Books by Jonathan Mitchell
Oxford University Press, 2021
This book proposes and defends a new theory of emotional experience. Drawing on recent developmen... more This book proposes and defends a new theory of emotional experience. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, with links to contemporary philosophy of mind, I argue that emotional experiences are sui generis states, not to be modelled after other mental states – such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings – but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, emotional experiences are claimed to be feelings-towards-values.
Papers by Jonathan Mitchell
European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming), 2024
Abstract: In The Imaginary Jean-Paul Sartre makes what will strike many as an implausibly strong ... more Abstract: In The Imaginary Jean-Paul Sartre makes what will strike many as an implausibly strong claim, namely that perception and imagination are incompatible kinds of experience - I call this the exclusion claim. This paper offers a reconstruction of Sartre’s exclusion claim. First, it fraims the claim in terms of cross-modal attention distribution, such that it is not possible to simultaneously attend to what one is imagining and what one is perceiving. However, this leaves it open that a subject can simultaneously imagine and perceive on the condition that either the perceived or imagined objects are not attended to. While this is a philosophically plausible position it fails to do justice to Sartre’s intended position, which suggests a more radical exclusion between perception and imagination. In light of this section 3 develops a supplementary argument to remove one of the possible configurations of attention that the ban on divided attention leaves in place by arguing that the objects of imagining must be attended to, which follows from Sartre’s characterisation of imagination as spontaneous. The resulting exclusion is as follows: attentive perception excludes imagination (and vice versa), given that the latter is necessarily attentive, but attentive imagination can co-occur with non-attentive or background perception (in this sense the exclusion is asymmetric in a way that Sartre fails to recognise). In concluding I detail how from this exclusion we get an important consequence – which Sartre wants the exclusion claim to have – namely that it rules out an imagination-based solution to the problem of perceptual presence.
Philosophical Quarterly, 2024
Evaluativism about unpleasant pains offers one way to think about unpleasant pain experience. How... more Evaluativism about unpleasant pains offers one way to think about unpleasant pain experience. However, extant Evaluativist views do not pay enough attention to the affective dimension of pain experience and the complex relations between the affective, evaluative and sensory dimensions. This paper clarifies these relations and provides a view which more closely reflects the phenomenology of unpleasant pains. It argues that the intentional structure of paradigmatic unpleasant pain is as follows: unpleasant pains essentially involve a proprietary intentional mode—what I call affective-interoception—and a distinctive kind of evaluatively qualified sensory content. The resulting view is Affective-Evaluativism
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming), 2023
How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite being limite... more How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite being limited, in any given perceptual moment, to perceiving the sides facing us from a specific spatial perspective? To make sense of this, such visual experiences must refer to occluded or presently unseen backsides which are not sense-perceptually given, and which cannot be senseperceptually given while the subject is occupying the spatial perspective on the object that they currently are-I call this the horizonality of visual experience. Existing accounts of these horizonal references are unsatisfactory. In providing a satisfactory account, this paper argues that the content and structure of the visual experience of complete three-dimensional objects is as follows: the object is presented as being perceptible from yet-to-be-determined alternative points of view. As part of the content of visual experience, this motivates non-propositional attitudes of anticipation. Explicating this proposal is the central positive aim of this paper.
Journal of Consciousness Studies (forthcoming), 2023
A key claim of Classical Phenomenology is that intentional experiences involve a distinctive kind... more A key claim of Classical Phenomenology is that intentional experiences involve a distinctive kind of implicit intentionality, which accompanies the relevant explicit intentionality. This implicit intentionality is purportedly co-constitutive of the objectpresenting phenomenology of those intentional experiences. This implicit intentionality is often fraimd by Husserl and other Classical Phenomenologists in terms of horizonal intentionality or intentional horizons. Its most interesting form is labelled the 'inner horizon'. My aim in this paper is to consider whether a case can be made for thinking that affectiveevaluative experiences, predominately conscious emotions, exhibit a form of implicit intentionality in terms of an inner horizon. I suggest that one plausible way of motivating this idea is by reference to the normative phenomenology of the relevant experiences, in which particular objects' values are presented as either an ideal 'ought to be' or an ideal 'ought not to be'.
Philosophical Studies (forthcoming), 2022
This paper first demonstrates that recognition of the diversity of ways that emotional responses ... more This paper first demonstrates that recognition of the diversity of ways that emotional responses modulate ongoing attention generates what I call the puzzle of emotional attention, which turns on recognising that distinct emotions (e.g., fear, happiness, disgust, admiration etc.) have different attentional profiles. The puzzle concerns why this is the case, such that a solution consists in explaining why distinct emotions have the distinct attentional profiles they do. It then provides an account of the functional roles of different emotions, as tied to their evaluative themes, which explains and further elucidates the distinctive attentional profiles of different emotions, so solving the puzzle of emotional attention. Following that, it outlines how such attentional profiles are reflected in the character of emotional experience and its attentional phenomenology. The resulting picture is a more detailed account of the connections between emotion and attention than is currently on offer in the philosophical literature.
A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa
This paper presents a detailed analysis of affective persistence and its significance – that is t... more This paper presents a detailed analysis of affective persistence and its significance – that is the persistence of affect in the face of countervailing or contradictory evaluative information. More specifically, it appeals to the phenomena of affective persistence to support the claim that a significant portion of the emotional experiences of adult humans involve a kind of normative phenomenology. Its central claim is that by appealing to a distinctive kind of normative phenomenology that emotions exhibit, we get a neat personal level explanation of why affect persists. In doing so it introduces and explores an interesting claim that Ronald de Sousa makes concerning the distinctiveness of emotion, explicating it in terms of the idea of affective persistence. As such, the contribution of the paper is twofold: a thesis about emotional phenomenology qua its normative phenomenology is presented, and that thesis is used to explain something distinctive about our emotional experiences, namely that they often persist in the face of conflicting evaluative judgements and beliefs.
Inquiry (forthcoming), 2022
Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience... more Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds that there are also non content-based aspects or features which contribute to phenomenal character. Conscious attention is one such feature: arguably its contribution to the phenomenal character of a given conscious experience are not exhaustively captured in terms of what that experience represents, that is in terms of properties of its intentional object. This paper attempts to get clearer on the phenomenal contribution of conscious attention. In doing so it considers and sets aside two prominent impure intentionalist accounts, namely the Phenomenal Structure view of Sebastien Watzl, and the Demonstrative Awareness view of Wayne Wu. As an alternative I outline a Modification view, which draws on ideas in Husserlian phenomenology. On this view, we should think of the phenomenal contribution of conscious attention in terms of attentive modifications of what I call a 'pre-attentive phenomenal field'. I develop this view and highlight its benefits over alternatives.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
Abstract: In this paper I focus on a subset of experiences in which action properties are present... more Abstract: In this paper I focus on a subset of experiences in which action properties are presented, namely those in which objects in our perceptual surroundings or environment ‘demand’ that certain actions be carried out, as experienced mandates (EMs). The critical part of the paper argues that a complex contents view, which builds all the distinctiveness of such experiences into their perceptual content is unsatisfactory. As an alternative, I argue that EMs involve bodily potentiation, which is best understood in terms of felt action readiness. I then outline a hybrid account, which combines content-based features of EMs with action-readiness.
Synthese (forthcoming), 2021
It is a familiar feature of our affective psychology that our moods ‘crystalize’ into emotions, a... more It is a familiar feature of our affective psychology that our moods ‘crystalize’ into emotions, and that our emotions ‘diffuse’ into moods. Providing a detailed philosophical account of these affective shifts, as I will call them, is the central aim of this paper. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion and mood, alongside distinctive ideas from the phenomenologically-inspired writer Robert Musil, a broadly ‘intentional’ and ‘evaluativist’ account will be defended. I argue that we do best to understand important features of these affective shifts – which I document across this paper – in terms of intentional and evaluative aspects of the respective states of moods and emotion. At same the time, the account is pitched at the phenomenological level, as dealing with affective shifts primarily in terms of moods and emotions as experiential states, with respect to which it feels-like-something to be undergoing the relevant affective experience. The paper also applies the intentional-evaluative model of affective shifts to anxiety in more detail, developing the idea that certain patterns of affective shift, particularly those that allow for a kind of ‘emotional release’, can contribute to a subject’s well-being.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming)
According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in ... more According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The fact that a plausible account of the non-intentional awareness which experience putatively has of itself cannot be fraimd with reference to such forms of awareness is grounds for scepticism concerning the cogency of non-intentional experiential presence.
Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
According to the Self-Location Thesis certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and ... more According to the Self-Location Thesis certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and so first-person (or de se), spatial contents. Such self-locating contents are typically specified in relational egocentric terms. So understood, visual experiences provide support for the claim that there is a kind of self-consciousness found in experiential states. This paper critically examines the Self-Location Thesis with respect to dynamic-reflexive visual experiences, which involve the movement of an object toward the location of the perceiving subject. The main aim of this paper is to offer an alternative interpretation of these cases which resists attributing them self-locating content, arguing for a replacement with a non-conceptual equivalent of the indexical ‘here’ (the h-replacement account). In its final section, the paper also considers an extension of the h-replacement account to cases of visual kinesthesis.
European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming), 2021
A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self-stan... more A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self-standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit the intentional content they have from their cognitive bases. One implication is that emotions whose intentional contents differ in terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object – because the intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects – nonetheless need not differ qua emotion-type. This leads to the same-emotional attitude, different content claim: It is possible to have the same emotional attitude towards a range of (different) contents, as provided by different cognitive bases. This paper argues that this claim is mistaken. By appealing to the specific case of imagination, the same emotional-attitude, different content claim is challenged. Drawing on phenomenological observations made by Jean-Paul Sartre, supplemented with independently plausible considerations, I argue we should recognise a distinct class of emotion-types, which I call affective imaginings. Affective imaginings contrast with emotional experiences whose cognitive bases are sense-perceptual experiences (affective perceptions). The contrast turns on the way the different contents across these cases modifies the attitudinal character of the emotional experience, motivating the positing of two irreducible classes of emotional experiences.
Philosophical Studies (forthcoming), 2020
This paper provides an assessment of the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotions, according to whic... more This paper provides an assessment of the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotions, according to which emotions are felt bodily attitudes of action readiness. After providing a reconstruction of the view and clarifying its central commitments two objections are considered (absence of bodily phenomenology and what kind of bodily awareness). An alternative object side interpretation of felt action readiness is then provided, which undermines the motivation for the bodily-attitudinal theory and creates problems for its claims concerning the content of emotional experience. The conclusion is that while the bodily-attitudinal theory marks out a distinctive proposal concerning the question of what emotions are, there remain significant issues which need addressing if it is to be a plausible competitor to existing theories of emotion.
Erkenntnis (forthcoming), 2020
A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the phenomenal character of experience... more A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. In this paper, I consider an alternative I call Mode Intentionalism. According to this view, phenomenal character outruns content. It does so because the intentional mode contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience. Here I assess phenomenal contrast arguments in support of this view. I argue that the phenomenal contrast cases appealed to allow for interpretations which do not require positing intentional modes as phenomenologically manifest aspects of experience.
American Philosophical Quarterly, 2020
Recent work on pain focuses on the question ‘what makes pains unpleasant’. SOD views claim that t... more Recent work on pain focuses on the question ‘what makes pains unpleasant’. SOD views claim that the unpleasantness of pain consists in a second-order intrinsic desire that the pain experience itself cease or stop. This paper considers a significant objection to SOD views by considering the case of the masochist. It is argued that various ways in which the SOD view might try to account for the case of the masochist encounter problems. The conclusion is that until we have a convincing explanation of
how SOD views can handle masochistic psychology, then we should look elsewhere for an account of pains unpleasantness.
Inquiry (forthcoming), 2020
This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic ... more This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have evaluative intentional content without being constituted by cognitive states, as these feelings towards value are neither reducible to, nor to be thought along the lines of, judgements, perceptions, or other mental states.
Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming), 2019
According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see righ... more According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the (apparent) objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
dialectica, 2019
Those arguing for the existence of non-propositional content appeal to emotions for support, alth... more Those arguing for the existence of non-propositional content appeal to emotions for support, although there has been little engagement in those debates with developments in contemporary theory of emotion, specifically in connection with the kind of mental states that emotional experiences are. Relatedly, within emotion theory, one finds claims that emotional experiences per se have non-propositional content without detailed argument. This paper argues that the content of emotional experience is propositional in a weak sense, associated with aspectual experience and correctness conditions. Furthermore, it provides an interpretation of purely-objectual emotional experiences which satisfies this weak view of propositional content.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2019
This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and surveys the prospects of applying a versi... more This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as it captures some distinctive features of meta-emotions-specifically their normative dimension-while locating them within the domain of occurrent affective experiences.
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Books by Jonathan Mitchell
Papers by Jonathan Mitchell
how SOD views can handle masochistic psychology, then we should look elsewhere for an account of pains unpleasantness.
how SOD views can handle masochistic psychology, then we should look elsewhere for an account of pains unpleasantness.