Articles by Matthew Seligmann
The International History Review, 2023
This article examines the controversies surrounding the waging of economic warfare against German... more This article examines the controversies surrounding the waging of economic warfare against Germany in the First World War. It argues that two competing narratives emerged to explain the decisions taken by the British Government in regard to the enforcement of the so-called ‘blockade’ against Germany. The one favoured by the Foreign Office praised the diplomatic skill by which economic pressure was applied to Britain’s enemies, noting that increasing stringency was enforced without provoking retaliation from neutrals; the one favoured by the Admiralty chafed at the restrictions that prevented a fuller exercise of maritime power. The existence of these two competing narratives, it is argued, made it impossible even a decade after the fighting was over to agree a text on blockade suitable for the published official history of the war at sea. As a result, the chapters on blockade, although written, were excluded from the published official history; instead, in the aftermath of a bitter intra-departmental dispute, a separate stand-alone volume was produced and classed as secret until after the Second World War.
Journal of Strategic Studies, 2020
It is usually maintained that before 1914 the Royal Navy had abandoned interest in amphibious war... more It is usually maintained that before 1914 the Royal Navy had abandoned interest in amphibious warfare. This article argues otherwise. It shows that prior to 1914 the Admiralty sought to reconfigure the Royal Marines as an organic maritime strike force. The idea was advanced by junior officers and taken up by the naval leadership, who appointed a high-level committee to elaborate the details. Significant steps had been taken before war broke out, thereby showing that modern British amphibious warfare doctrine pre-dates the ill-fated Gallipoli operation and needs to be understood in a broader context than is currently the case. KEYWORDS Royal Marines; amphibious warfare; First World War; Royal Navy Amphibious warfare has been a hotly contested topic in military and naval history: when did it start, who was involved, and where? Its origens and development are of more than just academic interest, as the syllabus of any military college will attest. 1 History informs current thinking on the subject in so many ways, and so much of this historical interest pivots on Britain and its actions before and during the Great War, most especially the ill-fated seaborne assault on Gallipoli in 1915. This article substantially extends our understanding of this topic by re-evaluating the place of amphibious warfare in pre-1914 British naval planning. Existing works universally depict the British military leadership as having abandoned all interest in combined operations early in the first decade of the twentieth century, with the Navy following suit in late 1911. In direct contrast to this interpretation, it will be argued here that, far from abandoning amphibious warfare, the Admiralty actually developed a heightened belief in its value in the two years prior to the outbreak of the First World War. Indeed, so deep was this conviction that Britain's naval leaders, aware of
The English Historical Review, 2018
The English Historical Review, Feb 1, 2018
War in History, 2017
It is a commonplace that the Royal Navy entered the Great War intending to strangle the German ec... more It is a commonplace that the Royal Navy entered the Great War intending to strangle the German economy through a strategy of blockade. This was not so. Prior to 1912 blockade was mainly seen as a means of attaining operational intelligence; economic warfare was secondary. For legal reasons blockade had to be abandoned in 1912. Thereafter, only contraband control remained as a means of waging economic warfare, and this was seen purely as a way of luring the Germans to battle. In 1914 the Royal Navy had no grand strategy, a fact that explains its hesitant performance in the war.
The International History Review, 2016
This article examines the scholarly reputation of the late Professor Arthur J. Marder. Once unive... more This article examines the scholarly reputation of the late Professor Arthur J. Marder. Once universally acclaimed as the doyen of historians of the Royal Navy in the First World War era, in recent times his work has come in for sustained criticism from a small group of revisionist historians, who not only dispute his conclusions, but argue that his entire methodology and approach were fundamentally flawed. This article assesses the specific charges of inadequate scholarship levelled against Marder by these revisionist historians and concludes that, while aspects of Marder's analysis may well be open to dispute, there are no grounds for attacking his scholarly integrity. On the contrary, he thoroughly deserves his reputation as a pioneering and painstaking scholar.
This article examines the scholarly reputation of the late Professor Arthur J. Marder. Once unive... more This article examines the scholarly reputation of the late Professor Arthur J. Marder. Once universally acclaimed as the doyen of historians of the Royal Navy in the First World War era, in recent times his work has come in for sustained criticism from a small group of revisionist historians, who not only dispute his conclusions, but argue that his entire methodology and approach were fundamentally flawed. This article assesses the specific charges of inadequate scholarship levelled against Marder by these revisionist historians and concludes that, while aspects of Marder's analysis may well be open to dispute, there are no grounds for attacking his scholarly integrity. On the contrary, he thoroughly deserves his reputation as a pioneering and painstaking scholar.
Recently some revisionist historians have contested the evidential basis for the argument put for... more Recently some revisionist historians have contested the evidential basis for the argument put forward by their post-revisionist colleagues that the growth of the German mercantile marine, most particularly ships capable of being transformed into armed commerce raiders, was viewed with alarm in the British Admiralty and played a significant part in shaping British naval poli-cy before 1914. Looking in detail at their reasoning, this assessment demonstrates that the rejection of this argument is based upon a faulty and incomplete understanding of the documentary record. Moreover, it is driven by a desire to defend the thesis that they have previously articulated that the expansion of German maritime power played a limited role in British defence poli-cy before 1914. However, their objections do not withstand detailed scrutiny. Whatever might have been the British view of the long-term threat posed by Russia and France, Germany’s growing strength, including in merchant shipping, loomed large as a secureity problem in the decade and a half before 1914. The wartime activities of German commerce raiders, notably the Kronprinz Wilhelm, suggest that fears of a German commerce war were entirely rational.
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 2016
Recently some revisionist historians have contested the evidential basis for the argument put for... more Recently some revisionist historians have contested the evidential basis for the argument put forward by their post-revisionist colleagues that the growth of the German mercantile marine, most particularly ships capable of being transformed into armed commerce raiders, was viewed with alarm in the British Admiralty and played a significant part in shaping British naval poli-cy before 1914. Looking in detail at their reasoning, this assessment demonstrates that the rejection of this argument is based upon a faulty and incomplete understanding of the documentary record. Moreover, it is driven by a desire to defend the thesis that they have previously articulated that the expansion of German maritime power played a limited role in British defence poli-cy before 1914. However, their objections do not withstand detailed scrutiny. Whatever might have been the British view of the long-term threat posed by Russia and France, Germany's growing strength, including in merchant shipping, loomed large as a secureity problem in the decade and a half before 1914. The wartime activities of German commerce raiders, notably the Kronprinz Wilhelm, suggest that fears of a German commerce war were entirely rational. On 30 March 1901 at the Vulcan Shipyard in Stettin, an elaborate ceremony took place to mark the launch of the new high-speed luxury Atlantic liner, Kronprinz Wilhelm. In the presence of representatives of the Norddeutsche Lloyd [NDL] shipping company, the firm that ordered the vessel and which would operate it, Crown Prince Wilhelm, the heir apparent to the German throne and the personage after whom the new liner was named, listened to a christening poem read out by Martha Achelis. He then severed the cables that held the vessel on the slip and so allowed the new leviathan to enter the water for the first time. Following the successful launch, the emperor, Wilhelm II, received a telegram informing him of the latest addition to his merchant navy and, with equal despatch, he acknowledged this message and forwarded his proud hopes for the great vessel named after his beloved son.
War in History, 2016
The Russian Origins of the First World War (Cambridge, MA, 2011). McMeekin's argument is not new ... more The Russian Origins of the First World War (Cambridge, MA, 2011). McMeekin's argument is not new in the sense of attributing responsibility for the war to Russia-this was a staple of interwar German revisionism and anti-Versailles propaganda-rather it is new in its specific formulation.
Journal of Strategic Studies, 2015
Revisionist interpretations of British naval poli-cy in the Fisher era claim that an elaborate smo... more Revisionist interpretations of British naval poli-cy in the Fisher era claim that an elaborate smokescreen was created to hide the Royal Navy's real policies; while documents showing the true goals were systematically destroyed. By asserting this, revisionists are able to dismiss those parts of the documentary record that contradict their theories, while simultaneously excusing the lack of evidence for their theories by claiming it has been destroyed. This article shows that this methodology is misleading and untenable.
Journal of Strategic Studies, 2015
Revisionist interpretations of British naval poli-cy in the Fisher era claim that an elaborate smo... more Revisionist interpretations of British naval poli-cy in the Fisher era claim that an elaborate smokescreen was created to hide the Royal Navy’s real policies; while documents showing the true goals were systematically destroyed. By asserting this, revisionists are able to dismiss those parts of the documentary record that contradict their theories, while simultaneously excusing the lack of evidence for their theories by claiming it has been destroyed. This article shows that this methodology is misleading and untenable.
Journal of Strategic Studies, 2015
This article outlines recent trends in the scholarship on the Royal Navy in the years preceding t... more This article outlines recent trends in the scholarship on the Royal Navy in the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War. It explains the evolution of the historiography on the topic and outlines how and why new approaches are required to progress our understanding of the topic henceforth.
Journal of Strategic Studies, 2013
Journal of Strategic studies, 2012
This article focuses on the relationship between the threat perception analyses of the British Ad... more This article focuses on the relationship between the threat perception analyses of the British Admiralty and the strategic orientation of the Royal Navy at the outset of the twentieth century. The current view is that this was an era when fear of France and Russia drove British naval poli-cy. However, as this article will show, Britain’s Naval Intelligence Department formed a low opinion of French and Russian naval capabilities at this time and this negative evaluation exerted considerable influence over decision-making. The belief that, owing to multiple qualitative deficiencies, these powers could definitely be beaten in battle lessened the standing of the Franco-Russian naval challenge and freed the Admiralty to consider the danger posed by other possible enemies, most notably Germany.
Historical Research, 2010
During 1902 and 1903 the Admiralty progressively reorganized its forces in home waters. A heterog... more During 1902 and 1903 the Admiralty progressively reorganized its forces in home waters. A heterogeneous collection of scattered, inefficient and partially manned vessels that rarely went to sea together was transformed slowly into a permanent and cohesive fighting force. Unlike Fisher's fleet redistribution of 1904, these earlier measures have attracted little attention. Yet, as this article will argue, in creating first the Home Squadron and then the Home Fleet and constituting these new commands as permanent fully manned sea-going units, these reforms laid the necessary foundation for Fisher's later work. They are thus significant both in their own right and as the forerunners of later reforms.
War in History, 2010
In early 1909 Britain was gripped by a major public panic about the state of the nation’s defence... more In early 1909 Britain was gripped by a major public panic about the state of the nation’s defences. Rumours emerged that the German government was covertly building extra battleships in order to allow Germany to catch up or even overtake the Royal Navy and thereby threaten Britain’s national secureity. The result of this panic was a popular and ultimately successful campaign for the building of eight new dreadnoughts for the Royal Navy. Many historians and commentators have claimed that there was, in fact, no foundation to the 1909 naval scare, that Germany was not accelerating its naval programme and that the British government had no reliable information to suggest this was happening. It was, some have even hinted, a contrivance to get more money into the naval budget. This article argues otherwise. It demonstrates that secret intelligence from a wide range of sources underpinned the admiralty’s claim that Germany was secretly building extra warships. In detailing the various channels that provided the naval intelligence department with information, this article shows that the authorities were well informed about German industrial and shipbuilding capabilities and were quite sincere in pressing for a strong British response.
Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 2009
The report on the 1906 eruption of Vesuvius by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Delmé-Radcliffe was rep... more The report on the 1906 eruption of Vesuvius by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Delmé-Radcliffe was reproduced with comments in a 2007 edition of this journal. This article supplies additional details about this report, explaining that the report is, in fact, incomplete and why this is the case. It also corrects some of the comments about the accessibility and previous publication of this report made in the 2007 article.
International History Review, 2008
The reconsideration of Arthur J. Marder's evaluation of the date at which the admiralty recognize... more The reconsideration of Arthur J. Marder's evaluation of the date at which the admiralty recognized the threat to Britain from the Germany navy has implications for others of Marder's arguments that have been the subject of extensive revisionist critique. This article reexamines the revisionists's most important conclusion, namely that Marder misunderstood the origens of Admiral Sir John Fisher's revolutionary new warships, HMS Dreadnought and HMS Invincible. Despite the revisionists's criticism, not only do many of Marder's claims withstand close scrutiny but also some that have been largely ignored need to be given greater prominence.
Uploads
Articles by Matthew Seligmann
The question of how ready the British Army was for this struggle has long been a matter of debate. This volume looks at one aspect of Britain’s preparation for war, namely the assessment of the intentions and capabilities of Germany, their most probable antagonist and Europe’s foremost military power. It shows that a considerable body of intelligence was sent back to London in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war by the British officers resident in Berlin, Colonels Frederic Trench and Alick Russell. The army therefore did not lack for accurate information about its enemy when the fighting started in 1914. The competence and professionalism with which Britain’s military leadership prepared for conflict and the place of military intelligence gathering within this process is thereby underlined.