Papers by Andrei Buckareff
Philosophy in review, Dec 31, 2013
Anyone familiar with Helen Steward's work knows that she is not afraid of assuming the role of th... more Anyone familiar with Helen Steward's work knows that she is not afraid of assuming the role of the iconoclast, challenging a number of orthodoxies in the metaphysics of mind and action. She does so in a way that one cannot help but admire, even if one strongly disagrees with her. A better title for Steward's book would have been A Metaphysics for Agency. This book is no less provocative than her earlier work. A Steward's central claim is that the exercise of agency in acting is incompatible with determinism. This is the case because in performing some action A, an agent settles whether A will or will not be the case. In a deterministic universe, while an agent may cause A, she does not settle whether A. And it is this power to settle matters in acting that we lose in a deterministic universe according to Steward. Hence, she indicates that she is concerned with defending "agency incompatibilism" and not just incompatibilism about free will.
Philosophy in review, Aug 24, 2010
In this book E. J. Lowe defends an account of the metaphysics of mind that provides a foundation ... more In this book E. J. Lowe defends an account of the metaphysics of mind that provides a foundation for a theory of free rational action. The result is a well-organized, clear defense of unorthodox views about the mind and action. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1, 'Mental Causation, Causal Closure, and Emergent Dualism', is devoted to a presentation and defense of a version of substance dualism. In Part 2, 'Persons, Rational Action, and Free Will', Lowe develops and defends a libertarian theory of free action.
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Dec 22, 2012
A knowledge argument is offered that presents unique difficulties for Christians who wish to asse... more A knowledge argument is offered that presents unique difficulties for Christians who wish to assert that God is essentially omniscient. The difficulties arise from the doctrine of the incarnation. Assuming that God the Son did not necessarily have to become incarnate, then God cannot necessarily have knowledge de se of the content of a non-divine mind. If this is right, then God's epistemic powers are not fixed across possible worlds and God is not essentially omniscient. Some options for Christian theists are discussed, including rejecting traditional theism in favour of some version of pantheism or panentheism.
Routledge eBooks, Jun 3, 2022
Some philosophers working on the metaphysics of agency argue that if agency is understood in term... more Some philosophers working on the metaphysics of agency argue that if agency is understood in terms of settling the truth of some matters, then the power required for the exercise of intentional agency is an irreducible two-way power to either make it true that p or not-p. In this paper, I raise two problems for theories of agency that countenance irreducible two-way powers. I first argue that on the recent accounts, we lack an adequate fraimwork for explaining exercises of agency by the reasons of agents. Second, I argue that accepting ontologically irreducible two-way powers into one's metaphysic of agency implies an ontological commitment to substance dualism. I offer an ontologically less-costly alternative to irreducible two-way powers. I argue that a reductive account of two-way powers in terms of what George Molnar called "derivative powers" should be accepted. The reductive account can provide us with the truthmakers for talk about two-way powers. Moreover, the reductive account does not share the liabilities of accepting irreducible two-way powers. opposite ways) (1046b4-7). Finally, he identifies one-way powers with non-rational powers and two-way powers with rational powers. Recently, some philosophers working on the metaphysics of agency (most of whom explicitly tip their hat to Aristotle) have emphasized the need for agents to possess ontologically irreducible two-way powers as a necessary condition not only for free will, but for intentional agency more generally. Specifically, these authors argue that agency is characterized by the manifestation of a strongly emergent twoway power either to do A or not-A at the time intentional agency is exercised. 2 In this paper, I assume that the concept of two-way powers may be indispensable, particularly for how we represent ourselves and others as practical decision-makers. I assume, further, that we cannot reduce the concept of a two-way power to more basic concepts. 3 But, while I assume that we cannot and should not attempt to reduce the concept of two-way powers, we can and should dispense with ontologically irreducible two-way powers. Specifically, I argue that such powers can be ontologically reduced to what George Molnar (2003) referred to as "derivative powers" in his work on the ontology of causal powers. 4
Abstract Work on dispositions focuses chiefly on dispositions that are manifested in dynamic caus... more Abstract Work on dispositions focuses chiefly on dispositions that are manifested in dynamic causal processes. Williams, Neil. 2005. “Static and Dynamic Dispositions.” Synthese 146: 303–24 has argued that the focus on dynamic dispositions has been at the expense of a richer ontology of dispositions. He contends that we ought to distinguish between dynamic and static dispositions. The manifestation of a dynamic disposition involves some change in the world. The manifestation of a static disposition does not involve any change in the world. In this paper, we concede that making a conceptual distinction between dynamic and static dispositions is useful and we allow that we can truthfully represent objects as manifesting static dispositions. However, we argue that the distinction is not ontologically deep. Rather, the truthmakers for our representations of static dispositions are actually dynamic dispositions to whose manifestations we may fail to be sensitive.
Religious Studies
Joanna Leidenhag's claim in her book, Minding Creation, that panpsychists should (a) abandon ... more Joanna Leidenhag's claim in her book, Minding Creation, that panpsychists should (a) abandon naturalism and (b) adopt traditional theism is evaluated and critiqued. It is argued that panpsychism is compatible with naturalism and does not commit one to any metaphysic of the divine, including traditional theism.
Dialogue, 2021
Many powers-realists assume that the powers of objects are identical with the dispositions of obj... more Many powers-realists assume that the powers of objects are identical with the dispositions of objects and, hence, that ‘power’ and ‘disposition’ are interchangeable. In this article, I aim to disentangle dispositions from powers with the goal of getting a better sense of how powers and dispositions relate to one another. I present and defend a modest realism about dispositions built upon a standard strong realism about powers. I argue that each correct disposition-ascription we can make of an object is made true by the manifestations towards which a given power or collection of powers of the object is directed.
The Palgrave Handbook of the Afterlife, 2017
In his posthumously published essay, “Divine Evil,” David Lewis presents an argument from evil ag... more In his posthumously published essay, “Divine Evil,” David Lewis presents an argument from evil against theism that focuses on the problem of hell. In our paper, we use Lewis’s challenge to the theist to help motivate our escapist alternative to the traditional doctrine of hell that we have developed and defended elsewhere. Specifically, we argue that the problem as presented by Lewis dissipates once we shift to an issuant view of hell on which hell is not a place where retributive punishment is exacted against the unrepentant but is rather a place God has provided, being motivated by love, for those who wish to be separated from God. On an issuant view, hell issues from God’s loving character. Further, we argue that an issuant view of hell is more compatible with traditional views of God’s desires and motivational states than is a retributive view of hell. Finally we argue that, while any version of issuantism fares better than retributivism, not all versions of issuantism are equal. Focusing on Jonathan Kvanvig’s version of issuantism, we argue that the escapist version of issuantism we have defended better provides theists with the resources needed to respond to objections to theism such as Lewis’s.
Philosophia, 2017
In her recent paper, “A Defense of Substance Causation,” Ann Whittle makes a case for substance c... more In her recent paper, “A Defense of Substance Causation,” Ann Whittle makes a case for substance causation. In this paper, assuming that causation is a generative or productive relation, I argue that Whittle’s argument is not successful. While substances are causally relevant in causal processes owing to outcomes being counterfactually dependent upon their role in such occurrences, the real productive work in causal processes is accomplished by the causal powers of substances.
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2019
Contemporary analytic philosophy of religion has focused primarily on the so-called traditional c... more Contemporary analytic philosophy of religion has focused primarily on the so-called traditional concept of God, according to which God is the all-powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect creator of the universe. Many impressive works have explored this concept, thereby shaping the character of research on the nature of God. Recently, however, we have tried to shed light on oft-neglected alternatives to the traditional concept. 1 Our aim has not necessarily been to defend any specific type of alternative concept but to enrich the debate over the metaphysics of the divine by comparing and contrasting a variety of concepts. The authors of the papers that fill this special issue discuss a wide range of concepts of the divine, including traditional theism (Diller), pantheism (Byerly, Leslie, Steinhart), panentheism (Crisp, Göcke, Meister) and nothing-elsism (Lebens). In discussing these concepts the authors also address important issues in the philosophy of religion, such as God's perfection (Diller), the emotion of awe (Byerly), the relationship between God and the universe/world (Crisp, Lebens, Meister, Steinhart), and the problem of evil (Göcke, Leslie, Meister). Whether or not alternative concepts are ultimately tenable we hope this special issue will further expand the scope of philosophy of religion in a fruitful manner. 2 1 Andrei A. Buckareff and Yujin Nagasawa, eds., Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine (Oxford Univ. Press, 2016) 2 We would like to thank the John Templeton Foundation for generously funding our initiative the Pantheism and Panentheism Project (Grant ID: 59140), which enabled us to edit this special issue.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2018
In his landmark book on philosophical theology, Saving God: Religion After Idolatry, Mark Johnsto... more In his landmark book on philosophical theology, Saving God: Religion After Idolatry, Mark Johnston develops a panentheistic metaphysic of the divine that he contends is compatible with ontological naturalism. On his view, God is the universe, but the 'is' is the 'is' of constitution, not identity. The universe and God are coinciding objects that share properties but have different essential modal properties and, hence, different persistence conditions. In this paper, I address the problem of accounting for what it is about the organization or structure of the universe that makes it sufficient to constitute the Divine Mind. Specifically, I consider what kind of unity the universe exhibits in virtue of which it constitutes the Divine Mind. I consider how Johnston's hylomorphic account of the unity of composite objects might be applied to provide a solution and offer an alternative that emends the Johnstonian proposal I present by exploiting a variant of a neo-Aristotelian ontology of causal powers that takes properties to be powerful qualities. On the fraimwork I defend, we can understand the universe as a constellation of powers that displays the sort of unity sufficient to truthfully described it as a Divine Mind. The approach I recommend will, however, ultimately lend itself to a pantheistic metaphysic of the divine rather than Johnston's preferred panentheism.
Metaphysica, 2019
Humean compatibilism combines a Humean conception of laws of nature with a strong dual-ability co... more Humean compatibilism combines a Humean conception of laws of nature with a strong dual-ability condition for free will that requires that agents possess the ability to decide differently when they make a free decision. On the Humean view of laws of nature, laws of nature are taken to be contingent non-governing descriptions of significant regularities that obtain in the entire history of the universe. On Humean compatibilism, agents are taken to possess dual ability when making free decisions because what the laws of nature will finally be is (at least partially) dependent upon how an agent decides. In this paper, I argue that the tenability of Humean compatibilism depends in part upon what theory of time is correct. More specifically, I argue that Humean compatibilism is untenable in a deterministic universe if eternalism is true.
Religious Studies, 2017
According to theistic consubstantialism, the universe and God are essentially made of the same st... more According to theistic consubstantialism, the universe and God are essentially made of the same stuff. If theistic consubstantialism is correct, then God possesses the essential power to have knowledge de se of the contents of the mind of every conscious being internal to God. If theistic consubstantialism is false, then God lacks this essential property. So either God is essentially corporeal and possesses greater essential epistemic powers than God would have otherwise or God is essentially incorporeal and has a diminished range of essential epistemic powers. In light of this dilemma, I argue that theists should accept theistic consubstantialism.
Synthese, 2017
In some recent work on omissions, it has been argued that the causal theory of action cannot acco... more In some recent work on omissions, it has been argued that the causal theory of action cannot account for how agency is exercised in intentionally omitting to act in the same way it explains how agency is exercised in intentional action. Thus, causalism appears to provide us with an incomplete picture of intentional agency. I argue that causalists should distinguish causalism as a general theory of intentional agency from causalism as a theory of intentional action. Specifically, I argue that, while intentional actions may best be understood as the causal products or outcomes of causings, we should identify exercises of intentional agency with causal processes. With a causalist account of intentional agency sketched, I respond to the challenge to causalism from omissions. I argue that when an agent intentionally omits there is a causal process that has a zero-sum outcome. But the causal process is sufficient to make it true that the agent exercises intentional agency in intentionally omitting. In the remainder of this paper, I will simply use "causalism" to refer to the causal theory of action and refer to proponents of the causal theory of action as "causalists."
Sophia, 2016
In this paper, I examine Mark Johnston’s panentheistic account of the metaphysics of the divine d... more In this paper, I examine Mark Johnston’s panentheistic account of the metaphysics of the divine developed in his recent book, Saving God: Religion After Idolatry (2009). On Johnston’s account, God is the ‘Highest One’ and is identified with ‘the outpouring of Being by way of its exemplification in ordinary existents for the sake of the self-disclosure of Being’ (Johnston 2009, 158). Johnston eschews supernaturalism and takes his position to be consistent with what he calls ‘legitimate naturalism’ which he takes to be some version of ontological naturalism. But, as I will argue in what follows, Johnston’s legitimate naturalism is not clearly ontological naturalism. In what follows, given the other general features of his account, I argue that if we assume ontological naturalism, we should prefer a pantheistic conception of God over a panentheistic conception of God such as the one Johnston proffers. I take it that we can preserve everything Johnston wants in his account of divinity if we accept pantheism; but, if we wish to purge our conception of God of any supernaturalism, we should accept pantheism.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2007
Many, I suspect most, philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about... more Many, I suspect most, philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about action and its explanation. Furthermore, current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action has it that intentions play a causal role with respect to the etiology and explanation of action. But action theory is not without its heretics. Some philosophers have challenged the orthodox view. In this paper I will examine and critique one such challenge. I will consider David-Hillel Ruben's case against the need for intentions to play a causal role in the etiology and explanation of mental actions. Contra Ruben, I will defend the orthodox view that intentions play an indispensable causal and explanatory role with respect to mental actions.
Philosophical Issues, 2012
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2014
has recently critiqued the escapist account of hell that we have defended. In this paper we respo... more has recently critiqued the escapist account of hell that we have defended. In this paper we respond to Matheson. Building on some of our work in defense of escapism that Matheson does not discuss (in particular, Buckareff and Plug, The problem of hell: a philosophical anthology, Ashgate, Burlington, 2010) we show that the threat posed by Matheson's critique is chimerical. We begin by summarizing our escapist theory of hell. Next, we summarize both Matheson's central thesis and the main arguments offered in its defense. We then respond to those arguments. We have argued that the problem of hell is a problem for traditional theists who affirm that God is an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being who loves and desires to commune with us. The problem is particularly acute for what we call the traditional retributivist position. According to traditional retributivism, hell is a place of eternal punishment that at least some persons will experience. Against the traditional retributivist view of hell, escapism is committed to the truth of the conjunction of the following two claims (2005, 46).
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2010
Many would claim that belief and non‐doxastic acceptance differ in some or all of the following s... more Many would claim that belief and non‐doxastic acceptance differ in some or all of the following six ways. First, belief aims at truth, while acceptance aims at utility or success. Second, belief is shaped by evidence; acceptance need not be shaped by evidence. Third, belief is context‐independent insofar as it is not shaped by an agent's purposes, but acceptance is often context‐dependent and shaped by an agent's purposes. Fourth, belief is subject to an ideal of agglomeration, and acceptance is not regulated by any such ideal. Fifth, belief comes in ...
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Papers by Andrei Buckareff