: 11). Some anthropologists who worked for intelligence agencies during World War II later encountered difficulties when applying for research visas, and some universities denied employment to professors with past links to intelligence agencies (AAA FN 1967 8[1]: 12). Suspicions that anthropologists might have CIA connections created conditions where researchers funded by *any* form of governmental funds were sometimes viewed with suspicion.

Project Camelot popularized notions of anthropologist-spies. Beals’s report included the account of an anthropologist who, during the course of conducting two years of fieldwork, “was accused variously of being a Castroite, a Chinese communist, a Russian communist, a CIA agent, a FBI agent, a spy for the host nation’s taxing agencies, and a Protestant missionary.” The punch line was that “only the last caused him serious difficulties, and such an identification given anthropologists generally seems to be the most important field problem in much of South and Central America” (AAA FN 1967 8[1]: 12).

The report did not issue specific recommendations, instead calling for concerted work on these problems. But within the context of the Aberles’ resolution adopted at the AAA Council meeting where Beals’s report was delivered, growing numbers within the AAA condemned all anthropological contributions to military-intelligence activities in ways that mixed political and ethical critiques of anthropological engagements.

In March 1967, the AAA fellows voted to adopt SPARE, which articulated the values and findings from the Beals Report (AAA 1967). This statement was not a formal ethics code, but it expressed commitment to standards of ethical practice championing the freedom of research, clarifying that anthropologists must disclose “their professional qualifications and associations, their sponsorship and source of funds, and the nature and objectives of the research being undertaken.” In response to Project Camelot, the statement proclaimed, “Constraint, deception, and secrecy have no place in science. Actions which compromise

the intellectual integrity and autonomy of research scholars and institutions not only weaken those international understandings essential to our discipline, but in so doing they also threaten any contribution anthropology might make to our own society and to the general interests of human welfare” (AAA 1967).

The AAA’s condemnation of covert research made SPARE’s adoption national news, with the *Washington Post* and other newspapers covering the vote as a significant step in limiting military access to academic knowledge (Reistrup 1967). As an ethics statement, SPARE lacked several features. It was more concerned about the damage that might be done to anthropology’s disciplinary reputation than with the well-being of studied populations. The word “harm” appeared nowhere in the statement, and the only use of “damage” appeared in a warning about damages to anthropology’s international reputation by false anthropologists (AAA 1967).

In the *Fellow Newsletter*, the AAA leadership sought to alleviate member concerns about anthropologists’ links to intelligence agencies with assurances that the new chair of the National Research Council, Division of Behavioral Sciences, was investigating this problem (AAAFN 1967 8[2]: 1). But this new chair was George Murdock, whose disqualifications for this task included secretly acting in the past as an FBI informer attacking other anthropologists he believed to be communists. Murdock also had long-standing ties to the HRAF, whose primary sources of funding were the very governmental agencies (including the CIA and Defense Department) that raised these concerns (D. H. Price 2004b: 70–89). While Murdock’s role as an FBI informer was unknown at the time, his letters to the *Fellow Newsletter* attacking the Aberles’ antiwar resolution and HRAF’s receipt of Pentagon funds made no secret of the political positions he would champion in this NRC role (AAAFN 1967 8[2]: 7–9).

For the next half year, the *Fellow Newsletter* published letters that argued passionately for and against the Aberles’ antiwar resolution. Many opponents argued that it was beyond the proper scope of a professional association to take stances on political issues (AAAFN 1967 8[2]: 7–9).<sup>17</sup> David Aberle responded to these arguments, stating, “The question is not whether the Association should be political; it has made itself political. The only question is what kind of political positions it should adopt” (AAAFN 1967 8[5]: 7). Lloyd Cabbot Briggs, an OSS veteran, scoffed at the rage over Camelot and concerns over CIA funding (AAAFN 8[6]: 8).<sup>18</sup> Betokening Goodwin’s law, Sally and Lewis Binford ridiculed claims that the association should not become involved in militarized political decisions, claiming these positions “are unpleasantly reminiscent of the ‘good’ German scientists during the 1930’s who hoped to keep their profession distinct

from its political and social matrix” (AAAFN 1967 8[6]: 9). Finally, after months of heated debate, a note published by the *Fellow Newsletter* editor announced, in all capitals: “CORRESPONDENCE ON THE ANTI-WAR RESOLUTION IS NOW CLOSED” (AAAFN 1967 8[6]: 11).

In July 1967, Thomas L. Hughes, chair of the Foreign Affairs Research Council and the Department of State’s director of intelligence and research, assured the AAA Executive Board that the State Department did not want to engage in research that would undermine relationships with foreign countries. Hughes stressed that most of the academic research supported by the department was of a general, basic science type, unrelated to specific political projects (AAAFN 1968 9[6]: 9). The federal government’s Foreign Area Research Coordination Group issued its “Guidelines for Foreign Area Research” in December 1967, addressing concerns raised by Project Camelot. These guidelines established that the government should not undertake actions that would undermine the integrity of American academics, that academics should acknowledge governmental research support, and that government research should be published. Research should preferably be unclassified, but the report acknowledged that in some cases classified research would be conducted by academics (AAAFN 1968 9[5]: 4–7).

In 1967, the AAA amended its bylaws to require resolutions presented at council meetings to “be submitted to the Executive Board at least one week in advance of the annual meeting if they are to be placed on the agenda. A copy of the agenda shall be furnished to all Fellows at the time of registration at the annual meeting or 24 hours before the Council Meeting” (AAAFN 1968 9[1]: 1). The year 1967 was a watershed for young AAA activists awakening to the possibilities of organizing the discipline to struggle against American foreign policies and abuses of anthropological knowledge. There were efforts to organize a forum for radical anthropological critiques. Karen Brodtkin later recalled that she and a “cohort of grad students from Michigan attend[ed] the 1967 meetings in DC with a plan to create a radical caucus. We had a couple of pretty well-attended evening meetings in hotel conference rooms. There were other efforts in other years and while they didn’t leave much of a paper trail, they were places where grad students especially began to form the political networks that underlay the upcoming generation of left anthropology” (2008: 4).

### *Thai Affair Prequel*

Even as the Executive Board finalized the report titled “Background Information on Problems of Anthropological Research and Ethics,” ARPA expanded

efforts to use ethnographic research for counterinsurgency projects. In one such effort ARPA sought the assistance of University of Washington sociologist Pierre L. van den Berghe for a study of Congo tribal groups.<sup>19</sup> However, van den Berghe immediately wrote the AAA and members of the press expressing concerns that ARPA was trying “to enlist him in intelligence activities for the suppression of Congo tribes in the conflict that was then in its final stages there. Only a firm denial by ARPA that a contract existed or was contemplated allowed the matter to come to rest” (Deitchman 1976: 300). Van den Berghe alerted Ralph Beals of ARPA’s efforts to recruit him, and he critically responded to ARPA that he was “morally obligated to publicize” this recruitment effort, adding that he was “deeply distressed at the continued misuse of social science research for purposes which conflict with the generally accepted norms of international relations as expressed in international law and in the United Nations Charter. Beyond the ethical issues involved, the behavior of some of our colleagues is making the pursuit of cross-cultural studies increasingly difficult for most of us. We have a collective responsibility in trying to put an end to this kind of academic colonialism” (RB, PVDB to RB 10/4/66; see D. H. Price 2012c: 6).

Around this time, a group of anthropologists working in Thailand were independently raising their own concerns with the director of a new ARPA program appropriating anthropological knowledge. On Halloween 1966, University of Washington anthropologist Charles F. Keyes wrote to the director of ARPA’s Remote Area Conflict Program (RACP) on behalf of himself, Everett Hawkins, Millard Long, Michael Moerman, Gayle Ness, Lauriston Sharp, and Robert Tilman, expressing alarm over RACP’s efforts to use anthropological knowledge (RB 75, CFK to ARPA 10/31/66). Keyes warned Seymour Deitchman that some of his “colleagues have even referred to this project as a potential Southeast Asian Camelot.” Keyes’s group requested a briefing from ARPA before the upcoming AAA annual meeting. Deitchman later wrote that Keyes, Moerman, Herbert Phillips, and Sharp “wanted an explanation, and if they didn’t get one, or weren’t satisfied with the one they did get, they would go to Congress and the press” (1976: 300).

Ten days later, Keyes expressed concerns to Moerman about RACP’s impact on anthropologists’ research. Keyes had heard that RACP’s Rural Security Systems Study planned to gather information on every village in Nkahn Phnom Province with “the establishment of villager ‘reporters’ in each village to channel information into a central office in Bangkok, and a general analysis of the

‘counter-insurgency’ situation in the province.” Keyes understood that about fifty social scientists would be hired by contractors at Stanford Research Institute, Abt Associates, and the Atlantic Research Corporation (RB 75, CFK to MM 11/10/66).<sup>20</sup>

Keyes wrote to the six anthropologists he had represented in his letter to ARPA and reported on his recent conversation with Seymour Deitchman, in which Deitchman tried to allay Keyes’s concerns without denying the program’s counterinsurgency goals. Deitchman’s explanations offered only clarifications of minor differences in detail, such as insisting there would be “no system of informants in each village,” while not denying the program’s broad use of village informants and informers. Some of Keyes’s concerns remained, but he felt that rather than withdraw from this flawed project, more good could be accomplished by anthropological engagement and efforts to steer the program in a better direction.<sup>21</sup>

Deitchman wanted to discuss the program with Keyes and his colleagues, and Keyes wrote to the group that he had told Deitchman of his wish to not make public their work until the project “was at least restructured along sounder lines.” Keyes was reassured by ARPA’s initial reactions to his concerns, and he hoped this would continue “in this vein since *a public airing might produce a backlash effect in the scholarly community*” (RB 75 CFK to EH et al. 11/15/66, emphasis added). Keyes’s belief that they could help transform ARPA by working with it quashed his initial desire to blow the whistle on the program. But his prediction that public knowledge of ARPA’s program would bring a backlash would later prove to be tragically prophetic.

Deitchman told the Keyes group that the Thai Rural Security Systems Program was in its early stages, and he assured them that this project was in no way linked to Camelot. While administratively it was true that this Thai program had no organizational ties to Camelot, the counterinsurgent goals had strong thematic links. As a Pentagon spokesperson explained to Congress, the Thai counterinsurgency program sought to “gather and collate critical information on the local geography,” to create “files on insurgent incidents and operations,” to “provide assistance in analyzing the effectiveness of various counterinsurgency programs,” and “to plan future CI [counterinsurgency] programs” (Department of Defense, in Deitchman 1976: 301).

Deitchman wrote that these would-be anthropological critics “were reassured” (1976: 302). He pitched the benevolence of ARPA’s counterinsurgency program in northern Thailand, stressing the Rostowian progress of the project

and claiming that, with one visit with Keyes and the other anthropologist-critics, he had turned them into allies. He wrote:

Having reached this happy conclusion to a delicate confrontation, I then asked whether, since they were among the recognized American experts on Thai culture and history, they would be willing to help us do a better job by helping in the research. The responses varied. One said that if the work were later to be criticized, he would not want to be associated with it but would rather be free to join the critics (although he later sent us a copy, which was very helpful of his yet-to-be-published Ph.D. thesis on life in Thai village society). Others promised benevolent neutrality. (303)

Keyes believed that by engaging in “dialogue with ARPA,” he could “minimize the ill-effects of such projects,” though he worried that he might be too naive about the changes he could accomplish (RB 75CFK to EH et al. 11/15/66). This correspondence was darkly prophetic. Four years later, Keyes’s concerns about his naïveté regarding effecting change and angry eruptions in the discipline following public knowledge of their contact with ARPA would later bear fruit in the AAA’s biggest showdown over the militarization of anthropology.

But even as Moerman, Keyes, and Phillips hoped to steer ARPA’s use of anthropological data to help rather than harm people, there was a rising tide within the AAA advocating for complete disengagement from military and intelligence agencies.

### *AAA Eruptions over AAA Military Advertisements*

Even as AAA members increasingly organized opposition to military and intelligence uses of anthropology, the association’s official publications carried advertisements for such jobs. A 1967 advertisement for Human Sciences Research, Inc., of McLean, Virginia, sought anthropologists with graduate-level expertise in cultures of Asia and the Middle East (AAA<sup>AFN</sup> 1967 8[2]: 12). An advertisement the following year angered a large group of association members to take action.

The back pages of the August 1968 issue of *American Anthropologist* carried a full-page employment advertisement, paid for by the U.S. Navy, with the heading “Research Anthropologist for Vietnam.” The ad sought anthropologists to work on a PSYOPS project in Saigon, where they would study “enemy propaganda,” “analyze the susceptibilities” and determine “enemy vulnerabilities” of target audiences, and make recommendations. The advertisement specified

“qualified professional anthropologists” with “at least three years of progressively responsible experience in anthropological research.” The position paid well, with a base advertised salary of “\$14,409 plus 25% foreign post differential” and \$1,250 to \$3,700 a year for dependents.

The next issue of *American Anthropologist* carried a note from the editor, Ward Goodenough, explaining that the AAA had received complaints concerning the navy PYSOP ad in the previous issue. He wrote that despite widespread moral objections to the war in Vietnam held by members of the association, in the absence of any policy banning such ads, AAA publications would continue to publish paid advertisements from the navy and other military branches (Goodenough 1968: vi).

The roots of the formalization of the association’s first code of ethics were established in 1968 in a series of meetings of the AAA’s ad hoc Committee on Organizations. The committee called for the writing of a formal ethics statement and recommended that a forum on ethics be held at the association’s next annual meeting. This push to establish an ethics code influenced elections, as election for seats on the 1968 Executive Board became referendums on the association’s stance on the Vietnam War.

David Aberle’s campaign statement for an open Executive Board seat declared that the board “seems to regard activities in support of U.S. Government policies as service and activities in opposition to those policies as politics. One of my chief concerns is for the Association to rethink this indefensible position, with a view to deciding its responsibilities to science, the public, the peoples it studies, the problems of our times, and the U.S. Government and other governments with which members of the profession and the Association have relations” (AAAFN 1968 9[8]: 3). On the basis of this radical campaign stance, David Aberle was elected to the board.

Attendance at the 1968 AAA meeting was low, most likely because its location in Seattle was distant from many departments (NAAA 1969 10[1]: 1). This was the last meeting before the association’s voting rules changed so resolutions no longer needed to be submitted a week before the council meeting. But even under the old rules, the council meeting adopted two resolutions that had been submitted in advance (NAAA 1969 10[1]: 1).<sup>22</sup> The Wenner-Gren Foundation funded seventy “student delegates” to attend the annual meeting. These delegates attended sessions, held their own meetings, and issued a “combined student statement” to the AAA, called for voting rights within the association and for more attention to professional ethics (AAAFN 1969 10[1]: 1).

A loosely organized group of anthropologists calling themselves a “Committee of Concerned Anthropologists” organized a mail campaign to gather signatures and funds for a counteradvertisement to be published in the back pages of *American Anthropologist* (AAAFN 1969 10[3]: 2). A war of words over whether the association should accept military advertisements filled the letters sections of the *Fellow Newsletter* (e.g., AAAFN 1969 10[3]: 3; 1969 10[6]: 2).

The February 1969 issue of *American Anthropologist* contained a paid ad protesting the navy’s August 1968 advertisement. To address issues raised by military ads in AAA publications and rising concerns over military and intelligence agencies seeking anthropological knowledge, the AAA Executive Board appointed an ad hoc Committee on Ethics, composed of cochairs David Schneider and David Aberle, Richard N. Adams, Joseph Jorgenson, William Shack, and Eric Wolf. As its first act, the committee issued a policy statement concerning the acceptance of military advertisements for association publications. The statement proclaimed, “The AAA will not accept advertisements or notices for positions involving research or other activities the products of which cannot be made available to the entire scholarly community through accepted academic channels of communication” (AAAFN 1969 10[3]: 1). The Committee on Ethics would review future advertisements that presented possible problems.

During a January 1969 weekend meeting in Chicago, the AAA ad hoc Committee on Ethics rapidly composed a working draft of a code of ethics and sent it to the Executive Board the following week. This draft, which drew heavily on Beals’s “Statement on Problems of Anthropological Research and Ethics,” incorporated ethical principles identified by the American Psychological Association, the American Sociological Association, and the Society for Applied Anthropology. The ad hoc committee recommended to the board that the membership elect a standing Committee on Ethics immediately (AAAFN 1969 10[4]: 3).

The ad hoc committee’s report described the composition of a standing committee in some detail and specified the range of issues it would address. The four general categories were “relations with those studied,” “responsibilities to the discipline,” “responsibilities to students,” and “relations with sponsors” (AAAFN 1969 10[4]: 4–5). Some language in this report remained in the Principles of Professional Responsibility that was adapted by the membership two years later.

The report of the ad hoc Committee on Ethics generated strong opposition from a vocal minority of anthropologists, who argued in the *Fellow Newsletter* that the proposed code attempted to “legislate a socio-ideological system” that was akin to the sort of controlling mechanism used in Nazi Germany, a totalitar-



ian tactic, similar to tactics in Orwell's *Animal Farm*; some derisively referred to the ethics committee as the "Censorship Committee" or the "Ethical Surveillance Committee."<sup>23</sup> This hyperbole reflected some anthropologists' concerns that the association would use the code to police research, but it also prefigured some of the ways that ethics would later be used to bolster political positions. These concerns also expressed many anthropologists' conception of science in an era in which practitioners of that most humanistic of sciences took umbrage at suggestions that anthropologists should be answerable for the impacts of the discipline's search for truth (Wolf 1964:88).

### *Collisions of Ethics and Politics*

The AAA's leadership historically viewed the association as an apolitical professional organization, though what this generally meant was that it helped organize anthropological support for governmental programs (social programs, military programs, etc.), while hesitating to oppose government policies or programs, as if alignment with power was an apolitical stance. After the association coordinated anthropological contributions to the Second World War, it experienced schisms during the 1960s — which widened during the early 1970s — as the annual council meetings became staging grounds for critical political discourse on anthropology and American militarism.

The 1960s opened with Margaret Mead leading a movement within the AAA opposing rising militarism; early in the 1970s, she was backed into a corner, defending anthropological counterinsurgency against a sizable faction of the discipline. While the generation of anthropologists who had served during World War II were less categorically opposed to anthropologists' contributions to counterinsurgency operations in Thailand than their younger colleagues, when news spread of Project Camelot's intentions to use anthropologists for counterinsurgency in South America, anthropologists young and old alike expressed their anger and opposition. Camelot touched a raw nerve in the discipline, as it exposed anthropology as a potentially manipulative instrument for American political gain. But just half a decade later, some anthropologists considered counterinsurgency as a peaceful alternative to, not just a component of, warfare.

Ralph Beals's efforts to describe relationships between military and intelligence agencies and anthropologists identified patterns of ongoing attempts to exploit cultural knowledge in ways that raised significant political and ethical questions. Beals's report prepared the association to oppose secret research and

some forms of counterinsurgency, and it laid the groundwork for SPARE and the coming Principles of Professional Responsibility. As his correspondence with Elizabeth Bacon records, Beals collected a good deal of information specifying how the CIA and the Pentagon contacted anthropologists or used anthropological knowledge, but he did not include these details in his final report. This correspondence provides an important view of how CIA efforts to directly and indirectly connect with and use anthropologists worked during the early Cold War. Bacon's account of the ways that CIA personnel contacted and attempted to debrief anthropologists returning from fieldwork fits with the reports of others, and while Bacon rejected offers to provide information to the CIA, other anthropologists during the Cold War held hopes of better informing CIA analysis.

But it was counterinsurgency, rather than spying or the more subtle articulations of academia's soft interfaces with the military-intelligence establishment, that most violently opened the fissures between anthropologists' passionate, if unarticulated, visions of anthropology. While the 1968 advertisements in *American Anthropologist* released volleys of anger opposing the association's alignment with the war in Vietnam, just a few years later, many of those who had opposed these ads would side with the anthropologists assisting counterinsurgency operations in Thailand.

The early exchanges between Seymour Deitchman and Charles Keyes show how supporters of counterinsurgency made humanitarian claims of stability, liberation, and peace, while avoiding the uncomfortable truth that these means of implementing "stability" were warfare by other means. While Keyes showed clear awareness of such critiques in this early correspondence, claims that anthropologists' assistance could lessen harm became a powerful enticement in the military's efforts to recruit anthropologists. Assurances that counterinsurgency was not a weapon of soft power but a tool for assisting those impacted by war were an effective argument for some anthropologists during the Vietnam War. As the next chapter shows, the contingencies supporting anthropological contributions to counterinsurgency helped convince some anthropologists to join these efforts and to overlook the lack of impact their research or recommendations had on the well-being of those they studied.