

Global Warming of 1.5°C

An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty



Summary for Policymakers
Technical Summary
Frequently Asked Questions
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The artwork was inspired by a graphic from the SPM (Figure SPM.1).

Foreword and Preface

Foreword

This IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C was formally approved by the world's governments in 2018 – the year of IPCC's 30th anniversary celebrations.

During its three decades of existence, the IPCC has shed light on climate change, contributing to the understanding of its causes and consequences and the options for risk management through adaptation and mitigation. In these three decades, global warming has continued unabated and we have witnessed an acceleration in sea-level rise. Emissions of greenhouse gases due to human activities, the root cause of global warming, continue to increase, year after year.

Five years ago, the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report provided the scientific input into the Paris Agreement, which aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

Many countries considered that a level of global warming close to 2°C would not be safe and, at that time, there was only limited knowledge about the implications of a level of 1.5°C of warming for climate-related risks and in terms of the scale of mitigation ambition and its feasibility. Parties to the Paris Agreement therefore invited the IPCC to assess the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and the related emissions pathways that would achieve this enhanced global ambition.

At the start of the Sixth Assessment cycle, governments, in a plenary IPCC session, decided to prepare three special reports, including this one, and expanded the scope of this special report by framing the assessment in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.

Sustainable development goals provide a new framework to consider climate action within the multiple dimensions of sustainability. This report is innovative in multiple ways. It shows the importance of integration across the traditional IPCC working groups and across disciplines within each chapter. Transitions, integrating adaptation and mitigation for each sector, are explored within six dimensions of feasibility, showing both low hanging fruits and barriers to overcome. It also provides scientific guidance on strategies to embed climate action within development strategies, and how to optimize choices that maximize benefits for multiple sustainable development dimensions and implement ethical and just transitions.

In his address to the UN General Assembly in 2018, Secretary-General António Guterres quoted World Meteorological Organization (WMO) data showing that the past two decades have included eighteen of the twenty warmest years since record-keeping began in 1850.

"Climate change is moving faster than we are," said Secretary-General Guterres. *"We must listen to the Earth's best scientists,"* he added.

One month later the IPCC presented the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, based on the assessment of around 6,000 peer-review publications, most of them published in the last few years. This Special Report confirms that climate change is already affecting people, ecosystems and livelihoods all around the world. It shows that limiting warming to 1.5°C is possible within the laws of chemistry and physics but would require unprecedented transitions in all aspects of society. It finds that there are clear benefits to keeping warming to

1.5°C rather than 2°C or higher. Every bit of warming matters. And it shows that limiting warming to 1.5°C can go hand in hand with achieving other global goals such as the Sustainable Development Agenda. Every year matters and every choice matters.

This Special Report also shows that recent trends in emissions and the level of international ambition indicated by nationally determined contributions, within the Paris Agreement, deviate from a track consistent with limiting warming to well below 2°C. Without increased and urgent mitigation ambition in the coming years, leading to a sharp decline in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, global warming will surpass 1.5°C in the following decades, leading to irreversible loss of the most fragile ecosystems, and crisis after crisis for the most vulnerable people and societies.


The Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C supports efforts by the WMO and United Nations Environment Programme for a comprehensive assessment of our understanding of climate change to help step up action to respond to climate change, achieve climate-resilient development and foster an integrated approach to the provision of climate services at all scales of governance.

The IPCC worked in record time to deliver this report for the 24th Conference of Parties (COP24) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Talanoa Dialogue. We would like to thank Hoesung Lee, Chair of the IPCC, for his leadership and guidance in the preparation of this Special Report. We commend the work undertaken by the authors of this Special Report and the many contributing authors and reviewers within a timeline of unprecedented severity; the leadership of the Co-Chairs of Working Groups I, II and III: Valérie Masson-Delmotte, Panmao Zhai, Hans-Otto Pörtner, Debra Roberts, Jim Skea and Priyadarshi R. Shukla; the oversight by the Bureau members of Working Groups I, II and III; and the implementation by the Technical Support Unit of Working Group I, supported by the Technical Support Units of Working Groups II and III. We are also grateful for the responsiveness of the international research community, who produced the knowledge assessed in the report, and thank the reviewers of the report for the thousands of comments that helped the authors strengthen the assessment.

Every bit of warming matters, every year matters, every choice matters.



Petteri Taalas
Secretary-General
World Meteorological Organization



Joyce Msuya
Acting Executive Director
United Nations Environment Programme

Preface

This Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, an IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty, is the first publication in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report (AR6). The Report was jointly prepared by Working Groups I, II and III. It is the first IPCC Report to be collectively produced by all three Working Groups, symbolizing the new level of integration sought between Working Groups during AR6. The Working Group I Technical Support Unit has been responsible for the logistical and technical support for the preparation of the Special Report. The Special Report builds upon the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) released in 2013–2014 and on relevant research subsequently published in the scientific, technical and socio-economic literature. It has been prepared following IPCC principles and procedures, following AR5 guidance on calibrated language for communicating the degree of certainty in key findings. This Special Report is the first of three cross-Working Group Special Reports to be published in AR6, accompanying the three main Working Group Reports, the Synthesis Report and a Refinement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.

Scope of the Report

In its decision on the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at its 21st Session in Paris, France (30 November to 11 December 2015), invited the IPCC to provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways. The Panel accepted the invitation and placed the Report in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.

The broad scientific community has also responded to the UNFCCC invitation. New knowledge and literature relevant to the topics of this report have been produced and published worldwide. The Special Report is an assessment of the relevant state of knowledge, based on the scientific and technical literature available and accepted for publication up to 15 May 2018. The Report draws on the findings of more than 6,000 published articles.

Structure of the Report

This report consists of a short Summary for Policymakers, a Technical Summary, five Chapters, and Annexes, as well as online chapter Supplementary Material.

Chapter 1 frames the context, knowledge base and assessment approaches used to understand the impacts of 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, building on AR5, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. The chapter provides an update on the current state of the climate system including the current level of warming.

Chapter 2 assesses the literature on mitigation pathways that limit or return global mean warming to 1.5°C (relative to the pre-industrial base period 1850–1900). Key questions addressed are: What types of mitigation pathways have been developed that could be consistent with 1.5°C? What changes in emissions, energy and land use do they entail? What do they imply for climate policy and implementation, and what impacts do they have on sustainable development? This chapter focuses on geophysical dimensions of feasibility and the technological and economic enabling conditions.

Chapter 3 builds on findings of AR5 and assesses new scientific evidence of changes in the climate system and the associated impacts on natural and human systems, with a specific focus on the magnitude and pattern of risks for global warming of 1.5°C above the pre-industrial period. It explores impacts and risks for a range of natural and human systems, including adaptation options, with a focus on how risk levels change between today and worlds where global mean temperature increases by 1.5°C and 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The chapter also revisits major categories of risk (Reasons for Concern) based on the assessment of the new knowledge available since AR5.

Chapter 4 discusses how the global economy and socio-technical and socio-ecological systems can transition to 1.5°C-consistent pathways and adapt to global warming of 1.5°C. In the context of systemic transitions across energy, land, urban and industrial systems, the chapter assesses adaptation and mitigation options, including carbon dioxide removal (CDR) measures, as well as the enabling conditions that would facilitate implementing the rapid and far-reaching global response.

Finally, Chapter 5 takes sustainable development, poverty eradication and reducing inequalities as the starting point and focus for analysis. It considers the complex interplay between

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sustainable development, including Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and climate actions related to a 1.5°C warmer world. The chapter also examines synergies and trade-offs of adaptation and mitigation options with sustainable development and the SDGs and offers insights into possible pathways, especially climate-resilient development pathways toward a 1.5°C warmer world.

The Process

The Special Report on 1.5°C of the IPCC AR6 has been prepared in accordance with the principles and procedures established by the IPCC and represents the combined efforts of leading experts in the field of climate change. A scoping meeting for the SR1.5°C was held in Geneva, Switzerland, in August 2016, and the final outline was approved by the Panel at its 44th Session in October 2016 in Bangkok, Thailand. Governments and IPCC observer organizations nominated 541 experts for the author team. The team of 74 Coordinating Lead Authors and Lead Authors plus 17 Review Editors were selected by the Working Group I, II and III Bureaux. In addition, 133 Contributing Authors were invited by chapter teams to provide technical information in the form of text, graphs or data for assessment. Report drafts prepared by the authors were subject to two rounds of formal review and revision followed by a final round of government comments on the Summary for Policymakers. The enthusiastic participation of the scientific community and governments to the review process resulted in 42,001 written review comments submitted by 796 individual expert reviewers and 65 governments.

The 17 Review Editors monitored the review process to ensure that all substantive review comments received appropriate consideration. The Summary for Policymakers was approved line-by-line at the joint meeting of Working Groups I, II and III; it and the underlying chapters were then accepted at the 48th Session of the IPCC from 01–06 October 2018 in Incheon, Republic of Korea.

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Our heartfelt thanks go to the hosts and organizers of the scoping meeting, the four Special Report on 1.5°C Lead Author Meetings and the 48th Session of the IPCC. We gratefully acknowledge the support from the host countries and institutions: World Meteorological Organization, Switzerland; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), Brazil; Met Office and the University of Exeter, the United Kingdom; Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI), Sweden; the Ministry of Environment Natural Resources Conservation and Tourism, the National Climate Change Committee in the Department of Meteorological Services and the Botswana Global Environmental Change Committee at the University of Botswana, Botswana; and Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA) and Incheon Metropolitan City, the Republic of Korea. The support provided by governments and institutions, as well as through contributions to the IPCC Trust Fund, is thankfully acknowledged as it enabled the participation of the author teams in the preparation of the Report. The efficient operation of the Working Group I Technical Support Unit was made possible by the generous financial support provided by the government of France and administrative and information technology support from the Université Paris Saclay (France), Institut Pierre Simon Laplace (IPSL) and the Laboratoire des Sciences du Climat et de l'Environnement (LSCE). We thank the Norwegian Environment Agency for supporting the preparation of the graphics for the Summary for Policymakers. We thank the UNEP Library, who supported authors throughout the drafting process by providing literature for the assessment.

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
Finally, our particular appreciation goes to the Working Group Technical Support Units whose tireless dedication, professionalism and enthusiasm led the production of this Special Report. This Report could not have been prepared without the commitment of members of the Working Group I Technical Support Unit, all new to the IPCC, who rose to the unprecedented Sixth Assessment Report challenge and were pivotal in all aspects of the preparation of the Report: Yang Chen, Sarah Connors, Melissa Gomis, Elisabeth Lonnoy, Robin Matthews, Wilfran Moufouma-Okia, Clotilde Péan, Roz Pidcock, Anna Pirani, Nicholas Reay, Tim Waterfield, and Xiao Zhou. Our warmest thanks go to the collegial and collaborative support provided by Marlies Craig, Andrew Okem, Jan Petzold, Melinda Tignor and Nora Weyer from the WGII Technical Support Unit and Bhushan Kankal, Suvadip

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
The Special Report website has been developed by Habitat 7, led by Jamie Herring, and the report content has been prepared and managed for the website by Nicholas Reay and Tim Waterfield. We gratefully acknowledge the UN Foundation for supporting the website development.



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« Pour ce qui est de l'avenir, il ne s'agit pas de le prévoir, mais de le rendre possible. »

Antoine de Saint Exupéry, *Citadelle*, 1948



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Introduction

This Report responds to the invitation for IPCC '... to provide a Special Report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways' contained in the Decision of the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to adopt the Paris Agreement.¹

The IPCC accepted the invitation in April 2016, deciding to prepare this Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.

This Summary for Policymakers (SPM) presents the key findings of the Special Report, based on the assessment of the available scientific, technical and socio-economic literature² relevant to global warming of 1.5°C and for the comparison between global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The level of confidence associated with each key finding is reported using the IPCC calibrated language.³ The underlying scientific basis of each key finding is indicated by references provided to chapter elements. In the SPM, knowledge gaps are identified associated with the underlying chapters of the Report.

A. Understanding Global Warming of 1.5°C⁴

A.1 Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming⁵ above pre-industrial levels, with a *likely* range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C. Global warming is *likely* to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.1) {1.2}

A.1.1 Reflecting the long-term warming trend since pre-industrial times, observed global mean surface temperature (GMST) for the decade 2006–2015 was 0.87°C (*likely* between 0.75°C and 0.99°C)⁶ higher than the average over the 1850–1900 period (*very high confidence*). Estimated anthropogenic global warming matches the level of observed warming to within ±20% (*likely range*). Estimated anthropogenic global warming is currently increasing at 0.2°C (*likely* between 0.1°C and 0.3°C) per decade due to past and ongoing emissions (*high confidence*). {1.2.1, Table 1.1, 1.2.4}

A.1.2 Warming greater than the global annual average is being experienced in many land regions and seasons, including two to three times higher in the Arctic. Warming is generally higher over land than over the ocean. (*high confidence*) {1.2.1, 1.2.2, Figure 1.1, Figure 1.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.2}

A.1.3 Trends in intensity and frequency of some climate and weather extremes have been detected over time spans during which about 0.5°C of global warming occurred (*medium confidence*). This assessment is based on several lines of evidence, including attribution studies for changes in extremes since 1950. {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3}

¹ Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 21.

² The assessment covers literature accepted for publication by 15 May 2018.

³ Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high and very high, and typeset in italics, for example, *medium confidence*. The following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: virtually certain 99–100% probability, very likely 90–100%, likely 66–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, unlikely 0–33%, very unlikely 0–10%, exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. Additional terms (extremely likely 95–100%, more likely than not >50–100%, more unlikely than likely 0–<50%, extremely unlikely 0–5%) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, for example, *very likely*. This is consistent with AR5.

⁴ See also Box SPM.1: Core Concepts Central to this Special Report.


⁵ Present level of global warming is defined as the average of a 30-year period centred on 2017 assuming the recent rate of warming continues.

⁶ This range spans the four available peer-reviewed estimates of the observed GMST change and also accounts for additional uncertainty due to possible short-term natural variability. {1.2.1, Table 1.1}

- A.2 Warming from anthropogenic emissions from the pre-industrial period to the present will persist for centuries to millennia and will continue to cause further long-term changes in the climate system, such as sea level rise, with associated impacts (*high confidence*), but these emissions alone are *unlikely* to cause global warming of 1.5°C (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM.1) {1.2, 3.3, Figure 1.5}**
- A.2.1 Anthropogenic emissions (including greenhouse gases, aerosols and their precursors) up to the present are *unlikely* to cause further warming of more than 0.5°C over the next two to three decades (*high confidence*) or on a century time scale (*medium confidence*). {1.2.4, Figure 1.5}
- A.2.2 Reaching and sustaining net zero global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions and declining net non-CO₂ radiative forcing would halt anthropogenic global warming on multi-decadal time scales (*high confidence*). The maximum temperature reached is then determined by cumulative net global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions up to the time of net zero CO₂ emissions (*high confidence*) and the level of non-CO₂ radiative forcing in the decades prior to the time that maximum temperatures are reached (*medium confidence*). On longer time scales, sustained net negative global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions and/or further reductions in non-CO₂ radiative forcing may still be required to prevent further warming due to Earth system feedbacks and to reverse ocean acidification (*medium confidence*) and will be required to minimize sea level rise (*high confidence*). {Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, Figure 1.4, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.4.4.8, 3.4.5.1, 3.6.3.2}
- A.3 Climate-related risks for natural and human systems are higher for global warming of 1.5°C than at present, but lower than at 2°C (*high confidence*). These risks depend on the magnitude and rate of warming, geographic location, levels of development and vulnerability, and on the choices and implementation of adaptation and mitigation options (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.2) {1.3, 3.3, 3.4, 5.6}**
- A.3.1 Impacts on natural and human systems from global warming have already been observed (*high confidence*). Many land and ocean ecosystems and some of the services they provide have already changed due to global warming (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.2) {1.4, 3.4, 3.5}
- A.3.2 Future climate-related risks depend on the rate, peak and duration of warming. In the aggregate, they are larger if global warming exceeds 1.5°C before returning to that level by 2100 than if global warming gradually stabilizes at 1.5°C, especially if the peak temperature is high (e.g., about 2°C) (*high confidence*). Some impacts may be long-lasting or irreversible, such as the loss of some ecosystems (*high confidence*). {3.2, 3.4.4, 3.6.3, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3}
- A.3.3 Adaptation and mitigation are already occurring (*high confidence*). Future climate-related risks would be reduced by the upscaling and acceleration of far-reaching, multilevel and cross-sectoral climate mitigation and by both incremental and transformational adaptation (*high confidence*). {1.2, 1.3, Table 3.5, 4.2.2, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Box 4.2, Box 4.3, Box 4.6, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.5.3}


Cumulative emissions of CO₂ and future non-CO₂ radiative forcing determine the probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C

a) Observed global temperature change and modeled responses to stylized anthropogenic emission and forcing pathways



b) Stylized net global CO₂ emission pathways


Billion tonnes CO₂ per year (GtCO₂/yr)



Faster immediate CO₂ emission reductions limit cumulative CO₂ emissions shown in panel (c).

c) Cumulative net CO₂ emissions

Billion tonnes CO₂ (GtCO₂)



Maximum temperature rise is determined by cumulative net CO₂ emissions and net non-CO₂ radiative forcing due to methane, nitrous oxide, aerosols and other anthropogenic forcing agents.

d) Non-CO₂ radiative forcing pathways

Watts per square metre (W/m²)




Figure SPM.1 | Panel a: Observed monthly global mean surface temperature (GMST, grey line up to 2017, from the HadCRUT4, GISTEMP, Cowtan–Way, and NOAA datasets) change and estimated anthropogenic global warming (solid orange line up to 2017, with orange shading indicating assessed *likely* range). Orange dashed arrow and horizontal orange error bar show respectively the central estimate and *likely* range of the time at which the current rate of warming continues. The grey plume on the right of panel a shows the *likely* range of warming responses, computed with a simple climate model, to a stylized pathway (hypothetical future) in which net CO₂ emissions (grey line in panels b and c) decline in a straight line from 2020 to reach net zero in 2055 and net non-CO₂ radiative forcing (grey line in panel d) increases to 2030 and then declines. The blue plume in panel a shows the response to faster CO₂ emissions reductions (blue line in panel b), reaching net zero in 2040, reducing cumulative CO₂ emissions (panel c). The purple plume shows the response to net CO₂ emissions declining to zero in 2055, with net non-CO₂ forcing remaining constant after 2030. The vertical error bars on right of panel a show the *likely* ranges (thin lines) and central terciles (33rd – 66th percentiles, thick lines) of the estimated distribution of warming in 2100 under these three stylized pathways. Vertical dotted error bars in panels b, c and d show the *likely* range of historical annual and cumulative global net CO₂ emissions in 2017 (data from the Global Carbon Project) and of net non-CO₂ radiative forcing in 2011 from AR5, respectively. Vertical axes in panels c and d are scaled to represent approximately equal effects on GMST. [1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 2.3, Figure 1.2 and Chapter 1 Supplementary Material, Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1]

B. Projected Climate Change, Potential Impacts and Associated Risks

B.1 Climate models project robust⁷ differences in regional climate characteristics between present-day and global warming of 1.5°C,⁸ and between 1.5°C and 2°C.⁸ These differences include increases in: mean temperature in most land and ocean regions (*high confidence*), hot extremes in most inhabited regions (*high confidence*), heavy precipitation in several regions (*medium confidence*), and the probability of drought and precipitation deficits in some regions (*medium confidence*). {3.3}

B.1.1 Evidence from attributed changes in some climate and weather extremes for a global warming of about 0.5°C supports the assessment that an additional 0.5°C of warming compared to present is associated with further detectable changes in these extremes (*medium confidence*). Several regional changes in climate are assessed to occur with global warming up to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels, including warming of extreme temperatures in many regions (*high confidence*), increases in frequency, intensity, and/or amount of heavy precipitation in several regions (*high confidence*), and an increase in intensity or frequency of droughts in some regions (*medium confidence*). {3.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, Table 3.2}

B.1.2 Temperature extremes on land are projected to warm more than GMST (*high confidence*): extreme hot days in mid-latitudes warm by up to about 3°C at global warming of 1.5°C and about 4°C at 2°C, and extreme cold nights in high latitudes warm by up to about 4.5°C at 1.5°C and about 6°C at 2°C (*high confidence*). The number of hot days is projected to increase in most land regions, with highest increases in the tropics (*high confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3}

B.1.3 Risks from droughts and precipitation deficits are projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming in some regions (*medium confidence*). Risks from heavy precipitation events are projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming in several northern hemisphere high-latitude and/or high-elevation regions, eastern Asia and eastern North America (*medium confidence*). Heavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones is projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C global warming (*medium confidence*). There is generally *low confidence* in projected changes in heavy precipitation at 2°C compared to 1.5°C in other regions. Heavy precipitation when aggregated at global scale is projected to be higher at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming (*medium confidence*). As a consequence of heavy precipitation, the fraction of the global land area affected by flood hazards is projected to be larger at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming (*medium confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6}

B.2 By 2100, global mean sea level rise is projected to be around 0.1 metre lower with global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (*medium confidence*). Sea level will continue to rise well beyond 2100 (*high confidence*), and the magnitude and rate of this rise depend on future emission pathways. A slower rate of sea level rise enables greater opportunities for adaptation in the human and ecological systems of small islands, low-lying coastal areas and deltas (*medium confidence*). {3.3, 3.4, 3.6}

B.2.1 Model-based projections of global mean sea level rise (relative to 1986–2005) suggest an indicative range of 0.26 to 0.77 m by 2100 for 1.5°C of global warming, 0.1 m (0.04–0.16 m) less than for a global warming of 2°C (*medium confidence*). A reduction of 0.1 m in global sea level rise implies that up to 10 million fewer people would be exposed to related risks, based on population in the year 2010 and assuming no adaptation (*medium confidence*). {3.4.4, 3.4.5, 4.3.2}

B.2.2 Sea level rise will continue beyond 2100 even if global warming is limited to 1.5°C in the 21st century (*high confidence*). Marine ice sheet instability in Antarctica and/or irreversible loss of the Greenland ice sheet could result in multi-metre rise in sea level over hundreds to thousands of years. These instabilities could be triggered at around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM.2) {3.3.9, 3.4.5, 3.5.2, 3.6.3, Box 3.3}

⁷ Robust is here used to mean that at least two thirds of climate models show the same sign of changes at the grid point scale, and that differences in large regions are statistically significant.

⁸ Projected changes in impacts between different levels of global warming are determined with respect to changes in global mean surface air temperature.

B.2.3 Increasing warming amplifies the exposure of small islands, low-lying coastal areas and deltas to the risks associated with sea level rise for many human and ecological systems, including increased saltwater intrusion, flooding and damage to infrastructure (*high confidence*). Risks associated with sea level rise are higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C. The slower rate of sea level rise at global warming of 1.5°C reduces these risks, enabling greater opportunities for adaptation including managing and restoring natural coastal ecosystems and infrastructure reinforcement (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM.2) {3.4.5, Box 3.5}

B.3 On land, impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems, including species loss and extinction, are projected to be lower at 1.5°C of global warming compared to 2°C. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is projected to lower the impacts on terrestrial, freshwater and coastal ecosystems and to retain more of their services to humans (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.2) {3.4, 3.5, Box 3.4, Box 4.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3}

B.3.1 Of 105,000 species studied,⁹ 6% of insects, 8% of plants and 4% of vertebrates are projected to lose over half of their climatically determined geographic range for global warming of 1.5°C, compared with 18% of insects, 16% of plants and 8% of vertebrates for global warming of 2°C (*medium confidence*). Impacts associated with other biodiversity-related risks such as forest fires and the spread of invasive species are lower at 1.5°C compared to 2°C of global warming (*high confidence*). {3.4.3, 3.5.2}

B.3.2 Approximately 4% (interquartile range 2–7%) of the global terrestrial land area is projected to undergo a transformation of ecosystems from one type to another at 1°C of global warming, compared with 13% (interquartile range 8–20%) at 2°C (*medium confidence*). This indicates that the area at risk is projected to be approximately 50% lower at 1.5°C compared to 2°C (*medium confidence*). {3.4.3.1, 3.4.3.5}

B.3.3 High-latitude tundra and boreal forests are particularly at risk of climate change-induced degradation and loss, with woody shrubs already encroaching into the tundra (*high confidence*) and this will proceed with further warming. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C is projected to prevent the thawing over centuries of a permafrost area in the range of 1.5 to 2.5 million km² (*medium confidence*). {3.3.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.5}

B.4 Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is projected to reduce increases in ocean temperature as well as associated increases in ocean acidity and decreases in ocean oxygen levels (*high confidence*). Consequently, limiting global warming to 1.5°C is projected to reduce risks to marine biodiversity, fisheries, and ecosystems, and their functions and services to humans, as illustrated by recent changes to Arctic sea ice and warm-water coral reef ecosystems (*high confidence*). {3.3, 3.4, 3.5, Box 3.4, Box 3.5}

B.4.1 There is *high confidence* that the probability of a sea ice-free Arctic Ocean during summer is substantially lower at global warming of 1.5°C when compared to 2°C. With 1.5°C of global warming, one sea ice-free Arctic summer is projected per century. This likelihood is increased to at least one per decade with 2°C global warming. Effects of a temperature overshoot are reversible for Arctic sea ice cover on decadal time scales (*high confidence*). {3.3.8, 3.4.4.7}

B.4.2 Global warming of 1.5°C is projected to shift the ranges of many marine species to higher latitudes as well as increase the amount of damage to many ecosystems. It is also expected to drive the loss of coastal resources and reduce the productivity of fisheries and aquaculture (especially at low latitudes). The risks of climate-induced impacts are projected to be higher at 2°C than those at global warming of 1.5°C (*high confidence*). Coral reefs, for example, are projected to decline by a further 70–90% at 1.5°C (*high confidence*) with larger losses (>99%) at 2°C (*very high confidence*). The risk of irreversible loss of many marine and coastal ecosystems increases with global warming, especially at 2°C or more (*high confidence*). {3.4.4, Box 3.4}

⁹ Consistent with earlier studies, illustrative numbers were adopted from one recent meta-study.

- B.4.3 The level of ocean acidification due to increasing CO₂ concentrations associated with global warming of 1.5°C is projected to amplify the adverse effects of warming, and even further at 2°C, impacting the growth, development, calcification, survival, and thus abundance of a broad range of species, for example, from algae to fish (*high confidence*). {3.3.10, 3.4.4}
- B.4.4 Impacts of climate change in the ocean are increasing risks to fisheries and aquaculture via impacts on the physiology, survivorship, habitat, reproduction, disease incidence, and risk of invasive species (*medium confidence*) but are projected to be less at 1.5°C of global warming than at 2°C. One global fishery model, for example, projected a decrease in global annual catch for marine fisheries of about 1.5 million tonnes for 1.5°C of global warming compared to a loss of more than 3 million tonnes for 2°C of global warming (*medium confidence*). {3.4.4, Box 3.4}
- B.5 Climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1.5°C and increase further with 2°C. (Figure SPM.2) {3.4, 3.5, 5.2, Box 3.2, Box 3.3, Box 3.5, Box 3.6, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, 5.2}**
- B.5.1 Populations at disproportionately higher risk of adverse consequences with global warming of 1.5°C and beyond include disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, some indigenous peoples, and local communities dependent on agricultural or coastal livelihoods (*high confidence*). Regions at disproportionately higher risk include Arctic ecosystems, dryland regions, small island developing states, and Least Developed Countries (*high confidence*). Poverty and disadvantage are expected to increase in some populations as global warming increases; limiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared with 2°C, could reduce the number of people both exposed to climate-related risks and susceptible to poverty by up to several hundred million by 2050 (*medium confidence*). {3.4.10, 3.4.11, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, 4.2.2.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.6.3}
- B.5.2 Any increase in global warming is projected to affect human health, with primarily negative consequences (*high confidence*). Lower risks are projected at 1.5°C than at 2°C for heat-related morbidity and mortality (*very high confidence*) and for ozone-related mortality if emissions needed for ozone formation remain high (*high confidence*). Urban heat islands often amplify the impacts of heatwaves in cities (*high confidence*). Risks from some vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever, are projected to increase with warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, including potential shifts in their geographic range (*high confidence*). {3.4.7, 3.4.8, 3.5.5.8}
- B.5.3 Limiting warming to 1.5°C compared with 2°C is projected to result in smaller net reductions in yields of maize, rice, wheat, and potentially other cereal crops, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central and South America, and in the CO₂-dependent nutritional quality of rice and wheat (*high confidence*). Reductions in projected food availability are larger at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming in the Sahel, southern Africa, the Mediterranean, central Europe, and the Amazon (*medium confidence*). Livestock are projected to be adversely affected with rising temperatures, depending on the extent of changes in feed quality, spread of diseases, and water resource availability (*high confidence*). {3.4.6, 3.5.4, 3.5.5, Box 3.1, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}
- B.5.4 Depending on future socio-economic conditions, limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C may reduce the proportion of the world population exposed to a climate change-induced increase in water stress by up to 50%, although there is considerable variability between regions (*medium confidence*). Many small island developing states could experience lower water stress as a result of projected changes in aridity when global warming is limited to 1.5°C, as compared to 2°C (*medium confidence*). {3.3.5, 3.4.2, 3.4.8, 3.5.5, Box 3.2, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}
- B.5.5 Risks to global aggregated economic growth due to climate change impacts are projected to be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C by the end of this century¹⁰ (*medium confidence*). This excludes the costs of mitigation, adaptation investments and the benefits of adaptation. Countries in the tropics and Southern Hemisphere subtropics are projected to experience the largest impacts on economic growth due to climate change should global warming increase from 1.5°C to 2°C (*medium confidence*). {3.5.2, 3.5.3}


¹⁰ Here, impacts on economic growth refer to changes in gross domestic product (GDP). Many impacts, such as loss of human lives, cultural heritage and ecosystem services, are difficult to value and monetize.

- B.5.6 Exposure to multiple and compound climate-related risks increases between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming, with greater proportions of people both so exposed and susceptible to poverty in Africa and Asia (*high confidence*). For global warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, risks across energy, food, and water sectors could overlap spatially and temporally, creating new and exacerbating current hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities that could affect increasing numbers of people and regions (*medium confidence*). {Box 3.5, 3.3.1, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.6, 3.4.11, 3.5.4.9}
- B.5.7 There are multiple lines of evidence that since AR5 the assessed levels of risk increased for four of the five Reasons for Concern (RFCs) for global warming to 2°C (*high confidence*). The risk transitions by degrees of global warming are now: from high to very high risk between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC1 (Unique and threatened systems) (*high confidence*); from moderate to high risk between 1°C and 1.5°C for RFC2 (Extreme weather events) (*medium confidence*); from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC3 (Distribution of impacts) (*high confidence*); from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2.5°C for RFC4 (Global aggregate impacts) (*medium confidence*); and from moderate to high risk between 1°C and 2.5°C for RFC5 (Large-scale singular events) (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM.2) {3.4.13; 3.5, 3.5.2}
- B.6 Most adaptation needs will be lower for global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (*high confidence*). There are a wide range of adaptation options that can reduce the risks of climate change (*high confidence*). There are limits to adaptation and adaptive capacity for some human and natural systems at global warming of 1.5°C, with associated losses (*medium confidence*). The number and availability of adaptation options vary by sector (*medium confidence*). {Table 3.5, 4.3, 4.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5}**
- B.6.1 A wide range of adaptation options are available to reduce the risks to natural and managed ecosystems (e.g., ecosystem-based adaptation, ecosystem restoration and avoided degradation and deforestation, biodiversity management, sustainable aquaculture, and local knowledge and indigenous knowledge), the risks of sea level rise (e.g., coastal defence and hardening), and the risks to health, livelihoods, food, water, and economic growth, especially in rural landscapes (e.g., efficient irrigation, social safety nets, disaster risk management, risk spreading and sharing, and community-based adaptation) and urban areas (e.g., green infrastructure, sustainable land use and planning, and sustainable water management) (*medium confidence*). {4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.5, 4.5.3, 4.5.4, 5.3.2, Box 4.2, Box 4.3, Box 4.6, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}.
- B.6.2 Adaptation is expected to be more challenging for ecosystems, food and health systems at 2°C of global warming than for 1.5°C (*medium confidence*). Some vulnerable regions, including small islands and Least Developed Countries, are projected to experience high multiple interrelated climate risks even at global warming of 1.5°C (*high confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.4.5, Box 3.5, Table 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, 5.6, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, Box 5.3}
- B.6.3 Limits to adaptive capacity exist at 1.5°C of global warming, become more pronounced at higher levels of warming and vary by sector, with site-specific implications for vulnerable regions, ecosystems and human health (*medium confidence*). {Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, Box 3.5, Table 3.5}

How the level of global warming affects impacts and/or risks associated with the Reasons for Concern (RFCs) and selected natural, managed and human systems

Five Reasons For Concern (RFCs) illustrate the impacts and risks of different levels of global warming for people, economies and ecosystems across sectors and regions.

Impacts and risks associated with the Reasons for Concern (RFCs)



Impacts and risks for selected natural, managed and human systems




Figure SPM.2 | Five integrative reasons for concern (RFCs) provide a framework for summarizing key impacts and risks across sectors and regions, and were introduced in the IPCC Third Assessment Report. RFCs illustrate the implications of global warming for people, economies and ecosystems. Impacts and/or risks for each RFC are based on assessment of the new literature that has appeared. As in AR5, this literature was used to make expert judgments to assess the levels of global warming at which levels of impact and/or risk are undetectable, moderate, high or very high. The selection of impacts and risks to natural, managed and human systems in the lower panel is illustrative and is not intended to be fully comprehensive. {3.4, 3.5, 3.5.2.1, 3.5.2.2, 3.5.2.3, 3.5.2.4, 3.5.2.5, 5.4.1, 5.5.3, 5.6.1, Box 3.4}

RFC1 Unique and threatened systems: ecological and human systems that have restricted geographic ranges constrained by climate-related conditions and have high endemism or other distinctive properties. Examples include coral reefs, the Arctic and its indigenous people, mountain glaciers and biodiversity hotspots.

RFC2 Extreme weather events: risks/impacts to human health, livelihoods, assets and ecosystems from extreme weather events such as heat waves, heavy rain, drought and associated wildfires, and coastal flooding.

RFC3 Distribution of impacts: risks/impacts that disproportionately affect particular groups due to uneven distribution of physical climate change hazards, exposure or vulnerability.

RFC4 Global aggregate impacts: global monetary damage, global-scale degradation and loss of ecosystems and biodiversity.

RFC5 Large-scale singular events: are relatively large, abrupt and sometimes irreversible changes in systems that are caused by global warming. Examples include disintegration of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets.

C. Emission Pathways and System Transitions Consistent with 1.5°C Global Warming

C.1 In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO₂ emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range). For limiting global warming to below 2°C¹¹ CO₂ emissions are projected to decline by about 25% by 2030 in most pathways (10–30% interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2070 (2065–2080 interquartile range). Non-CO₂ emissions in pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C show deep reductions that are similar to those in pathways limiting warming to 2°C. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.3a) {2.1, 2.3, Table 2.4}

C.1.1 CO₂ emissions reductions that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot can involve different portfolios of mitigation measures, striking different balances between lowering energy and resource intensity, rate of decarbonization, and the reliance on carbon dioxide removal. Different portfolios face different implementation challenges and potential synergies and trade-offs with sustainable development. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.3b) {2.3.2, 2.3.4, 2.4, 2.5.3}

C.1.2 Modelled pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot involve deep reductions in emissions of methane and black carbon (35% or more of both by 2050 relative to 2010). These pathways also reduce most of the cooling aerosols, which partially offsets mitigation effects for two to three decades. Non-CO₂ emissions¹² can be reduced as a result of broad mitigation measures in the energy sector. In addition, targeted non-CO₂ mitigation measures can reduce nitrous oxide and methane from agriculture, methane from the waste sector, some sources of black carbon, and hydrofluorocarbons. High bioenergy demand can increase emissions of nitrous oxide in some 1.5°C pathways, highlighting the importance of appropriate management approaches. Improved air quality resulting from projected reductions in many non-CO₂ emissions provide direct and immediate population health benefits in all 1.5°C model pathways. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.3a) {2.2.1, 2.3.3, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, 4.3.6, 5.4.2}

C.1.3 Limiting global warming requires limiting the total cumulative global anthropogenic emissions of CO₂ since the pre-industrial period, that is, staying within a total carbon budget (*high confidence*).¹³ By the end of 2017, anthropogenic CO₂ emissions since the pre-industrial period are estimated to have reduced the total carbon budget for 1.5°C by approximately 2200 ± 320 GtCO₂ (*medium confidence*). The associated remaining budget is being depleted by current emissions of 42 ± 3 GtCO₂ per year (*high confidence*). The choice of the measure of global temperature affects the estimated remaining carbon budget. Using global mean surface air temperature, as in AR5, gives an estimate of the remaining carbon budget of 580 GtCO₂ for a 50% probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C, and 420 GtCO₂ for a 66% probability (*medium confidence*).¹⁴ Alternatively, using GMST gives estimates of 770 and 570 GtCO₂, for 50% and 66% probabilities,¹⁵ respectively (*medium confidence*). Uncertainties in the size of these estimated remaining carbon budgets are substantial and depend on several factors. Uncertainties in the climate response to CO₂ and non-CO₂ emissions contribute ±400 GtCO₂ and the level of historic warming contributes ±250 GtCO₂ (*medium confidence*). Potential additional carbon release from future permafrost thawing and methane release from wetlands would reduce budgets by up to 100 GtCO₂ over the course of this century and more thereafter (*medium confidence*). In addition, the level of non-CO₂ mitigation in the future could alter the remaining carbon budget by 250 GtCO₂ in either direction (*medium confidence*). {1.2.4, 2.2.2, 2.6.1, Table 2.2, Chapter 2 Supplementary Material}

C.1.4 Solar radiation modification (SRM) measures are not included in any of the available assessed pathways. Although some SRM measures may be theoretically effective in reducing an overshoot, they face large uncertainties and knowledge gaps

11 References to pathways limiting global warming to 2°C are based on a 66% probability of staying below 2°C.

12 Non-CO₂ emissions included in this Report are all anthropogenic emissions other than CO₂ that result in radiative forcing. These include short-lived climate forcers, such as methane, some fluorinated gases, ozone precursors, aerosols or aerosol precursors, such as black carbon and sulphur dioxide, respectively, as well as long-lived greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxide or some fluorinated gases. The radiative forcing associated with non-CO₂ emissions and changes in surface albedo is referred to as non-CO₂ radiative forcing. {2.2.1}

13 There is a clear scientific basis for a total carbon budget consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C. However, neither this total carbon budget nor the fraction of this budget taken up by past emissions were assessed in this Report.

14 Irrespective of the measure of global temperature used, updated understanding and further advances in methods have led to an increase in the estimated remaining carbon budget of about 300 GtCO₂ compared to AR5. (*medium confidence*) {2.2.2}

15 These estimates use observed GMST to 2006–2015 and estimate future temperature changes using near surface air temperatures.


as well as substantial risks and institutional and social constraints to deployment related to governance, ethics, and impacts on sustainable development. They also do not mitigate ocean acidification. (*medium confidence*) {4.3.8, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4}

Global emissions pathway characteristics

General characteristics of the evolution of anthropogenic net emissions of CO₂, and total emissions of methane, black carbon, and nitrous oxide in model pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. Net emissions are defined as anthropogenic emissions reduced by anthropogenic removals. Reductions in net emissions can be achieved through different portfolios of mitigation measures illustrated in Figure SPM.3b.


Global total net CO₂ emissions

Billion tonnes of CO₂/yr



Timing of net zero CO₂


Line widths depict the 5–95th percentile and the 25–75th percentile of scenarios




Non-CO₂ emissions relative to 2010

Emissions of non-CO₂ forcers are also reduced or limited in pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with **no or limited overshoot**, but they do not reach zero globally.

Methane emissions



Black carbon emissions



Nitrous oxide emissions





Figure SPM.3a | Global emissions pathway characteristics. The main panel shows global net anthropogenic CO₂ emissions in pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited (less than 0.1°C) overshoot and pathways with higher overshoot. The shaded area shows the full range for pathways analysed in this Report. The panels on the right show non-CO₂ emissions ranges for three compounds with large historical forcing and a substantial portion of emissions coming from sources distinct from those central to CO₂ mitigation. Shaded areas in these panels show the 5–95% (light shading) and interquartile (dark shading) ranges of pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. Box and whiskers at the bottom of the figure show the timing of pathways reaching global net zero CO₂ emission levels, and a comparison with pathways limiting global warming to 2°C with at least 66% probability. Four illustrative model pathways are highlighted in the main panel and are labelled P1, P2, P3 and P4, corresponding to the LED, S1, S2, and S5 pathways assessed in Chapter 2. Descriptions and characteristics of these pathways are available in Figure SPM.3b. {2.1, 2.2, 2.3, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.10, Figure 2.11}

Characteristics of four illustrative model pathways

Different mitigation strategies can achieve the net emissions reductions that would be required to follow a pathway that limits global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. All pathways use Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), but the amount varies across pathways, as do the relative contributions of Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and removals in the Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector. This has implications for emissions and several other pathway characteristics.

Breakdown of contributions to global net CO₂ emissions in four illustrative model pathways

● Fossil fuel and industry ● AFOLU ● BECCS



P1: A scenario in which social, business and technological innovations result in lower energy demand up to 2050 while living standards rise, especially in the global South. A downsized energy system enables rapid decarbonization of energy supply. Afforestation is the only CDR option considered; neither fossil fuels with CCS nor BECCS are used.

P2: A scenario with a broad focus on sustainability including energy intensity, human development, economic convergence and international cooperation, as well as shifts towards sustainable and healthy consumption patterns, low-carbon technology innovation, and well-managed land systems with limited societal acceptability for BECCS.

P3: A middle-of-the-road scenario in which societal as well as technological development follows historical patterns. Emissions reductions are mainly achieved by changing the way in which energy and products are produced, and to a lesser degree by reductions in demand.

P4: A resource- and energy-intensive scenario in which economic growth and globalization lead to widespread adoption of greenhouse-gas-intensive lifestyles, including high demand for transportation fuels and livestock products. Emissions reductions are mainly achieved through technological means, making strong use of CDR through the deployment of BECCS.

Global indicators	P1	P2	P3	P4	Interquartile range
Pathway classification	No or limited overshoot	No or limited overshoot	No or limited overshoot	Higher overshoot	No or limited overshoot
CO ₂ emission change in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-58	-47	-41	4	(-58,-40)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-93	-95	-91	-97	(-107,-94)
Kyoto-GHG emissions* in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-50	-49	-35	-2	(-51,-39)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-82	-89	-78	-80	(-93,-81)
Final energy demand** in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-15	-5	17	39	(-12,7)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-32	2	21	44	(-11,22)
Renewable share in electricity in 2030 (%)	60	58	48	25	(47,65)
↳ in 2050 (%)	77	81	63	70	(69,86)
Primary energy from coal in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-78	-61	-75	-59	(-78,-59)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-97	-77	-73	-97	(-95,-74)
from oil in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-37	-13	-3	86	(-34,3)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-87	-50	-81	-32	(-78,-31)
from gas in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-25	-20	33	37	(-26,21)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-74	-53	21	-48	(-56,6)
from nuclear in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	59	83	98	106	(44,102)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	150	98	501	468	(91,190)
from biomass in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-11	0	36	-1	(29,80)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-16	49	121	418	(123,261)
from non-biomass renewables in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	430	470	315	110	(245,436)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	833	1327	878	1137	(576,1299)
Cumulative CCS until 2100 (GtCO ₂)	0	348	687	1218	(550,1017)
↳ of which BECCS (GtCO ₂)	0	151	414	1191	(364,662)
Land area of bioenergy crops in 2050 (million km ²)	0.2	0.9	2.8	7.2	(1.5,3.2)
Agricultural CH ₄ emissions in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-24	-48	1	14	(-30,-11)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-33	-69	-23	2	(-47,-24)
Agricultural N ₂ O emissions in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	5	-26	15	3	(-21,3)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	6	-26	0	39	(-26,1)

NOTE: Indicators have been selected to show global trends identified by the Chapter 2 assessment. National and sectoral characteristics can differ substantially from the global trends shown above.

* Kyoto-gas emissions are based on IPCC Second Assessment Report GWP-100
 ** Changes in energy demand are associated with improvements in energy efficiency and behaviour change

Figure SPM.3b | Characteristics of four illustrative model pathways in relation to global warming of 1.5°C introduced in Figure SPM.3a. These pathways were selected to show a range of potential mitigation approaches and vary widely in their projected energy and land use, as well as their assumptions about future socio-economic developments, including economic and population growth, equity and sustainability. A breakdown of the global net anthropogenic CO₂ emissions into the contributions in terms of CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel and industry; agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU); and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is shown. AFOLU estimates reported here are not necessarily comparable with countries' estimates. Further characteristics for each of these pathways are listed below each pathway. These pathways illustrate relative global differences in mitigation strategies, but do not represent central estimates, national strategies, and do not indicate requirements. For comparison, the right-most column shows the interquartile ranges across pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C. Pathways P1, P2, P3 and P4 correspond to the LED, S1, S2 and S5 pathways assessed in Chapter 2 (Figure SPM.3a). {2.2.1, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.10, Figure 2.11, Figure 2.14, Figure 2.15, Figure 2.16, Figure 2.17, Figure 2.24, Figure 2.25, Table 2.4, Table 2.6, Table 2.7, Table 2.9, Table 4.1}

C.2 Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems (*high confidence*). These systems transitions are unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily in terms of speed, and imply deep emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options and a significant upscaling of investments in those options (*medium confidence*). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5}

- C.2.1 Pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot show system changes that are more rapid and pronounced over the next two decades than in 2°C pathways (*high confidence*). The rates of system changes associated with limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot have occurred in the past within specific sectors, technologies and spatial contexts, but there is no documented historic precedent for their scale (*medium confidence*). {2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4, 2.5, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}
- C.2.2 In energy systems, modelled global pathways (considered in the literature) limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (for more details see Figure SPM.3b) generally meet energy service demand with lower energy use, including through enhanced energy efficiency, and show faster electrification of energy end use compared to 2°C (*high confidence*). In 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot, low-emission energy sources are projected to have a higher share, compared with 2°C pathways, particularly before 2050 (*high confidence*). In 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot, renewables are projected to supply 70–85% (interquartile range) of electricity in 2050 (*high confidence*). In electricity generation, shares of nuclear and fossil fuels with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) are modelled to increase in most 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot. In modelled 1.5°C pathways with limited or no overshoot, the use of CCS would allow the electricity generation share of gas to be approximately 8% (3–11% interquartile range) of global electricity in 2050, while the use of coal shows a steep reduction in all pathways and would be reduced to close to 0% (0–2% interquartile range) of electricity (*high confidence*). While acknowledging the challenges, and differences between the options and national circumstances, political, economic, social and technical feasibility of solar energy, wind energy and electricity storage technologies have substantially improved over the past few years (*high confidence*). These improvements signal a potential system transition in electricity generation. (Figure SPM.3b) {2.4.1, 2.4.2, Figure 2.1, Table 2.6, Table 2.7, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.5.2}
- C.2.3 CO₂ emissions from industry in pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot are projected to be about 65–90% (interquartile range) lower in 2050 relative to 2010, as compared to 50–80% for global warming of 2°C (*medium confidence*). Such reductions can be achieved through combinations of new and existing technologies and practices, including electrification, hydrogen, sustainable bio-based feedstocks, product substitution, and carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS). These options are technically proven at various scales but their large-scale deployment may be limited by economic, financial, human capacity and institutional constraints in specific contexts, and specific characteristics of large-scale industrial installations. In industry, emissions reductions by energy and process efficiency by themselves are insufficient for limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (*high confidence*). {2.4.3, 4.2.1, Table 4.1, Table 4.3, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.5.2}
- C.2.4 The urban and infrastructure system transition consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would imply, for example, changes in land and urban planning practices, as well as deeper emissions reductions in transport and buildings compared to pathways that limit global warming below 2°C (*medium confidence*). Technical measures

and practices enabling deep emissions reductions include various energy efficiency options. In pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, the electricity share of energy demand in buildings would be about 55–75% in 2050 compared to 50–70% in 2050 for 2°C global warming (*medium confidence*). In the transport sector, the share of low-emission final energy would rise from less than 5% in 2020 to about 35–65% in 2050 compared to 25–45% for 2°C of global warming (*medium confidence*). Economic, institutional and socio-cultural barriers may inhibit these urban and infrastructure system transitions, depending on national, regional and local circumstances, capabilities and the availability of capital (*high confidence*). {2.3.4, 2.4.3, 4.2.1, Table 4.1, 4.3.3, 4.5.2}

- C.2.5 Transitions in global and regional land use are found in all pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, but their scale depends on the pursued mitigation portfolio. Model pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot project a 4 million km² reduction to a 2.5 million km² increase of non-pasture agricultural land for food and feed crops and a 0.5–11 million km² reduction of pasture land, to be converted into a 0–6 million km² increase of agricultural land for energy crops and a 2 million km² reduction to 9.5 million km² increase in forests by 2050 relative to 2010 (*medium confidence*).¹⁶ Land-use transitions of similar magnitude can be observed in modelled 2°C pathways (*medium confidence*). Such large transitions pose profound challenges for sustainable management of the various demands on land for human settlements, food, livestock feed, fibre, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity and other ecosystem services (*high confidence*). Mitigation options limiting the demand for land include sustainable intensification of land-use practices, ecosystem restoration and changes towards less resource-intensive diets (*high confidence*). The implementation of land-based mitigation options would require overcoming socio-economic, institutional, technological, financing and environmental barriers that differ across regions (*high confidence*). {2.4.4, Figure 2.24, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.5.2, Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3}
- C.2.6 Additional annual average energy-related investments for the period 2016 to 2050 in pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C compared to pathways without new climate policies beyond those in place today are estimated to be around 830 billion USD₂₀₁₀ (range of 150 billion to 1700 billion USD₂₀₁₀ across six models¹⁷). This compares to total annual average energy supply investments in 1.5°C pathways of 1460 to 3510 billion USD₂₀₁₀ and total annual average energy demand investments of 640 to 910 billion USD₂₀₁₀ for the period 2016 to 2050. Total energy-related investments increase by about 12% (range of 3% to 24%) in 1.5°C pathways relative to 2°C pathways. Annual investments in low-carbon energy technologies and energy efficiency are upscaled by roughly a factor of six (range of factor of 4 to 10) by 2050 compared to 2015 (*medium confidence*). {2.5.2, Box 4.8, Figure 2.27}
- C.2.7 Modelled pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot project a wide range of global average discounted marginal abatement costs over the 21st century. They are roughly 3–4 times higher than in pathways limiting global warming to below 2°C (*high confidence*). The economic literature distinguishes marginal abatement costs from total mitigation costs in the economy. The literature on total mitigation costs of 1.5°C mitigation pathways is limited and was not assessed in this Report. Knowledge gaps remain in the integrated assessment of the economy-wide costs and benefits of mitigation in line with pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C. {2.5.2; 2.6; Figure 2.26}

¹⁶ The projected land-use changes presented are not deployed to their upper limits simultaneously in a single pathway.

¹⁷ Including two pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot and four pathways with higher overshoot.

- C.3 All pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot project the use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) on the order of 100–1000 GtCO₂ over the 21st century. CDR would be used to compensate for residual emissions and, in most cases, achieve net negative emissions to return global warming to 1.5°C following a peak (*high confidence*). CDR deployment of several hundreds of GtCO₂ is subject to multiple feasibility and sustainability constraints (*high confidence*). Significant near-term emissions reductions and measures to lower energy and land demand can limit CDR deployment to a few hundred GtCO₂ without reliance on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) (*high confidence*). {2.3, 2.4, 3.6.2, 4.3, 5.4}**
- C.3.1 Existing and potential CDR measures include afforestation and reforestation, land restoration and soil carbon sequestration, BECCS, direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS), enhanced weathering and ocean alkalization. These differ widely in terms of maturity, potentials, costs, risks, co-benefits and trade-offs (*high confidence*). To date, only a few published pathways include CDR measures other than afforestation and BECCS. {2.3.4, 3.6.2, 4.3.2, 4.3.7}
- C.3.2 In pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot, BECCS deployment is projected to range from 0–1, 0–8, and 0–16 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ in 2030, 2050, and 2100, respectively, while agriculture, forestry and land-use (AFOLU) related CDR measures are projected to remove 0–5, 1–11, and 1–5 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ in these years (*medium confidence*). The upper end of these deployment ranges by mid-century exceeds the BECCS potential of up to 5 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ and afforestation potential of up to 3.6 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ assessed based on recent literature (*medium confidence*). Some pathways avoid BECCS deployment completely through demand-side measures and greater reliance on AFOLU-related CDR measures (*medium confidence*). The use of bioenergy can be as high or even higher when BECCS is excluded compared to when it is included due to its potential for replacing fossil fuels across sectors (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.3b) {2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.2, 3.6.2, 4.3.1, 4.2.3, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.4.3, Table 2.4}
- C.3.3 Pathways that overshoot 1.5°C of global warming rely on CDR exceeding residual CO₂ emissions later in the century to return to below 1.5°C by 2100, with larger overshoots requiring greater amounts of CDR (Figure SPM.3b) (*high confidence*). Limitations on the speed, scale, and societal acceptability of CDR deployment hence determine the ability to return global warming to below 1.5°C following an overshoot. Carbon cycle and climate system understanding is still limited about the effectiveness of net negative emissions to reduce temperatures after they peak (*high confidence*). {2.2, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.6, 4.3.7, 4.5.2, Table 4.11}
- C.3.4 Most current and potential CDR measures could have significant impacts on land, energy, water or nutrients if deployed at large scale (*high confidence*). Afforestation and bioenergy may compete with other land uses and may have significant impacts on agricultural and food systems, biodiversity, and other ecosystem functions and services (*high confidence*). Effective governance is needed to limit such trade-offs and ensure permanence of carbon removal in terrestrial, geological and ocean reservoirs (*high confidence*). Feasibility and sustainability of CDR use could be enhanced by a portfolio of options deployed at substantial, but lesser scales, rather than a single option at very large scale (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.3b) {2.3.4, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, 2.6, 3.6.2, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.5.2, 5.4.1, 5.4.2; Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in Chapter 3, Table 4.11, Table 5.3, Figure 5.3}
- C.3.5 Some AFOLU-related CDR measures such as restoration of natural ecosystems and soil carbon sequestration could provide co-benefits such as improved biodiversity, soil quality, and local food security. If deployed at large scale, they would require governance systems enabling sustainable land management to conserve and protect land carbon stocks and other ecosystem functions and services (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM.4) {2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.2, 2.4.4, 3.6.2, 5.4.1, Cross-Chapter Boxes 3 in Chapter 1 and 7 in Chapter 3, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, Table 2.4}

D. Strengthening the Global Response in the Context of Sustainable Development and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty

D.1 Estimates of the global emissions outcome of current nationally stated mitigation ambitions as submitted under the Paris Agreement would lead to global greenhouse gas emissions¹⁸ in 2030 of 52–58 GtCO₂eq yr⁻¹ (*medium confidence*). Pathways reflecting these ambitions would not limit global warming to 1.5°C, even if supplemented by very challenging increases in the scale and ambition of emissions reductions after 2030 (*high confidence*). Avoiding overshoot and reliance on future large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) can only be achieved if global CO₂ emissions start to decline well before 2030 (*high confidence*). {1.2, 2.3, 3.3, 3.4, 4.2, 4.4, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}

D.1.1 Pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot show clear emission reductions by 2030 (*high confidence*). All but one show a decline in global greenhouse gas emissions to below 35 GtCO₂eq yr⁻¹ in 2030, and half of available pathways fall within the 25–30 GtCO₂eq yr⁻¹ range (interquartile range), a 40–50% reduction from 2010 levels (*high confidence*). Pathways reflecting current nationally stated mitigation ambition until 2030 are broadly consistent with cost-effective pathways that result in a global warming of about 3°C by 2100, with warming continuing afterwards (*medium confidence*). {2.3.3, 2.3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4, 5.5.3.2}

D.1.2 Overshoot trajectories result in higher impacts and associated challenges compared to pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (*high confidence*). Reversing warming after an overshoot of 0.2°C or larger during this century would require upscaling and deployment of CDR at rates and volumes that might not be achievable given considerable implementation challenges (*medium confidence*). {1.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, 3.3, 4.3.7, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}

D.1.3 The lower the emissions in 2030, the lower the challenge in limiting global warming to 1.5°C after 2030 with no or limited overshoot (*high confidence*). The challenges from delayed actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions include the risk of cost escalation, lock-in in carbon-emitting infrastructure, stranded assets, and reduced flexibility in future response options in the medium to long term (*high confidence*). These may increase uneven distributional impacts between countries at different stages of development (*medium confidence*). {2.3.5, 4.4.5, 5.4.2}

D.2 The avoided climate change impacts on sustainable development, eradication of poverty and reducing inequalities would be greater if global warming were limited to 1.5°C rather than 2°C, if mitigation and adaptation synergies are maximized while trade-offs are minimized (*high confidence*). {1.1, 1.4, 2.5, 3.3, 3.4, 5.2, Table 5.1}

D.2.1 Climate change impacts and responses are closely linked to sustainable development which balances social well-being, economic prosperity and environmental protection. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, provide an established framework for assessing the links between global warming of 1.5°C or 2°C and development goals that include poverty eradication, reducing inequalities, and climate action. (*high confidence*) {Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1, 1.4, 5.1}

D.2.2 The consideration of ethics and equity can help address the uneven distribution of adverse impacts associated with 1.5°C and higher levels of global warming, as well as those from mitigation and adaptation, particularly for poor and disadvantaged populations, in all societies (*high confidence*). {1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.4.3, 2.5.3, 3.4.10, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1, Cross-Chapter Boxes 6 and 8 in Chapter 3, and Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5}

D.2.3 Mitigation and adaptation consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C are underpinned by enabling conditions, assessed in this Report across the geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional

¹⁸ GHG emissions have been aggregated with 100-year GWP values as introduced in the IPCC Second Assessment Report.

dimensions of feasibility. Strengthened multilevel governance, institutional capacity, policy instruments, technological innovation and transfer and mobilization of finance, and changes in human behaviour and lifestyles are enabling conditions that enhance the feasibility of mitigation and adaptation options for 1.5°C-consistent systems transitions. (*high confidence*) {1.4, Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1, 2.5.1, 4.4, 4.5, 5.6}

D.3 Adaptation options specific to national contexts, if carefully selected together with enabling conditions, will have benefits for sustainable development and poverty reduction with global warming of 1.5°C, although trade-offs are possible (*high confidence*). {1.4, 4.3, 4.5}

D.3.1 Adaptation options that reduce the vulnerability of human and natural systems have many synergies with sustainable development, if well managed, such as ensuring food and water security, reducing disaster risks, improving health conditions, maintaining ecosystem services and reducing poverty and inequality (*high confidence*). Increasing investment in physical and social infrastructure is a key enabling condition to enhance the resilience and the adaptive capacities of societies. These benefits can occur in most regions with adaptation to 1.5°C of global warming (*high confidence*). {1.4.3, 4.2.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.5.3, 5.3.1, 5.3.2}

D.3.2 Adaptation to 1.5°C global warming can also result in trade-offs or maladaptations with adverse impacts for sustainable development. For example, if poorly designed or implemented, adaptation projects in a range of sectors can increase greenhouse gas emissions and water use, increase gender and social inequality, undermine health conditions, and encroach on natural ecosystems (*high confidence*). These trade-offs can be reduced by adaptations that include attention to poverty and sustainable development (*high confidence*). {4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.5.4, 5.3.2; Cross-Chapter Boxes 6 and 7 in Chapter 3}

D.3.3 A mix of adaptation and mitigation options to limit global warming to 1.5°C, implemented in a participatory and integrated manner, can enable rapid, systemic transitions in urban and rural areas (*high confidence*). These are most effective when aligned with economic and sustainable development, and when local and regional governments and decision makers are supported by national governments (*medium confidence*). {4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.2}

D.3.4 Adaptation options that also mitigate emissions can provide synergies and cost savings in most sectors and system transitions, such as when land management reduces emissions and disaster risk, or when low-carbon buildings are also designed for efficient cooling. Trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation, when limiting global warming to 1.5°C, such as when bioenergy crops, reforestation or afforestation encroach on land needed for agricultural adaptation, can undermine food security, livelihoods, ecosystem functions and services and other aspects of sustainable development. (*high confidence*) {3.4.3, 4.3.2, 4.3.4, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4}

D.4 Mitigation options consistent with 1.5°C pathways are associated with multiple synergies and trade-offs across the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While the total number of possible synergies exceeds the number of trade-offs, their net effect will depend on the pace and magnitude of changes, the composition of the mitigation portfolio and the management of the transition. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.4) {2.5, 4.5, 5.4}

D.4.1 1.5°C pathways have robust synergies particularly for the SDGs 3 (health), 7 (clean energy), 11 (cities and communities), 12 (responsible consumption and production) and 14 (oceans) (*very high confidence*). Some 1.5°C pathways show potential trade-offs with mitigation for SDGs 1 (poverty), 2 (hunger), 6 (water) and 7 (energy access), if not managed carefully (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.4) {5.4.2; Figure 5.4, Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in Chapter 3}

D.4.2 1.5°C pathways that include low energy demand (e.g., see P1 in Figure SPM.3a and SPM.3b), low material consumption, and low GHG-intensive food consumption have the most pronounced synergies and the lowest number of trade-offs with respect to sustainable development and the SDGs (*high confidence*). Such pathways would reduce dependence on CDR. In modelled pathways, sustainable development, eradicating poverty and reducing inequality can support limiting warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.3b, Figure SPM.4) {2.4.3, 2.5.1, 2.5.3, Figure 2.4, Figure 2.28, 5.4.1, 5.4.2, Figure 5.4}

Indicative linkages between mitigation options and sustainable development using SDGs (The linkages do not show costs and benefits)


Mitigation options deployed in each sector can be associated with potential positive effects (synergies) or negative effects (trade-offs) with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The degree to which this potential is realized will depend on the selected portfolio of mitigation options, mitigation policy design, and local circumstances and context. Particularly in the energy-demand sector, the potential for synergies is larger than for trade-offs. The bars group individually assessed options by level of confidence and take into account the relative strength of the assessed mitigation-SDG connections.

Length shows strength of connection



The overall size of the coloured bars depict the relative potential for synergies and trade-offs between the sectoral mitigation options and the SDGs.

Shades show level of confidence



The shades depict the level of confidence of the assessed potential for Trade-offs/Synergies.




Figure SPM.4 | Potential synergies and trade-offs between the sectoral portfolio of climate change mitigation options and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs serve as an analytical framework for the assessment of the different sustainable development dimensions, which extend beyond the time frame of the 2030 SDG targets. The assessment is based on literature on mitigation options that are considered relevant for 1.5°C. The assessed strength of the SDG interactions is based on the qualitative and quantitative assessment of individual mitigation options listed in Table 5.2. For each mitigation option, the strength of the SDG-connection as well as the associated confidence of the underlying literature (shades of green and red) was assessed. The strength of positive connections (synergies) and negative connections (trade-offs) across all individual options within a sector (see Table 5.2) are aggregated into sectoral potentials for the whole mitigation portfolio. The (white) areas outside the bars, which indicate no interactions, have *low confidence* due to the uncertainty and limited number of studies exploring indirect effects. The strength of the connection considers only the effect of mitigation and does not include benefits of avoided impacts. SDG 13 (climate action) is not listed because mitigation is being considered in terms of interactions with SDGs and not vice versa. The bars denote the strength of the connection, and do not consider the strength of the impact on the SDGs. The energy demand sector comprises behavioural responses, fuel switching and efficiency options in the transport, industry and building sector as well as carbon capture options in the industry sector. Options assessed in the energy supply sector comprise biomass and non-biomass renewables, nuclear, carbon capture and storage (CCS) with bioenergy, and CCS with fossil fuels. Options in the land sector comprise agricultural and forest options, sustainable diets and reduced food waste, soil sequestration, livestock and manure management, reduced deforestation, afforestation and reforestation, and responsible sourcing. In addition to this figure, options in the ocean sector are discussed in the underlying report. {5.4, Table 5.2, Figure 5.2}

Information about the net impacts of mitigation on sustainable development in 1.5°C pathways is available only for a limited number of SDGs and mitigation options. Only a limited number of studies have assessed the benefits of avoided climate change impacts of 1.5°C pathways for the SDGs, and the co-effects of adaptation for mitigation and the SDGs. The assessment of the indicative mitigation potentials in Figure SPM.4 is a step further from AR5 towards a more comprehensive and integrated assessment in the future.

- D.4.3 1.5°C and 2°C modelled pathways often rely on the deployment of large-scale land-related measures like afforestation and bioenergy supply, which, if poorly managed, can compete with food production and hence raise food security concerns (*high confidence*). The impacts of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) options on SDGs depend on the type of options and the scale of deployment (*high confidence*). If poorly implemented, CDR options such as BECCS and AFOLU options would lead to trade-offs. Context-relevant design and implementation requires considering people's needs, biodiversity, and other sustainable development dimensions (*very high confidence*). (Figure SPM.4) {5.4.1.3, Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3}
- D.4.4 Mitigation consistent with 1.5°C pathways creates risks for sustainable development in regions with high dependency on fossil fuels for revenue and employment generation (*high confidence*). Policies that promote diversification of the economy and the energy sector can address the associated challenges (*high confidence*). {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2}
- D.4.5 Redistributive policies across sectors and populations that shield the poor and vulnerable can resolve trade-offs for a range of SDGs, particularly hunger, poverty and energy access. Investment needs for such complementary policies are only a small fraction of the overall mitigation investments in 1.5°C pathways. (*high confidence*) {2.4.3, 5.4.2, Figure 5.5}
- D.5 Limiting the risks from global warming of 1.5°C in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication implies system transitions that can be enabled by an increase of adaptation and mitigation investments, policy instruments, the acceleration of technological innovation and behaviour changes (*high confidence*). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.2, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6}**
- D.5.1 Directing finance towards investment in infrastructure for mitigation and adaptation could provide additional resources. This could involve the mobilization of private funds by institutional investors, asset managers and development or investment banks, as well as the provision of public funds. Government policies that lower the risk of low-emission and adaptation investments can facilitate the mobilization of private funds and enhance the effectiveness of other public policies. Studies indicate a number of challenges, including access to finance and mobilization of funds. (*high confidence*) {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.4.5}
- D.5.2 Adaptation finance consistent with global warming of 1.5°C is difficult to quantify and compare with 2°C. Knowledge gaps include insufficient data to calculate specific climate resilience-enhancing investments from the provision of currently underinvested basic infrastructure. Estimates of the costs of adaptation might be lower at global warming of 1.5°C than for 2°C. Adaptation needs have typically been supported by public sector sources such as national and subnational government budgets, and in developing countries together with support from development assistance, multilateral development banks, and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change channels (*medium confidence*). More recently there is a

growing understanding of the scale and increase in non-governmental organizations and private funding in some regions (*medium confidence*). Barriers include the scale of adaptation financing, limited capacity and access to adaptation finance (*medium confidence*). {4.4.5, 4.6}

- D.5.3 Global model pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C are projected to involve the annual average investment needs in the energy system of around 2.4 trillion USD2010 between 2016 and 2035, representing about 2.5% of the world GDP (*medium confidence*). {4.4.5, Box 4.8}
- D.5.4 Policy tools can help mobilize incremental resources, including through shifting global investments and savings and through market and non-market based instruments as well as accompanying measures to secure the equity of the transition, acknowledging the challenges related with implementation, including those of energy costs, depreciation of assets and impacts on international competition, and utilizing the opportunities to maximize co-benefits (*high confidence*). {1.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4, 4.4.5, 5.5.2}
- D.5.5 The systems transitions consistent with adapting to and limiting global warming to 1.5°C include the widespread adoption of new and possibly disruptive technologies and practices and enhanced climate-driven innovation. These imply enhanced technological innovation capabilities, including in industry and finance. Both national innovation policies and international cooperation can contribute to the development, commercialization and widespread adoption of mitigation and adaptation technologies. Innovation policies may be more effective when they combine public support for research and development with policy mixes that provide incentives for technology diffusion. (*high confidence*) {4.4.4, 4.4.5}.
- D.5.6 Education, information, and community approaches, including those that are informed by indigenous knowledge and local knowledge, can accelerate the wide-scale behaviour changes consistent with adapting to and limiting global warming to 1.5°C. These approaches are more effective when combined with other policies and tailored to the motivations, capabilities and resources of specific actors and contexts (*high confidence*). Public acceptability can enable or inhibit the implementation of policies and measures to limit global warming to 1.5°C and to adapt to the consequences. Public acceptability depends on the individual's evaluation of expected policy consequences, the perceived fairness of the distribution of these consequences, and perceived fairness of decision procedures (*high confidence*). {1.1, 1.5, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, Box 4.3, 5.5.3, 5.6.5}
- D.6 Sustainable development supports, and often enables, the fundamental societal and systems transitions and transformations that help limit global warming to 1.5°C. Such changes facilitate the pursuit of climate-resilient development pathways that achieve ambitious mitigation and adaptation in conjunction with poverty eradication and efforts to reduce inequalities (*high confidence*). {Box 1.1, 1.4.3, Figure 5.1, 5.5.3, Box 5.3}**
- D.6.1 Social justice and equity are core aspects of climate-resilient development pathways that aim to limit global warming to 1.5°C as they address challenges and inevitable trade-offs, widen opportunities, and ensure that options, visions, and values are deliberated, between and within countries and communities, without making the poor and disadvantaged worse off (*high confidence*). {5.5.2, 5.5.3, Box 5.3, Figure 5.1, Figure 5.6, Cross-Chapter Boxes 12 and 13 in Chapter 5}
- D.6.2 The potential for climate-resilient development pathways differs between and within regions and nations, due to different development contexts and systemic vulnerabilities (*very high confidence*). Efforts along such pathways to date have been limited (*medium confidence*) and enhanced efforts would involve strengthened and timely action from all countries and non-state actors (*high confidence*). {5.5.1, 5.5.3, Figure 5.1}
- D.6.3 Pathways that are consistent with sustainable development show fewer mitigation and adaptation challenges and are associated with lower mitigation costs. The large majority of modelling studies could not construct pathways characterized by lack of international cooperation, inequality and poverty that were able to limit global warming to 1.5°C. (*high confidence*) {2.3.1, 2.5.1, 2.5.3, 5.5.2}

- D.7 Strengthening the capacities for climate action of national and sub-national authorities, civil society, the private sector, indigenous peoples and local communities can support the implementation of ambitious actions implied by limiting global warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). International cooperation can provide an enabling environment for this to be achieved in all countries and for all people, in the context of sustainable development. International cooperation is a critical enabler for developing countries and vulnerable regions (*high confidence*). {1.4, 2.3, 2.5, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7, Box 5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 5}**
- D.7.1 Partnerships involving non-state public and private actors, institutional investors, the banking system, civil society and scientific institutions would facilitate actions and responses consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C (*very high confidence*). {1.4, 4.4.1, 4.2.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.5, 4.5.3, 5.4.1, 5.6.2, Box 5.3}.
- D.7.2 Cooperation on strengthened accountable multilevel governance that includes non-state actors such as industry, civil society and scientific institutions, coordinated sectoral and cross-sectoral policies at various governance levels, gender-sensitive policies, finance including innovative financing, and cooperation on technology development and transfer can ensure participation, transparency, capacity building and learning among different players (*high confidence*). {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, 5.3.1, 5.5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 5, 5.6.1, 5.6.3}
- D.7.3 International cooperation is a critical enabler for developing countries and vulnerable regions to strengthen their action for the implementation of 1.5°C-consistent climate responses, including through enhancing access to finance and technology and enhancing domestic capacities, taking into account national and local circumstances and needs (*high confidence*). {2.3.1, 2.5.1, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 5.4.1 5.5.3, 5.6.1, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7}.
- D.7.4 Collective efforts at all levels, in ways that reflect different circumstances and capabilities, in the pursuit of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, taking into account equity as well as effectiveness, can facilitate strengthening the global response to climate change, achieving sustainable development and eradicating poverty (*high confidence*). {1.4.2, 2.3.1, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.5.3, 5.3.1, 5.4.1, 5.5.3, 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3}

Box SPM.1: Core Concepts Central to this Special Report

Global mean surface temperature (GMST): Estimated global average of near-surface air temperatures over land and sea ice, and sea surface temperatures over ice-free ocean regions, with changes normally expressed as departures from a value over a specified reference period. When estimating changes in GMST, near-surface air temperature over both land and oceans are also used.¹⁹ {1.2.1.1}

Pre-industrial: The multi-century period prior to the onset of large-scale industrial activity around 1750. The reference period 1850–1900 is used to approximate pre-industrial GMST. {1.2.1.2}

Global warming: The estimated increase in GMST averaged over a 30-year period, or the 30-year period centred on a particular year or decade, expressed relative to pre-industrial levels unless otherwise specified. For 30-year periods that span past and future years, the current multi-decadal warming trend is assumed to continue. {1.2.1}

Net zero CO₂ emissions: Net zero carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions are achieved when anthropogenic CO₂ emissions are balanced globally by anthropogenic CO₂ removals over a specified period.

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR): Anthropogenic activities removing CO₂ from the atmosphere and durably storing it in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products. It includes existing and potential anthropogenic enhancement of biological or geochemical sinks and direct air capture and storage, but excludes natural CO₂ uptake not directly caused by human activities.

Total carbon budget: Estimated cumulative net global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions from the pre-industrial period to the time that anthropogenic CO₂ emissions reach net zero that would result, at some probability, in limiting global warming to a given level, accounting for the impact of other anthropogenic emissions. {2.2.2}

Remaining carbon budget: Estimated cumulative net global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions from a given start date to the time that anthropogenic CO₂ emissions reach net zero that would result, at some probability, in limiting global warming to a given level, accounting for the impact of other anthropogenic emissions. {2.2.2}

Temperature overshoot: The temporary exceedance of a specified level of global warming.

Emission pathways: In this Summary for Policymakers, the modelled trajectories of global anthropogenic emissions over the 21st century are termed emission pathways. Emission pathways are classified by their temperature trajectory over the 21st century: pathways giving at least 50% probability based on current knowledge of limiting global warming to below 1.5°C are classified as ‘no overshoot’; those limiting warming to below 1.6°C and returning to 1.5°C by 2100 are classified as ‘1.5°C limited-overshoot’; while those exceeding 1.6°C but still returning to 1.5°C by 2100 are classified as ‘higher-overshoot’.

Impacts: Effects of climate change on human and natural systems. Impacts can have beneficial or adverse outcomes for livelihoods, health and well-being, ecosystems and species, services, infrastructure, and economic, social and cultural assets.

Risk: The potential for adverse consequences from a climate-related hazard for human and natural systems, resulting from the interactions between the hazard and the vulnerability and exposure of the affected system. Risk integrates the likelihood of exposure to a hazard and the magnitude of its impact. Risk also can describe the potential for adverse consequences of adaptation or mitigation responses to climate change.

Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs): Trajectories that strengthen sustainable development at multiple scales and efforts to eradicate poverty through equitable societal and systems transitions and transformations while reducing the threat of climate change through ambitious mitigation, adaptation and climate resilience.

¹⁹ Past IPCC reports, reflecting the literature, have used a variety of approximately equivalent metrics of GMST change.

Technical Summary

TS

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TS.1 Framing and Context

This chapter frames the context, knowledge-base and assessment approaches used to understand the impacts of 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, building on the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.

Human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C (likely between 0.8°C and 1.2°C) above pre-industrial levels in 2017, increasing at 0.2°C (likely between 0.1°C and 0.3°C) per decade (high confidence). Global warming is defined in this report as an increase in combined surface air and sea surface temperatures averaged over the globe and over a 30-year period. Unless otherwise specified, warming is expressed relative to the period 1850–1900, used as an approximation of pre-industrial temperatures in AR5. For periods shorter than 30 years, warming refers to the estimated average temperature over the 30 years centred on that shorter period, accounting for the impact of any temperature fluctuations or trend within those 30 years. Accordingly, warming from pre-industrial levels to the decade 2006–2015 is assessed to be 0.87°C (likely between 0.75°C and 0.99°C). Since 2000, the estimated level of human-induced warming has been equal to the level of observed warming with a likely range of ±20% accounting for uncertainty due to contributions from solar and volcanic activity over the historical period (high confidence). {1.2.1}

Warming greater than the global average has already been experienced in many regions and seasons, with higher average warming over land than over the ocean (high confidence). Most land regions are experiencing greater warming than the global average, while most ocean regions are warming at a slower rate. Depending on the temperature dataset considered, 20–40% of the global human population live in regions that, by the decade 2006–2015, had already experienced warming of more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial in at least one season (medium confidence). {1.2.1, 1.2.2}

Past emissions alone are unlikely to raise global-mean temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (medium confidence), but past emissions do commit to other changes, such as further sea level rise (high confidence). If all anthropogenic emissions (including aerosol-related) were reduced to zero immediately, any further warming beyond the 1°C already experienced would likely be less than 0.5°C over the next two to three decades (high confidence), and likely less than 0.5°C on a century time scale (medium confidence), due to the opposing effects of different climate processes and drivers. A warming greater than 1.5°C is therefore not geophysically unavoidable: whether it will occur depends on future rates of emission reductions. {1.2.3, 1.2.4}

1.5°C emission pathways are defined as those that, given current knowledge of the climate response, provide a one-in-two to two-in-three chance of warming either remaining below 1.5°C or returning to 1.5°C by around 2100 following

an overshoot. Overshoot pathways are characterized by the peak magnitude of the overshoot, which may have implications for impacts. All 1.5°C pathways involve limiting cumulative emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, and substantial reductions in other climate forcers (high confidence). Limiting cumulative emissions requires either reducing net global emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases to zero before the cumulative limit is reached, or net negative global emissions (anthropogenic removals) after the limit is exceeded. {1.2.3, 1.2.4, Cross-Chapter Boxes 1 and 2}

This report assesses projected impacts at a global average warming of 1.5°C and higher levels of warming. Global warming of 1.5°C is associated with global average surface temperatures fluctuating naturally on either side of 1.5°C, together with warming substantially greater than 1.5°C in many regions and seasons (high confidence), all of which must be considered in the assessment of impacts. Impacts at 1.5°C of warming also depend on the emission pathway to 1.5°C. Very different impacts result from pathways that remain below 1.5°C versus pathways that return to 1.5°C after a substantial overshoot, and when temperatures stabilize at 1.5°C versus a transient warming past 1.5°C (medium confidence). {1.2.3, 1.3}

Ethical considerations, and the principle of equity in particular, are central to this report, recognizing that many of the impacts of warming up to and beyond 1.5°C, and some potential impacts of mitigation actions required to limit warming to 1.5°C, fall disproportionately on the poor and vulnerable (high confidence). Equity has procedural and distributive dimensions and requires fairness in burden sharing both between generations and between and within nations. In framing the objective of holding the increase in the global average temperature rise to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C, the Paris Agreement associates the principle of equity with the broader goals of poverty eradication and sustainable development, recognising that effective responses to climate change require a global collective effort that may be guided by the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. {1.1.1}

Climate adaptation refers to the actions taken to manage impacts of climate change by reducing vulnerability and exposure to its harmful effects and exploiting any potential benefits. Adaptation takes place at international, national and local levels. Subnational jurisdictions and entities, including urban and rural municipalities, are key to developing and reinforcing measures for reducing weather- and climate-related risks. Adaptation implementation faces several barriers including lack of up-to-date and locally relevant information, lack of finance and technology, social values and attitudes, and institutional constraints (high confidence). Adaptation is more likely to contribute to sustainable development when policies align with mitigation and poverty eradication goals (medium confidence). {1.1, 1.4}

Ambitious mitigation actions are indispensable to limit warming to 1.5°C while achieving sustainable development and poverty eradication (high confidence). Ill-designed responses,

however, could pose challenges especially – but not exclusively – for countries and regions contending with poverty and those requiring significant transformation of their energy systems. This report focuses on ‘climate-resilient development pathways’, which aim to meet the goals of sustainable development, including climate adaptation and mitigation, poverty eradication and reducing inequalities. But any feasible pathway that remains within 1.5°C involves synergies and trade-offs (*high confidence*). Significant uncertainty remains as to which pathways are more consistent with the principle of equity. {1.1.1, 1.4}

Multiple forms of knowledge, including scientific evidence, narrative scenarios and prospective pathways, inform the understanding of 1.5°C. This report is informed by traditional evidence of the physical climate system and associated impacts and vulnerabilities of climate change, together with knowledge drawn from the perceptions of risk and the experiences of climate impacts and governance systems. Scenarios and pathways are used to explore conditions enabling goal-oriented futures while recognizing the significance of ethical considerations, the principle of equity, and the societal transformation needed. {1.2.3, 1.5.2}

There is no single answer to the question of whether it is feasible to limit warming to 1.5°C and adapt to the consequences. Feasibility is considered in this report as the capacity of a system as a whole to achieve a specific outcome. The global transformation that would be needed to limit warming to 1.5°C requires enabling conditions that reflect the links, synergies and trade-offs between mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development. These enabling conditions are assessed across many dimensions of feasibility – geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional – that may be considered through the unifying lens of the Anthropocene, acknowledging profound, differential but increasingly geologically significant human influences on the Earth system as a whole. This framing also emphasises the global interconnectivity of past, present and future human–environment relations, highlighting the need and opportunities for integrated responses to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. {1.1, Cross-Chapter Box 1}

TS.2 Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable Development

This chapter assesses mitigation pathways consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. In doing so, it explores the following key questions: What role do CO₂ and non-CO₂ emissions play? {2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6} To what extent do 1.5°C pathways involve overshooting and returning below 1.5°C during the 21st century? {2.2, 2.3} What are the implications for transitions in energy, land use and sustainable development? {2.3, 2.4, 2.5} How do policy frameworks affect the ability to limit warming to 1.5°C? {2.3, 2.5} What are the associated knowledge gaps? {2.6}

The assessed pathways describe integrated, quantitative evolutions of all emissions over the 21st century associated with global energy and land use and the world economy. The assessment is contingent upon available integrated assessment literature and model assumptions, and is complemented by other studies with different scope, for example, those focusing on individual sectors. In recent years, integrated mitigation studies have improved the characterizations of mitigation pathways. However, limitations remain, as climate damages, avoided impacts, or societal co-benefits of the modelled transformations remain largely unaccounted for, while concurrent rapid technological changes, behavioural aspects, and uncertainties about input data present continuous challenges. (*high confidence*) {2.1.3, 2.3, 2.5.1, 2.6, Technical Annex 2}

The Chances of Limiting Warming to 1.5°C and the Requirements for Urgent Action

Pathways consistent with 1.5°C of warming above pre-industrial levels can be identified under a range of assumptions about economic growth, technology developments and lifestyles. However, lack of global cooperation, lack of governance of the required energy and land transformation, and increases in resource-intensive consumption are key impediments to achieving 1.5°C pathways. Governance challenges have been related to scenarios with high inequality and high population growth in the 1.5°C pathway literature. {2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.5}

Under emissions in line with current pledges under the Paris Agreement (known as Nationally Determined Contributions, or NDCs), global warming is expected to surpass 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, even if these pledges are supplemented with very challenging increases in the scale and ambition of mitigation after 2030 (*high confidence*). This increased action would need to achieve net zero CO₂ emissions in less than 15 years. Even if this is achieved, temperatures would only be expected to remain below the 1.5°C threshold if the actual geophysical response ends up being towards the low end of the currently estimated uncertainty range. Transition challenges as well as identified trade-offs can be reduced if global emissions peak before 2030 and marked emissions reductions compared to today are already achieved by 2030. {2.2, 2.3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}

Limiting warming to 1.5°C depends on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over the next decades, where lower GHG emissions in 2030 lead to a higher chance of keeping peak warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). Available pathways that aim for no or limited (less than 0.1°C) overshoot of 1.5°C keep GHG emissions in 2030 to 25–30 GtCO_{2e} yr⁻¹ in 2030 (interquartile range). This contrasts with median estimates for current unconditional NDCs of 52–58 GtCO_{2e} yr⁻¹ in 2030. Pathways that aim for limiting warming to 1.5°C by 2100 after a temporary temperature overshoot rely on large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) measures, which are uncertain and entail clear risks. In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO₂ emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range). For limiting global warming to below 2°C with at least 66% probability CO₂ emissions are projected to decline by about 25% by 2030 in most pathways (10–30% interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2070 (2065–2080 interquartile range).¹ {2.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.5, 2.5.3, Cross-Chapter Boxes 6 in Chapter 3 and 9 in Chapter 4, 4.3.7}

Limiting warming to 1.5°C implies reaching net zero CO₂ emissions globally around 2050 and concurrent deep reductions in emissions of non-CO₂ forcers, particularly methane (*high confidence*). Such mitigation pathways are characterized by energy-demand reductions, decarbonization of electricity and other fuels, electrification of energy end use, deep reductions in agricultural emissions, and some form of CDR with carbon storage on land or sequestration in geological reservoirs. Low energy demand and low demand for land- and GHG-intensive consumption goods facilitate limiting warming to as close as possible to 1.5°C. {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}

In comparison to a 2°C limit, the transformations required to limit warming to 1.5°C are qualitatively similar but more pronounced and rapid over the next decades (*high confidence*). 1.5°C implies very ambitious, internationally cooperative policy environments that transform both supply and demand (*high confidence*). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5}

Policies reflecting a high price on emissions are necessary in models to achieve cost-effective 1.5°C pathways (*high confidence*). Other things being equal, modelling studies suggest the global average discounted marginal abatement costs for limiting warming to 1.5°C being about 3–4 times higher compared to 2°C over the 21st century, with large variations across models and socio-economic and policy assumptions. Carbon pricing can be imposed directly or implicitly by regulatory policies. Policy instruments, like technology policies or performance standards, can complement explicit carbon pricing in specific areas. {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.4.5}

Limiting warming to 1.5°C requires a marked shift in investment patterns (*medium confidence*). Additional annual average energy-related investments for the period 2016 to 2050 in pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C compared to pathways without new climate policies beyond those in place today (i.e., baseline) are estimated to be around

830 billion USD₂₀₁₀ (range of 150 billion to 1700 billion USD₂₀₁₀ across six models). Total energy-related investments increase by about 12% (range of 3% to 24%) in 1.5°C pathways relative to 2°C pathways. Average annual investment in low-carbon energy technologies and energy efficiency are upscaled by roughly a factor of six (range of factor of 4 to 10) by 2050 compared to 2015, overtaking fossil investments globally by around 2025 (*medium confidence*). Uncertainties and strategic mitigation portfolio choices affect the magnitude and focus of required investments. {2.5.2}

Future Emissions in 1.5°C Pathways

Mitigation requirements can be quantified using carbon budget approaches that relate cumulative CO₂ emissions to global mean temperature increase. Robust physical understanding underpins this relationship, but uncertainties become increasingly relevant as a specific temperature limit is approached. These uncertainties relate to the transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE), non-CO₂ emissions, radiative forcing and response, potential additional Earth system feedbacks (such as permafrost thawing), and historical emissions and temperature. {2.2.2, 2.6.1}

Cumulative CO₂ emissions are kept within a budget by reducing global annual CO₂ emissions to net zero. This assessment suggests a remaining budget of about 420 GtCO₂ for a two-thirds chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C, and of about 580 GtCO₂ for an even chance (*medium confidence*). The remaining carbon budget is defined here as cumulative CO₂ emissions from the start of 2018 until the time of net zero global emissions for global warming defined as a change in global near-surface air temperatures. Remaining budgets applicable to 2100 would be approximately 100 GtCO₂ lower than this to account for permafrost thawing and potential methane release from wetlands in the future, and more thereafter. These estimates come with an additional geophysical uncertainty of at least ±400 GtCO₂, related to non-CO₂ response and TCRE distribution. Uncertainties in the level of historic warming contribute ±250 GtCO₂. In addition, these estimates can vary by ±250 GtCO₂ depending on non-CO₂ mitigation strategies as found in available pathways. {2.2.2, 2.6.1}

Staying within a remaining carbon budget of 580 GtCO₂ implies that CO₂ emissions reach carbon neutrality in about 30 years, reduced to 20 years for a 420 GtCO₂ remaining carbon budget (*high confidence*). The ±400 GtCO₂ geophysical uncertainty range surrounding a carbon budget translates into a variation of this timing of carbon neutrality of roughly ±15–20 years. If emissions do not start declining in the next decade, the point of carbon neutrality would need to be reached at least two decades earlier to remain within the same carbon budget. {2.2.2, 2.3.5}

Non-CO₂ emissions contribute to peak warming and thus affect the remaining carbon budget. The evolution of methane and sulphur dioxide emissions strongly influences the chances of limiting warming to 1.5°C. In the near-term, a

¹ Kyoto-GHG emissions in this statement are aggregated with GWP-100 values of the IPCC Second Assessment Report.

weakening of aerosol cooling would add to future warming, but can be tempered by reductions in methane emissions (*high confidence*). Uncertainty in radiative forcing estimates (particularly aerosol) affects carbon budgets and the certainty of pathway categorizations. Some non-CO₂ forcers are emitted alongside CO₂, particularly in the energy and transport sectors, and can be largely addressed through CO₂ mitigation. Others require specific measures, for example, to target agricultural nitrous oxide (N₂O) and methane (CH₄), some sources of black carbon, or hydrofluorocarbons (*high confidence*). In many cases, non-CO₂ emissions reductions are similar in 2°C pathways, indicating reductions near their assumed maximum potential by integrated assessment models. Emissions of N₂O and NH₃ increase in some pathways with strongly increased bioenergy demand. {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.2, 2.5.3}

The Role of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)

All analysed pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot use CDR to some extent to neutralize emissions from sources for which no mitigation measures have been identified and, in most cases, also to achieve net negative emissions to return global warming to 1.5°C following a peak (*high confidence*). The longer the delay in reducing CO₂ emissions towards zero, the larger the likelihood of exceeding 1.5°C, and the heavier the implied reliance on net negative emissions after mid-century to return warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). The faster reduction of net CO₂ emissions in 1.5°C compared to 2°C pathways is predominantly achieved by measures that result in less CO₂ being produced and emitted, and only to a smaller degree through additional CDR. Limitations on the speed, scale and societal acceptability of CDR deployment also limit the conceivable extent of temperature overshoot. Limits to our understanding of how the carbon cycle responds to net negative emissions increase the uncertainty about the effectiveness of CDR to decline temperatures after a peak. {2.2, 2.3, 2.6, 4.3.7}

CDR deployed at scale is unproven, and reliance on such technology is a major risk in the ability to limit warming to 1.5°C. CDR is needed less in pathways with particularly strong emphasis on energy efficiency and low demand. The scale and type of CDR deployment varies widely across 1.5°C pathways, with different consequences for achieving sustainable development objectives (*high confidence*). Some pathways rely more on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), while others rely more on afforestation, which are the two CDR methods most often included in integrated pathways. Trade-offs with other sustainability objectives occur predominantly through increased land, energy, water and investment demand. Bioenergy use is substantial in 1.5°C pathways with or without BECCS due to its multiple roles in decarbonizing energy use. {2.3.1, 2.5.3, 2.6.3, 4.3.7}

Properties of Energy and Land Transitions in 1.5°C Pathways

The share of primary energy from renewables increases while coal usage decreases across pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (*high confidence*). By 2050, renewables (including bioenergy, hydro, wind, and solar, with direct-

equivalence method) supply a share of 52–67% (interquartile range) of primary energy in 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot; while the share from coal decreases to 1–7% (interquartile range), with a large fraction of this coal use combined with carbon capture and storage (CCS). From 2020 to 2050 the primary energy supplied by oil declines in most pathways (–39 to –77% interquartile range). Natural gas changes by –13% to –62% (interquartile range), but some pathways show a marked increase albeit with widespread deployment of CCS. The overall deployment of CCS varies widely across 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot, with cumulative CO₂ stored through 2050 ranging from zero up to 300 GtCO₂ (minimum–maximum range), of which zero up to 140 GtCO₂ is stored from biomass. Primary energy supplied by bioenergy ranges from 40–310 EJ yr^{–1} in 2050 (minimum–maximum range), and nuclear from 3–66 EJ yr^{–1} (minimum–maximum range). These ranges reflect both uncertainties in technological development and strategic mitigation portfolio choices. {2.4.2}

1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot include a rapid decline in the carbon intensity of electricity and an increase in electrification of energy end use (*high confidence*). By 2050, the carbon intensity of electricity decreases to –92 to +11 gCO₂ MJ^{–1} (minimum–maximum range) from about 140 gCO₂ MJ^{–1} in 2020, and electricity covers 34–71% (minimum–maximum range) of final energy across 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot from about 20% in 2020. By 2050, the share of electricity supplied by renewables increases to 59–97% (minimum–maximum range) across 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot. Pathways with higher chances of holding warming to below 1.5°C generally show a faster decline in the carbon intensity of electricity by 2030 than pathways that temporarily overshoot 1.5°C. {2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3}

Transitions in global and regional land use are found in all pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, but their scale depends on the pursued mitigation portfolio (*high confidence*). Pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot project a 4 million km² reduction to a 2.5 million km² increase of non-pasture agricultural land for food and feed crops and a 0.5–11 million km² reduction of pasture land, to be converted into 0–6 million km² of agricultural land for energy crops and a 2 million km² reduction to 9.5 million km² increase in forests by 2050 relative to 2010 (*medium confidence*). Land-use transitions of similar magnitude can be observed in modelled 2°C pathways (*medium confidence*). Such large transitions pose profound challenges for sustainable management of the various demands on land for human settlements, food, livestock feed, fibre, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity and other ecosystem services (*high confidence*). {2.3.4, 2.4.4}

Demand-Side Mitigation and Behavioural Changes

Demand-side measures are key elements of 1.5°C pathways. Lifestyle choices lowering energy demand and the land- and GHG-intensity of food consumption can further support achievement of 1.5°C pathways (*high confidence*). By 2030 and 2050, all end-use sectors (including building, transport, and industry) show marked energy demand reductions in modelled 1.5°C pathways,

comparable and beyond those projected in 2°C pathways. Sectoral models support the scale of these reductions. {2.3.4, 2.4.3, 2.5.1}

Links between 1.5°C Pathways and Sustainable Development

Choices about mitigation portfolios for limiting warming to 1.5°C can positively or negatively impact the achievement of other societal objectives, such as sustainable development (*high confidence*). In particular, demand-side and efficiency measures, and lifestyle choices that limit energy, resource, and GHG-intensive food demand support sustainable development (*medium confidence*). Limiting warming to 1.5°C can be achieved synergistically with poverty alleviation and improved energy security and can provide large public health benefits through improved air quality, preventing millions of premature deaths. However, specific mitigation measures, such as bioenergy, may result in trade-offs that require consideration. {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3}

TS.3 Impacts of 1.5°C Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems

This chapter builds on findings of AR5 and assesses new scientific evidence of changes in the climate system and the associated impacts on natural and human systems, with a specific focus on the magnitude and pattern of risks linked for global warming of 1.5°C above temperatures in the pre-industrial period. Chapter 3 explores observed impacts and projected risks to a range of natural and human systems, with a focus on how risk levels change from 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming. The chapter also revisits major categories of risk (Reasons for Concern, RFC) based on the assessment of new knowledge that has become available since AR5.

1.5°C and 2°C Warmer Worlds

The global climate has changed relative to the pre-industrial period, and there are multiple lines of evidence that these changes have had impacts on organisms and ecosystems, as well as on human systems and well-being (*high confidence*). The increase in global mean surface temperature (GMST), which reached 0.87°C in 2006–2015 relative to 1850–1900, has increased the frequency and magnitude of impacts (*high confidence*), strengthening evidence of how an increase in GMST of 1.5°C or more could impact natural and human systems (1.5°C versus 2°C). {3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, Cross-Chapter Boxes 6, 7 and 8 in this chapter}

Human-induced global warming has already caused multiple observed changes in the climate system (*high confidence*). Changes include increases in both land and ocean temperatures, as well as more frequent heatwaves in most land regions (*high confidence*). There is also *high confidence* that global warming has resulted in an increase in the frequency and duration of marine heatwaves. Further, there is substantial evidence that human-induced global warming has led to an increase in the frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy precipitation events at the global scale (*medium confidence*), as well as an increased risk of drought in the Mediterranean region (*medium confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, Box 3.4}

Trends in intensity and frequency of some climate and weather extremes have been detected over time spans during which about 0.5°C of global warming occurred (*medium confidence*). This assessment is based on several lines of evidence, including attribution studies for changes in extremes since 1950. {3.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4}

Several regional changes in climate are assessed to occur with global warming up to 1.5°C as compared to pre-industrial levels, including warming of extreme temperatures in many regions (*high confidence*), increases in frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy precipitation in several regions (*high confidence*), and an increase in intensity or frequency of droughts in some regions (*medium confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, Table 3.2}

There is no single '1.5°C warmer world' (*high confidence*). In addition to the overall increase in GMST, it is important to consider the

size and duration of potential overshoots in temperature. Furthermore, there are questions on how the stabilization of an increase in GMST of 1.5°C can be achieved, and how policies might be able to influence the resilience of human and natural systems, and the nature of regional and subregional risks. Overshooting poses large risks for natural and human systems, especially if the temperature at peak warming is high, because some risks may be long-lasting and irreversible, such as the loss of some ecosystems (*high confidence*). The rate of change for several types of risks may also have relevance, with potentially large risks in the case of a rapid rise to overshooting temperatures, even if a decrease to 1.5°C can be achieved at the end of the 21st century or later (*medium confidence*). If overshoot is to be minimized, the remaining equivalent CO₂ budget available for emissions is very small, which implies that large, immediate and unprecedented global efforts to mitigate greenhouse gases are required (*high confidence*). {3.2, 3.6.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this chapter}

Robust¹ global differences in temperature means and extremes are expected if global warming reaches 1.5°C versus 2°C above the pre-industrial levels (*high confidence*). For oceans, regional surface temperature means and extremes are projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming (*high confidence*). Temperature means and extremes are also projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C in most land regions, with increases being 2–3 times greater than the increase in GMST projected for some regions (*high confidence*). Robust increases in temperature means and extremes are also projected at 1.5°C compared to present-day values (*high confidence*) {3.3.1, 3.3.2}. There are decreases in the occurrence of cold extremes, but substantial increases in their temperature, in particular in regions with snow or ice cover (*high confidence*) {3.3.1}.

Climate models project robust² differences in regional climate between present-day and global warming up to 1.5°C³, and between 1.5°C and 2°C³ (*high confidence*), depending on the variable and region in question (*high confidence*). Large, robust and widespread differences are expected for temperature extremes (*high confidence*). Regarding hot extremes, the strongest warming is expected to occur at mid-latitudes in the warm season (with increases of up to 3°C for 1.5°C of global warming, i.e., a factor of two) and at high latitudes in the cold season (with increases of up to 4.5°C at 1.5°C of global warming, i.e., a factor of three) (*high confidence*). The strongest warming of hot extremes is projected to occur in central and eastern North America, central and southern Europe, the Mediterranean region (including southern Europe, northern Africa and the Near East), western and central Asia, and southern Africa (*medium confidence*). The number of exceptionally hot days are expected to increase the most in the tropics, where interannual temperature variability is lowest; extreme heatwaves are thus projected to emerge earliest in these regions, and they are expected to already become widespread there at 1.5°C global warming (*high confidence*). Limiting global warming to 1.5°C instead of 2°C could result in around 420 million fewer people being frequently exposed to extreme heatwaves,

and about 65 million fewer people being exposed to exceptional heatwaves, assuming constant vulnerability (*medium confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this chapter}

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would limit risks of increases in heavy precipitation events on a global scale and in several regions compared to conditions at 2°C global warming (*medium confidence*). The regions with the largest increases in heavy precipitation events for 1.5°C to 2°C global warming include: several high-latitude regions (e.g. Alaska/western Canada, eastern Canada/Greenland/Iceland, northern Europe and northern Asia); mountainous regions (e.g., Tibetan Plateau); eastern Asia (including China and Japan); and eastern North America (*medium confidence*). Tropical cyclones are projected to decrease in frequency but with an increase in the number of very intense cyclones (*limited evidence, low confidence*). Heavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones is projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming (*medium confidence*). Heavy precipitation, when aggregated at a global scale, is projected to be higher at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming (*medium confidence*) {3.3.3, 3.3.6}

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C is expected to substantially reduce the probability of extreme drought, precipitation deficits, and risks associated with water availability (i.e., water stress) in some regions (*medium confidence*). In particular, risks associated with increases in drought frequency and magnitude are projected to be substantially larger at 2°C than at 1.5°C in the Mediterranean region (including southern Europe, northern Africa and the Near East) and southern Africa (*medium confidence*). {3.3.3, 3.3.4, Box 3.1, Box 3.2}

Risks to natural and human systems are expected to be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C of global warming (*high confidence*). This difference is due to the smaller rates and magnitudes of climate change associated with a 1.5°C temperature increase, including lower frequencies and intensities of temperature-related extremes. Lower rates of change enhance the ability of natural and human systems to adapt, with substantial benefits for a wide range of terrestrial, freshwater, wetland, coastal and ocean ecosystems (including coral reefs) (*high confidence*), as well as food production systems, human health, and tourism (*medium confidence*), together with energy systems and transportation (*low confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.4}

Exposure to multiple and compound climate-related risks is projected to increase between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming with greater proportions of people both exposed and susceptible to poverty in Africa and Asia (*high confidence*). For global warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, risks across energy, food, and water sectors could overlap spatially and temporally, creating new – and exacerbating current – hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities that could affect increasing numbers of people and regions (*medium confidence*). Small island states and economically disadvantaged populations are particularly at risk (*high confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.6, 3.4.11, 3.5.4.9, Box 3.5}

² Robust is used here to mean that at least two thirds of climate models show the same sign of changes at the grid point scale, and that differences in large regions are statistically significant.

³ Projected changes in impacts between different levels of global warming are determined with respect to changes in global mean near-surface air temperature.

Global warming of 2°C would lead to an expansion of areas with significant increases in runoff, as well as those affected by flood hazard, compared to conditions at 1.5°C (medium confidence). Global warming of 1.5°C would also lead to an expansion of the global land area with significant increases in runoff (*medium confidence*) and an increase in flood hazard in some regions (*medium confidence*) compared to present-day conditions. {3.3.5}

The probability of a sea-ice-free Arctic Ocean⁴ during summer is substantially higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming (medium confidence). Model simulations suggest that at least one sea-ice-free Arctic summer is expected every 10 years for global warming of 2°C, with the frequency decreasing to one sea-ice-free Arctic summer every 100 years under 1.5°C (*medium confidence*). An intermediate temperature overshoot will have no long-term consequences for Arctic sea ice coverage, and hysteresis is not expected (*high confidence*). {3.3.8, 3.4.4.7}

Global mean sea level rise (GMSLR) is projected to be around 0.1 m (0.04 – 0.16 m) less by the end of the 21st century in a 1.5°C warmer world compared to a 2°C warmer world (medium confidence). Projected GMSLR for 1.5°C of global warming has an indicative range of 0.26 – 0.77m, relative to 1986–2005, (*medium confidence*). A smaller sea level rise could mean that up to 10.4 million fewer people (based on the 2010 global population and assuming no adaptation) would be exposed to the impacts of sea level rise globally in 2100 at 1.5°C compared to at 2°C. A slower rate of sea level rise enables greater opportunities for adaptation (*medium confidence*). There is *high confidence* that sea level rise will continue beyond 2100. Instabilities exist for both the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, which could result in multi-meter rises in sea level on time scales of century to millennia. There is *medium confidence* that these instabilities could be triggered at around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming. {3.3.9, 3.4.5, 3.6.3}

The ocean has absorbed about 30% of the anthropogenic carbon dioxide, resulting in ocean acidification and changes to carbonate chemistry that are unprecedented for at least the last 65 million years (high confidence). Risks have been identified for the survival, calcification, growth, development and abundance of a broad range of marine taxonomic groups, ranging from algae to fish, with substantial evidence of predictable trait-based sensitivities (*high confidence*). There are multiple lines of evidence that ocean warming and acidification corresponding to 1.5°C of global warming would impact a wide range of marine organisms and ecosystems, as well as sectors such as aquaculture and fisheries (*high confidence*). {3.3.10, 3.4.4}

Larger risks are expected for many regions and systems for global warming at 1.5°C, as compared to today, with adaptation required now and up to 1.5°C. However, risks would be larger at 2°C of warming and an even greater effort would be needed for adaptation to a temperature increase of that magnitude (*high confidence*). {3.4, Box 3.4, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter}

Future risks at 1.5°C of global warming will depend on the mitigation pathway and on the possible occurrence of a transient overshoot (high confidence). The impacts on natural and human systems would be greater if mitigation pathways temporarily overshoot 1.5°C and return to 1.5°C later in the century, as compared to pathways that stabilize at 1.5°C without an overshoot (*high confidence*). The size and duration of an overshoot would also affect future impacts (e.g., irreversible loss of some ecosystems) (*high confidence*). Changes in land use resulting from mitigation choices could have impacts on food production and ecosystem diversity. {3.6.1, 3.6.2, Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in this chapter}

Climate Change Risks for Natural and Human systems

Terrestrial and Wetland Ecosystems

Risks of local species losses and, consequently, risks of extinction are much less in a 1.5°C versus a 2°C warmer world (high confidence). The number of species projected to lose over half of their climatically determined geographic range at 2°C global warming (18% of insects, 16% of plants, 8% of vertebrates) is projected to be reduced to 6% of insects, 8% of plants and 4% of vertebrates at 1.5°C warming (*medium confidence*). Risks associated with other biodiversity-related factors, such as forest fires, extreme weather events, and the spread of invasive species, pests and diseases, would also be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C of warming (*high confidence*), supporting a greater persistence of ecosystem services. {3.4.3, 3.5.2}

Constraining global warming to 1.5°C, rather than to 2°C and higher, is projected to have many benefits for terrestrial and wetland ecosystems and for the preservation of their services to humans (high confidence). Risks for natural and managed ecosystems are higher on drylands compared to humid lands. The global terrestrial land area projected to be affected by ecosystem transformations (13%, interquartile range 8–20%) at 2°C is approximately halved at 1.5°C global warming to 4% (interquartile range 2–7%) (*medium confidence*). Above 1.5°C, an expansion of desert terrain and vegetation would occur in the Mediterranean biome (*medium confidence*), causing changes unparalleled in the last 10,000 years (*medium confidence*). {3.3.2.2, 3.4.3.2, 3.4.3.5, 3.4.6.1, 3.5.5.10, Box 4.2}

Many impacts are projected to be larger at higher latitudes, owing to mean and cold-season warming rates above the global average (medium confidence). High-latitude tundra and boreal forest are particularly at risk, and woody shrubs are already encroaching into tundra (*high confidence*) and will proceed with further warming. Constraining warming to 1.5°C would prevent the thawing of an estimated permafrost area of 1.5 to 2.5 million km² over centuries compared to thawing under 2°C (*medium confidence*). {3.3.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4}

⁴ Ice free is defined for the Special Report as when the sea ice extent is less than 106 km². Ice coverage less than this is considered to be equivalent to an ice-free Arctic Ocean for practical purposes in all recent studies.

Ocean Ecosystems

Ocean ecosystems are already experiencing large-scale changes, and critical thresholds are expected to be reached at 1.5°C and higher levels of global warming (*high confidence*).

In the transition to 1.5°C of warming, changes to water temperatures are expected to drive some species (e.g., plankton, fish) to relocate to higher latitudes and cause novel ecosystems to assemble (*high confidence*). Other ecosystems (e.g., kelp forests, coral reefs) are relatively less able to move, however, and are projected to experience high rates of mortality and loss (*very high confidence*). For example, multiple lines of evidence indicate that the majority (70–90%) of warm water (tropical) coral reefs that exist today will disappear even if global warming is constrained to 1.5°C (*very high confidence*). {3.4.4, Box 3.4}

Current ecosystem services from the ocean are expected to be reduced at 1.5°C of global warming, with losses being even greater at 2°C of global warming (*high confidence*). The risks of declining ocean productivity, shifts of species to higher latitudes, damage to ecosystems (e.g., coral reefs, and mangroves, seagrass and other wetland ecosystems), loss of fisheries productivity (at low latitudes), and changes to ocean chemistry (e.g., acidification, hypoxia and dead zones) are projected to be substantially lower when global warming is limited to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). {3.4.4, Box 3.4}

Water Resources

The projected frequency and magnitude of floods and droughts in some regions are smaller under 1.5°C than under 2°C of warming (*medium confidence*). Human exposure to increased flooding is projected to be substantially lower at 1.5°C compared to 2°C of global warming, although projected changes create regionally differentiated risks (*medium confidence*). The differences in the risks among regions are strongly influenced by local socio-economic conditions (*medium confidence*). {3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.4.2}

Risks of water scarcity are projected to be greater at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming in some regions (*medium confidence*).

Depending on future socio-economic conditions, limiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared to 2°C, may reduce the proportion of the world population exposed to a climate change-induced increase in water stress by up to 50%, although there is considerable variability between regions (*medium confidence*). Regions with particularly large benefits could include the Mediterranean and the Caribbean (*medium confidence*). Socio-economic drivers, however, are expected to have a greater influence on these risks than the changes in climate (*medium confidence*). {3.3.5, 3.4.2, Box 3.5}

Land Use, Food Security and Food Production Systems

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared with 2°C, is projected to result in smaller net reductions in yields of maize, rice, wheat, and potentially other cereal crops, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central and South America; and in the CO₂-dependent nutritional quality of rice and wheat

(*high confidence*). A loss of 7–10% of rangeland livestock globally is projected for approximately 2°C of warming, with considerable economic consequences for many communities and regions (*medium confidence*). {3.4.6, 3.6, Box 3.1, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter}

Reductions in projected food availability are larger at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming in the Sahel, southern Africa, the Mediterranean, central Europe and the Amazon (*medium confidence*). This suggests a transition from medium to high risk of regionally differentiated impacts on food security between 1.5°C and 2°C (*medium confidence*). Future economic and trade environments and their response to changing food availability (*medium confidence*) are important potential adaptation options for reducing hunger risk in low- and middle-income countries. {Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter}

Fisheries and aquaculture are important to global food security but are already facing increasing risks from ocean warming and acidification (*medium confidence*). These risks are projected to increase at 1.5°C of global warming and impact key organisms such as fin fish and bivalves (e.g., oysters), especially at low latitudes (*medium confidence*). Small-scale fisheries in tropical regions, which are very dependent on habitat provided by coastal ecosystems such as coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass and kelp forests, are expected to face growing risks at 1.5°C of warming because of loss of habitat (*medium confidence*). Risks of impacts and decreasing food security are projected to become greater as global warming reaches beyond 1.5°C and both ocean warming and acidification increase, with substantial losses likely for coastal livelihoods and industries (e.g., fisheries and aquaculture) (*medium to high confidence*). {3.4.4, 3.4.5, 3.4.6, Box 3.1, Box 3.4, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter}

Land use and land-use change emerge as critical features of virtually all mitigation pathways that seek to limit global warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). Most least-cost mitigation pathways to limit peak or end-of-century warming to 1.5°C make use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR), predominantly employing significant levels of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and/or afforestation and reforestation (AR) in their portfolio of mitigation measures (*high confidence*). {Cross-Chapter Box 7 in this chapter}

Large-scale deployment of BECCS and/or AR would have a far-reaching land and water footprint (*high confidence*). Whether this footprint would result in adverse impacts, for example on biodiversity or food production, depends on the existence and effectiveness of measures to conserve land carbon stocks, measures to limit agricultural expansion in order to protect natural ecosystems, and the potential to increase agricultural productivity (*medium agreement*). In addition, BECCS and/or AR would have substantial direct effects on regional climate through biophysical feedbacks, which are generally not included in Integrated Assessments Models (*high confidence*). {3.6.2, Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in this chapter}

The impacts of large-scale CDR deployment could be greatly reduced if a wider portfolio of CDR options were deployed, if a

holistic policy for sustainable land management were adopted, and if increased mitigation efforts were employed to strongly limit the demand for land, energy and material resources, including through lifestyle and dietary changes (*medium confidence*). In particular, reforestation could be associated with significant co-benefits if implemented in a manner than helps restore natural ecosystems (*high confidence*). {Cross-Chapter Box 7 in this chapter}

Human Health, Well-Being, Cities and Poverty

Any increase in global temperature (e.g., +0.5°C) is projected to affect human health, with primarily negative consequences (*high confidence*). Lower risks are projected at 1.5°C than at 2°C for heat-related morbidity and mortality (*very high confidence*), and for ozone-related mortality if emissions needed for ozone formation remain high (*high confidence*). Urban heat islands often amplify the impacts of heatwaves in cities (*high confidence*). Risks for some vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever are projected to increase with warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, including potential shifts in their geographic range (*high confidence*). Overall for vector-borne diseases, whether projections are positive or negative depends on the disease, region and extent of change (*high confidence*). Lower risks of undernutrition are projected at 1.5°C than at 2°C (*medium confidence*). Incorporating estimates of adaptation into projections reduces the magnitude of risks (*high confidence*). {3.4.7, 3.4.7.1, 3.4.8, 3.5.5.8}

Global warming of 2°C is expected to pose greater risks to urban areas than global warming of 1.5°C (*medium confidence*). The extent of risk depends on human vulnerability and the effectiveness of adaptation for regions (coastal and non-coastal), informal settlements and infrastructure sectors (such as energy, water and transport) (*high confidence*). {3.4.5, 3.4.8}

Poverty and disadvantage have increased with recent warming (about 1°C) and are expected to increase for many populations as average global temperatures increase from 1°C to 1.5°C and higher (*medium confidence*). Outmigration in agricultural-dependent communities is positively and statistically significantly associated with global temperature (*medium confidence*). Our understanding of the links of 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming to human migration are limited and represent an important knowledge gap. {3.4.10, 3.4.11, 5.2.2, Table 3.5}

Key Economic Sectors and Services

Risks to global aggregated economic growth due to climate change impacts are projected to be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C by the end of this century (*medium confidence*). {3.5.2, 3.5.3}

The largest reductions in economic growth at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of warming are projected for low- and middle-income countries and regions (the African continent, Southeast Asia, India, Brazil and Mexico) (*low to medium confidence*). Countries in the tropics and Southern Hemisphere subtropics are projected to experience the largest impacts on economic growth due to climate

change should global warming increase from 1.5°C to 2°C (*medium confidence*). {3.5}

Global warming has already affected tourism, with increased risks projected under 1.5°C of warming in specific geographic regions and for seasonal tourism including sun, beach and snow sports destinations (*very high confidence*). Risks will be lower for tourism markets that are less climate sensitive, such as gaming and large hotel-based activities (*high confidence*). Risks for coastal tourism, particularly in subtropical and tropical regions, will increase with temperature-related degradation (e.g., heat extremes, storms) or loss of beach and coral reef assets (*high confidence*). {3.3.6, 3.4.4.12, 3.4.9.1, Box 3.4}

Small Islands, and Coastal and Low-lying areas

Small islands are projected to experience multiple inter-related risks at 1.5°C of global warming that will increase with warming of 2°C and higher levels (*high confidence*). Climate hazards at 1.5°C are projected to be lower compared to those at 2°C (*high confidence*). Long-term risks of coastal flooding and impacts on populations, infrastructures and assets (*high confidence*), freshwater stress (*medium confidence*), and risks across marine ecosystems (*high confidence*) and critical sectors (*medium confidence*) are projected to increase at 1.5°C compared to present-day levels and increase further at 2°C, limiting adaptation opportunities and increasing loss and damage (*medium confidence*). Migration in small islands (internally and internationally) occurs for multiple reasons and purposes, mostly for better livelihood opportunities (*high confidence*) and increasingly owing to sea level rise (*medium confidence*). {3.3.2.2, 3.3.6–9, 3.4.3.2, 3.4.4.2, 3.4.4.5, 3.4.4.12, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.7.1, 3.4.9.1, 3.5.4.9, Box 3.4, Box 3.5}

Impacts associated with sea level rise and changes to the salinity of coastal groundwater, increased flooding and damage to infrastructure, are projected to be critically important in vulnerable environments, such as small islands, low-lying coasts and deltas, at global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C (*high confidence*). Localized subsidence and changes to river discharge can potentially exacerbate these effects. Adaptation is already happening (*high confidence*) and will remain important over multi-centennial time scales. {3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.4, 3.4.5.7, 5.4.5.4, Box 3.5}

Existing and restored natural coastal ecosystems may be effective in reducing the adverse impacts of rising sea levels and intensifying storms by protecting coastal and deltaic regions (*medium confidence*). Natural sedimentation rates are expected to be able to offset the effect of rising sea levels, given the slower rates of sea level rise associated with 1.5°C of warming (*medium confidence*). Other feedbacks, such as landward migration of wetlands and the adaptation of infrastructure, remain important (*medium confidence*). {3.4.4.12, 3.4.5.4, 3.4.5.7}

Increased Reasons for Concern

There are multiple lines of evidence that since AR5 the assessed levels of risk increased for four of the five Reasons for Concern

(RFCs) for global warming levels of up to 2°C (*high confidence*).

The risk transitions by degrees of global warming are now: from high to very high between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC1 (Unique and threatened systems) (*high confidence*); from moderate to high risk between 1°C and 1.5°C for RFC2 (Extreme weather events) (*medium confidence*); from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC3 (Distribution of impacts) (*high confidence*); from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2.5°C for RFC4 (Global aggregate impacts) (*medium confidence*); and from moderate to high risk between 1°C and 2.5°C for RFC5 (Large-scale singular events) (*medium confidence*). {3.5.2}

1. **The category 'Unique and threatened systems' (RFC1) display a transition from high to very high risk which is now located between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming** as opposed to at 2.6°C of global warming in AR5, owing to new and multiple lines of evidence for changing risks for coral reefs, the Arctic and biodiversity in general (*high confidence*). {3.5.2.1}
2. **In 'Extreme weather events' (RFC2), the transition from moderate to high risk is now located between 1.0°C and 1.5°C of global warming**, which is very similar to the AR5 assessment but is projected with greater confidence (*medium confidence*). The impact literature contains little information about the potential for human society to adapt to extreme weather events, and hence it has not been possible to locate the transition from 'high' to 'very high' risk within the context of assessing impacts at 1.5°C versus 2°C of global warming. There is thus *low confidence* in the level at which global warming could lead to very high risks associated with extreme weather events in the context of this report. {3.5}
3. **With respect to the 'Distribution of impacts' (RFC3) a transition from moderate to high risk is now located between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming**, compared with between 1.6°C and 2.6°C global warming in AR5, owing to new evidence about regionally differentiated risks to food security, water resources, drought, heat exposure and coastal submergence (*high confidence*). {3.5}
4. **In 'global aggregate impacts' (RFC4) a transition from moderate to high levels of risk is now located between 1.5°C and 2.5°C of global warming**, as opposed to at 3.6°C of warming in AR5, owing to new evidence about global aggregate economic impacts and risks to Earth's biodiversity (*medium confidence*). {3.5}
5. **Finally, 'large-scale singular events' (RFC5), moderate risk is now located at 1°C of global warming and high risk is located at 2.5°C of global warming**, as opposed to at 1.6°C (moderate risk) and around 4°C (high risk) in AR5, because of new observations and models of the West Antarctic ice sheet (*medium confidence*). {3.3.9, 3.5.2, 3.6.3}

TS.4 Strengthening and Implementing the Global Response

Limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels would require transformative systemic change, integrated with sustainable development. Such change would require the upscaling and acceleration of the implementation of far-reaching, multilevel and cross-sectoral climate mitigation and addressing barriers. Such systemic change would need to be linked to complementary adaptation actions, including transformational adaptation, especially for pathways that temporarily overshoot 1.5°C (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {Chapter 2, Chapter 3, 4.2.1, 4.4.5, 4.5}. Current national pledges on mitigation and adaptation are not enough to stay below the Paris Agreement temperature limits and achieve its adaptation goals. While transitions in energy efficiency, carbon intensity of fuels, electrification and land-use change are underway in various countries, limiting warming to 1.5°C will require a greater scale and pace of change to transform energy, land, urban and industrial systems globally. {4.3, 4.4, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in this Chapter}

Although multiple communities around the world are demonstrating the possibility of implementation consistent with 1.5°C pathways {Boxes 4.1-4.10}, very few countries, regions, cities, communities or businesses can currently make such a claim (*high confidence*). To strengthen the global response, almost all countries would need to significantly raise their level of ambition. Implementation of this raised ambition would require enhanced institutional capabilities in all countries, including building the capability to utilize indigenous and local knowledge (*medium evidence, high agreement*). In developing countries and for poor and vulnerable people, implementing the response would require financial, technological and other forms of support to build capacity, for which additional local, national and international resources would need to be mobilized (*high confidence*). However, public, financial, institutional and innovation capabilities currently fall short of implementing far-reaching measures at scale in all countries (*high confidence*). Transnational networks that support multilevel climate action are growing, but challenges in their scale-up remain. {4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7}

Adaptation needs will be lower in a 1.5°C world compared to a 2°C world (*high confidence*) {Chapter 3; Cross-Chapter Box 11 in this chapter}. Learning from current adaptation practices and strengthening them through adaptive governance {4.4.1}, lifestyle and behavioural change {4.4.3} and innovative financing mechanisms {4.4.5} can help their mainstreaming within sustainable development practices. Preventing maladaptation, drawing on bottom-up approaches {Box 4.6} and using indigenous knowledge {Box 4.3} would effectively engage and protect vulnerable people and communities. While adaptation finance has increased quantitatively, significant further expansion would be needed to adapt to 1.5°C. Qualitative gaps in the distribution of adaptation finance, readiness to absorb resources, and monitoring mechanisms undermine the potential of adaptation finance to reduce impacts. {Chapter 3, 4.4.2, 4.4.5, 4.6}

System Transitions

The energy system transition that would be required to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial conditions is underway in many sectors and regions around the world (*medium evidence, high agreement*). The political, economic, social and technical feasibility of solar energy, wind energy and electricity storage technologies has improved dramatically over the past few years, while that of nuclear energy and carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) in the electricity sector have not shown similar improvements. {4.3.1}

Electrification, hydrogen, bio-based feedstocks and substitution, and, in several cases, carbon dioxide capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) would lead to the deep emissions reductions required in energy-intensive industries to limit warming to 1.5°C. However, those options are limited by institutional, economic and technical constraints, which increase financial risks to many incumbent firms (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Energy efficiency in industry is more economically feasible and helps enable industrial system transitions but would have to be complemented with greenhouse gas (GHG)-neutral processes or carbon dioxide removal (CDR) to make energy-intensive industries consistent with 1.5°C (*high confidence*). {4.3.1, 4.3.4}

Global and regional land-use and ecosystems transitions and associated changes in behaviour that would be required to limit warming to 1.5°C can enhance future adaptation and land-based agricultural and forestry mitigation potential. Such transitions could, however, carry consequences for livelihoods that depend on agriculture and natural resources {4.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3}. Alterations of agriculture and forest systems to achieve mitigation goals could affect current ecosystems and their services and potentially threaten food, water and livelihood security. While this could limit the social and environmental feasibility of land-based mitigation options, careful design and implementation could enhance their acceptability and support sustainable development objectives (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). {4.3.2, 4.5.3}

Changing agricultural practices can be an effective climate adaptation strategy. A diversity of adaptation options exists, including mixed crop-livestock production systems which can be a cost-effective adaptation strategy in many global agriculture systems (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). Improving irrigation efficiency could effectively deal with changing global water endowments, especially if achieved via farmers adopting new behaviours and water-efficient practices rather than through large-scale infrastructural interventions (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Well-designed adaptation processes such as community-based adaptation can be effective depending upon context and levels of vulnerability. {4.3.2, 4.5.3}

Improving the efficiency of food production and closing yield gaps has the potential to reduce emissions from agriculture, reduce pressure on land, and enhance food security and future mitigation potential (*high confidence*). Improving productivity of

existing agricultural systems generally reduces the emissions intensity of food production and offers strong synergies with rural development, poverty reduction and food security objectives, but options to reduce absolute emissions are limited unless paired with demand-side measures. Technological innovation including biotechnology, with adequate safeguards, could contribute to resolving current feasibility constraints and expand the future mitigation potential of agriculture. {4.3.2, 4.4.4}

Shifts in dietary choices towards foods with lower emissions and requirements for land, along with reduced food loss and waste, could reduce emissions and increase adaptation options (*high confidence*). Decreasing food loss and waste and changing dietary behaviour could result in mitigation and adaptation (*high confidence*) by reducing both emissions and pressure on land, with significant co-benefits for food security, human health and sustainable development {4.3.2, 4.4.5, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 5.4.2}, but evidence of successful policies to modify dietary choices remains limited.

Mitigation and Adaptation Options and Other Measures

A mix of mitigation and adaptation options implemented in a participatory and integrated manner can enable rapid, systemic transitions – in urban and rural areas – that are necessary elements of an accelerated transition consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. Such options and changes are most effective when aligned with economic and sustainable development, and when local and regional governments are supported by national governments {4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.3}. Various mitigation options are expanding rapidly across many geographies. Although many have development synergies, not all income groups have so far benefited from them. Electrification, end-use energy efficiency and increased share of renewables, amongst other options, are lowering energy use and decarbonizing energy supply in the built environment, especially in buildings. Other rapid changes needed in urban environments include demotorization and decarbonization of transport, including the expansion of electric vehicles, and greater use of energy-efficient appliances (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Technological and social innovations can contribute to limiting warming to 1.5°C, for example, by enabling the use of smart grids, energy storage technologies and general-purpose technologies, such as information and communication technology (ICT) that can be deployed to help reduce emissions. Feasible adaptation options include green infrastructure, resilient water and urban ecosystem services, urban and peri-urban agriculture, and adapting buildings and land use through regulation and planning (*medium evidence, medium to high agreement*). {4.3.3, 4.4.3, 4.4.4}

Synergies can be achieved across systemic transitions through several overarching adaptation options in rural and urban areas. Investments in health, social security and risk sharing and spreading are cost-effective adaptation measures with high potential for scaling up (*medium evidence, medium to high agreement*). Disaster risk management and education-based adaptation have lower prospects of scalability and cost-effectiveness (*medium evidence, high agreement*) but are critical for building adaptive capacity. {4.3.5, 4.5.3}

Converging adaptation and mitigation options can lead to synergies and potentially increase cost-effectiveness, but multiple trade-offs can limit the speed of and potential for scaling up. Many examples of synergies and trade-offs exist in all sectors and system transitions. For instance, sustainable water management (*high evidence, medium agreement*) and investment in green infrastructure (*medium evidence, high agreement*) to deliver sustainable water and environmental services and to support urban agriculture are less cost-effective than other adaptation options but can help build climate resilience. Achieving the governance, finance and social support required to enable these synergies and to avoid trade-offs is often challenging, especially when addressing multiple objectives, and attempting appropriate sequencing and timing of interventions. {4.3.2, 4.3.4, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4}

Though CO₂ dominates long-term warming, the reduction of warming short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs), such as methane and black carbon, can in the short term contribute significantly to limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Reductions of black carbon and methane would have substantial co-benefits (high confidence), including improved health due to reduced air pollution. This, in turn, enhances the institutional and socio-cultural feasibility of such actions. Reductions of several warming SLCFs are constrained by economic and social feasibility (*low evidence, high agreement*). As they are often co-emitted with CO₂, achieving the energy, land and urban transitions necessary to limit warming to 1.5°C would see emissions of warming SLCFs greatly reduced. {2.3.3.2, 4.3.6}

Most CDR options face multiple feasibility constraints, which differ between options, limiting the potential for any single option to sustainably achieve the large-scale deployment required in the 1.5°C-consistent pathways described in Chapter 2 (high confidence). Those 1.5°C pathways typically rely on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), afforestation and reforestation (AR), or both, to neutralize emissions that are expensive to avoid, or to draw down CO₂ emissions in excess of the carbon budget {Chapter 2}. Though BECCS and AR may be technically and geophysically feasible, they face partially overlapping yet different constraints related to land use. The land footprint per tonne of CO₂ removed is higher for AR than for BECCS, but given the low levels of current deployment, the speed and scales required for limiting warming to 1.5°C pose a considerable implementation challenge, even if the issues of public acceptance and absence of economic incentives were to be resolved (*high agreement, medium evidence*). The large potential of afforestation and the co-benefits if implemented appropriately (e.g., on biodiversity and soil quality) will diminish over time, as forests saturate (*high confidence*). The energy requirements and economic costs of direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) and enhanced weathering remain high (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). At the local scale, soil carbon sequestration has co-benefits with agriculture and is cost-effective even without climate policy (high confidence). Its potential feasibility and cost-effectiveness at the global scale appears to be more limited. {4.3.7}

Uncertainties surrounding solar radiation modification (SRM) measures constrain their potential deployment. These uncertainties include: technological immaturity; limited physical

understanding about their effectiveness to limit global warming; and a weak capacity to govern, legitimize, and scale such measures. Some recent model-based analysis suggests SRM would be effective but that it is too early to evaluate its feasibility. Even in the uncertain case that the most adverse side-effects of SRM can be avoided, public resistance, ethical concerns and potential impacts on sustainable development could render SRM economically, socially and institutionally undesirable (*low agreement, medium evidence*). {4.3.8, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in this chapter}

Enabling Rapid and Far-Reaching Change

The speed of transitions and of technological change required to limit warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels has been observed in the past within specific sectors and technologies {4.2.2.1}. But the geographical and economic scales at which the required rates of change in the energy, land, urban, infrastructure and industrial systems would need to take place are larger and have no documented historic precedent (limited evidence, medium agreement). To reduce inequality and alleviate poverty, such transformations would require more planning and stronger institutions (including inclusive markets) than observed in the past, as well as stronger coordination and disruptive innovation across actors and scales of governance. {4.3, 4.4}

Governance consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C and the political economy of adaptation and mitigation can enable and accelerate system transitions, behavioural change, innovation and technology deployment (medium evidence, medium agreement). For 1.5°C-consistent actions, an effective governance framework would include: accountable multilevel governance that includes non-state actors, such as industry, civil society and scientific institutions; coordinated sectoral and cross-sectoral policies that enable collaborative multi-stakeholder partnerships; strengthened global-to-local financial architecture that enables greater access to finance and technology; addressing climate-related trade barriers; improved climate education and greater public awareness; arrangements to enable accelerated behaviour change; strengthened climate monitoring and evaluation systems; and reciprocal international agreements that are sensitive to equity and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). System transitions can be enabled by enhancing the capacities of public, private and financial institutions to accelerate climate change policy planning and implementation, along with accelerated technological innovation, deployment and upkeep. {4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4}

Behaviour change and demand-side management can significantly reduce emissions, substantially limiting the reliance on CDR to limit warming to 1.5°C {Chapter 2, 4.4.3}. Political and financial stakeholders may find climate actions more cost-effective and socially acceptable if multiple factors affecting behaviour are considered, including aligning these actions with people's core values (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Behaviour- and lifestyle-related measures and demand-side management have already led to emission reductions around the world and can enable significant future reductions (*high confidence*). Social innovation through bottom-up initiatives can result in greater participation in the governance of systems transitions and increase support for technologies, practices

and policies that are part of the global response to limit warming to 1.5°C. {Chapter 2, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, Figure 4.3}

This rapid and far-reaching response required to keep warming below 1.5°C and enhance the capacity to adapt to climate risks would require large increases of investments in low-emission infrastructure and buildings, along with a redirection of financial flows towards low-emission investments (*robust evidence, high agreement*). An estimated mean annual incremental investment of around 1.5% of global gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) for the energy sector is indicated between 2016 and 2035, as well as about 2.5% of global GFCF for other development infrastructure that could also address SDG implementation. Though quality policy design and effective implementation may enhance efficiency, they cannot fully substitute for these investments. {2.5.2, 4.2.1, 4.4.5}

Enabling this investment requires the mobilization and better integration of a range of policy instruments that include the reduction of socially inefficient fossil fuel subsidy regimes and innovative price and non-price national and international policy instruments. These would need to be complemented by de-risking financial instruments and the emergence of long-term low-emission assets. These instruments would aim to reduce the demand for carbon-intensive services and shift market preferences away from fossil fuel-based technology. Evidence and theory suggest that carbon pricing alone, in the absence of sufficient transfers to compensate their unintended distributional cross-sector, cross-nation effects, cannot reach the incentive levels needed to trigger system transitions (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). But, embedded in consistent policy packages, they can help mobilize incremental resources and provide flexible mechanisms that help reduce the social and economic costs of the triggering phase of the transition (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). {4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5}

Increasing evidence suggests that a climate-sensitive realignment of savings and expenditure towards low-emission, climate-resilient infrastructure and services requires an evolution of global and national financial systems. Estimates suggest that, in addition to climate-friendly allocation of public investments, a potential redirection of 5% to 10% of the annual capital revenues⁵ is necessary for limiting warming to 1.5°C {4.4.5, Table 1 in Box 4.8}. This could be facilitated by a change of incentives for private day-to-day expenditure and the redirection of savings from speculative and precautionary investments towards long-term productive low-emission assets and services. This implies the mobilization of institutional investors and mainstreaming of climate finance within financial and banking system regulation. Access by developing countries to low-risk and low-interest finance through multilateral and national development banks would have to be facilitated (*medium evidence, high agreement*). New forms of public-private partnerships may be needed with multilateral, sovereign and sub-sovereign guarantees to de-risk climate-friendly investments, support new business models for small-scale enterprises and help households with limited access to capital. Ultimately, the aim is to promote a portfolio shift towards long-term low-emission assets that

would help redirect capital away from potentially stranded assets (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). {4.4.5}

Knowledge Gaps

Knowledge gaps around implementing and strengthening the global response to climate change would need to be urgently resolved if the transition to a 1.5°C world is to become reality. Remaining questions include: how much can be realistically expected from innovation and behavioural and systemic political and economic changes in improving resilience, enhancing adaptation and reducing GHG emissions? How can rates of changes be accelerated and scaled up? What is the outcome of realistic assessments of mitigation and adaptation land transitions that are compliant with sustainable development, poverty eradication and addressing inequality? What are life-cycle emissions and prospects of early-stage CDR options? How can climate and sustainable development policies converge, and how can they be organised within a global governance framework and financial system, based on principles of justice and ethics (including 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' (CBDR-RC)), reciprocity and partnership? To what extent would limiting warming to 1.5°C require a harmonization of macro-financial and fiscal policies, which could include financial regulators such as central banks? How can different actors and processes in climate governance reinforce each other, and hedge against the fragmentation of initiatives? {4.1, 4.3.7, 4.4.1, 4.4.5, 4.6}

⁵ Annual capital revenues are the paid interests plus the increase of the asset value.

TS.5 Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication and Reducing Inequalities

This chapter takes sustainable development as the starting point and focus for analysis. It considers the broad and multifaceted bi-directional interplay between sustainable development, including its focus on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality in their multidimensional aspects, and climate actions in a 1.5°C warmer world. These fundamental connections are embedded in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The chapter also examines synergies and trade-offs of adaptation and mitigation options with sustainable development and the SDGs and offers insights into possible pathways, especially climate-resilient development pathways towards a 1.5°C warmer world.

Sustainable Development, Poverty and Inequality in a 1.5°C Warmer World

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C above pre-industrial levels would make it markedly easier to achieve many aspects of sustainable development, with greater potential to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Impacts avoided with the lower temperature limit could reduce the number of people exposed to climate risks and vulnerable to poverty by 62 to 457 million, and lessen the risks of poor people to experience food and water insecurity, adverse health impacts, and economic losses, particularly in regions that already face development challenges (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). {5.2.2, 5.2.3} Avoided impacts expected to occur between 1.5°C and 2°C warming would also make it easier to achieve certain SDGs, such as those that relate to poverty, hunger, health, water and sanitation, cities and ecosystems (SDGs 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 14 and 15) (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.2.3, Table 5.2 available at the end of the chapter}

Compared to current conditions, 1.5°C of global warming would nonetheless pose heightened risks to eradicating poverty, reducing inequalities and ensuring human and ecosystem well-being (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Warming of 1.5°C is not considered 'safe' for most nations, communities, ecosystems and sectors and poses significant risks to natural and human systems as compared to the current warming of 1°C (*high confidence*). {Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5} The impacts of 1.5°C of warming would disproportionately affect disadvantaged and vulnerable populations through food insecurity, higher food prices, income losses, lost livelihood opportunities, adverse health impacts and population displacements (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.2.1} Some of the worst impacts on sustainable development are expected to be felt among agricultural and coastal dependent livelihoods, indigenous people, children and the elderly, poor labourers, poor urban dwellers in African cities, and people and ecosystems in the Arctic and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.2.1, Box 5.3, Chapter 3, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}

Climate Adaptation and Sustainable Development

Prioritization of sustainable development and meeting the SDGs is consistent with efforts to adapt to climate change (*high*

***confidence*).** Many strategies for sustainable development enable transformational adaptation for a 1.5°C warmer world, provided attention is paid to reducing poverty in all its forms and to promoting equity and participation in decision-making (*medium evidence, high agreement*). As such, sustainable development has the potential to significantly reduce systemic vulnerability, enhance adaptive capacity, and promote livelihood security for poor and disadvantaged populations (*high confidence*). {5.3.1}

Synergies between adaptation strategies and the SDGs are expected to hold true in a 1.5°C warmer world, across sectors and contexts (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Synergies between adaptation and sustainable development are significant for agriculture and health, advancing SDGs 1 (extreme poverty), 2 (hunger), 3 (healthy lives and well-being) and 6 (clean water) (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). {5.3.2} Ecosystem- and community-based adaptation, along with the incorporation of indigenous and local knowledge, advances synergies with SDGs 5 (gender equality), 10 (reducing inequalities) and 16 (inclusive societies), as exemplified in drylands and the Arctic (*high evidence, medium agreement*). {5.3.2, Box 5.1, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4}

Adaptation strategies can result in trade-offs with and among the SDGs (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Strategies that advance one SDG may create negative consequences for other SDGs, for instance SDGs 3 (health) versus 7 (energy consumption) and agricultural adaptation and SDG 2 (food security) versus SDGs 3 (health), 5 (gender equality), 6 (clean water), 10 (reducing inequalities), 14 (life below water) and 15 (life on the land) (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). {5.3.2}

Pursuing place-specific adaptation pathways towards a 1.5°C warmer world has the potential for significant positive outcomes for well-being in countries at all levels of development (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Positive outcomes emerge when adaptation pathways (i) ensure a diversity of adaptation options based on people's values and the trade-offs they consider acceptable, (ii) maximize synergies with sustainable development through inclusive, participatory and deliberative processes, and (iii) facilitate equitable transformation. Yet such pathways would be difficult to achieve without redistributive measures to overcome path dependencies, uneven power structures, and entrenched social inequalities (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.3.3}

Mitigation and Sustainable Development

The deployment of mitigation options consistent with 1.5°C pathways leads to multiple synergies across a range of sustainable development dimensions. At the same time, the rapid pace and magnitude of change that would be required to limit warming to 1.5°C, if not carefully managed, would lead to trade-offs with some sustainable development dimensions (*high confidence*). The number of synergies between mitigation response options and sustainable development exceeds the number of trade-offs in energy demand and supply sectors; agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU); and for oceans (*very high confidence*). {Figure 5.2, Table 5.2 available at the end of the chapter} The 1.5°C

pathways indicate robust synergies, particularly for the SDGs 3 (health), 7 (energy), 12 (responsible consumption and production) and 14 (oceans) (*very high confidence*). {5.4.2, Figure 5.3} For SDGs 1 (poverty), 2 (hunger), 6 (water) and 7 (energy), there is a risk of trade-offs or negative side effects from stringent mitigation actions compatible with 1.5°C of warming (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.4.2}

Appropriately designed mitigation actions to reduce energy demand can advance multiple SDGs simultaneously. Pathways compatible with 1.5°C that feature low energy demand show the most pronounced synergies and the lowest number of trade-offs with respect to sustainable development and the SDGs (*very high confidence*). Accelerating energy efficiency in all sectors has synergies with SDGs 7 (energy), 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure), 11 (sustainable cities and communities), 12 (responsible consumption and production), 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), and 17 (partnerships for the goals) (*robust evidence, high agreement*). {5.4.1, Figure 5.2, Table 5.2} Low-demand pathways, which would reduce or completely avoid the reliance on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) in 1.5°C pathways, would result in significantly reduced pressure on food security, lower food prices and fewer people at risk of hunger (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.4.2, Figure 5.3}

The impacts of carbon dioxide removal options on SDGs depend on the type of options and the scale of deployment (*high confidence*). If poorly implemented, carbon dioxide removal (CDR) options such as bioenergy, BECCS and AFOLU would lead to trade-offs. Appropriate design and implementation requires considering local people's needs, biodiversity and other sustainable development dimensions (*very high confidence*). {5.4.1.3, Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3}

The design of the mitigation portfolios and policy instruments to limit warming to 1.5°C will largely determine the overall synergies and trade-offs between mitigation and sustainable development (*very high confidence*). Redistributive policies that shield the poor and vulnerable can resolve trade-offs for a range of SDGs (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Individual mitigation options are associated with both positive and negative interactions with the SDGs (*very high confidence*). {5.4.1} However, appropriate choices across the mitigation portfolio can help to maximize positive side effects while minimizing negative side effects (*high confidence*). {5.4.2, 5.5.2} Investment needs for complementary policies resolving trade-offs with a range of SDGs are only a small fraction of the overall mitigation investments in 1.5°C pathways (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.4.2, Figure 5.4} Integration of mitigation with adaptation and sustainable development compatible with 1.5°C warming requires a systems perspective (*high confidence*). {5.4.2, 5.5.2}

Mitigation consistent with 1.5°C of warming create high risks for sustainable development in countries with high dependency on fossil fuels for revenue and employment generation (*high confidence*). These risks are caused by the reduction of global demand affecting mining activity and export revenues and challenges to rapidly decrease high carbon intensity of the domestic economy (*robust*

evidence, high agreement). {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2} Targeted policies that promote diversification of the economy and the energy sector could ease this transition (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2}

Sustainable Development Pathways to 1.5°C

Sustainable development broadly supports and often enables the fundamental societal and systems transformations that would be required for limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (*high confidence*). Simulated pathways that feature the most sustainable worlds (e.g., Shared Socio-Economic Pathways (SSP) 1) are associated with relatively lower mitigation and adaptation challenges and limit warming to 1.5°C at comparatively lower mitigation costs. In contrast, development pathways with high fragmentation, inequality and poverty (e.g., SSP3) are associated with comparatively higher mitigation and adaptation challenges. In such pathways, it is not possible to limit warming to 1.5°C for the vast majority of the integrated assessment models (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.5.2} In all SSPs, mitigation costs substantially increase in 1.5°C pathways compared to 2°C pathways. No pathway in the literature integrates or achieves all 17 SDGs (*high confidence*). {5.5.2} Real-world experiences at the project level show that the actual integration between adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development is challenging as it requires reconciling trade-offs across sectors and spatial scales (*very high confidence*). {5.5.1}

Without societal transformation and rapid implementation of ambitious greenhouse gas reduction measures, pathways to limiting warming to 1.5°C and achieving sustainable development will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to achieve (*high confidence*). The potential for pursuing such pathways differs between and within nations and regions, due to different development trajectories, opportunities and challenges (*very high confidence*). {5.5.3.2, Figure 5.1} Limiting warming to 1.5°C would require all countries and non-state actors to strengthen their contributions without delay. This could be achieved through sharing efforts based on bolder and more committed cooperation, with support for those with the least capacity to adapt, mitigate and transform (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.5.3.1, 5.5.3.2} Current efforts towards reconciling low-carbon trajectories and reducing inequalities, including those that avoid difficult trade-offs associated with transformation, are partially successful yet demonstrate notable obstacles (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). {5.5.3.3, Box 5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in this chapter}

Social justice and equity are core aspects of climate-resilient development pathways for transformational social change. Addressing challenges and widening opportunities between and within countries and communities would be necessary to achieve sustainable development and limit warming to 1.5°C, without making the poor and disadvantaged worse off (*high confidence*). Identifying and navigating inclusive and socially acceptable pathways towards low-carbon, climate-resilient futures is a challenging yet important endeavour, fraught with moral, practical and political difficulties and inevitable trade-offs (*very high confidence*). {5.5.2, 5.5.3.3, Box 5.3} It entails deliberation and problem-solving

processes to negotiate societal values, well-being, risks and resilience and to determine what is desirable and fair, and to whom (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Pathways that encompass joint, iterative planning and transformative visions, for instance in Pacific SIDS like Vanuatu and in urban contexts, show potential for liveable and sustainable futures (*high confidence*). {5.5.3.1, 5.5.3.3, Figure 5.5, Box 5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in this chapter}

The fundamental societal and systemic changes to achieve sustainable development, eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities while limiting warming to 1.5°C would require meeting a set of institutional, social, cultural, economic and technological conditions (*high confidence*). The coordination and monitoring of policy actions across sectors and spatial scales is essential to support sustainable development in 1.5°C warmer conditions (*very high confidence*). {5.6.2, Box 5.3} External funding and technology transfer better support these efforts when they consider recipients' context-specific needs (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.6.1} Inclusive processes can facilitate transformations by ensuring participation, transparency, capacity building and iterative social learning (*high confidence*). {5.5.3.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13, 5.6.3} Attention to power asymmetries and unequal opportunities for development, among and within countries, is key to adopting 1.5°C-compatible development pathways that benefit all populations (*high confidence*). {5.5.3, 5.6.4, Box 5.3} Re-examining individual and collective values could help spur urgent, ambitious and cooperative change (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.5.3, 5.6.5}

Frequently Asked Questions



FAQ

Frequently Asked Questions

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These Frequently Asked Questions have been extracted from the chapters of the underlying report and are compiled here. When referencing specific FAQs, please reference the corresponding chapter in the report from where the FAQ originated (e.g., FAQ 3.1 is part of Chapter 3).

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FAQ

Frequently Asked Questions

FAQ 1.1 | Why are we Talking about 1.5°C?

Summary: Climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet. In recognition of this, the overwhelming majority of countries around the world adopted the Paris Agreement in December 2015, the central aim of which includes pursuing efforts to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C. In doing so, these countries, through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), also invited the IPCC to provide a Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emissions pathways.

At the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in December 2015, 195 nations adopted the Paris Agreement¹. The first instrument of its kind, the landmark agreement includes the aim to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by 'holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels'.

The first UNFCCC document to mention a limit to global warming of 1.5°C was the Cancun Agreement, adopted at the sixteenth COP (COP16) in 2010. The Cancun Agreement established a process to periodically review the 'adequacy of the long-term global goal (LTGG) in the light of the ultimate objective of the Convention and the overall progress made towards achieving the LTGG, including a consideration of the implementation of the commitments under the Convention'. The definition of LTGG in the Cancun Agreement was 'to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels'. The agreement also recognised the need to consider 'strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge...to a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C'.

Beginning in 2013 and ending at the COP21 in Paris in 2015, the first review period of the long-term global goal largely consisted of the Structured Expert Dialogue (SED). This was a fact-finding, face-to-face exchange of views between invited experts and UNFCCC delegates. The final report of the SED² concluded that 'in some regions and vulnerable ecosystems, high risks are projected even for warming above 1.5°C'. The SED report also suggested that Parties would profit from restating the temperature limit of the long-term global goal as a 'defence line' or 'buffer zone', instead of a 'guardrail' up to which all would be safe, adding that this new understanding would 'probably also favour emission pathways that will limit warming to a range of temperatures below 2°C'. Specifically on strengthening the temperature limit of 2°C, the SED's key message was: 'While science on the 1.5°C warming limit is less robust, efforts should be made to push the defence line as low as possible'. The findings of the SED, in turn, fed into the draft decision adopted at COP21.

With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the UNFCCC invited the IPCC to provide a Special Report in 2018 on 'the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emissions pathways'. The request was that the report, known as SR1.5, should not only assess what a 1.5°C warmer world would look like but also the different pathways by which global temperature rise could be limited to 1.5°C. In 2016, the IPCC accepted the invitation, adding that the Special Report would also look at these issues in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.


The combination of rising exposure to climate change and the fact that there is a limited capacity to adapt to its impacts amplifies the risks posed by warming of 1.5°C and 2°C. This is particularly true for developing and island countries in the tropics and other vulnerable countries and areas. The risks posed by global warming of 1.5°C are greater than for present-day conditions but lower than at 2°C.

(continued on next page)

¹ Paris Agreement FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 <https://unfccc.int/documents/9097>

² Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) final report FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1 <https://unfccc.int/documents/8707>

FAQ 1.1 (continued)



FAQ 1.1, Figure 1 | Timeline of notable dates in preparing the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (blue) embedded within processes and milestones of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; grey), including events that may be relevant for discussion of temperature limits.

Frequently Asked Questions

FAQ 1.2 | How Close are we to 1.5°C?

Summary: Human-induced warming has already reached about 1°C above pre-industrial levels at the time of writing of this Special Report. By the decade 2006–2015, human activity had warmed the world by 0.87°C ($\pm 0.12^\circ\text{C}$) compared to pre-industrial times (1850–1900). If the current warming rate continues, the world would reach human-induced global warming of 1.5°C around 2040.

Under the 2015 Paris Agreement, countries agreed to cut greenhouse gas emissions with a view to ‘holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’. While the overall intention of strengthening the global response to climate change is clear, the Paris Agreement does not specify precisely what is meant by ‘global average temperature’, or what period in history should be considered ‘pre-industrial’. To answer the question of how close are we to 1.5°C of warming, we need to first be clear about how both terms are defined in this Special Report.

The choice of pre-industrial reference period, along with the method used to calculate global average temperature, can alter scientists’ estimates of historical warming by a couple of tenths of a degree Celsius. Such differences become important in the context of a global temperature limit just half a degree above where we are now. But provided consistent definitions are used, they do not affect our understanding of how human activity is influencing the climate.

In principle, ‘pre-industrial levels’ could refer to any period of time before the start of the industrial revolution. But the number of direct temperature measurements decreases as we go back in time. Defining a ‘pre-industrial’ reference period is, therefore, a compromise between the reliability of the temperature information and how representative it is of truly pre-industrial conditions. Some pre-industrial periods are cooler than others for purely natural reasons. This could be because of spontaneous climate variability or the response of the climate to natural perturbations, such as volcanic eruptions and variations in the sun’s activity. This IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C uses the reference period 1850–1900 to represent pre-industrial temperature. This is the earliest period with near-global observations and is the reference period used as an approximation of pre-industrial temperatures in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report.

Once scientists have defined ‘pre-industrial’, the next step is to calculate the amount of warming at any given time relative to that reference period. In this report, warming is defined as the increase in the 30-year global average of combined air temperature over land and water temperature at the ocean surface. The 30-year timespan accounts for the effect of natural variability, which can cause global temperatures to fluctuate from one year to the next. For example, 2015 and 2016 were both affected by a strong El Niño event, which amplified the underlying human-caused warming.

In the decade 2006–2015, warming reached 0.87°C ($\pm 0.12^\circ\text{C}$) relative to 1850–1900, predominantly due to human activity increasing the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Given that global temperature is currently rising by 0.2°C ($\pm 0.1^\circ\text{C}$) per decade, human-induced warming reached 1°C above pre-industrial levels around 2017 and, if this pace of warming continues, would reach 1.5°C around 2040.


While the change in global average temperature tells researchers about how the planet as a whole is changing, looking more closely at specific regions, countries and seasons reveals important details. Since the 1970s, most land regions have been warming faster than the global average, for example. This means that warming in many regions has already exceeded 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Over a fifth of the global population live in regions that have already experienced warming in at least one season that is greater than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

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FAQ 1.2 (continued)

FAQ1.2: How close are we to 1.5°C?

Human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C above pre-industrial levels in 2017



FAQ 1.2, Figure 1 | Human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C above pre-industrial levels in 2017. At the present rate, global temperatures would reach 1.5°C around 2040. Stylized 1.5°C pathway shown here involves emission reductions beginning immediately, and CO₂ emissions reaching zero by 2055.

Frequently Asked Questions

FAQ 2.1 | What Kind of Pathways Limit Warming to 1.5°C and are we on Track?

Summary: *There is no definitive way to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. This Special Report identifies two main conceptual pathways to illustrate different interpretations. One stabilizes global temperature at, or just below, 1.5°C. Another sees global temperature temporarily exceed 1.5°C before coming back down. Countries' pledges to reduce their emissions are currently not in line with limiting global warming to 1.5°C.*

Scientists use computer models to simulate the emissions of greenhouse gases that would be consistent with different levels of warming. The different possibilities are often referred to as 'greenhouse gas emission pathways'. There is no single, definitive pathway to limiting warming to 1.5°C.

This IPCC special report identifies two main pathways that explore global warming of 1.5°C. The first involves global temperature stabilizing at or below before 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. The second pathway sees warming exceed 1.5°C around mid-century, remain above 1.5°C for a maximum duration of a few decades, and return to below 1.5°C before 2100. The latter is often referred to as an 'overshoot' pathway. Any alternative situation in which global temperature continues to rise, exceeding 1.5°C permanently until the end of the 21st century, is not considered to be a 1.5°C pathway.

The two types of pathway have different implications for greenhouse gas emissions, as well as for climate change impacts and for achieving sustainable development. For example, the larger and longer an 'overshoot', the greater the reliance on practices or technologies that remove CO₂ from the atmosphere, on top of reducing the sources of emissions (mitigation). Such ideas for CO₂ removal have not been proven to work at scale and, therefore, run the risk of being less practical, effective or economical than assumed. There is also the risk that the use of CO₂ removal techniques ends up competing for land and water, and if these trade-offs are not appropriately managed, they can adversely affect sustainable development. Additionally, a larger and longer overshoot increases the risk for irreversible climate impacts, such as the onset of the collapse of polar ice shelves and accelerated sea level rise.

Countries that formally accept or 'ratify' the Paris Agreement submit pledges for how they intend to address climate change. Unique to each country, these pledges are known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Different groups of researchers around the world have analysed the combined effect of adding up all the NDCs. Such analyses show that current pledges are not on track to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. If current pledges for 2030 are achieved but no more, researchers find very few (if any) ways to reduce emissions after 2030 sufficiently quickly to limit warming to 1.5°C. This, in turn, suggests that with the national pledges as they stand, warming would exceed 1.5°C, at least for a period of time, and practices and technologies that remove CO₂ from the atmosphere at a global scale would be required to return warming to 1.5°C at a later date.


A world that is consistent with holding warming to 1.5°C would see greenhouse gas emissions rapidly decline in the coming decade, with strong international cooperation and a scaling up of countries' combined ambition beyond current NDCs. In contrast, delayed action, limited international cooperation, and weak or fragmented policies that lead to stagnating or increasing greenhouse gas emissions would put the possibility of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels out of reach.

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FAQ 2.1 (continued)

FAQ2.1: Conceptual pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C

Two main pathways illustrate different interpretations for limiting global warming to 1.5°C. The consequences will be different depending on the pathway



FAQ 2.1, Figure 1 | Two main pathways for limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels are discussed in this Special Report. These are: stabilizing global temperature at, or just below, 1.5°C (left) and global temperature temporarily exceeding 1.5°C before coming back down later in the century (right). Temperatures shown are relative to pre-industrial but pathways are illustrative only, demonstrating conceptual not quantitative characteristics.

Frequently Asked Questions

FAQ 2.2 | What do Energy Supply and Demand have to do with Limiting Warming to 1.5°C?

Summary: *Limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels would require major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in all sectors. But different sectors are not independent of each other, and making changes in one can have implications for another. For example, if we as a society use a lot of energy, then this could mean we have less flexibility in the choice of mitigation options available to limit warming to 1.5°C. If we use less energy, the choice of possible actions is greater – for example, we could be less reliant on technologies that remove carbon dioxide (CO₂) from the atmosphere.*

To stabilize global temperature at any level, 'net' CO₂ emissions would need to be reduced to zero. This means the amount of CO₂ entering the atmosphere must equal the amount that is removed. Achieving a balance between CO₂ 'sources' and 'sinks' is often referred to as 'net zero' emissions or 'carbon neutrality'. The implication of net zero emissions is that the concentration of CO₂ in the atmosphere would slowly decline over time until a new equilibrium is reached, as CO₂ emissions from human activity are redistributed and taken up by the oceans and the land biosphere. This would lead to a near-constant global temperature over many centuries.

Warming will not be limited to 1.5°C or 2°C unless transformations in a number of areas achieve the required greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Emissions would need to decline rapidly across all of society's main sectors, including buildings, industry, transport, energy, and agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU). Actions that can reduce emissions include, for example, phasing out coal in the energy sector, increasing the amount of energy produced from renewable sources, electrifying transport, and reducing the 'carbon footprint' of the food we consume.

The above are examples of 'supply-side' actions. Broadly speaking, these are actions that can reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the use of low-carbon solutions. A different type of action can reduce how much energy human society uses, while still ensuring increasing levels of development and well-being. Known as 'demand-side' actions, this category includes improving energy efficiency in buildings and reducing consumption of energy- and greenhouse-gas intensive products through behavioural and lifestyle changes, for example. Demand- and supply-side measures are not an either-or question, they work in parallel with each other. But emphasis can be given to one or the other.

Making changes in one sector can have consequences for another, as they are not independent of each other. In other words, the choices that we make now as a society in one sector can either restrict or expand our options later on. For example, a high demand for energy could mean we would need to deploy almost all known options to reduce emissions in order to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, with the potential for adverse side-effects. In particular, a pathway with high energy demand would increase our reliance on practices and technologies that remove CO₂ from the atmosphere. As of yet, such techniques have not been proven to work on a large scale and, depending on how they are implemented, could compete for land and water. By leading to lower overall energy demand, effective demand-side measures could allow for greater flexibility in how we structure our energy system. However, demand-side measures are not easy to implement and barriers have prevented the most efficient practices being used in the past.

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
FAQ 2.2 (continued)

FAQ2.2: Energy demand and supply in 1.5°C world

Lower energy demand could allow for greater flexibility in how we structure our energy system.

Low energy demand allows more choice about which low-carbon energy supply options to use to limit warming to 1.5°C.

With high energy demand, there is less flexibility as virtually all available options would need to be considered.



* Options include renewable energy (such as bioenergy, hydro, wind and solar), nuclear and the use of carbon dioxide removal techniques

FAQ 2.2, Figure 1 | Having a lower energy demand increases the flexibility in choosing options for supplying energy. A larger energy demand means many more low carbon energy supply options would need to be used.

Frequently Asked Questions

FAQ 3.1 | What are the Impacts of 1.5°C and 2°C of Warming?

Summary: *The impacts of climate change are being felt in every inhabited continent and in the oceans. However, they are not spread uniformly across the globe, and different parts of the world experience impacts differently. An average warming of 1.5°C across the whole globe raises the risk of heatwaves and heavy rainfall events, amongst many other potential impacts. Limiting warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C can help reduce these risks, but the impacts the world experiences will depend on the specific greenhouse gas emissions 'pathway' taken. The consequences of temporarily overshooting 1.5°C of warming and returning to this level later in the century, for example, could be larger than if temperature stabilizes below 1.5°C. The size and duration of an overshoot will also affect future impacts.*

Human activity has warmed the world by about 1°C since pre-industrial times, and the impacts of this warming have already been felt in many parts of the world. This estimate of the increase in global temperature is the average of many thousands of temperature measurements taken over the world's land and oceans. Temperatures are not changing at the same speed everywhere, however: warming is strongest on continents and is particularly strong in the Arctic in the cold season and in mid-latitude regions in the warm season. This is due to self-amplifying mechanisms, for instance due to snow and ice melt reducing the reflectivity of solar radiation at the surface, or soil drying leading to less evaporative cooling in the interior of continents. This means that some parts of the world have already experienced temperatures greater than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

Extra warming on top of the approximately 1°C we have seen so far would amplify the risks and associated impacts, with implications for the world and its inhabitants. This would be the case even if the global warming is held at 1.5°C, just half a degree above where we are now, and would be further amplified at 2°C of global warming. Reaching 2°C instead of 1.5°C of global warming would lead to substantial warming of extreme hot days in all land regions. It would also lead to an increase in heavy rainfall events in some regions, particularly in the high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere, potentially raising the risk of flooding. In addition, some regions, such as the Mediterranean, are projected to become drier at 2°C versus 1.5°C of global warming. The impacts of any additional warming would also include stronger melting of ice sheets and glaciers, as well as increased sea level rise, which would continue long after the stabilization of atmospheric CO₂ concentrations.

Change in climate means and extremes have knock-on effects for the societies and ecosystems living on the planet. Climate change is projected to be a poverty multiplier, which means that its impacts are expected to make the poor poorer and the total number of people living in poverty greater. The 0.5°C rise in global temperatures that we have experienced in the past 50 years has contributed to shifts in the distribution of plant and animal species, decreases in crop yields and more frequent wildfires. Similar changes can be expected with further rises in global temperature.

Essentially, the lower the rise in global temperature above pre-industrial levels, the lower the risks to human societies and natural ecosystems. Put another way, limiting warming to 1.5°C can be understood in terms of 'avoided impacts' compared to higher levels of warming. Many of the impacts of climate change assessed in this report have lower associated risks at 1.5°C compared to 2°C.

Thermal expansion of the ocean means sea level will continue to rise even if the increase in global temperature is limited to 1.5°C, but this rise would be lower than in a 2°C warmer world. Ocean acidification, the process by which excess CO₂ is dissolving into the ocean and increasing its acidity, is expected to be less damaging in a world where CO₂ emissions are reduced and warming is stabilized at 1.5°C compared to 2°C. The persistence of coral reefs is greater in a 1.5°C world than that of a 2°C world, too.

The impacts of climate change that we experience in future will be affected by factors other than the change in temperature. The consequences of 1.5°C of warming will additionally depend on the specific greenhouse gas emissions 'pathway' that is followed and the extent to which adaptation can reduce vulnerability. This IPCC Special Report uses a number of 'pathways' to explore different possibilities for limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. One type of pathway sees global temperature stabilize at, or just below, 1.5°C. Another sees global temperature temporarily exceed 1.5°C before declining later in the century (known as an 'overshoot' pathway).

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
FAQ 3.1 (continued)

Such pathways would have different associated impacts, so it is important to distinguish between them for planning adaptation and mitigation strategies. For example, impacts from an overshoot pathway could be larger than impacts from a stabilization pathway. The size and duration of an overshoot would also have consequences for the impacts the world experiences. For instance, pathways that overshoot 1.5°C run a greater risk of passing through ‘tipping points’, thresholds beyond which certain impacts can no longer be avoided even if temperatures are brought back down later on. The collapse of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets on the time scale of centuries and millennia is one example of a tipping point.


FAQ3.1: Impact of 1.5°C and 2.0°C global warming

Temperature rise is not uniform across the world. Some regions will experience greater increases in the temperature of hot days and cold nights than others.


+ 1.5°C: Change in average temperature of hottest days





+ 2.0°C: Change in average temperature of hottest days



+ 1.5°C: Change in average temperature of coldest nights



+ 2.0°C: Change in average temperature of coldest nights



FAQ 3.1, Figure 1 | Temperature change is not uniform across the globe. Projected changes are shown for the average temperature of the annual hottest day (top) and the annual coldest night (bottom) with 1.5°C of global warming (left) and 2°C of global warming (right) compared to pre-industrial levels.

Frequently Asked Questions

FAQ 4.1 | What Transitions could Enable Limiting Global Warming to 1.5°C?

Summary: In order to limit warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, the world would need to transform in a number of complex and connected ways. While transitions towards lower greenhouse gas emissions are underway in some cities, regions, countries, businesses and communities, there are few that are currently consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. Meeting this challenge would require a rapid escalation in the current scale and pace of change, particularly in the coming decades. There are many factors that affect the feasibility of different adaptation and mitigation options that could help limit warming to 1.5°C and with adapting to the consequences.

There are actions across all sectors that can substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This Special Report assesses energy, land and ecosystems, urban and infrastructure, and industry in developed and developing nations to see how they would need to be transformed to limit warming to 1.5°C. Examples of actions include shifting to low- or zero-emission power generation, such as renewables; changing food systems, such as diet changes away from land-intensive animal products; electrifying transport and developing 'green infrastructure', such as building green roofs, or improving energy efficiency by smart urban planning, which will change the layout of many cities.

Because these different actions are connected, a 'whole systems' approach would be needed for the type of transformations that could limit warming to 1.5°C. This means that all relevant companies, industries and stakeholders would need to be involved to increase the support and chance of successful implementation. As an illustration, the deployment of low-emission technology (e.g., renewable energy projects or a bio-based chemical plants) would depend upon economic conditions (e.g., employment generation or capacity to mobilize investment), but also on social/cultural conditions (e.g., awareness and acceptability) and institutional conditions (e.g., political support and understanding).

To limit warming to 1.5°C, mitigation would have to be large-scale and rapid. Transitions can be transformative or incremental, and they often, but not always, go hand in hand. Transformative change can arise from growth in demand for a new product or market, such that it displaces an existing one. This is sometimes called 'disruptive innovation'. For example, high demand for LED lighting is now making more energy-intensive, incandescent lighting near-obsolete, with the support of policy action that spurred rapid industry innovation. Similarly, smart phones have become global in use within ten years. But electric cars, which were released around the same time, have not been adopted so quickly because the bigger, more connected transport and energy systems are harder to change. Renewable energy, especially solar and wind, is considered to be disruptive by some as it is rapidly being adopted and is transitioning faster than predicted. But its demand is not yet uniform. Urban systems that are moving towards transformation are coupling solar and wind with battery storage and electric vehicles in a more incremental transition, though this would still require changes in regulations, tax incentives, new standards, demonstration projects and education programmes to enable markets for this system to work.

Transitional changes are already underway in many systems, but limiting warming to 1.5°C would require a rapid escalation in the scale and pace of transition, particularly in the next 10–20 years. While limiting warming to 1.5°C would involve many of the same types of transitions as limiting warming to 2°C, the pace of change would need to be much faster. While the pace of change that would be required to limit warming to 1.5°C can be found in the past, there is no historical precedent for the scale of the necessary transitions, in particular in a socially and economically sustainable way. Resolving such speed and scale issues would require people's support, public-sector interventions and private-sector cooperation.

Different types of transitions carry with them different associated costs and requirements for institutional or governmental support. Some are also easier to scale up than others, and some need more government support than others. Transitions between, and within, these systems are connected and none would be sufficient on its own to limit warming to 1.5°C.

The 'feasibility' of adaptation and mitigation options or actions within each system that together can limit warming to 1.5°C within the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty requires careful consideration of multiple different factors. These factors include: (i) whether sufficient natural systems and resources are available to support the various options for transitioning (known as *environmental feasibility*); (ii) the degree to which the required technologies are developed and available (known as *technological feasibility*);


FAQ 4.1 (continued)

(iii) the economic conditions and implications (known as *economic feasibility*); (iv) what are the implications for human behaviour and health (known as *social/cultural feasibility*); and (v) what type of institutional support would be needed, such as governance, institutional capacity and political support (known as *institutional feasibility*). An additional factor (vi – known as the *geophysical feasibility*) addresses the capacity of physical systems to carry the option, for example, whether it is geophysically possible to implement large-scale afforestation consistent with 1.5°C.

Promoting enabling conditions, such as finance, innovation and behaviour change, would reduce barriers to the options, make the required speed and scale of the system transitions more likely, and therefore would increase the overall feasibility limiting warming to 1.5°C.

FAQ4.1: The different feasibility dimensions towards limiting warming to 1.5°C

Assessing the feasibility of different adaptation and mitigation options/actions requires consideration across six dimensions.



FAQ 4.1, Figure 1 | The different dimensions to consider when assessing the 'feasibility' of adaptation and mitigation options or actions within each system that can help to limit warming to 1.5°C. These are: (i) the environmental feasibility; (ii) the technological feasibility; (iii) the economic feasibility; (iv) the social/cultural feasibility; (v) the institutional feasibility; and (vi) the geophysical feasibility.

Frequently Asked Questions

FAQ 4.2 | What are Carbon Dioxide Removal and Negative Emissions?

Summary: Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) refers to the process of removing CO₂ from the atmosphere. Since this is the opposite of emissions, practices or technologies that remove CO₂ are often described as achieving 'negative emissions'. The process is sometimes referred to more broadly as greenhouse gas removal if it involves removing gases other than CO₂. There are two main types of CDR: either enhancing existing natural processes that remove carbon from the atmosphere (e.g., by increasing its uptake by trees, soil, or other 'carbon sinks') or using chemical processes to, for example, capture CO₂ directly from the ambient air and store it elsewhere (e.g., underground). All CDR methods are at different stages of development and some are more conceptual than others, as they have not been tested at scale.

Limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels would require unprecedented rates of transformation in many areas, including in the energy and industrial sectors, for example. Conceptually, it is possible that techniques to draw CO₂ out of the atmosphere (known as carbon dioxide removal, or CDR) could contribute to limiting warming to 1.5°C. One use of CDR could be to compensate for greenhouse gas emissions from sectors that cannot completely decarbonize, or which may take a long time to do so.

If global temperature temporarily overshoots 1.5°C, CDR would be required to reduce the atmospheric concentration of CO₂ to bring global temperature back down. To achieve this temperature reduction, the amount of CO₂ drawn out of the atmosphere would need to be greater than the amount entering the atmosphere, resulting in 'net negative emissions'. This would involve a greater amount of CDR than stabilizing atmospheric CO₂ concentration – and, therefore, global temperature – at a certain level. The larger and longer an overshoot, the greater the reliance on practices that remove CO₂ from the atmosphere.

There are a number of CDR methods, each with different potentials for achieving negative emissions, as well as different associated costs and side effects. They are also at differing levels of development, with some more conceptual than others. One example of a CDR method in the demonstration phase is a process known as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), in which atmospheric CO₂ is absorbed by plants and trees as they grow, and then the plant material (biomass) is burned to produce bioenergy. The CO₂ released in the production of bioenergy is captured before it reaches the atmosphere and stored in geological formations deep underground on very long time scales. Since the plants absorb CO₂ as they grow and the process does not emit CO₂, the overall effect can be to reduce atmospheric CO₂.


Afforestation (planting new trees) and reforestation (replanting trees where they previously existed) are also considered forms of CDR because they enhance natural CO₂ 'sinks'. Another category of CDR techniques uses chemical processes to capture CO₂ from the air and store it away on very long time scales. In a process known as direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS), CO₂ is extracted directly from the air and stored in geological formations deep underground. Converting waste plant material into a charcoal-like substance called biochar and burying it in soil can also be used to store carbon away from the atmosphere for decades to centuries.

There can be beneficial side effects of some types of CDR, other than removing CO₂ from the atmosphere. For example, restoring forests or mangroves can enhance biodiversity and protect against flooding and storms. But there could also be risks involved with some CDR methods. For example, deploying BECCS at large scale would require a large amount of land to cultivate the biomass required for bioenergy. This could have consequences for sustainable development if the use of land competes with producing food to support a growing population, biodiversity conservation or land rights. There are also other considerations. For example, there are uncertainties about how much it would cost to deploy DACCS as a CDR technique, given that removing CO₂ from the air requires considerable energy.

FAQ 4.2 (continued)

FAQ4.2: Carbon dioxide removal and negative emissions

Examples of some CDR / negative emissions techniques and practices



FAQ 4.2, Figure 1 | Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) refers to the process of removing CO₂ from the atmosphere. There are a number of CDR techniques, each with different potential for achieving 'negative emissions', as well as different associated costs and side effects.

Frequently Asked Questions

FAQ 4.3 | Why is Adaptation Important in a 1.5°C-Warmer World?

Summary: Adaptation is the process of adjusting to current or expected changes in climate and its effects. Even though climate change is a global problem, its impacts are experienced differently across the world. This means that responses are often specific to the local context, and so people in different regions are adapting in different ways. A rise in global temperature from the current 1°C above pre-industrial levels to 1.5°C, and beyond, increases the need for adaptation. Therefore, stabilizing global temperatures at 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels would require a smaller adaptation effort than at 2°C. Despite many successful examples around the world, progress in adaptation is, in many regions, in its infancy and unevenly distributed globally.

Adaptation refers to the process of adjustment to actual or expected changes in climate and its effects. Since different parts of the world are experiencing the impacts of climate change differently, there is similar diversity in how people in a given region are adapting to those impacts.

The world is already experiencing the impacts from 1°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels, and there are many examples of adaptation to impacts associated with this warming. Examples of adaptation efforts taking place around the world include investing in flood defences such as building sea walls or restoring mangroves, efforts to guide development away from high risk areas, modifying crops to avoid yield reductions, and using social learning (social interactions that change understanding on the community level) to modify agricultural practices, amongst many others. Adaptation also involves building capacity to respond better to climate change impacts, including making governance more flexible and strengthening financing mechanisms, such as by providing different types of insurance.

In general, an increase in global temperature from present day to 1.5°C or 2°C (or higher) above pre-industrial temperatures would increase the need for adaptation. Stabilizing global temperature increase at 1.5°C would require a smaller adaptation effort than for 2°C.

Since adaptation is still in early stages in many regions, there are questions about the capacity of vulnerable communities to cope with any amount of further warming. Successful adaptation can be supported at the national and sub-national levels, with national governments playing an important role in coordination, planning, determining policy priorities, and distributing resources and support. However, given that the need for adaptation can be very different from one community to the next, the kinds of measures that can successfully reduce climate risks will also depend heavily on the local context.

When done successfully, adaptation can allow individuals to adjust to the impacts of climate change in ways that minimize negative consequences and to maintain their livelihoods. This could involve, for example, a farmer switching to drought-tolerant crops to deal with increasing occurrences of heatwaves. In some cases, however, the impacts of climate change could result in entire systems changing significantly, such as moving to an entirely new agricultural system in areas where the climate is no longer suitable for current practices. Constructing sea walls to stop flooding due to sea level rise from climate change is another example of adaptation, but developing city planning to change how flood water is managed throughout the city would be an example of transformational adaptation. These actions require significantly more institutional, structural, and financial support. While this kind of transformational adaptation would not be needed everywhere in a 1.5°C world, the scale of change needed would be challenging to implement, as it requires additional support, such as through financial assistance and behavioural change. Few empirical examples exist to date.


Examples from around the world show that adaptation is an iterative process. Adaptation pathways describe how communities can make decisions about adaptation in an ongoing and flexible way. Such pathways allow for pausing, evaluating the outcomes of specific adaptation actions, and modifying the strategy as appropriate. Due to their flexible nature, adaptation pathways can help to identify the most effective ways to minimise the impacts of present and future climate change for a given local context. This is important since adaptation can sometimes exacerbate vulnerabilities and existing inequalities if poorly designed. The unintended negative consequences of adaptation that can sometimes occur are known as 'maladaptation'. Maladaptation can be seen if a particular adaptation option has negative consequences for some (e.g., rainwater harvesting upstream might reduce water availability downstream) or if an adaptation intervention in the present has trade-offs in the future (e.g., desalination plants may improve water availability in the present but have large energy demands over time).

FAQ 4.3 (continued)

While adaptation is important to reduce the negative impacts from climate change, adaptation measures on their own are not enough to prevent climate change impacts entirely. The more global temperature rises, the more frequent, severe, and erratic the impacts will be, and adaptation may not protect against all risks. Examples of where limits may be reached include substantial loss of coral reefs, massive range losses for terrestrial species, more human deaths from extreme heat, and losses of coastal-dependent livelihoods in low lying islands and coasts.

FAQ4.3: Adaptation in a warming world

Adapting to further warming requires action at national & sub-national levels and can mean different things to different people in different contexts



FAQ 4.3, Figure 1 | Why is adaptation important in a world with global warming of 1.5°C? Examples of adaptation and transformational adaptation. Adapting to further warming requires action at national and sub-national levels and can mean different things to different people in different contexts. While transformational adaptation would not be needed everywhere in a world limited to 1.5°C warming, the scale of change needed would be challenging to implement.

Frequently Asked Questions

FAQ 5.1 | What are the Connections between Sustainable Development and Limiting Global Warming to 1.5°C above Pre-Industrial Levels?

Summary: Sustainable development seeks to meet the needs of people living today without compromising the needs of future generations, while balancing social, economic and environmental considerations. The 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include targets for eradicating poverty; ensuring health, energy and food security; reducing inequality; protecting ecosystems; pursuing sustainable cities and economies; and a goal for climate action (SDG 13). Climate change affects the ability to achieve sustainable development goals, and limiting warming to 1.5°C will help meet some sustainable development targets. Pursuing sustainable development will influence emissions, impacts and vulnerabilities. Responses to climate change in the form of adaptation and mitigation will also interact with sustainable development with positive effects, known as synergies, or negative effects, known as trade-offs. Responses to climate change can be planned to maximize synergies and limit trade-offs with sustainable development.

For more than 25 years, the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations have embraced the concept of sustainable development to promote well-being and meet the needs of today's population without compromising the needs of future generations. This concept spans economic, social and environmental objectives including poverty and hunger alleviation, equitable economic growth, access to resources, and the protection of water, air and ecosystems. Between 1990 and 2015, the UN monitored a set of eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They reported progress in reducing poverty, easing hunger and child mortality, and improving access to clean water and sanitation. But with millions remaining in poor health, living in poverty and facing serious problems associated with climate change, pollution and land-use change, the UN decided that more needed to be done. In 2015, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were endorsed as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The 17 SDGs (Figure FAQ 5.1) apply to all countries and have a timeline for success by 2030. The SDGs seek to eliminate extreme poverty and hunger; ensure health, education, peace, safe water and clean energy for all; promote inclusive and sustainable consumption, cities, infrastructure and economic growth; reduce inequality including gender inequality; combat climate change and protect oceans and terrestrial ecosystems.

Climate change and sustainable development are fundamentally connected. Previous IPCC reports found that climate change can undermine sustainable development, and that well-designed mitigation and adaptation responses can support poverty alleviation, food security, healthy ecosystems, equality and other dimensions of sustainable development. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require mitigation actions and adaptation measures to be taken at all levels. These adaptation and mitigation actions would include reducing emissions and increasing resilience through technology and infrastructure choices, as well as changing behaviour and policy.

These actions can interact with sustainable development objectives in positive ways that strengthen sustainable development, known as synergies. Or they can interact in negative ways, where sustainable development is hindered or reversed, known as trade-offs.

An example of a synergy is sustainable forest management, which can prevent emissions from deforestation and take up carbon to reduce warming at reasonable cost. It can work synergistically with other dimensions of sustainable development by providing food (SDG 2) and clean water (SDG 6) and protecting ecosystems (SDG 15). Other examples of synergies are when climate adaptation measures, such as coastal or agricultural projects, empower women and benefit local incomes, health and ecosystems.

An example of a trade-off can occur if ambitious climate change mitigation compatible with 1.5°C changes land use in ways that have negative impacts on sustainable development. An example could be turning natural forests, agricultural areas, or land under indigenous or local ownership to plantations for bioenergy production. If not managed carefully, such changes could undermine dimensions of sustainable development by threatening food and water security, creating conflict over land rights and causing biodiversity loss. Another trade-off could occur for some countries, assets, workers and infrastructure already in place if a switch is made from fossil fuels to other energy sources without adequate planning for such a transition. Trade-offs can be minimized if effectively managed, as when care is taken to improve bioenergy crop yields to reduce harmful land-use change or where workers are retrained for employment in lower carbon sectors.

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FAQ 5.1 (continued)

Limiting temperature increase to 1.5°C can make it much easier to achieve the SDGs, but it is also possible that pursuing the SDGs could result in trade-offs with efforts to limit climate change. There are trade-offs when people escaping from poverty and hunger consume more energy or land and thus increase emissions, or if goals for economic growth and industrialization increase fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Conversely, efforts to reduce poverty and gender inequalities and to enhance food, health and water security can reduce vulnerability to climate change. Other synergies can occur when coastal and ocean ecosystem protection reduces the impacts of climate change on these systems. The sustainable development goal of affordable and clean energy (SDG 7) specifically targets access to renewable energy and energy efficiency, which are important to ambitious mitigation and limiting warming to 1.5°C.

The link between sustainable development and limiting global warming to 1.5°C is recognized by the SDG for climate action (SDG 13), which seeks to combat climate change and its impacts while acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change.

The challenge is to put in place sustainable development policies and actions that reduce deprivation, alleviate poverty and ease ecosystem degradation while also lowering emissions, reducing climate change impacts and facilitating adaptation. It is important to strengthen synergies and minimize trade-offs when planning climate change adaptation and mitigation actions. Unfortunately, not all trade-offs can be avoided or minimized, but careful planning and implementation can build the enabling conditions for long-term sustainable development.

FAQ5.1: The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

The link between sustainable development and limiting global warming to 1.5°C is recognised by the Sustainable Development Goal for climate action (SDG 13)



FAQ 5.1, Figure 1 | Climate change action is one of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and is connected to sustainable development more broadly. Actions to reduce climate risk can interact with other sustainable development objectives in positive ways (synergies) and negative ways (trade-offs).

Frequently Asked Questions

FAQ 5.2 | What are the Pathways to Achieving Poverty Reduction and Reducing Inequalities while Reaching a 1.5°C World?

Summary: *There are ways to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Of the pathways that exist, some simultaneously achieve sustainable development. They entail a mix of measures that lower emissions and reduce the impacts of climate change, while contributing to poverty eradication and reducing inequalities. Which pathways are possible and desirable will differ between and within regions and nations. This is due to the fact that development progress to date has been uneven and climate-related risks are unevenly distributed. Flexible governance would be needed to ensure that such pathways are inclusive, fair and equitable to avoid poor and disadvantaged populations becoming worse off. Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs) offer possibilities to achieve both equitable and low-carbon futures.*

Issues of equity and fairness have long been central to climate change and sustainable development. Equity, like equality, aims to promote justness and fairness for all. This is not necessarily the same as treating everyone equally, since not everyone comes from the same starting point. Often used interchangeably with fairness and justice, equity implies implementing different actions in different places, all with a view to creating an equal world that is fair for all and where no one is left behind.

The Paris Agreement states that it ‘will be implemented to reflect equity... in the light of different national circumstances’ and calls for ‘rapid reductions’ of greenhouse gases to be achieved ‘on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty’. Similarly, the UN SDGs include targets to reduce poverty and inequalities, and to ensure equitable and affordable access to health, water and energy for all.

Equity and fairness are important for considering pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C in a way that is liveable for every person and species. They recognize the uneven development status between richer and poorer nations, the uneven distribution of climate impacts (including on future generations) and the uneven capacity of different nations and people to respond to climate risks. This is particularly true for those who are highly vulnerable to climate change, such as indigenous communities in the Arctic, people whose livelihoods depend on agriculture or coastal and marine ecosystems, and inhabitants of small island developing states. The poorest people will continue to experience climate change through the loss of income and livelihood opportunities, hunger, adverse health effects and displacement.


Well-planned adaptation and mitigation measures are essential to avoid exacerbating inequalities or creating new injustices. Pathways that are compatible with limiting warming to 1.5°C and aligned with the SDGs consider mitigation and adaptation options that reduce inequalities in terms of who benefits, who pays the costs and who is affected by possible negative consequences. Attention to equity ensures that disadvantaged people can secure their livelihoods and live in dignity, and that those who experience mitigation or adaptation costs have financial and technical support to enable fair transitions.

CRDPs describe trajectories that pursue the dual goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C while strengthening sustainable development. This includes eradicating poverty as well as reducing vulnerabilities and inequalities for regions, countries, communities, businesses and cities. These trajectories entail a mix of adaptation and mitigation measures consistent with profound societal and systems transformations. The goals are to meet the short-term SDGs, achieve longer-term sustainable development, reduce emissions towards net zero around the middle of the century, build resilience and enhance human capacities to adapt, all while paying close attention to equity and well-being for all.

The characteristics of CRDPs will differ across communities and nations, and will be based on deliberations with a diverse range of people, including those most affected by climate change and by possible routes towards transformation. For this reason, there are no standard methods for designing CRDPs or for monitoring their progress towards climate-resilient futures. However, examples from around the world demonstrate that flexible and inclusive governance structures and broad participation often help support iterative decision-making, continuous learning and experimentation. Such inclusive processes can also help to overcome weak institutional arrangements and power structures that may further exacerbate inequalities.

(continued on next page)

FAQ 5.2 (continued)



FAQ 5.2, Figure 1 | Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs) describe trajectories that pursue the dual goals of limiting warming to 1.5°C while strengthening sustainable development. Decision-making that achieves the SDGs, lowers greenhouse gas emissions and limits global warming could help lead to a climate-resilient world, within the context of enhancing adaptation.

Ambitious actions already underway around the world can offer insight into CRDPs for limiting warming to 1.5°C. For example, some countries have adopted clean energy and sustainable transport while creating environmentally friendly jobs and supporting social welfare programmes to reduce domestic poverty. Other examples teach us about different ways to promote development through practices inspired by community values. For instance, *Buen Vivir*, a Latin American concept based on indigenous ideas of communities living in harmony with nature, is aligned with peace; diversity; solidarity; rights to education, health, and safe food, water, and energy; and well-being and justice for all. The Transition Movement, with origins in Europe, promotes equitable and resilient communities through low-carbon living, food self-sufficiency and citizen science. Such examples indicate that pathways that reduce poverty and inequalities while limiting warming to 1.5°C are possible and that they can provide guidance on pathways towards socially desirable, equitable and low-carbon futures.

FAQ



Glossary

Glossary

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Notes:

Note that subterms are in italics beneath main terms.

This glossary defines some specific terms as the Lead Authors intend them to be interpreted in the context of this report. Blue, italicized words indicate that the term is defined in the Glossary.

This annex should be cited as:

IPCC, 2018: Annex I: Glossary [Matthews, J.B.R. (ed.)]. In: *Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty* [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, pp. 541-562, doi:[10.1017/9781009157940.008](https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157940.008).

1.5°C pathway See [Pathways](#).

1.5°C warmer worlds *Projected* worlds in which [global warming](#) has reached and, unless otherwise indicated, been limited to 1.5°C above [pre-industrial](#) levels. There is no single 1.5°C warmer world, and [projections](#) of 1.5°C warmer worlds look different depending on whether it is considered on a near-term transient trajectory or at climate equilibrium after several millennia, and, in both cases, if it occurs with or without [overshoot](#). Within the 21st century, several aspects play a role for the assessment of risk and potential [impacts](#) in 1.5°C warmer worlds: the possible occurrence, magnitude and duration of an overshoot; the way in which emissions reductions are achieved; the ways in which policies might be able to influence the [resilience](#) of human and natural systems; and the nature of the regional and sub-regional risks. Beyond the 21st century, several elements of the [climate system](#) would continue to change even if the global mean temperatures remain stable, including further increases of sea level.

2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development A UN resolution in September 2015 adopting a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity in a new global development framework anchored in 17 [Sustainable Development Goals](#) (UN, 2015). See also [Sustainable Development Goals \(SDGs\)](#).

Acceptability of policy or system change The extent to which a policy or system change is evaluated unfavourably or favourably, or rejected or supported, by members of the general public (public acceptability) or politicians or governments (political acceptability). Acceptability may vary from totally unacceptable/fully rejected to totally acceptable/fully supported; individuals may differ in how acceptable policies or system changes are believed to be.

Adaptability See [Adaptive capacity](#).

Adaptation In [human systems](#), the process of adjustment to actual or expected [climate](#) and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects.

Incremental adaptation

Adaptation that maintains the essence and integrity of a system or process at a given scale. In some cases, incremental adaptation can accrue to result in [transformational adaptation](#) (Termeer et al., 2017; Tàbara et al., 2018).

Transformational adaptation

Adaptation that changes the fundamental attributes of a [socio-ecological system](#) in anticipation of [climate change](#) and its [impacts](#).

Adaptation limits

The point at which an actor's objectives (or system needs) cannot be secured from intolerable risks through adaptive actions.

- Hard adaptation limit: No adaptive actions are possible to avoid intolerable risks.
- Soft adaptation limit: Options are currently not available to avoid intolerable risks through adaptive action.

See also [Adaptation options](#), [Adaptive capacity](#) and [Maladaptive actions \(Maladaptation\)](#).

Adaptation behaviour See [Human behaviour](#).

Adaptation limits See [Adaptation](#).

Adaptation options The array of strategies and measures that are available and appropriate for addressing [adaptation](#). They include a wide range of actions that can be categorized as structural, institutional,

ecological or behavioural. See also [Adaptation](#), [Adaptive capacity](#) and [Maladaptive actions \(Maladaptation\)](#).

Adaptation pathways See [Pathways](#).

Adaptive capacity The ability of systems, [institutions](#), humans and other organisms to adjust to potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to respond to consequences. This glossary entry builds from definitions used in previous IPCC reports and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005). See also [Adaptation](#), [Adaptation options and Maladaptive actions \(Maladaptation\)](#).

Adaptive governance See [Governance](#).

Aerosol A suspension of airborne solid or liquid particles, with a typical size between a few nanometres and 10 µm that reside in the [atmosphere](#) for at least several hours. The term aerosol, which includes both the particles and the suspending gas, is often used in this report in its plural form to mean aerosol particles. Aerosols may be of either natural or [anthropogenic](#) origin. Aerosols may influence [climate](#) in several ways: through both interactions that scatter and/or absorb radiation and through interactions with cloud microphysics and other cloud properties, or upon deposition on snow- or ice-covered surfaces thereby altering their [albedo](#) and contributing to [climate feedback](#). Atmospheric aerosols, whether natural or anthropogenic, originate from two different pathways: emissions of primary particulate matter (PM), and formation of secondary PM from gaseous [precursors](#). The bulk of aerosols are of natural origin. Some scientists use group labels that refer to the chemical composition, namely: sea salt, organic carbon, [black carbon \(BC\)](#), mineral species (mainly desert dust), sulphate, nitrate, and ammonium. These labels are, however, imperfect as aerosols combine particles to create complex mixtures. See also [Short-lived climate forcers \(SLCF\)](#) and [Black carbon \(BC\)](#).

Afforestation Planting of new [forests](#) on lands that historically have not contained forests. For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforestation, [reforestation](#) and [deforestation](#), see the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000), information provided by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2013) and the report on Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003). See also [Reforestation](#), [Deforestation](#), and [Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation \(REDD+\)](#).

Agreement In this report, the degree of agreement within the scientific body of knowledge on a particular finding is assessed based on multiple lines of [evidence](#) (e.g., mechanistic understanding, theory, data, models, expert judgement) and expressed qualitatively (Mastrandrea et al., 2010). See also [Evidence](#), [Confidence](#), [Likelihood](#) and [Uncertainty](#).

Air pollution Degradation of air quality with negative effects on human health or the natural or built environment due to the introduction, by natural processes or human activity, into the [atmosphere](#) of substances (gases, [aerosols](#)) which have a direct (primary pollutants) or indirect (secondary pollutants) harmful effect. See also [Aerosol](#) and [Short-lived climate forcers \(SLCF\)](#).

Albedo The fraction of solar radiation reflected by a surface or object, often expressed as a percentage. Snow-covered surfaces have a high albedo, the surface albedo of soils ranges from high to low, and vegetation-covered surfaces and the oceans have a low albedo. The Earth's planetary albedo changes mainly through varying cloudiness and changes in snow, ice, leaf area and land cover.

Ambient persuasive technology Technological systems and environments that are designed to change human cognitive processing,

attitudes and behaviours without the need for the user's conscious attention.

Anomaly The deviation of a variable from its value averaged over a *reference period*.

Anthropocene The 'Anthropocene' is a proposed new geological epoch resulting from significant human-driven changes to the structure and functioning of the Earth System, including the *climate system*. Originally proposed in the Earth System science community in 2000, the proposed new epoch is undergoing a formalization process within the geological community based on the stratigraphic *evidence* that human activities have changed the Earth System to the extent of forming geological deposits with a signature that is distinct from those of the *Holocene*, and which will remain in the geological record. Both the stratigraphic and Earth System approaches to defining the Anthropocene consider the mid-20th Century to be the most appropriate starting date, although others have been proposed and continue to be discussed. The Anthropocene concept has been taken up by a diversity of disciplines and the public to denote the substantive influence humans have had on the state, dynamics and future of the Earth System. See also *Holocene*.

Anthropogenic Resulting from or produced by human activities. See also *Anthropogenic emissions* and *Anthropogenic removals*.

Anthropogenic emissions Emissions of *greenhouse gases (GHGs)*, *precursors* of GHGs and aerosols caused by human activities. These activities include the burning of *fossil fuels*, *deforestation*, *land use* and *land-use changes (LULUC)*, livestock production, fertilisation, waste management and industrial processes. See also *Anthropogenic* and *Anthropogenic removals*.

Anthropogenic removals Anthropogenic removals refer to the withdrawal of *GHGs* from the *atmosphere* as a result of deliberate human activities. These include enhancing biological *sinks of CO₂* and using chemical engineering to achieve long-term removal and storage. *Carbon capture and storage (CCS)* from industrial and energy-related sources, which alone does not remove CO₂ in the atmosphere, can reduce atmospheric CO₂ if it is combined with *bioenergy* production (*BECCS*). See also *Anthropogenic emissions*, *Bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS)* and *Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)*.

Artificial intelligence (AI) Computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence, such as visual perception and speech recognition.

Atmosphere The gaseous envelope surrounding the earth, divided into five layers – the *troposphere* which contains half of the Earth's atmosphere, the *stratosphere*, the mesosphere, the thermosphere, and the exosphere, which is the outer limit of the atmosphere. The dry atmosphere consists almost entirely of nitrogen (78.1% volume mixing ratio) and oxygen (20.9% volume mixing ratio), together with a number of trace gases, such as argon (0.93 % volume mixing ratio), helium and radiatively active *greenhouse gases (GHGs)* such as *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* (0.04% volume mixing ratio) and *ozone (O₃)*. In addition, the atmosphere contains the GHG water vapour (H₂O), whose amounts are highly variable but typically around 1% volume mixing ratio. The atmosphere also contains clouds and aerosols. See also *Troposphere*, *Stratosphere*, *Greenhouse gas (GHG)* and *Hydrological cycle*.

Atmosphere–ocean general circulation model (AOGCM) See *Climate model*.

Attribution See *Detection and attribution*.

Baseline scenario In much of the literature the term is also synonymous with the term business-as-usual (BAU) *scenario*, although

the term BAU has fallen out of favour because the idea of business as usual in century-long socio-economic *projections* is hard to fathom. In the context of *transformation pathways*, the term baseline scenarios refers to scenarios that are based on the assumption that no mitigation *policies* or measures will be implemented beyond those that are already in force and/or are legislated or planned to be adopted. Baseline scenarios are not intended to be predictions of the future, but rather counterfactual constructions that can serve to highlight the level of emissions that would occur without further policy effort. Typically, baseline scenarios are then compared to *mitigation scenarios* that are constructed to meet different goals for *greenhouse gas (GHG)* emissions, atmospheric concentrations or temperature change. The term baseline scenario is often used interchangeably with reference scenario and no policy scenario. See also *Emission scenario* and *Mitigation scenario*.

Battery electric vehicle (BEV) See *Electric vehicle (EV)*.

Biochar Stable, carbon-rich material produced by heating *biomass* in an oxygen-limited environment. Biochar may be added to soils to improve soil functions and to reduce *greenhouse gas* emissions from biomass and soils, and for *carbon sequestration*. This definition builds from IBI (2018).

Biodiversity Biological diversity means the variability among living organisms from all sources, including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic *ecosystems* and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems (UN, 1992).

Bioenergy Energy derived from any form of *biomass* or its metabolic by-products. See also *Biomass* and *Biofuel*.

Bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS) *Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)* technology applied to a *bioenergy* facility. Note that depending on the total emissions of the BECCS supply chain, *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* can be removed from the *atmosphere*. See also *Bioenergy* and *Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)*.

Biofuel A fuel, generally in liquid form, produced from *biomass*. Biofuels currently include bioethanol from sugarcane or maize, biodiesel from canola or soybeans, and black liquor from the paper-manufacturing process. See also *Biomass* and *Bioenergy*.

Biomass Living or recently dead organic material. See also *Bioenergy* and *Biofuel*.

Biophilic urbanism Designing cities with green roofs, green walls and green balconies to bring nature into the densest parts of cities in order to provide *green infrastructure* and human health benefits. See also *Green infrastructure*.

Black carbon (BC) Operationally defined *aerosol* species based on measurement of light absorption and chemical reactivity and/or thermal stability. It is sometimes referred to as soot. BC is mostly formed by the incomplete combustion of *fossil fuels*, *biofuels* and *biomass* but it also occurs naturally. It stays in the *atmosphere* only for days or weeks. It is the most strongly light-absorbing component of particulate matter (PM) and has a warming effect by absorbing heat into the atmosphere and reducing the *albedo* when deposited on snow or ice. See also *Aerosol*.

Blue carbon Blue carbon is the carbon captured by living organisms in coastal (e.g., mangroves, salt marshes, seagrasses) and marine *ecosystems*, and stored in *biomass* and sediments.

Burden sharing (also referred to as Effort sharing) In the context of *mitigation*, burden sharing refers to sharing the effort of reducing the sources or enhancing the sinks of *greenhouse gases (GHGs)*

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from historical or *projected* levels, usually allocated by some criteria, as well as sharing the cost burden across countries.

Business as usual (BAU) See *Baseline scenario*.

Carbon budget This term refers to three concepts in the literature: (1) an assessment of *carbon cycle* sources and *sinks* on a global level, through the synthesis of *evidence* for *fossil fuel* and cement emissions, *land-use change* emissions, ocean and land *CO₂* sinks, and the resulting atmospheric *CO₂* growth rate. This is referred to as the global carbon budget; (2) the estimated cumulative amount of global carbon dioxide emissions that is estimated to limit global surface temperature to a given level above a *reference period*, taking into account global surface temperature contributions of other *GHGs* and climate forcers; (3) the distribution of the carbon budget defined under (2) to the regional, national, or sub-national level based on considerations of *equity*, costs or efficiency. See also *Remaining carbon budget*.

Carbon cycle The term used to describe the flow of carbon (in various forms, e.g., as *carbon dioxide (CO₂)*, carbon in *biomass*, and carbon dissolved in the ocean as carbonate and bicarbonate) through the *atmosphere*, hydrosphere, terrestrial and marine biosphere and lithosphere. In this report, the reference unit for the global carbon cycle is GtCO₂ or GtC (Gigatonne of carbon = 1 GtC = 10¹⁵ grams of carbon. This corresponds to 3.667 GtCO₂).

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) A naturally occurring gas, CO₂ is also a by-product of burning *fossil fuels* (such as oil, gas and coal), of burning *biomass*, of *land-use changes (LUC)* and of industrial processes (e.g., cement production). It is the principal *anthropogenic* greenhouse gas (*GHG*) that affects the Earth's radiative balance. It is the reference gas against which other GHGs are measured and therefore has a global warming potential (GWP) of 1. See also *Greenhouse gas (GHG)*.

Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) A process in which a relatively pure stream of *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* from industrial and energy-related sources is separated (captured), conditioned, compressed and transported to a storage location for long-term isolation from the *atmosphere*. Sometimes referred to as Carbon capture and storage. See also *Carbon dioxide capture and utilisation (CCU)*, *Bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS)* and *Uptake*.

Carbon dioxide capture and utilisation (CCU) A process in which *CO₂* is captured and then used to produce a new product. If the *CO₂* is stored in a product for a *climate-relevant* time horizon, this is referred to as carbon dioxide capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS). Only then, and only combined with *CO₂* recently removed from the *atmosphere*, can CCUS lead to *carbon dioxide removal*. CCU is sometimes referred to as carbon dioxide capture and use. See also *Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)*.

Carbon dioxide capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) See *Carbon dioxide capture and utilisation (CCU)*.

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) *Anthropogenic* activities removing *CO₂* from the *atmosphere* and durably storing it in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products. It includes existing and potential anthropogenic enhancement of biological or geochemical sinks and direct air capture and storage, but excludes natural *CO₂* *uptake* not directly caused by human activities. See also *Mitigation (of climate change)*, *Greenhouse gas removal (GGR)*, *Negative emissions*, *Direct air carbon dioxide capture and storage (DACCS)* and *Sink*.

Carbon intensity The amount of emissions of *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* released per unit of another variable such as *gross domestic product (GDP)*, output energy use or transport.

Carbon neutrality See *Net zero CO₂ emissions*.

Carbon price The price for avoided or released *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* or *CO₂-equivalent emissions*. This may refer to the rate of a carbon tax, or the price of emission permits. In many models that are used to assess the economic costs of *mitigation*, carbon prices are used as a proxy to represent the level of effort in mitigation *policies*.

Carbon sequestration The process of storing carbon in a carbon pool. See also *Blue carbon*, *Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)*, *Uptake* and *Sink*.

Carbon sink See *Sink*.

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) A mechanism defined under Article 12 of the *Kyoto Protocol* through which investors (governments or companies) from developed (Annex B) countries may finance *greenhouse gas (GHG)* emission reduction or removal projects in developing countries (Non-Annex B), and receive Certified Emission Reduction Units (CERs) for doing so. The CERs can be credited towards the commitments of the respective developed countries. The CDM is intended to facilitate the two objectives of promoting *sustainable development (SD)* in developing countries and of helping *industrialised countries* to reach their emissions commitments in a cost-effective way.

Climate Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the average weather, or more rigorously, as the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time ranging from months to thousands or millions of years. The classical period for averaging these variables is 30 years, as defined by the World Meteorological Organization. The relevant quantities are most often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, of the *climate system*.

Climate change Climate change refers to a change in the state of the *climate* that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external *forcings* such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and persistent *anthropogenic* changes in the composition of the *atmosphere* or in *land use*. Note that the *Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)*, in its Article 1, defines climate change as: 'a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.' The UNFCCC thus makes a distinction between climate change attributable to human activities altering the atmospheric composition and climate variability attributable to natural causes. See also *Climate variability*, *Global warming*, *Ocean acidification (OA)* and *Detection and attribution*.

Climate change commitment Climate change commitment is defined as the unavoidable future *climate change* resulting from inertia in the geophysical and socio-economic systems. Different types of climate change commitment are discussed in the literature (see subterms). Climate change commitment is usually quantified in terms of the further change in temperature, but it includes other future changes, for example in the *hydrological cycle*, in *extreme weather events*, in extreme climate events, and in sea level.

Constant composition commitment

The constant composition commitment is the remaining *climate change* that would result if atmospheric composition, and hence *radiative forcing*, were held fixed at a given value. It results from the thermal inertia of the ocean and slow processes in the cryosphere and land surface.

Constant emissions commitment

The constant emissions commitment is the committed *climate change* that would result from keeping *anthropogenic emissions* constant.

Zero emissions commitment

The zero emissions commitment is the climate change commitment that would result from setting *anthropogenic emissions* to zero. It is determined by both inertia in physical *climate system* components (ocean, cryosphere, land surface) and *carbon cycle* inertia.

Feasible scenario commitment

The feasible scenario commitment is the *climate change* that corresponds to the lowest *emission scenario* judged feasible.

Infrastructure commitment

The infrastructure commitment is the *climate change* that would result if existing *greenhouse gas* and *aerosol* emitting infrastructure were used until the end of its expected lifetime.

Climate-compatible development (CCD) A form of development building on climate strategies that embrace development goals and development strategies that integrate climate *risk management*, *adaptation* and *mitigation*. This definition builds from Mitchell and Maxwell (2010).

Climate extreme (extreme weather or climate event) The occurrence of a value of a weather or *climate* variable above (or below) a threshold value near the upper (or lower) ends of the range of observed values of the variable. For simplicity, both *extreme weather events* and extreme climate events are referred to collectively as 'climate extremes'. See also *Extreme weather event*.

Climate feedback An interaction in which a perturbation in one *climate* quantity causes a change in a second and the change in the second quantity ultimately leads to an additional change in the first. A negative feedback is one in which the initial perturbation is weakened by the changes it causes; a positive feedback is one in which the initial perturbation is enhanced. The initial perturbation can either be externally forced or arise as part of internal variability.

Climate governance See *Governance*.

Climate justice See *Justice*.

Climate model A numerical representation of the *climate system* based on the physical, chemical and biological properties of its components, their interactions and *feedback* processes, and accounting for some of its known properties. The climate system can be represented by models of varying complexity; that is, for any one component or combination of components a spectrum or hierarchy of models can be identified, differing in such aspects as the number of spatial dimensions, the extent to which physical, chemical or biological processes are explicitly represented, or the level at which empirical parametrizations are involved. There is an evolution towards more complex models with interactive chemistry and biology. *Climate models* are applied as a research tool to study and simulate the *climate* and for operational purposes, including monthly, seasonal and interannual climate predictions. See also *Earth system model (ESM)*.

Climate neutrality Concept of a state in which human activities result in no net effect on the *climate system*. Achieving such a state would require balancing of residual emissions with emission (*carbon dioxide*) removal as well as accounting for regional or local biogeophysical effects of human activities that, for example, affect surface *albedo* or local *climate*. See also *Net zero CO₂ emissions*.

Climate projection A climate *projection* is the simulated response of the *climate system* to a *scenario* of future emission or concentration of

greenhouse gases (GHGs) and *aerosols*, generally derived using *climate models*. Climate projections are distinguished from climate predictions by their dependence on the emission/concentration/*radiative forcing* scenario used, which is in turn based on assumptions concerning, for example, future socioeconomic and technological developments that may or may not be realized.

Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs) Trajectories that strengthen *sustainable development* and efforts to eradicate *poverty* and reduce inequalities while promoting *fair* and cross-scalar *adaptation* to and *resilience* in a changing *climate*. They raise the *ethics*, *equity* and *feasibility* aspects of the deep *societal transformation* needed to drastically reduce emissions to limit *global warming* (e.g., to 1.5°C) and achieve desirable and liveable futures and *well-being* for all.

Climate-resilient pathways Iterative processes for managing change within complex systems in order to reduce disruptions and enhance opportunities associated with *climate change*. See also *Development pathways* (under *Pathways*), *Transformation pathways* (under *Pathways*), and *Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs)*.

Climate sensitivity Climate sensitivity refers to the change in the annual *global mean surface temperature* in response to a change in the atmospheric CO₂ concentration or other radiative forcing.

Equilibrium climate sensitivity

Refers to the equilibrium (steady state) change in the annual *global mean surface temperature* following a doubling of the atmospheric *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* concentration. As a true equilibrium is challenging to define in *climate models* with dynamic oceans, the equilibrium climate sensitivity is often estimated through experiments in AOGCMs where CO₂ levels are either quadrupled or doubled from *pre-industrial* levels and which are integrated for 100-200 years. The climate sensitivity parameter (units: °C (W m⁻²)⁻¹) refers to the equilibrium change in the annual global mean surface temperature following a unit change in *radiative forcing*.

Effective climate sensitivity

An estimate of the *global mean surface temperature* response to a doubling of the atmospheric *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* concentration that is evaluated from model output or observations for evolving non-equilibrium conditions. It is a measure of the strengths of the *climate feedbacks* at a particular time and may vary with *forcing* history and *climate* state, and therefore may differ from *equilibrium climate sensitivity*.

Transient climate response

The change in the *global mean surface temperature*, averaged over a 20-year period, centered at the time of atmospheric CO₂ doubling, in a *climate model* simulation in which CO₂ increases at 1% yr⁻¹ from *pre-industrial*. It is a measure of the strength of *climate feedbacks* and the timescale of ocean heat uptake.

Climate services Climate services refers to information and products that enhance users' knowledge and understanding about the *impacts* of *climate change* and/or *climate variability* so as to aid decision-making of individuals and organizations and enable preparedness and early climate change action. Products can include climate data products.

Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) is an approach that helps to guide actions needed to transform and reorient agricultural systems to effectively support development and ensure *food security* in a changing *climate*. CSA aims to tackle three main objectives: sustainably increasing agricultural productivity and incomes, *adapting* and building *resilience* to *climate change*, and reducing and/or removing *greenhouse gas* emissions, where possible (FAO, 2018).

Climate system The climate system is the highly complex system consisting of five major components: the *atmosphere*, the hydrosphere,

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the cryosphere, the lithosphere and the biosphere and the interactions between them. The climate system evolves in time under the influence of its own internal dynamics and because of external *forcings* such as volcanic eruptions, solar variations and *anthropogenic* forcings such as the changing composition of the atmosphere and *land-use change*.

Climate target Climate target refers to a temperature limit, concentration level, or emissions reduction goal used towards the aim of avoiding dangerous *anthropogenic* interference with the *climate system*. For example, national climate targets may aim to reduce *greenhouse gas* emissions by a certain amount over a given time horizon, for example those under the *Kyoto Protocol*.

Climate variability Climate variability refers to variations in the mean state and other statistics (such as standard deviations, the occurrence of extremes, etc.) of the *climate* on all spatial and temporal scales beyond that of individual weather events. Variability may be due to natural internal processes within the *climate system* (internal variability), or to variations in natural or *anthropogenic* external *forcing* (external variability). See also *Climate change*.

CO₂ equivalent (CO₂-eq) emission The amount of *carbon dioxide* (CO₂) emission that would cause the same integrated *radiative forcing* or temperature change, over a given time horizon, as an emitted amount of a *greenhouse gas* (GHG) or a mixture of GHGs. There are a number of ways to compute such equivalent emissions and choose appropriate time horizons. Most typically, the CO₂-equivalent emission is obtained by multiplying the emission of a GHG by its global warming potential (GWP) for a 100-year time horizon. For a mix of GHGs it is obtained by summing the CO₂-equivalent emissions of each gas. CO₂-equivalent emission is a common scale for comparing emissions of different GHGs but does not imply equivalence of the corresponding *climate change* responses. There is generally no connection between CO₂-equivalent emissions and resulting CO₂-equivalent concentrations.

Co-benefits The positive effects that a policy or measure aimed at one objective might have on other objectives, thereby increasing the total benefits for society or the environment. Co-benefits are often subject to *uncertainty* and depend on local circumstances and implementation practices, among other factors. Co-benefits are also referred to as ancillary benefits.

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) is a key principle in the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)* that recognises the different capabilities and differing responsibilities of individual countries in tackling *climate change*. The principle of CBDR-RC is embedded in the 1992 UNFCCC treaty. The convention states: "... the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions." Since then the CBDR-RC principle has guided the UN climate negotiations.

Conference of the Parties (COP) The supreme body of UN conventions, such as the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)*, comprising parties with a right to vote that have ratified or acceded to the convention. See also *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)*.

Confidence The robustness of a finding based on the type, amount, quality and consistency of *evidence* (e.g., mechanistic understanding, theory, data, models, expert judgment) and on the degree of *agreement* across multiple lines of evidence. In this report, confidence is expressed

qualitatively (Mastrandrea et al., 2010). See Section 1.6 for the list of confidence levels used. See also *Agreement*, *Evidence*, *Likelihood* and *Uncertainty*.

Conservation agriculture A coherent group of agronomic and soil management practices that reduce the disruption of soil structure and biota.

Constant composition commitment See *Climate change commitment*.

Constant emissions commitment See *Climate change commitment*.

Coping capacity The ability of people, *institutions*, organizations, and systems, using available skills, values, beliefs, resources, and opportunities, to address, manage, and overcome adverse conditions in the short to medium term. This glossary entry builds from the definition used in UNISDR (2009) and IPCC (2012a). See also *Resilience*.

Cost-benefit analysis Monetary assessment of all negative and positive impacts associated with a given action. Cost-benefit analysis enables comparison of different interventions, investments or strategies and reveals how a given investment or policy effort pays off for a particular person, company or country. Cost-benefit analyses representing society's point of view are important for *climate change* decision-making, but there are difficulties in aggregating costs and benefits across different actors and across timescales. See also *Discounting*.

Cost-effectiveness A measure of the cost at which policy goal or outcome is achieved. The lower the cost the greater the cost-effectiveness.

Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) The Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) is a climate modelling activity from the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) which coordinates and archives *climate model* simulations based on shared model inputs by modelling groups from around the world. The CMIP3 multimodel data set includes *projections* using SRES *scenarios*. The CMIP5 data set includes projections using the *Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)*. The CMIP6 phase involves a suite of common model experiments as well as an ensemble of CMIP-endorsed model intercomparison projects (MIPs).

Cumulative emissions The total amount of emissions released over a specified period of time. See also *Carbon budget*, and *Transient climate response to cumulative CO₂ emissions (TCRE)*.

Decarbonization The process by which countries, individuals or other entities aim to achieve zero fossil carbon existence. Typically refers to a reduction of the carbon emissions associated with electricity, industry and transport.

Decoupling Decoupling (in relation to *climate change*) is where economic growth is no longer strongly associated with consumption of *fossil fuels*. Relative decoupling is where both grow but at different rates. Absolute decoupling is where economic growth happens but fossil fuels decline.

Deforestation Conversion of *forest* to non-forest. For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as *afforestation*, *reforestation* and *deforestation*, see the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000). See also information provided by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2013) and the report on Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003). See also *Afforestation*, *Reforestation* and *Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)*.

Deliberative governance See *Governance*.

Demand- and supply-side measures

Demand-side measures

Policies and programmes for influencing the demand for goods and/or services. In the energy sector, demand-side management aims at reducing the demand for electricity and other forms of energy required to deliver energy services.

Supply-side measures

Policies and programmes for influencing how a certain demand for goods and/or services is met. In the energy sector, for example, supply-side *mitigation measures* aim at reducing the amount of *greenhouse gas* emissions emitted per unit of energy produced.

See also *Mitigation measures*.

Demand-side measures See *Demand- and supply-side measures*.

Detection See *Detection and attribution*.

Detection and attribution Detection of change is defined as the process of demonstrating that *climate* or a system affected by climate has changed in some defined statistical sense, without providing a reason for that change. An identified change is detected in observations if its *likelihood* of occurrence by chance due to internal variability alone is determined to be small, for example, <10%. Attribution is defined as the process of evaluating the relative contributions of multiple causal factors to a change or event with a formal assessment of *confidence*.

Development pathways See *Pathways*.

Direct air carbon dioxide capture and storage (DACCS) Chemical process by which *CO₂* is captured directly from the ambient air, with subsequent storage. Also known as direct air capture and storage (DACs).

Disaster Severe alterations in the normal functioning of a community or a society due to hazardous physical events interacting with vulnerable social conditions, leading to widespread adverse human, material, economic or environmental effects that require immediate emergency response to satisfy critical human needs and that may require external support for recovery. See also *Hazard* and *Vulnerability*.

Disaster risk management (DRM) Processes for designing, implementing, and evaluating strategies, policies, and measures to improve the understanding of *disaster* risk, foster disaster risk reduction and transfer, and promote continuous improvement in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery practices, with the explicit purpose of increasing *human security, well-being, quality of life*, and *sustainable development*.

Discount rate See *Discounting*.

Discounting A mathematical operation that aims to make monetary (or other) amounts received or expended at different times (years) comparable across time. The discounter uses a fixed or possibly time-varying discount rate from year to year that makes future value worth less today (if the discount rate is positive). The choice of discount rate(s) is debated as it is a judgement based on hidden and/or explicit values.

(Internal) Displacement Internal displacement refers to the forced movement of people within the country they live in. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are 'Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.' (UN, 1998). See also *Migration*.

Disruptive innovation Disruptive innovation is demand-led technological change that leads to significant system change and is characterized by strong exponential growth.

Distributive equity See *Equity*.

Distributive justice See *Justice*.

Double dividend The extent to which revenues generated by *policy* instruments, such as carbon taxes or auctioned (tradeable) emission permits can (1) contribute to *mitigation* and (2) offset part of the potential welfare losses of climate policies through recycling the revenue in the economy by reducing other distortionary taxes.

Downscaling Downscaling is a method that derives local- to regional-scale (up to 100 km) information from larger-scale models or data analyses. Two main methods exist: dynamical downscaling and empirical/statistical downscaling. The dynamical method uses the output of regional *climate models*, global models with variable spatial resolution, or high-resolution global models. The empirical/statistical methods are based on observations and develop statistical relationships that link the large-scale atmospheric variables with local/regional *climate* variables. In all cases, the quality of the driving model remains an important limitation on quality of the downscaled information. The two methods can be combined, e.g., applying empirical/statistical downscaling to the output of a regional climate model, consisting of a dynamical downscaling of a global climate model.

Drought A period of abnormally dry weather long enough to cause a serious hydrological imbalance. Drought is a relative term, therefore any discussion in terms of precipitation deficit must refer to the particular precipitation-related activity that is under discussion. For example, shortage of precipitation during the growing season impinges on crop production or *ecosystem* function in general (due to *soil moisture* drought, also termed agricultural drought), and during the *runoff* and percolation season primarily affects water supplies (hydrological drought). Storage changes in soil moisture and groundwater are also affected by increases in actual evapotranspiration in addition to reductions in precipitation. A period with an abnormal precipitation deficit is defined as a meteorological drought. See also *Soil moisture*.

Megadrought

A megadrought is a very lengthy and pervasive drought, lasting much longer than normal, usually a decade or more.

Early warning systems (EWS) The set of technical, financial and *institutional capacities* needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a *hazard* to prepare to act promptly and appropriately to reduce the possibility of harm or loss. Dependent upon context, EWS may draw upon scientific and/or *Indigenous knowledge*. EWS are also considered for ecological applications e.g., conservation, where the organization itself is not threatened by hazard but the *ecosystem* under conservation is (an example is coral bleaching alerts), in agriculture (for example, warnings of ground frost, hailstorms) and in fisheries (storm and tsunami warnings). This glossary entry builds from the definitions used in UNISDR (2009) and IPCC (2012a).

Earth system feedbacks See *Climate feedback*.

Earth system model (ESM) A coupled atmosphere–ocean general circulation model in which a representation of the *carbon cycle* is included, allowing for interactive calculation of atmospheric *CO₂* or compatible emissions. Additional components (e.g., atmospheric chemistry, *ice sheets*, dynamic vegetation, nitrogen cycle, but also urban or crop models) may be included. See also *Climate model*.

Ecosystem An ecosystem is a functional unit consisting of living organisms, their non-living environment and the interactions within and between them. The components included in a given ecosystem and its spatial boundaries depend on the purpose for which the ecosystem is defined: in some cases they are relatively sharp, while in others they are diffuse. Ecosystem boundaries can change over time. Ecosystems are nested within other ecosystems and their scale can range from very small to the entire biosphere. In the current era, most ecosystems either contain people as key organisms, or are influenced by the effects of human activities in their environment. See also *Ecosystem services*.

Ecosystem services Ecological processes or functions having monetary or non-monetary value to individuals or society at large. These are frequently classified as (1) supporting services such as productivity or *biodiversity* maintenance, (2) provisioning services such as food or fibre, (3) regulating services such as climate regulation or *carbon sequestration*, and (4) cultural services such as tourism or spiritual and aesthetic appreciation.

Effective climate sensitivity See *Climate sensitivity*.

Effective radiative forcing See *Radiative forcing*.

El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) The term El Niño was initially used to describe a warm-water current that periodically flows along the coast of Ecuador and Peru, disrupting the local fishery. It has since become identified with warming of the tropical Pacific Ocean east of the dateline. This oceanic event is associated with a fluctuation of a global-scale tropical and subtropical surface pressure pattern called the Southern Oscillation. This coupled atmosphere–ocean phenomenon, with preferred time scales of two to about seven years, is known as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). It is often measured by the surface pressure anomaly difference between Tahiti and Darwin and/or the *sea surface temperatures* in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific. During an ENSO event, the prevailing trade winds weaken, reducing upwelling and altering ocean currents such that the sea surface temperatures warm, further weakening the trade winds. This phenomenon has a great impact on the wind, sea surface temperature and precipitation patterns in the tropical Pacific. It has climatic effects throughout the Pacific region and in many other parts of the world, through global teleconnections. The cold phase of ENSO is called La Niña.

Electric vehicle (EV) A vehicle whose propulsion is powered fully or mostly by electricity.

Battery electric vehicle (BEV)

A vehicle whose propulsion is entirely electric without any internal combustion engine.

Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV)

A vehicle whose propulsion is mostly electric with batteries re-charged from an electric source but extra power and distance are provided by a hybrid internal combustion engine.

Emission pathways See *Pathways*.

Emission scenario A plausible representation of the future development of emissions of substances that are radiatively active (e.g., *greenhouse gases (GHGs)*, *aerosols*) based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about driving forces (such as demographic and socio-economic development, technological change, energy and *land use*) and their key relationships. Concentration *scenarios*, derived from emission scenarios, are often used as input to a *climate model* to compute *climate projections*. See also *Baseline scenario*, *Mitigation scenario*, *Socio-economic scenario*, *Scenario*, *Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)* (under *Pathways*), *Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs)* (under *Pathways*) and *Transformation pathways* (under *Pathways*).

Emission trajectories A *projected* development in time of the emission of a *greenhouse gas (GHG)* or group of GHGs, *aerosols*, and *GHG precursors*. See also *Emission pathways* (under *Pathways*).

Emissions trading A market-based instrument aiming at meeting a *mitigation* objective in an efficient way. A cap on *GHG* emissions is divided in tradeable emission permits that are allocated by a combination of auctioning and handing out free allowances to entities within the jurisdiction of the trading scheme. Entities need to surrender emission permits equal to the amount of their emissions (e.g., tonnes of *CO₂*). An entity may sell excess permits to entities that can avoid the same amount of emissions in a cheaper way. Trading schemes may occur at the intra-company, domestic, or international level (e.g., the flexibility mechanisms under the *Kyoto Protocol* and the EU-ETS) and may apply to carbon dioxide (*CO₂*), other greenhouse gases (GHGs), or other substances.

Enabling conditions Conditions that affect the *feasibility* of *adaptation* and *mitigation* options, and can accelerate and scale-up systemic transitions that would limit temperature increase to 1.5°C and enhance capacities of systems and societies to adapt to the associated *climate change*, while achieving *sustainable development*, eradicating *poverty* and reducing *inequalities*. Enabling conditions include finance, technological innovation, strengthening *policy* instruments, *institutional capacity*, *multilevel governance*, and changes in *human behaviour* and lifestyles. They also include inclusive processes, attention to power asymmetries and unequal opportunities for development and reconsideration of values. See also *Feasibility*.

Energy efficiency The ratio of output or useful energy or energy services or other useful physical outputs obtained from a system, conversion process, transmission or storage activity to the input of energy (measured as kWh kWh⁻¹, tonnes kWh⁻¹ or any other physical measure of useful output like tonne-km transported). Energy efficiency is often described by energy intensity. In economics, energy intensity describes the ratio of economic output to energy input. Most commonly energy efficiency is measured as input energy over a physical or economic unit, i.e., kWh USD⁻¹ (energy intensity), kWh tonne⁻¹. For buildings, it is often measured as kWh m⁻², and for vehicles as km liter⁻¹ or liter km⁻¹. Very often in policy 'energy efficiency' is intended as the measures to reduce energy demand through technological options such as insulating buildings, more efficient appliances, efficient lighting, efficient vehicles, etc.

Energy security The goal of a given country, or the global community as a whole, to maintain an adequate, stable and predictable energy supply. Measures encompass safeguarding the sufficiency of energy resources to meet national energy demand at competitive and stable prices and the *resilience* of the energy supply; enabling development and deployment of technologies; building sufficient infrastructure to generate, store and transmit energy supplies; and ensuring enforceable contracts of delivery.

Enhanced weathering Enhancing the removal of *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* from the *atmosphere* through dissolution of silicate and carbonate rocks by grinding these minerals to small particles and actively applying them to soils, coasts or oceans.

(Model) Ensemble A group of parallel model simulations characterising historical *climate* conditions, *climate predictions*, or climate projections. Variation of the results across the ensemble members may give an estimate of modelling-based *uncertainty*. Ensembles made with the same model but different initial conditions only characterize the uncertainty associated with internal *climate variability*, whereas multimodel ensembles including simulations by several models also include the impact of model differences. Perturbed parameter ensembles, in which model parameters are varied in a systematic

manner, aim to assess the uncertainty resulting from internal model specifications within a single model. Remaining sources of uncertainty unaddressed with model ensembles are related to systematic model errors or biases, which may be assessed from systematic comparisons of model simulations with observations wherever available. See also *Climate projection*.

Equality A principle that ascribes equal worth to all human beings, including equal opportunities, rights, and obligations, irrespective of origins.

Inequality

Uneven opportunities and social positions, and processes of discrimination within a group or society, based on gender, class, ethnicity, age, and (dis)ability, often produced by uneven development. Income inequality refers to gaps between highest and lowest income earners within a country and between countries. See also *Equity*, *Ethics* and *Fairness*.

Equilibrium climate sensitivity See *Climate sensitivity*.

Equity Equity is the principle of *fairness* in burden sharing and is a basis for understanding how the *impacts* and responses to *climate change*, including costs and benefits, are distributed in and by society in more or less equal ways. It is often aligned with ideas of *equality*, *fairness* and *justice* and applied with respect to equity in the responsibility for, and distribution of, climate *impacts* and *policies* across society, generations, and gender, and in the sense of who participates and controls the processes of decision-making.

Distributive equity

Equity in the consequences, outcomes, costs and benefits of actions or policies. In the case of *climate change* or climate *policies* for different people, places and countries, including equity aspects of sharing burdens and benefits for *mitigation* and *adaptation*.

Gender equity

Ensuring equity in that women and men have the same rights, resources and opportunities. In the case of *climate change* gender equity recognizes that women are often more vulnerable to the *impacts* of climate change and may be disadvantaged in the process and outcomes of climate *policy*.

Inter-generational equity

Equity between generations that acknowledges that the effects of past and present emissions, *vulnerabilities* and policies impose costs and benefits for people in the future and of different age groups.

Procedural equity

Equity in the process of decision-making, including recognition and inclusiveness in participation, equal representation, bargaining power, voice and equitable access to knowledge and resources to participate.

See also *Equality*, *Ethics* and *Fairness*.

Ethics Ethics involves questions of *justice* and value. Justice is concerned with right and wrong, *equity* and *fairness*, and, in general, with the rights to which people and living beings are entitled. Value is a matter of worth, benefit, or good. See also *Equality*, *Equity* and *Fairness*.

Evidence Data and information used in the scientific process to establish findings. In this report, the degree of evidence reflects the amount, quality and consistency of scientific/technical information on which the Lead Authors are basing their findings. See also *Agreement*, *Confidence*, *Likelihood* and *Uncertainty*.

Exposure The presence of people; *livelihoods*; species or *ecosystems*; environmental functions, services, and resources; infrastructure; or economic, social, or cultural assets in places and settings that could be adversely affected. See also *Hazard*, *Risk* and *Vulnerability*.

Extratropical cyclone Any cyclonic-scale storm that is not a *tropical cyclone*. Usually refers to a middle- or high-latitude migratory storm system formed in regions of large horizontal temperature variations. Sometimes called extratropical storm or extratropical low. See also *Tropical cyclone*.

Extreme weather event An extreme weather event is an event that is rare at a particular place and time of year. Definitions of rare vary, but an extreme weather event would normally be as rare as or rarer than the 10th or 90th percentile of a probability density function estimated from observations. By definition, the characteristics of what is called extreme weather may vary from place to place in an absolute sense. When a pattern of extreme weather persists for some time, such as a season, it may be classed as an extreme climate event, especially if it yields an average or total that is itself extreme (e.g., *drought* or heavy rainfall over a season). See also *Heatwave* and *Climate extreme (extreme weather or climate event)*.

Extreme weather or climate event See *Climate extreme (extreme weather or climate event)*.

Fairness Impartial and just treatment without favouritism or discrimination in which each person is considered of equal worth with equal opportunity. See also *Equity*, *Equality* and *Ethics*.

Feasibility The degree to which climate goals and response options are considered possible and/or desirable. Feasibility depends on geophysical, ecological, technological, economic, social and *institutional* conditions for change. Conditions underpinning feasibility are dynamic, spatially variable, and may vary between different groups. See also *Enabling conditions*.

Feasible scenario commitment See *Climate change commitment*.

Feedback See *Climate feedback*.

Flexible governance See *Governance*.

Flood The overflowing of the normal confines of a stream or other body of water, or the accumulation of water over areas that are not normally submerged. Floods include river (fluvial) floods, flash floods, urban floods, pluvial floods, sewer floods, coastal floods, and glacial lake outburst floods.

Food security A situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO, 2001).

Food wastage Food wastage encompasses food loss (the loss of food during production and transportation) and food waste (the waste of food by the consumer) (FAO, 2013).

Forcing See *Radiative forcing*.

Forest A vegetation type dominated by trees. Many definitions of the term forest are in use throughout the world, reflecting wide differences in biogeophysical conditions, social structure and economics. For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as *afforestation*, *reforestation* and *deforestation*, see the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000). See also information provided by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2013) and the Report on Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003). See also *Afforestation*, *Deforestation* and *Reforestation*.

Fossil fuels Carbon-based fuels from fossil hydrocarbon deposits, including coal, oil, and natural gas.

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Framework Convention on Climate Change See *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)*.

Gender equity See *Equity*.

General purpose technologies (GPT) General purpose technologies can be or are used pervasively in a wide range of sectors in ways that fundamentally change the modes of operation of those sectors (Helpman, 1998). Examples include the steam engine, power generator and motor, *ICT*, and biotechnology.

Geoengineering In this report, separate consideration is given to the two main approaches considered as 'geoengineering' in some of the literature: *solar radiation modification (SRM)* and *carbon dioxide removal (CDR)*. Because of this separation, the term 'geoengineering' is not used in this report. See also *Carbon dioxide removal (CDR)* and *Solar radiation modification (SRM)*.

Glacier A perennial mass of ice, and possibly firn and snow, originating on the land surface by the recrystallisation of snow and showing *evidence* of past or present flow. A glacier typically gains mass by accumulation of snow, and loses mass by melting and ice discharge into the sea or a lake if the glacier terminates in a body of water. Land ice masses of continental size (>50,000 km²) are referred to as *ice sheets*. See also *Ice sheet*.

Global climate model (also referred to as general circulation model, both abbreviated as GCM) See *Climate model*.

Global mean surface temperature (GMST) Estimated global average of near-surface air temperatures over land and sea-ice, and *sea surface temperatures* over ice-free ocean regions, with changes normally expressed as departures from a value over a specified *reference period*. When estimating changes in GMST, near-surface air temperature over both land and oceans are also used.¹ See also *Land surface air temperature*, *Sea surface temperature (SST)* and *Global mean surface air temperature (GSAT)*.

Global mean surface air temperature (GSAT) Global average of near-surface air temperatures over land and oceans. Changes in GSAT are often used as a measure of global temperature change in *climate models* but are not observed directly. See also *Global mean surface temperature (GMST)* and *Land surface air temperature*.

Global warming The estimated increase in *global mean surface temperature (GMST)* averaged over a 30-year period, or the 30-year period centered on a particular year or decade, expressed relative to *pre-industrial* levels unless otherwise specified. For 30-year periods that span past and future years, the current multi-decadal warming trend is assumed to continue. See also *Climate change* and *Climate variability*.

Governance A comprehensive and inclusive concept of the full range of means for deciding, managing, implementing and monitoring policies and measures. Whereas government is defined strictly in terms of the nation-state, the more inclusive concept of governance recognizes the contributions of various levels of government (global, international, regional, sub-national and local) and the contributing roles of the private sector, of nongovernmental actors, and of civil society to addressing the many types of issues facing the global community.

Adaptive governance

An emerging term in the literature for the evolution of formal and informal *institutions* of governance that prioritize *social learning* in planning, implementation and evaluation of policy through iterative social learning to steer the use and protection of natural resources,

ecosystem services and common pool natural resources, particularly in situations of complexity and *uncertainty*.

Climate governance

Purposeful mechanisms and measures aimed at steering social systems towards preventing, mitigating, or adapting to the risks posed by *climate change* (Jagers and Strippel, 2003).

Deliberative governance

Deliberative governance involves decision-making through inclusive public conversation, which allows opportunity for developing policy options through public discussion rather than collating individual preferences through voting or referenda (although the latter governance mechanisms can also be proceeded and legitimated by public deliberation processes).

Flexible governance

Strategies of governance at various levels, which prioritize the use of *social learning* and rapid feedback mechanisms in planning and policy making, often through incremental, experimental and iterative management processes.

Governance capacity

The ability of governance *institutions*, leaders, and non-state and civil society to plan, co-ordinate, fund, implement, evaluate and adjust policies and measures over the short, medium and long term, adjusting for *uncertainty*, rapid change and wide-ranging impacts and multiple actors and demands.

Multilevel governance

Multilevel governance refers to negotiated, non-hierarchical exchanges between *institutions* at the transnational, national, regional and local levels. Multilevel governance identifies relationships among governance processes at these different levels. Multilevel governance does include negotiated relationships among institutions at different institutional levels and also a vertical 'layering' of governance processes at different levels. Institutional relationships take place directly between transnational, regional and local levels, thus bypassing the state level (Peters and Pierre, 2001)

Participatory governance

A governance system that enables direct public engagement in decision-making using a variety of techniques for example, referenda, community deliberation, citizen juries or participatory budgeting. The approach can be applied in formal and informal *institutional* contexts from national to local, but is usually associated with devolved decision-making. This definition builds from Fung and Wright (2003) and Sarmiento and Tilly (2018).

Governance capacity See *Governance*.

Green infrastructure The interconnected set of natural and constructed ecological systems, green spaces and other landscape features. It includes planted and indigenous trees, wetlands, parks, green open spaces and original grassland and woodlands, as well as possible building and street-level design interventions that incorporate vegetation. Green infrastructure provides services and functions in the same way as conventional infrastructure. This definition builds from Culwick and Bobbins (2016).

Greenhouse gas (GHG) Greenhouse gases are those gaseous constituents of the *atmosphere*, both natural and *anthropogenic*, that absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of terrestrial radiation emitted by the Earth's surface, the atmosphere itself and by clouds. This property causes the greenhouse effect. Water vapour (H₂O), *carbon dioxide (CO₂)*, *nitrous oxide (N₂O)*, *methane (CH₄)* and

¹ Past IPCC reports, reflecting the literature, have used a variety of approximately equivalent metrics of GMST change.

ozone (O₃) are the primary GHGs in the Earth's atmosphere. Moreover, there are a number of entirely human-made GHGs in the atmosphere, such as the **halocarbons** and other chlorine- and bromine-containing substances, dealt with under the Montreal Protocol. Beside CO₂, N₂O and CH₄, the *Kyoto Protocol* deals with the GHGs sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). See also **Carbon dioxide (CO₂)**, **Methane (CH₄)**, **Nitrous oxide (N₂O)** and **Ozone (O₃)**.

Greenhouse gas removal (GGR) Withdrawal of a **GHG** and/or a **precursor** from the **atmosphere** by a **sink**. See also **Carbon dioxide removal (CDR)** and **Negative emissions**.

Gross domestic product (GDP) The sum of gross value added, at purchasers' prices, by all resident and non-resident producers in the economy, plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products in a country or a geographic region for a given period, normally one year. GDP is calculated without deducting for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources.

Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) One component of the **GDP** that corresponds to the total value of acquisitions, minus disposals of fixed assets during one year by the business sector, governments and households, plus certain additions to the value of non-produced assets (such as subsoil assets or major improvements in the quantity, quality or productivity of land).

Halocarbons A collective term for the group of partially halogenated organic species, which includes the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), halons, methyl chloride and methyl bromide. Many of the halocarbons have large global warming potentials. The chlorine and bromine-containing halocarbons are also involved in the depletion of the ozone layer.

Hazard The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event or trend that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, infrastructure, **livelihoods**, service provision, **ecosystems** and environmental resources. See also **Disaster**, **Exposure**, **Risk**, and **Vulnerability**.

Heatwave A period of abnormally hot weather. Heatwaves and warm spells have various and in some cases overlapping definitions. See also **Extreme weather event**.

Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) Heating, ventilation and air conditioning technology is used to control temperature and humidity in an indoor environment, be it in buildings or in vehicles, providing thermal comfort and healthy air quality to the occupants. HVAC systems can be designed for an isolated space, an individual building or a distributed heating and cooling network within a building structure or a district heating system. The latter provides economies of scale and also scope for integration with solar heat, natural seasonal cooling/heating etc.

Holocene The Holocene is the current interglacial geological epoch, the second of two epochs within the Quaternary period, the preceding being the Pleistocene. The International Commission on Stratigraphy defines the start of the Holocene at 11,650 years before 1950. See also **Anthropocene**.

Human behaviour The way in which a person acts in response to a particular situation or stimulus. Human actions are relevant at different levels, from international, national, and **sub-national actors**, to NGO, firm-level actors, and communities, households, and individual actions.

Adaptation behaviour

Human actions that directly or indirectly affect the risks of climate change **impacts**.

Mitigation behaviour

Human actions that directly or indirectly influence **mitigation**.

Human behavioural change A transformation or modification of human actions. Behaviour change efforts can be planned in ways that mitigate **climate change** and/or reduce negative consequences of climate change **impacts**.

Human rights Rights that are inherent to all human beings, universal, inalienable, and indivisible, typically expressed and guaranteed by law. They include the right to life; economic, social, and cultural rights; and the right to development and self-determination. Based upon the definition by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR, 2018).

Procedural rights

Rights to a legal procedure to enforce **substantive rights**.

Substantive rights

Basic human rights, including the right to the substance of being human such as life itself, liberty and happiness.

Human security A condition that is met when the vital core of human lives is protected, and when people have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity. In the context of **climate change**, the vital core of human lives includes the universal and culturally specific, material and non-material elements necessary for people to act on behalf of their interests and to live with dignity.

Human system Any system in which human organizations and **institutions** play a major role. Often, but not always, the term is synonymous with society or social system. Systems such as agricultural systems, urban systems, political systems, technological systems and economic systems are all human systems in the sense applied in this report.

Hydrological cycle The cycle in which water evaporates from the oceans and the land surface, is carried over the earth in atmospheric circulation as water vapour, condenses to form clouds, precipitates as rain or snow, which on land can be intercepted by trees and vegetation, potentially accumulates as snow or ice, provides **runoff** on the land surface, infiltrates into soils, recharges groundwater, discharges into streams, flows out into the oceans, and ultimately evaporates again from the ocean or land surface. The various systems involved in the hydrological cycle are usually referred to as hydrological systems.

Ice sheet A mass of land ice of continental size that is sufficiently thick to cover most of the underlying bed, so that its shape is mainly determined by its dynamics (the flow of the ice as it deforms internally and/or slides at its base). An ice sheet flows outward from a high central ice plateau with a small average surface slope. The margins usually slope more steeply, and most ice is discharged through fast flowing ice streams or outlet **glaciers**, in some cases into the sea or into ice shelves floating on the sea. There are only two ice sheets in the modern world, one on Greenland and one on Antarctica. During glacial periods there were others. See also **Glacier**.

(climate change) Impact assessment The practice of identifying and evaluating, in monetary and/or non-monetary terms, the effects of **climate change** on natural and **human systems**.

Impacts (consequences, outcomes) The consequences of realized risks on natural and **human systems**, where risks result from the interactions of climate-related **hazards** (including **extreme weather and climate events**), **exposure**, and **vulnerability**. Impacts generally refer to effects on lives; **livelihoods**; health and **well-being**; **ecosystems** and species; economic, social and cultural assets; services (including

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ecosystem services); and infrastructure. Impacts may be referred to as consequences or outcomes, and can be adverse or beneficial. See also *Adaptation*, *Exposure*, *Hazard*, *Loss and Damage*, and *losses and damages*, and *Vulnerability*.

Incremental adaptation See *Adaptation*.

Indigenous knowledge Indigenous knowledge refers to the understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies with long histories of interaction with their natural surroundings. For many Indigenous peoples, Indigenous knowledge informs decision-making about fundamental aspects of life, from day-to-day activities to longer term actions. This knowledge is integral to cultural complexes, which also encompass language, systems of classification, resource use practices, social interactions, values, ritual and spirituality. These distinctive ways of knowing are important facets of the world's cultural diversity. This definition builds on UNESCO (2018).

Indirect land-use change (iLUC) See *Land-use change (LUC)*.

Industrial revolution A period of rapid industrial growth with far-reaching social and economic consequences, beginning in Britain during the second half of the 18th century and spreading to Europe and later to other countries, including the United States. The invention of the steam engine was an important trigger of this development. The industrial revolution marks the beginning of a strong increase in the use of *fossil fuels*, initially coal, and hence emission of *carbon dioxide (CO₂)*. See also *Pre-industrial*.

Industrialized/developed/developing countries There are a diversity of approaches for categorizing countries on the basis of their level of development, and for defining terms such as industrialized, developed, or developing. Several categorizations are used in this report. (1) In the United Nations system, there is no established convention for designation of developed and developing countries or areas. (2) The United Nations Statistics Division specifies developed and developing regions based on common practice. In addition, specific countries are designated as Least Developed Countries (LDC), landlocked developing countries, *small island developing states*, and transition economies. Many countries appear in more than one of these categories. (3) The World Bank uses income as the main criterion for classifying countries as low, lower middle, upper middle and high income. (4) The UNDP aggregates indicators for life expectancy, educational attainment, and income into a single composite Human Development Index (HDI) to classify countries as low, medium, high or very high human development.

Inequality See *Equality*.

Information and communication technology (ICT) An umbrella term that includes any information and communication device or application, encompassing: computer systems, network hardware and software, cell phones, etc.

Infrastructure commitment See *Climate change commitment*.

Institution Institutions are rules and norms held in common by social actors that guide, constrain and shape human interaction. Institutions can be formal, such as laws and policies, or informal, such as norms and conventions. Organizations – such as parliaments, regulatory agencies, private firms and community bodies – develop and act in response to institutional frameworks and the incentives they frame. Institutions can guide, constrain and shape human interaction through direct control, through incentives, and through processes of socialization. See also *Institutional capacity*.

Institutional capacity *Institutional* capacity comprises building and strengthening individual organizations and providing technical

and management training to support integrated planning and decision-making processes between organizations and people, as well as empowerment, social capital, and an enabling environment, including the culture, values and power relations (Willems and Baumert, 2003).

Integrated assessment A method of analysis that combines results and models from the physical, biological, economic and social sciences and the interactions among these components in a consistent framework to evaluate the status and the consequences of environmental change and the policy responses to it. See also *Integrated assessment model (IAM)*.

Integrated assessment model (IAM) Integrated assessment models (IAMs) integrate knowledge from two or more domains into a single framework. They are one of the main tools for undertaking *integrated assessments*.

One class of IAM used in respect of climate change *mitigation* may include representations of: multiple sectors of the economy, such as energy, *land use* and *land-use change*; interactions between sectors; the economy as a whole; associated *GHG* emissions and *sinks*; and reduced representations of the *climate system*. This class of model is used to assess linkages between economic, social and technological development and the evolution of the climate system.

Another class of IAM additionally includes representations of the costs associated with climate change *impacts*, but includes less detailed representations of economic systems. These can be used to assess impacts and mitigation in a *cost–benefit* framework and have been used to estimate the *social cost of carbon*.

Integrated water resources management (IWRM) A process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources in order to maximize economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital *ecosystems*.

Inter-generational equity See *Equity*.

Inter-generational justice See *Justice*.

Internal variability See *Climate variability*.

Internet of Things (IoT) The network of computing devices embedded in everyday objects such as cars, phones and computers, connected via the internet, enabling them to send and receive data.

Iron fertilization See *Ocean fertilization*.

Irreversibility A perturbed state of a dynamical system is defined as irreversible on a given timescale, if the recovery time scale from this state due to natural processes is substantially longer than the time it takes for the system to reach this perturbed state. See also *Tipping point*.

Justice Justice is concerned with ensuring that people get what is due to them, setting out the moral or legal principles of *fairness* and *equity* in the way people are treated, often based on the *ethics* and values of society.

Climate justice

Justice that links development and *human rights* to achieve a human-centred approach to addressing *climate change*, safeguarding the rights of the most vulnerable people and sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change and its impacts *equitably* and *fairly*. This definition builds upon the one used by the Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice (MRFCJ, 2018).

Distributive justice

Justice in the allocation of economic and non-economic costs and benefits across society.

Inter-generational justice

Justice in the distribution of economic and non-economic costs and benefits across generations.

Procedural justice

Justice in the way outcomes are brought about including who participates and is heard in the processes of decision-making.

Social justice

Just or fair relations within society that seek to address the distribution of wealth, access to resources, opportunity, and support according to principles of justice and fairness.

See also *Equity, Ethics, Fairness, and Human rights*.

Kyoto Protocol The Kyoto Protocol to the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)* is an international treaty adopted in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, at the Third Session of the *Conference of the Parties (COP3)* to the UNFCCC. It contains legally binding commitments, in addition to those included in the UNFCCC. Countries included in Annex B of the Protocol (mostly OECD countries and countries with economies in transition) agreed to reduce their anthropogenic *greenhouse gas (GHG)* emissions (*carbon dioxide (CO₂)*, *methane (CH₄)*, *nitrous oxide (N₂O)*, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆)) by at least 5% below 1990 levels in the first commitment period (2008–2012). The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and as of May 2018 had 192 Parties (191 States and the European Union). A second commitment period was agreed in December 2012 at COP18, known as the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, in which a new set of Parties committed to reduce GHG emissions by at least 18% below 1990 levels in the period from 2013 to 2020. However, as of May 2018, the Doha Amendment had not received sufficient ratifications to enter into force. See also *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)* and *Paris Agreement*.

Land surface air temperature The near-surface air temperature over land, typically measured at 1.25–2 m above the ground using standard meteorological equipment.

Land use Land use refers to the total of arrangements, activities and inputs undertaken in a certain land cover type (a set of human actions). The term land use is also used in the sense of the social and economic purposes for which land is managed (e.g., grazing, timber extraction, conservation and city dwelling). In national *greenhouse gas* inventories, land use is classified according to the IPCC land use categories of forest land, cropland, grassland, wetland, settlements, other. See also *Land-use change (LUC)*.

Land-use change (LUC) Land-use change involves a change from one *land use* category to another.

Indirect land-use change (iLUC)

Refers to market-mediated or policy-driven shifts in *land use* that cannot be directly attributed to land-use management decisions of individuals or groups. For example, if agricultural land is diverted to fuel production, *forest* clearance may occur elsewhere to replace the former agricultural production.

Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)

In the context of national *greenhouse gas (GHG)* inventories under the UNFCCC, LULUCF is a GHG inventory sector that covers *anthropogenic emissions* and removals of GHG from carbon pools in managed lands, excluding non-CO₂ agricultural emissions. Following the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National GHG Inventories, ‘anthropogenic’ land-related GHG fluxes are defined as all those occurring on ‘managed land’, i.e., ‘where human interventions and practices have been applied to perform

production, ecological or social functions’. Since managed land may include CO₂ removals not considered as ‘anthropogenic’ in some of the scientific literature assessed in this report (e.g., removals associated with CO₂ fertilization and N deposition), the land-related net GHG emission estimates included in this report are not necessarily directly comparable with LULUCF estimates in National GHG Inventories.

See also *Afforestation, Deforestation, Reforestation*, and the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000).

Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) See *Land-use change (LUC)*.

Life cycle assessment (LCA) Compilation and evaluation of the inputs, outputs and the potential environmental impacts of a product or service throughout its life cycle. This definition builds from ISO (2018).

Likelihood The chance of a specific outcome occurring, where this might be estimated probabilistically. Likelihood is expressed in this report using a standard terminology (Mastrandrea et al., 2010). See Section 1.6 for the list of likelihood qualifiers used. See also *Agreement, Evidence, Confidence* and *Uncertainty*.

Livelihood The resources used and the activities undertaken in order to live. Livelihoods are usually determined by the entitlements and assets to which people have access. Such assets can be categorised as human, social, natural, physical or financial.

Local knowledge Local knowledge refers to the understandings and skills developed by individuals and populations, specific to the places where they live. Local knowledge informs decision-making about fundamental aspects of life, from day-to-day activities to longer-term actions. This knowledge is a key element of the social and cultural systems which influence observations of, and responses to *climate change*; it also informs *governance* decisions. This definition builds on UNESCO (2018).

Lock-in A situation in which the future development of a system, including infrastructure, technologies, investments, *institutions*, and behavioural norms, is determined or constrained (‘locked in’) by historic developments.

Long-lived climate forcers (LLCF) Long-lived climate forcers refer to a set of well-mixed *greenhouse gases* with long atmospheric lifetimes. This set of compounds includes *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* and *nitrous oxide (N₂O)*, together with some fluorinated gases. They have a warming effect on *climate*. These compounds accumulate in the *atmosphere* at decadal to centennial time scales, and their effect on climate hence persists for decades to centuries after their emission. On time scales of decades to a century, already emitted emissions of long-lived climate forcers can only be abated by *greenhouse gas removal (GGR)*. See also *Short-lived climate forcers (SLCF)*.

Loss and Damage, and losses and damages Research has taken Loss and Damage (capitalized letters) to refer to political debate under the *UNFCCCmkpHERE*

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Market exchange rate (MER) The rate at which a currency of one country can be exchanged with the currency of another country. In most economies such rates evolve daily while in others there are official conversion rates that are adjusted periodically. See also *Purchasing power parity (PPP)*.

Market failure When private decisions are based on market prices that do not reflect the real scarcity of goods and services but rather reflect market distortions, they do not generate an efficient allocation of resources but cause welfare losses. A market distortion is any event in which a market reaches a market clearing price that is substantially different from the price that a market would achieve while operating under conditions of perfect competition and state enforcement of legal contracts and the ownership of private property. Examples of factors causing market prices to deviate from real economic scarcity are environmental externalities, public goods, monopoly power, information asymmetry, transaction costs and non-rational behaviour.

Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV)

Measurement

'Processes of data collection over time, providing basic datasets, including associated accuracy and precision, for the range of relevant variables. Possible data sources are field measurements, field observations, detection through remote sensing and interviews.' (UN-REDD, 2009).

Reporting

'The process of formal reporting of assessment results to the UNFCCC, according to predetermined formats and according to established standards, especially the IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] Guidelines and GPG [Good Practice Guidance].' (UN-REDD, 2009)

Verification

'The process of formal verification of reports, for example the established approach to verify national communications and national inventory reports to the UNFCCC.' (UN-REDD, 2009)

Megadrought See *Drought*.

Methane (CH₄) One of the six *greenhouse gases (GHGs)* to be mitigated under the *Kyoto Protocol* and is the major component of natural gas and associated with all hydrocarbon fuels. Significant emissions occur as a result of animal husbandry and agriculture, and their management represents a major *mitigation* option.

Migrant See *Migration*.

Migration The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines migration as 'The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.' (IOM, 2018).

Migrant

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines a migrant as 'any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.' (IOM, 2018).

See also *(Internal) Displacement*.

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) A set of eight time-bound and measurable goals for combating *poverty*, hunger, disease,

illiteracy, discrimination against women and environmental degradation. These goals were agreed at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 together with an action plan to reach the goals by 2015.

Mitigation (of climate change) A human intervention to reduce emissions or enhance the *sinks* of *greenhouse gases*.

Mitigation behaviour See *Human behaviour*.

Mitigation measures In climate *policy*, mitigation measures are technologies, processes or practices that contribute to *mitigation*, for example, renewable energy (RE) technologies, waste minimization processes and public transport commuting practices. See also *Mitigation option*, and *Policies (for climate change mitigation and adaptation)*.

Mitigation option A technology or practice that reduces *GHG* emissions or enhances *sinks*.

Mitigation pathways See *Pathways*.

Mitigation scenario A plausible description of the future that describes how the (studied) system responds to the implementation of *mitigation* policies and measures. See also *Emission scenario*, *Pathways*, *Socio-economic scenario* and *Stabilization (of GHG or CO₂-equivalent concentration)*.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) Monitoring and evaluation refers to mechanisms put in place at national to local scales to respectively monitor and evaluate efforts to reduce *greenhouse gas* emissions and/or adapt to the *impacts* of *climate change* with the aim of systematically identifying, characterizing and assessing progress over time.

Motivation (of an individual) An individual's reason or reasons for acting in a particular way; individuals may consider various consequences of actions, including financial, social, affective and environmental consequences. Motivation can come from outside (extrinsic) or from inside (intrinsic) the individual.

Multilevel governance See *Governance*.

Narratives Qualitative descriptions of plausible future world evolutions, describing the characteristics, general logic and developments underlying a particular quantitative set of *scenarios*. Narratives are also referred to in the literature as 'storylines'. See also *Scenario*, *Scenario storyline* and *Pathways*.

Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) A term used under the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)* whereby a country that has joined the *Paris Agreement* outlines its plans for reducing its emissions. Some countries' NDCs also address how they will adapt to climate change impacts, and what support they need from, or will provide to, other countries to adopt low-carbon pathways and to build climate resilience. According to Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement, each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs that it intends to achieve. In the lead up to 21st *Conference of the Parties* in Paris in 2015, countries submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). As countries join the Paris Agreement, unless they decide otherwise, this INDC becomes their first Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). See also *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)* and *Paris Agreement*.

Negative emissions Removal of *greenhouse gases (GHGs)* from the atmosphere by deliberate human activities, i.e., in addition to the removal that would occur via natural *carbon cycle* processes. See also *Net negative emissions*, *Net zero emissions*, *Carbon dioxide removal (CDR)* and *Greenhouse gas removal (GGR)*.

Net negative emissions A situation of net negative emissions is achieved when, as result of human activities, more *greenhouse gases* are removed from the *atmosphere* than are emitted into it. Where multiple greenhouse gases are involved, the quantification of *negative emissions* depends on the climate metric chosen to compare emissions of different gases (such as global warming potential, global temperature change potential, and others, as well as the chosen time horizon). See also *Negative emissions*, *Net zero emissions* and *Net zero CO₂ emissions*.

Net zero CO₂ emissions Net zero *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* emissions are achieved when *anthropogenic CO₂* emissions are balanced globally by anthropogenic CO₂ removals over a specified period. Net zero CO₂ emissions are also referred to as carbon neutrality. See also *Net zero emissions* and *Net negative emissions*.

Net zero emissions Net zero emissions are achieved when *anthropogenic emissions* of *greenhouse gases* to the *atmosphere* are balanced by *anthropogenic removals* over a specified period. Where multiple greenhouse gases are involved, the quantification of net zero emissions depends on the climate metric chosen to compare emissions of different gases (such as global warming potential, global temperature change potential, and others, as well as the chosen time horizon). See also *Net zero CO₂ emissions*, *Negative emissions* and *Net negative emissions*.

Nitrous oxide (N₂O) One of the six *greenhouse gases (GHGs)* to be mitigated under the *Kyoto Protocol*. The main *anthropogenic* source of N₂O is agriculture (soil and animal manure management), but important contributions also come from sewage treatment, *fossil fuel* combustion, and chemical industrial processes. N₂O is also produced naturally from a wide variety of biological sources in soil and water, particularly microbial action in wet tropical *forests*.

Non-CO₂ emissions and radiative forcing Non-CO₂ emissions included in this report are all *anthropogenic emissions* other than CO₂ that result in *radiative forcing*. These include *short-lived climate forcers*, such as *methane (CH₄)*, some fluorinated gases, *ozone (O₃)* precursors, *aerosols* or aerosol *precursors*, such as *black carbon* and sulphur dioxide, respectively, as well as long-lived *greenhouse gases*, such as *nitrous oxide (N₂O)* or other fluorinated gases. The radiative forcing associated with non-CO₂ emissions and changes in surface *albedo* is referred to as non-CO₂ radiative forcing.

Non-overshoot pathways See *Pathways*.

Ocean acidification (OA) Ocean acidification refers to a reduction in the *pH* of the ocean over an extended period, typically decades or longer, which is caused primarily by uptake of *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* from the *atmosphere*, but can also be caused by other chemical additions or subtractions from the ocean. *Anthropogenic* ocean acidification refers to the component of pH reduction that is caused by human activity (IPCC, 2011, p. 37).

Ocean fertilization Deliberate increase of nutrient supply to the near-surface ocean in order to enhance biological production through which additional *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* from the *atmosphere* is sequestered. This can be achieved by the addition of micro-nutrients or macro-nutrients. Ocean fertilization is regulated by the London Protocol.

Overshoot See *Temperature overshoot*.

Overshoot pathways See *Pathways*.

Ozone (O₃) Ozone, the triatomic form of oxygen (O₃), is a gaseous atmospheric constituent. In the *stratosphere*, it is created both naturally and by photochemical reactions involving gases resulting from human activities (smog). Tropospheric ozone acts as a *greenhouse gas*. In the

stratosphere, it is created by the interaction between solar ultraviolet radiation and molecular oxygen (O₂). Stratospheric ozone plays a dominant role in the stratospheric radiative balance. Its concentration is highest in the ozone layer.

Paris Agreement The Paris Agreement under the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)* was adopted on December 2015 in Paris, France, at the 21st session of the *Conference of the Parties (COP)* to the UNFCCC. The agreement, adopted by 196 Parties to the UNFCCC, entered into force on 4 November 2016 and as of May 2018 had 195 Signatories and was ratified by 177 Parties. One of the goals of the Paris Agreement is 'Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels', recognising that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. Additionally, the Agreement aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change. The Paris Agreement is intended to become fully effective in 2020. See also *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)*, *Kyoto Protocol* and *Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)*.

Participatory governance See *Governance*.

Pathways The temporal evolution of natural and/or *human systems* towards a future state. Pathway concepts range from sets of quantitative and qualitative *scenarios* or *narratives* of potential futures to solution-oriented decision-making processes to achieve desirable societal goals. Pathway approaches typically focus on biophysical, techno-economic, and/or socio-behavioural trajectories and involve various dynamics, goals and actors across different scales.

1.5°C pathway

A pathway of emissions of *greenhouse gases* and other climate forcers that provides an approximately one-in-two to two-in-three chance, given current knowledge of the climate response, of *global warming* either remaining below 1.5°C or returning to 1.5°C by around 2100 following an *overshoot*. See also *Temperature overshoot*.

Adaptation pathways

A series of *adaptation* choices involving trade-offs between short-term and long-term goals and values. These are processes of deliberation to identify solutions that are meaningful to people in the context of their daily lives and to avoid potential *maladaptation*.

Development pathways

Development pathways are trajectories based on an array of social, economic, cultural, technological, *institutional* and biophysical features that characterise the interactions between human and natural systems and outline visions for the future, at a particular scale.

Emission pathways

Modelled trajectories of global *anthropogenic emissions* over the 21st century are termed emission pathways.

Mitigation pathways

A mitigation pathway is a temporal evolution of a set of *mitigation scenario* features, such as *greenhouse gas* emissions and socio-economic development.

Overshoot pathways

Pathways that exceed the stabilization level (concentration, *forcing*, or temperature) before the end of a time horizon of interest (e.g., before 2100) and then decline towards that level by that time. Once the target level is exceeded, removal by sinks of *greenhouse gases* is required. See also *Temperature overshoot*.

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Non-overshoot pathways

Pathways that stay below the stabilization level (concentration, *forcing*, or temperature) during the time horizon of interest (e.g., until 2100).

Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)

Scenarios that include time series of emissions and concentrations of the full suite of *greenhouse gases (GHGs)* and *aerosols* and chemically active gases, as well as *land use/land cover* (Moss et al., 2008). The word representative signifies that each RCP provides only one of many possible scenarios that would lead to the specific *radiative forcing* characteristics. The term pathway emphasizes the fact that not only the long-term concentration levels but also the trajectory taken over time to reach that outcome are of interest (Moss et al., 2010). RCPs were used to develop *climate projections* in CMIP5.

- RCP2.6: One pathway where radiative forcing peaks at approximately 3 W m^{-2} and then declines to be limited at 2.6 W m^{-2} in 2100 (the corresponding Extended Concentration Pathway, or ECP, has constant emissions after 2100).
- RCP4.5 and RCP6.0: Two intermediate stabilization pathways in which radiative forcing is limited at approximately 4.5 W m^{-2} and 6.0 W m^{-2} in 2100 (the corresponding ECPs have constant concentrations after 2150).
- RCP8.5: One high pathway which leads to $>8.5 \text{ W m}^{-2}$ in 2100 (the corresponding ECP has constant emissions after 2100 until 2150 and constant concentrations after 2250).

See also *Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP)* and *Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs)*.

Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs)

Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) were developed to complement the RCPs with varying socio-economic challenges to *adaptation* and *mitigation* (O'Neill et al., 2014). Based on five *narratives*, the SSPs describe alternative socio-economic futures in the absence of climate *policy* intervention, comprising sustainable development (SSP1), regional rivalry (SSP3), inequality (SSP4), fossil-fuelled development (SSP5) and middle-of-the-road development (SSP2) (O'Neill, 2000; O'Neill et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017). The combination of SSP-based socio-economic scenarios and Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP)-based *climate projections* provides an integrative frame for climate *impact* and policy analysis.

Transformation pathways

Trajectories describing consistent sets of possible futures of *greenhouse gas (GHG)* emissions, atmospheric concentrations, or *global mean surface temperatures* implied from *mitigation* and *adaptation* actions associated with a set of broad and irreversible economic, technological, societal and behavioural changes. This can encompass changes in the way energy and infrastructure are used and produced, natural resources are managed and *institutions* are set up and in the pace and direction of technological change.

See also *Scenario*, *Scenario storyline*, *Emission scenario*, *Mitigation scenario*, *Baseline scenario*, *Stabilization (of GHG or CO₂-equivalent concentration)* and *Narratives*.

Peri-urban areas Peri-urban areas are those parts of a city that appear to be quite rural but are in reality strongly linked functionally to the city in its daily activities.

Permafrost Ground (soil or rock and included ice and organic material) that remains at or below 0°C for at least two consecutive years.

pH pH is a dimensionless measure of the acidity of a solution given by its concentration of hydrogen ions ($[\text{H}^+]$). pH is measured on a logarithmic scale where $\text{pH} = -\log_{10}[\text{H}^+]$. Thus, a pH decrease of 1 unit corresponds to a 10-fold increase in the concentration of H^+ , or acidity.

Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) See *Electric vehicle (EV)*.

Policies (for climate change mitigation and adaptation)

Policies are taken and/or mandated by a government – often in conjunction with business and industry within a single country, or collectively with other countries – to accelerate *mitigation* and *adaptation* measures. Examples of policies are support mechanisms for renewable energy supplies, carbon or energy taxes, fuel efficiency standards for automobiles, etc.

Political economy The set of interlinked relationships between people, the state, society and markets as defined by law, politics, economics, customs and power that determine the outcome of trade and transactions and the distribution of wealth in a country or economy.

Poverty Poverty is a complex concept with several definitions stemming from different schools of thought. It can refer to material circumstances (such as need, pattern of deprivation or limited resources), economic conditions (such as standard of living, *inequality* or economic position) and/or social relationships (such as social class, dependency, exclusion, lack of basic security or lack of entitlement). See also *Poverty eradication*.

Poverty eradication A set of measures to end *poverty* in all its forms everywhere. See also *Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)*.

Precursors Atmospheric compounds that are not *greenhouse gases (GHGs)* or *aerosols*, but that have an effect on GHG or aerosol concentrations by taking part in physical or chemical processes regulating their production or destruction rates. See also *Aerosol* and *Greenhouse gas (GHG)*.

Pre-industrial The multi-century period prior to the onset of large-scale industrial activity around 1750. The *reference period* 1850–1900 is used to approximate pre-industrial *global mean surface temperature (GMST)*. See also *Industrial revolution*.

Procedural equity See *Equity*.

Procedural justice See *Justice*.

Procedural rights See *Human rights*.

Projection A projection is a potential future evolution of a quantity or set of quantities, often computed with the aid of a model. Unlike predictions, projections are conditional on assumptions concerning, for example, future socio-economic and technological developments that may or may not be realized. See also *Climate projection*, *Scenario* and *Pathways*.

Purchasing power parity (PPP) The purchasing power of a currency is expressed using a basket of goods and services that can be bought with a given amount in the home country. International comparison of, for example, *gross domestic products (GDPs)* of countries can be based on the purchasing power of currencies rather than on current exchange rates. PPP estimates tend to lower the gap between the per capita GDP in *industrialized* and developing countries. See also *Market exchange rate (MER)*.

Radiative forcing Radiative forcing is the change in the net, downward minus upward, radiative flux (expressed in W m^{-2}) at the tropopause or top of *atmosphere* due to a change in a driver of *climate change*, such as a change in the concentration of *carbon dioxide (CO₂)* or the output of the Sun. The traditional radiative forcing is computed with all tropospheric properties held fixed at their unperturbed values, and after allowing for stratospheric temperatures, if perturbed, to readjust to radiative-dynamical equilibrium. Radiative forcing is called instantaneous if no change in stratospheric temperature is accounted for. The radiative forcing once rapid adjustments are accounted for is termed

the effective radiative forcing. Radiative forcing is not to be confused with cloud radiative forcing, which describes an unrelated measure of the impact of clouds on the radiative flux at the top of the atmosphere.

Reasons for Concern (RFCs) Elements of a classification framework, first developed in the IPCC Third Assessment Report, which aims to facilitate judgments about what level of *climate change* may be dangerous (in the language of Article 2 of the *UNFCCC*) by aggregating risks from various sectors, considering *hazards*, *exposures*, *vulnerabilities*, capacities to adapt, and the resulting impacts.

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) An effort to create financial value for the carbon stored in *forests*, offering incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to *sustainable development (SD)*. It is therefore a mechanism for *mitigation* that results from avoiding *deforestation*. REDD+ goes beyond deforestation and forest degradation, and includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The concept was first introduced in 2005 in the 11th Session of the *Conference of the Parties (COP)* in Montreal and later given greater recognition in the 13th Session of the COP in 2007 at Bali and inclusion in the Bali Action Plan, which called for 'policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD) and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stock in developing countries.' Since then, support for REDD has increased and has slowly become a framework for action supported by a number of countries.

Reference period The period relative to which *anomalies* are computed. See also *Anomaly*.

Reference scenario See *Baseline scenario*.

Reforestation Planting of *forests* on lands that have previously contained forests but that have been converted to some other use. For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as *afforestation*, reforestation and *deforestation*, see the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000), information provided by the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC, 2013), the report on Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003). See also *Deforestation*, *Afforestation* and *Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)*.

Region A region is a relatively large-scale land or ocean area characterized by specific geographical and climatological features. The *climate* of a land-based region is affected by regional and local scale features like topography, *land use* characteristics and large water bodies, as well as remote influences from other regions, in addition to global climate conditions. The IPCC defines a set of standard regions for analyses of observed climate trends and climate model *projections* (see Figure 3.2; AR5, SREX).

Remaining carbon budget Estimated cumulative net global *anthropogenic* CO₂ emissions from the start of 2018 to the time that anthropogenic CO₂ emissions reach net zero that would result, at some probability, in limiting *global warming* to a given level, accounting for the impact of other *anthropogenic emissions*.

Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) See *Pathways*.

Resilience The capacity of social, economic and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function,

identity and structure while also maintaining the capacity for *adaptation*, learning and *transformation*. This definition builds from the definition used by Arctic Council (2013). See also *Hazard*, *Risk* and *Vulnerability*.

Risk The potential for adverse consequences where something of value is at stake and where the occurrence and degree of an outcome is uncertain. In the context of the assessment of climate *impacts*, the term risk is often used to refer to the potential for adverse consequences of a climate-related *hazard*, or of *adaptation* or *mitigation* responses to such a hazard, on lives, *livelihoods*, health and *well-being*, *ecosystems* and species, economic, social and cultural assets, services (including *ecosystem services*), and infrastructure. Risk results from the interaction of *vulnerability* (of the affected system), its *exposure* over time (to the hazard), as well as the (climate-related) hazard and the *likelihood* of its occurrence.

Risk assessment The qualitative and/or quantitative scientific estimation of *risks*. See also *Risk*, *Risk management* and *Risk perception*.

Risk management Plans, actions, strategies or policies to reduce the *likelihood* and/or consequences of risks or to respond to consequences. See also *Risk*, *Risk assessment* and *Risk perception*.

Risk perception The subjective judgment that people make about the characteristics and severity of a *risk*. See also *Risk*, *Risk assessment* and *Risk management*.

Runoff The flow of water over the surface or through the subsurface, which typically originates from the part of liquid precipitation and/or snow/ice melt that does not evaporate or refreeze, and is not transpired. See also *Hydrological cycle*.

Scenario A plausible description of how the future may develop based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about key driving forces (e.g., rate of technological change, prices) and relationships. Note that scenarios are neither predictions nor forecasts, but are used to provide a view of the implications of developments and actions. See also *Baseline scenario*, *Emission scenario*, *Mitigation scenario* and *Pathways*.

Scenario storyline A *narrative* description of a *scenario* (or family of scenarios), highlighting the main scenario characteristics, relationships between key driving forces and the dynamics of their evolution. Also referred to as 'narratives' in the scenario literature. See also *Narratives*.

SDG-interaction score A seven-point scale (Nilsson et al., 2016) used to rate interactions between *mitigation options* and the *SDGs*. Scores range from +3 (indivisible) to -3 (cancelling), with a zero score indicating 'consistent' but with neither a positive or negative interaction. The scale, as applied in this report, also includes direction (whether the interaction is uni- or bi-directional) and *confidence* as assessed per IPCC guidelines.

Sea ice Ice found at the sea surface that has originated from the freezing of seawater. Sea ice may be discontinuous pieces (ice floes) moved on the ocean surface by wind and currents (pack ice), or a motionless sheet attached to the coast (land-fast ice). Sea ice concentration is the fraction of the ocean covered by ice. Sea ice less than one year old is called first-year ice. Perennial ice is sea ice that survives at least one summer. It may be subdivided into second-year ice and multi-year ice, where multi-year ice has survived at least two summers.

Sea level change (sea level rise/sea level fall) Sea level can change, both globally and locally (relative sea level change) due to (1) a change in ocean volume as a result of a change in the mass of water in the ocean, (2) changes in ocean volume as a result of changes in ocean water density, (3) changes in the shape of the ocean basins and changes

in the Earth's gravitational and rotational fields, and (4) local subsidence or uplift of the land. Global mean sea level change resulting from change in the mass of the ocean is called *barystatic*. The amount of *barystatic* sea level change due to the addition or removal of a mass of water is called its sea level equivalent (SLE). Sea level changes, both globally and locally, resulting from changes in water density are called *steric*. Density changes induced by temperature changes only are called *thermosteric*, while density changes induced by salinity changes are called *halosteric*. *Barystatic* and *steric* sea level changes do not include the effect of changes in the shape of ocean basins induced by the change in the ocean mass and its distribution.

Sea surface temperature (SST) The sea surface temperature is the subsurface bulk temperature in the top few meters of the ocean, measured by ships, buoys, and drifters. From ships, measurements of water samples in buckets were mostly switched in the 1940s to samples from engine intake water. Satellite measurements of skin temperature (uppermost layer; a fraction of a millimeter thick) in the infrared or the top centimeter or so in the microwave are also used, but must be adjusted to be compatible with the bulk temperature.

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 outlines seven clear targets and four priorities for action to prevent new, and to reduce existing, disaster risks. The voluntary, non-binding agreement recognizes that the State has the primary role to reduce disaster risk but that responsibility should be shared with other stakeholders, including local government and the private sector. Its aim is to achieve 'substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, *livelihoods* and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries.'

Sequestration See *Uptake*.

Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) See *Pathways*.

Short-lived climate forcers (SLCF) Short-lived climate forcers refers to a set of compounds that are primarily composed of those with short lifetimes in the *atmosphere* compared to well-mixed *greenhouse gases*, and are also referred to as near-term climate forcers. This set of compounds includes *methane (CH₄)*, which is also a well-mixed greenhouse gas, as well as *ozone (O₃)* and *aerosols*, or their *precursors*, and some halogenated species that are not well-mixed greenhouse gases. These compounds do not accumulate in the atmosphere at decadal to centennial time scales, and so their effect on *climate* is predominantly in the first decade after their emission, although their changes can still induce long-term climate effects such as *sea level change*. Their effect can be cooling or warming. A subset of exclusively warming short-lived climate forcers is referred to as short-lived climate pollutants. See also *Long-lived climate forcers (LLCF)*.

Short-lived climate pollutants (SLCP) See *Short-lived climate forcers (SLCF)*.

Sink A reservoir (natural or human, in soil, ocean, and plants) where a *greenhouse gas*, an *aerosol* or a *precursor* of a greenhouse gas is stored. Note that *UNFCCC* Article 1.8 refers to a sink as any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the *atmosphere*. See also *Uptake*.

Small island developing states (SIDS) Small island developing states (SIDS), as recognised by the United Nations OHRLLS (Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States), are a distinct group of developing countries facing specific social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities (UN-OHRLLS, 2011). They were recognized

as a special case both for their environment and development at the Rio Earth Summit in Brazil in 1992. Fifty-eight countries and territories are presently classified as SIDS by the UN OHRLLS, with 38 being UN member states and 20 being Non-UN Members or Associate Members of the Regional Commissions (UN-OHRLLS, 2018).

Social cost of carbon (SCC) The net present value of aggregate climate damages (with overall harmful damages expressed as a number with positive sign) from one more tonne of carbon in the form of *carbon dioxide (CO₂)*, conditional on a global emissions trajectory over time.

Social costs The full costs of an action in terms of social welfare losses, including external costs associated with the impacts of this action on the environment, the economy (*GDP*, employment) and on the society as a whole.

Social-ecological systems An integrated system that includes human societies and *ecosystems*, in which humans are part of nature. The functions of such a system arise from the interactions and interdependence of the social and ecological subsystems. The system's structure is characterized by reciprocal feedbacks, emphasising that humans must be seen as a part of, not apart from, nature. This definition builds from Arctic Council (2016) and Berkes and Folke (1998).

Social inclusion A process of improving the terms of participation in society, particularly for people who are disadvantaged, through enhancing opportunities, access to resources, and respect for rights (UN DESA, 2016).

Social justice See *Justice*.

Social learning A process of social interaction through which people learn new behaviours, capacities, values and attitudes.

Social value of mitigation activities (SVMA) Social, economic and environmental value of *mitigation* activities that include, in addition to their climate benefits, their *co-benefits* to *adaptation* and *sustainable development* objectives.

Societal (social) transformation See *Transformation*.

Socio-economic scenario A *scenario* that describes a possible future in terms of population, *gross domestic product (GDP)*, and other socio-economic factors relevant to understanding the implications of *climate change*. See also *Baseline scenario*, *Emission scenario*, *Mitigation scenario* and *Pathways*.

Socio-technical transitions Socio-technical transitions are where technological change is associated with social systems and the two are inextricably linked.

Soil carbon sequestration (SCS) Land management changes which increase the soil organic carbon content, resulting in a net removal of *CO₂* from the *atmosphere*.

Soil moisture Water stored in the soil in liquid or frozen form. Root-zone soil moisture is of most relevance for plant activity.

Solar radiation management See *Solar radiation modification (SRM)*.

Solar radiation modification (SRM) Solar radiation modification refers to the intentional modification of the Earth's shortwave radiative budget with the aim of reducing warming. Artificial injection of stratospheric *aerosols*, marine cloud brightening and land surface *albedo* modification are examples of proposed SRM methods. SRM does not fall within the definitions of *mitigation* and *adaptation* (IPCC, 2012b, p. 2). Note that in the literature SRM is also referred to as solar radiation management or albedo enhancement.

Stabilization (of GHG or CO₂-equivalent concentration) A state in which the atmospheric concentrations of one *greenhouse gas (GHG)* (e.g., *carbon dioxide*) or of a CO₂-equivalent basket of GHGs (or a combination of GHGs and *aerosols*) remains constant over time.

Stranded assets Assets exposed to devaluations or conversion to 'liabilities' because of unanticipated changes in their initially expected revenues due to innovations and/or evolutions of the business context, including changes in public regulations at the domestic and international levels.

Stratosphere The highly stratified region of the *atmosphere* above the *troposphere* extending from about 10 km (ranging from 9 km at high latitudes to 16 km in the tropics on average) to about 50 km altitude. See also *Atmosphere*, and *Troposphere*.

Sub-national actor Sub-national actors include state/provincial, regional, metropolitan and local/municipal governments as well as non-party stakeholders, such as civil society, the private sector, cities and other sub-national authorities, local communities and indigenous peoples.

Substantive rights See *Human rights*.

Supply-side measures See *Demand- and supply-side measures*.

Surface temperature See *Global mean surface temperature (GMST)*, *Land surface air temperature*, *Global mean surface air temperature (GSAT)* and *Sea surface temperature (SST)*.

Sustainability A dynamic process that guarantees the persistence of natural and *human systems* in an equitable manner.

Sustainable development (SD) Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987) and balances social, economic and environmental concerns. See also *Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)* and *Development pathways* (under *Pathways*).

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) The 17 global goals for development for all countries established by the United Nations through a participatory process and elaborated in the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, including ending *poverty* and hunger; ensuring health and *well-being*, education, gender *equality*, clean water and energy, and decent work; building and ensuring *resilient* and sustainable infrastructure, cities and consumption; reducing *inequalities*; protecting land and water *ecosystems*; promoting peace, *justice* and partnerships; and taking urgent action on *climate change*. See also *Sustainable development (SD)*.

Technology transfer The exchange of knowledge, hardware and associated software, money and goods among stakeholders, which leads to the spread of technology for *adaptation* or *mitigation*. The term encompasses both diffusion of technologies and technological cooperation across and within countries.

Temperature overshoot The temporary exceedance of a specified level of *global warming*, such as 1.5°C. Overshoot implies a peak followed by a decline in global warming, achieved through *anthropogenic removal* of CO₂ exceeding remaining CO₂ emissions globally. See also *Overshoot pathways* and *Non-overshoot pathways* (both under *Pathways*).

Tippling point A level of change in system properties beyond which a system reorganizes, often abruptly, and does not return to the initial state even if the drivers of the change are abated. For the *climate system*, it refers to a critical threshold when global or regional *climate* changes from one stable state to another stable state. See also *Irreversibility*.

Transformation A change in the fundamental attributes of natural and human systems.

Societal (social) transformation

A profound and often deliberate shift initiated by communities toward sustainability, facilitated by changes in individual and collective values and behaviours, and a fairer balance of political, cultural, and *institutional* power in society.

Transformation pathways See *Pathways*.

Transformational adaptation See *Adaptation*.

Transformative change A system-wide change that requires more than technological change through consideration of social and economic factors that, with technology, can bring about rapid change at scale.

Transient climate response See *Climate sensitivity*.

Transient climate response to cumulative CO₂ emissions (TCRE) The transient global average surface temperature change per unit cumulative CO₂ emissions, usually 1000 GtC. TCRE combines both information on the airborne fraction of cumulative CO₂ emissions (the fraction of the total CO₂ emitted that remains in the *atmosphere*, which is determined by *carbon cycle* processes) and on the *transient climate response (TCR)*. See also *Transient climate response* (under *Climate sensitivity*).

Transit-oriented development (TOD) An approach to urban development that maximizes the amount of residential, business and leisure space within walking distance of efficient public transport, so as to enhance mobility of citizens, the viability of public transport and the value of urban land in mutually supporting ways.

Transition The process of changing from one state or condition to another in a given period of time. Transition can be in individuals, firms, cities, regions and nations, and can be based on incremental or transformative change.

Tropical cyclone The general term for a strong, cyclonic-scale disturbance that originates over tropical oceans. Distinguished from weaker systems (often named tropical disturbances or depressions) by exceeding a threshold wind speed. A tropical storm is a tropical cyclone with one-minute average surface winds between 18 and 32 m s⁻¹. Beyond 32 m s⁻¹, a tropical cyclone is called a hurricane, typhoon, or cyclone, depending on geographic location. See also *Extratropical cyclone*.

Troposphere The lowest part of the *atmosphere*, from the surface to about 10 km in altitude at mid-latitudes (ranging from 9 km at high latitudes to 16 km in the tropics on average), where clouds and weather phenomena occur. In the troposphere, temperatures generally decrease with height. See also *Atmosphere* and *Stratosphere*.

Uncertainty A state of incomplete knowledge that can result from a lack of information or from disagreement about what is known or even knowable. It may have many types of sources, from imprecision in the data to ambiguously defined concepts or terminology, incomplete understanding of critical processes, or uncertain *projections* of *human behaviour*. Uncertainty can therefore be represented by quantitative measures (e.g., a probability density function) or by qualitative statements (e.g., reflecting the judgment of a team of experts) (see Moss and Schneider, 2000; IPCC, 2004; Mastrandrea et al., 2010). See also *Confidence* and *Likelihood*.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) The UNFCCC was adopted in May 1992 and opened for signature at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. It entered into force in March 1994 and as of May 2018 had 197 Parties (196 States and the European Union). The Convention's ultimate objective is the 'stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate

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system.' The provisions of the Convention are pursued and implemented by two treaties: the *Kyoto Protocol* and the *Paris Agreement*. See also *Kyoto Protocol* and *Paris Agreement*.

Uptake The addition of a substance of concern to a reservoir. See also *Carbon sequestration* and *Sink*.

Vulnerability The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt. See also *Exposure*, *Hazard* and *Risk*.

Water cycle See *Hydrological cycle*.

Well-being A state of existence that fulfils various human needs, including material living conditions and quality of life, as well as the ability to pursue one's goals, to thrive, and feel satisfied with one's life. Ecosystem well-being refers to the ability of *ecosystems* to maintain their diversity and quality.

Zero emissions commitment See *Climate change commitment*.

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