... Is there a new economy? Autores: Alan Greenspan, James A. Wilcox; Localización: California ma... more ... Is there a new economy? Autores: Alan Greenspan, James A. Wilcox; Localización: California management review, ISSN 0008-1256, Vol. 41, Nº 1, 1998 , págs. 74-85. Fundación Dialnet. Acceso de usuarios registrados. Acceso de usuarios registrados Usuario. Contraseña. Entrar ...
ABSTRACT We analyzed theoretically and empirically the effects of Japanese government loan guaran... more ABSTRACT We analyzed theoretically and empirically the effects of Japanese government loan guarantees on banks’ non-guaranteed lending and risk-taking. Both theory and evidence further suggested that increasing loan guarantees gave banks incentives to take more risk. On the other hand, having more capital was associated with reduced risk-taking. Banks that started with lower capital levels appeared to increase their risk-taking more than well capitalized banks did in response to a reduction in capital. Guaranteeing more business loans generally resulted in banks’ extending, not only more guaranteed, but also more non-guaranteed loans to their borrowers. The model highlighted the conditions that would lead profit-maximizing banks to either displace or stimulate more non-guaranteed lending. The model and evidence suggest that non-guaranteed loans were complements, rather than substitutes, when banks had higher capital ratios and when they had fewer guaranteed loans. Under those conditions, loan guarantees might be “high-powered,” leading to a multiple increase in non-guaranteed loans. Estimates also suggested that less-well-capitalized banks boosted their non-guaranteed lending by more than better-capitalized banks adjusted theirs. That fits the perspective that regulatory capital constraints tend to bind increasingly tightly as bank capital falls.
This paper uses data from a new, large survey to estimate the demand for financial services of lo... more This paper uses data from a new, large survey to estimate the demand for financial services of low-and-moderate income households. We show that socio-economic characteristics have significant and importantly different effects on the choices about which bank accounts to have. In particular, racial and ethnic minorities were less likely to have checking accounts than whites were, but were more likely to have savings accounts. Our estimates could be used to support Caskey's recommendation that efforts to reach LMI individuals should focus on savings accounts. Caskey's view that managing a checking account is particularly difficult (and likely very costly) for the very poor is consonant with our findings that those with less income, education, and wealth are more likely to own a savings account than a checking account. We also provide evidence that, in addition to individuals' characteristics, neighborhood characteristics significantly affected whether individuals were unbanked. Our estimates showed that everyone living in neighborhoods with higher proportions of racial or ethnic minorities was less likely to have any bank account and that the likelihood of owning a checking account was particularly reduced by neighborhood effects.
... Michael Darby and Martin Feldstein, on the other hand, argue that nominal rates should exhibi... more ... Michael Darby and Martin Feldstein, on the other hand, argue that nominal rates should exhibit a greater ... Linda Pacheco supplied able research assis-tance ... Berndt and David Wood, Berndt and Mohammed Khaled, and Edward Hudson and Dale Jorgenson have each found the ...
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for down... more No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
Quarterly real GNP and implicit GNP deflator series are derived for the 1948–1970 period using th... more Quarterly real GNP and implicit GNP deflator series are derived for the 1948–1970 period using the related series technique of Chow and Lin. These estimated series are compared with the official, revised series; to official, unrevised series; and to univariate proxies using regression, time series, and spectral methods. The derived series possess autocorrelation and turning point characteristics similar to those of the official, revised series. The derived series also deliver structural equation parameter estimates similar to those based on official, revised data.
ABSTRACT A recurring criticism of U.S. bank supervisors is that their standards vary procyclicly ... more ABSTRACT A recurring criticism of U.S. bank supervisors is that their standards vary procyclicly with banking and economic conditions. Academic studies of the causes of U.S. banking crises report lapses in bank oversight caused by a pre-crisis period of greater risk tolerance by supervisors. Conversely, post-crisis periods are marked by bankers’ claims of overzealous supervision and tightening of supervisory standards. The 2010 reforms of supervisory standards for bank capital adequacy and liquidity (Basel III) directly address procyclicality in supervision and its effects on credit cycles. We revisit the question of procyclicality in bank supervisors’ standards and find mixed support for the Basel III reforms. Using data on bank supervisors’ safety and soundness assessments of all U.S. FDIC-insured banks between March 1985 and December 2010, as well as information on banks’ financial and macroeconomic conditions, we develop a model of supervisors’ risk assessments of banks — Ratings Rule Model. We use the Model to examine the relationships between changing risk assessments of banks by their supervisors, bank conditions and economic conditions. Specifically, we estimate the marginal effects of changes in explanatory variables of the Ratings Rule Model on banks’ likelihood of receiving high (low) supervisory ratings. We next analyze the marginal effects and test for significant changes in effects between stressful and non-stressful periods for banking markets. Our analysis of the Ratings Rule Model suggests that bank supervisors’ risk assessments have been procyclical in some respects. We find evidence that supervisors’ standards for capital adequacy under pillar II of the Basel Accord have been procyclical in the past — becoming more stringent during periods of banking market stress and less stringent during non-stressful periods. In addition, these changes in supervisory risk tolerances for equity capitalization appear to have had a greater impact on risk assessments of sound, well-managed banks than on weak, poorly managed banks. We find, however, that supervisory standards for capital adequacy did not become more stringent during the current financial crisis (2007–2010). Finally, supervisors’ attitude toward other categories of risk — asset quality, earnings strength, and liquidity — appear to be somewhat countercyclical. In addition to presenting new information on supervisory standards during the current financial crisis, we believe this is the first paper to analyze cyclicality in supervisory standards using the marginal effects of risk factors on banks’ likelihood receiving high (low) supervisory ratings. Hence, we believe this is the first paper to present evidence on the treatment of different risk factors — capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings strength, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk — by supervisors across different types of banks and over banking market cycles.
... Is there a new economy? Autores: Alan Greenspan, James A. Wilcox; Localización: California ma... more ... Is there a new economy? Autores: Alan Greenspan, James A. Wilcox; Localización: California management review, ISSN 0008-1256, Vol. 41, Nº 1, 1998 , págs. 74-85. Fundación Dialnet. Acceso de usuarios registrados. Acceso de usuarios registrados Usuario. Contraseña. Entrar ...
ABSTRACT We analyzed theoretically and empirically the effects of Japanese government loan guaran... more ABSTRACT We analyzed theoretically and empirically the effects of Japanese government loan guarantees on banks’ non-guaranteed lending and risk-taking. Both theory and evidence further suggested that increasing loan guarantees gave banks incentives to take more risk. On the other hand, having more capital was associated with reduced risk-taking. Banks that started with lower capital levels appeared to increase their risk-taking more than well capitalized banks did in response to a reduction in capital. Guaranteeing more business loans generally resulted in banks’ extending, not only more guaranteed, but also more non-guaranteed loans to their borrowers. The model highlighted the conditions that would lead profit-maximizing banks to either displace or stimulate more non-guaranteed lending. The model and evidence suggest that non-guaranteed loans were complements, rather than substitutes, when banks had higher capital ratios and when they had fewer guaranteed loans. Under those conditions, loan guarantees might be “high-powered,” leading to a multiple increase in non-guaranteed loans. Estimates also suggested that less-well-capitalized banks boosted their non-guaranteed lending by more than better-capitalized banks adjusted theirs. That fits the perspective that regulatory capital constraints tend to bind increasingly tightly as bank capital falls.
This paper uses data from a new, large survey to estimate the demand for financial services of lo... more This paper uses data from a new, large survey to estimate the demand for financial services of low-and-moderate income households. We show that socio-economic characteristics have significant and importantly different effects on the choices about which bank accounts to have. In particular, racial and ethnic minorities were less likely to have checking accounts than whites were, but were more likely to have savings accounts. Our estimates could be used to support Caskey's recommendation that efforts to reach LMI individuals should focus on savings accounts. Caskey's view that managing a checking account is particularly difficult (and likely very costly) for the very poor is consonant with our findings that those with less income, education, and wealth are more likely to own a savings account than a checking account. We also provide evidence that, in addition to individuals' characteristics, neighborhood characteristics significantly affected whether individuals were unbanked. Our estimates showed that everyone living in neighborhoods with higher proportions of racial or ethnic minorities was less likely to have any bank account and that the likelihood of owning a checking account was particularly reduced by neighborhood effects.
... Michael Darby and Martin Feldstein, on the other hand, argue that nominal rates should exhibi... more ... Michael Darby and Martin Feldstein, on the other hand, argue that nominal rates should exhibit a greater ... Linda Pacheco supplied able research assis-tance ... Berndt and David Wood, Berndt and Mohammed Khaled, and Edward Hudson and Dale Jorgenson have each found the ...
No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for down... more No abstract is available for this item. ... To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online. 2. Check on the ...
Quarterly real GNP and implicit GNP deflator series are derived for the 1948–1970 period using th... more Quarterly real GNP and implicit GNP deflator series are derived for the 1948–1970 period using the related series technique of Chow and Lin. These estimated series are compared with the official, revised series; to official, unrevised series; and to univariate proxies using regression, time series, and spectral methods. The derived series possess autocorrelation and turning point characteristics similar to those of the official, revised series. The derived series also deliver structural equation parameter estimates similar to those based on official, revised data.
ABSTRACT A recurring criticism of U.S. bank supervisors is that their standards vary procyclicly ... more ABSTRACT A recurring criticism of U.S. bank supervisors is that their standards vary procyclicly with banking and economic conditions. Academic studies of the causes of U.S. banking crises report lapses in bank oversight caused by a pre-crisis period of greater risk tolerance by supervisors. Conversely, post-crisis periods are marked by bankers’ claims of overzealous supervision and tightening of supervisory standards. The 2010 reforms of supervisory standards for bank capital adequacy and liquidity (Basel III) directly address procyclicality in supervision and its effects on credit cycles. We revisit the question of procyclicality in bank supervisors’ standards and find mixed support for the Basel III reforms. Using data on bank supervisors’ safety and soundness assessments of all U.S. FDIC-insured banks between March 1985 and December 2010, as well as information on banks’ financial and macroeconomic conditions, we develop a model of supervisors’ risk assessments of banks — Ratings Rule Model. We use the Model to examine the relationships between changing risk assessments of banks by their supervisors, bank conditions and economic conditions. Specifically, we estimate the marginal effects of changes in explanatory variables of the Ratings Rule Model on banks’ likelihood of receiving high (low) supervisory ratings. We next analyze the marginal effects and test for significant changes in effects between stressful and non-stressful periods for banking markets. Our analysis of the Ratings Rule Model suggests that bank supervisors’ risk assessments have been procyclical in some respects. We find evidence that supervisors’ standards for capital adequacy under pillar II of the Basel Accord have been procyclical in the past — becoming more stringent during periods of banking market stress and less stringent during non-stressful periods. In addition, these changes in supervisory risk tolerances for equity capitalization appear to have had a greater impact on risk assessments of sound, well-managed banks than on weak, poorly managed banks. We find, however, that supervisory standards for capital adequacy did not become more stringent during the current financial crisis (2007–2010). Finally, supervisors’ attitude toward other categories of risk — asset quality, earnings strength, and liquidity — appear to be somewhat countercyclical. In addition to presenting new information on supervisory standards during the current financial crisis, we believe this is the first paper to analyze cyclicality in supervisory standards using the marginal effects of risk factors on banks’ likelihood receiving high (low) supervisory ratings. Hence, we believe this is the first paper to present evidence on the treatment of different risk factors — capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings strength, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk — by supervisors across different types of banks and over banking market cycles.
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Papers by James A Wilcox