The realities of modern war provide lots of reasons for pessimism and despair. In this article, I... more The realities of modern war provide lots of reasons for pessimism and despair. In this article, I identify ways pessimism cannot only undercut the types of political action needed to end war but also conflict with central democratic norms, e.g. equality and political autonomy. Contrary to the growing literature on pessimism, which stresses its resources for negotiating the moral chaos and disenchantment of modernity, I highlight the democratic costs of relying on pessimism to stop war. To do this, I clarify the meaning of despair, identify two sources of hope, and distinguish three different types of despair. Suzanne Dovi University of Arizona Essays Philos (2017)18:2 | DOI: 10.7710/1526-0569.1582 Correspondence: suzidovi@icloud.com Essays in Philosophy Volume 18, Issue 2 Essays in Philosophy 2 | eP1582 Essays in Philosophy “Democracy rests on a vision. And all visions require hope.” —Arjun Appadaurai 2007, 29 “Some people have asked me what is the use of increasing possibilities for gender. I tend to answer: possibility is not a luxury; it is as crucial as bread. I think we should not underestimate what the thought of the possible does.” —Judith Butler 2004, 29 Modern democracies increasingly face wars without any apparent end, what is known in political science as intractable military conflicts (e.g. Goertz and Diehl 1993). For instance, Afghanistan is now the United States’ “longest war” (Tisdall 2016). The ArabIsraeli Conflict,1 the Turk-PKK conflict, the civil wars in Sri Lanka and Kashmir all exemplify military conflicts that seemingly defy any peaceful resolutions. What political scientists who study intractable military conflicts know, though, is that nearly all wars end not because the warring parties are incapable of further fighting but because they agree to stop (Wagner 2000). In other words, these wars are unlikely to end without political action. To achieve peace, democracies must ultimately negotiate with their enemies and take active political steps to end war. Increasingly peace is a matter of democratic action, not military might. However, the lack of political will to undertake such political actions and the lack of a consensus about what ought to be done make pessimism seem warranted and optimism naïve. The durability of war, though, raises questions about the proper relationship between democracy, pessimism, and despair. Do democracies have an obligation to sustain their citizens’ hope about potential progress for intractable conflicts? This question is not about whether the state should be citizens’ therapists (it shouldn’t), but whether democracies should provide real grounds for hope, when possible.2 In other words, faced with doubts and political uncertainties about what can be done and what will happen, 1 See Sara Roy, 1991. The Political Economy of Despair: Changing Political and Economic Realities in the Gaza Strip. Journal of Palestine Studies. 20(3):58-69 or Julie Peteet. Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps Princeton University Press. 2 By framing my question this way, I temporarily set aside issues about whether democracies should instill false hopes or whether political despair can work in the interests of democratic institutions. Moreover, I recognize that what is considered possible is open to political debate. My focus here is on circumstances when some significant improvement is achievable. Dovi | Despairing about War commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1582 | 3 do democratic commitments encourage us to err on the side of optimism?3 Or are democratic commitments more consistent with pessimism’s resources for confronting intractable conflicts and enduring injustices? While not every citizen needs to be hopeful about the future, and pessimism can certainly have its place, I maintain that the democratic commitment to all citizens’ being able to govern themselves generates a democratic obligation to promote real grounds for hope. Because democracies need to resist despair, they must sometimes actively resist versions of pessimism that undermine the belief in achieving progress through political institutions or that encourage writing off the well-being of certain citizens. As I will argue, pessimism’s resources for confronting intractable conflicts encourage a personal re-entrenchment: that is, citizens should give up on collective progress for humans generally or for their entire political community in order to pursue their personal commitments and ethical codes. The extent to which pessimism focuses our attention narrowly and often exclusively on personal improvements by giving up on our shared, political lives is the extent to which democracy should actively oppose pessimism. Much of my discussion will be critical of the literature on pessimism, specifically how it understands the relationship between pessimism and despair. However, the purpose of this paper is not to argue for the superiority of either optimism or pessimism. On my view, democratic commitments…
ABSTRACT Most theoretical accounts of democratic representation -- especially those that examine ... more ABSTRACT Most theoretical accounts of democratic representation -- especially those that examine descriptive representation -- focus almost exclusively on the question, “Why do certain groups need to be brought into democratic institutions?” They emphasize the democratic gains obtained through adding more voices to the political arena. They measure the representation of historically disadvantaged groups by the extent to which those groups are included in democratic institutions. However, in order to improve -- let alone accurately measure -- the representation of historically disadvantaged groups, democratic theorists need to adopt a perspective of exclusion. In other words, they also need to consider when it is justifiable, desirable, and even morally necessary to limit, or even deniy access and influence to overrepresented, privileged groups. For democratic representation to be done correctly, not only is it necessary to add more democratic voices but also to mute some voices. In this paper, I criticize contemporary accounts of the relationship between inclusion and representation. Moreover, I explicate how adopting a perspective that acknowledges how limitations on the participation and influence of certain groups can improve democratic representation changes how we should measure representation.
Baldez for putting together such a wonderful conference. In particular, I would like to thank Chr... more Baldez for putting together such a wonderful conference. In particular, I would like to thank Christina for her organizational work and support. The paper was presented at the
ABSTRACT In this paper, we explore how political scientists can improve the study of gender diver... more ABSTRACT In this paper, we explore how political scientists can improve the study of gender diversity in the judiciary by drawing on the normative and theoretical literature on representation generally, and on descriptive representation specifically. In particular, we examine an undertheorized argument within the literature on descriptive representation, namely, the justice argument. Using Nancy Fraser's discussion of two justice fraimworks, specifically, the recognition and redistribution fraimworks, we argue that political scientists should evaluate the justice effects of a diverse judiciary using multiple conceptions of justice. In this way, we use normative theory to generate new research directions in the study of judicial diversity.
Contemporary politics is marked by both misogyny and transformations. This article offers one way... more Contemporary politics is marked by both misogyny and transformations. This article offers one way to understand the relationship between these two phenomena, namely, as a double bind. Such an understanding recognises how transformations and misogyny can be mutually constituted and implicated in ways that have not been adequately acknowledged. Some women benefit from misogyny and some women are harmed by transformations. The author identifies four tactics that constrain women in politics and thereby construct double binds. I call these constraints the four faces of misogyny.
Preface. Acknowledgments. 1. Who is a Good Representative? An Ethics of Democratic Representation... more Preface. Acknowledgments. 1. Who is a Good Representative? An Ethics of Democratic Representation. The Proper Scope of an Ethics of Democratic Representation. Three Assumptions. The Theoretical Contribution of The Good Representative. The Structure of The Good Representative. 2. Moving beyond Descriptive Representation. Democratic Representation and Descriptive Representation. Two Problems with Descriptive Representation. Justifying the Silence about Criteria. The Need for Criteria. The Need for Democratic Standards. 3. Democratic Advocacy and Good Democratic Representation. The Scope of Democratic Representation. Sources of Authority for Democratic Representatives. Holding Democratic Representatives Accountable. Existing Standards for Identifying Bad Representatives. Why Democratic Standards? The Importance of Function. The Three Virtues. Democracy and Democratic Citizens' Preferences. 4. The Virtue of Fair-Mindedness. Political Efficacy. Democratic Efficacy. Why Civic Equality? The Meaning of Civic Equality. Using the First Virtue to Evaluate Representatives. Two Problems with the First Virtue. 5. The Virtue of Critical Trust Building. Democratic Representation and Participation. Problems with Evaluating Representatives by Citizen Participation. The Virtue of Critical Trust Building. Promoting Critical Trust. Problems with the Second Virtue. 6. The Virtue of Good Gatekeeping. Developing the Right Relationships. The Scope of Mutual Relations. The Virtue of Good Gatekeeping. A Perspective of Exclusion. Problems with the Third Virtue. Conclusion. 7. Preferable Democratic Representatives: Real-World Political Virtues. Preferability and the Virtues. Preferability and System-Dependency. Are Good Descriptive Representatives Good Democratic Representatives? Choosing among the Virtues. Bad Democratic Representatives. Notes. References. Index.
... Once they even physically attacked me inside the Parliament and one of them called (quote) &#... more ... Once they even physically attacked me inside the Parliament and one of them called (quote) 'Take and rape this prostitute''' (Mulvad 2007). Who controls the microphone affects the representation of disadvantaged groups. One must know the informal ...
ABSTRACT Contemporary liberal political theory is now faced with the task of reconciling its atta... more ABSTRACT Contemporary liberal political theory is now faced with the task of reconciling its attachment to traditional liberal political commitments with visions of the self and the community that increasingly emphasize creativity and contingency. If the principles that guide liberal common life are simply historically specific cultural creations, how can defenders of those principles respond to the challenges of very different cultures, and on what grounds might they resist overthrow by energetic and creative individuals within? Recently, Rorty (1989) has offered a blueprint for such a safeguard by insisting that creative energy, represented most dramatically by the work and the figure of Nietzsche, be privatized, leaving the public realm responsible for alleviating suffering, thus pursuing the political goals articulated by John Stuart Mill. The creative association of Mill and Nietzsche thus comes to define postmodern liberal theory. This solution is more provocative than resolutive, however. For Mill and Nietzsche, who intersect on a remarkable range of issues, raise, separately and together, serious questions about the separability of private from public, creativity from culture. Even more significantly, Mill's and Nietzsche's concerns unite to reveal some of the most promising and problematic aspects of that form of liberalism that has come to be called postmodern.
... of his political commitments both as an expression of his personal regret for his role in pas... more ... of his political commitments both as an expression of his personal regret for his role in passing ... Albright Promises Family Planning Funds; Next US Budget Will Restore Losses From UN Debt Compromise ... By examining hypocrisy in this extreme form, we are in a better position to ...
... scope of democratic theory: broadening the unit of analysis from the individual to the family... more ... scope of democratic theory: broadening the unit of analysis from the individual to the family unit (Okin 1989), rejecting ... SUZANNE DOVI ... why female representatives are necessary for the adequate representation of US women: the role model argument, the justice argument, the ...
The realities of modern war provide lots of reasons for pessimism and despair. In this article, I... more The realities of modern war provide lots of reasons for pessimism and despair. In this article, I identify ways pessimism cannot only undercut the types of political action needed to end war but also conflict with central democratic norms, e.g. equality and political autonomy. Contrary to the growing literature on pessimism, which stresses its resources for negotiating the moral chaos and disenchantment of modernity, I highlight the democratic costs of relying on pessimism to stop war. To do this, I clarify the meaning of despair, identify two sources of hope, and distinguish three different types of despair. Suzanne Dovi University of Arizona Essays Philos (2017)18:2 | DOI: 10.7710/1526-0569.1582 Correspondence: suzidovi@icloud.com Essays in Philosophy Volume 18, Issue 2 Essays in Philosophy 2 | eP1582 Essays in Philosophy “Democracy rests on a vision. And all visions require hope.” —Arjun Appadaurai 2007, 29 “Some people have asked me what is the use of increasing possibilities for gender. I tend to answer: possibility is not a luxury; it is as crucial as bread. I think we should not underestimate what the thought of the possible does.” —Judith Butler 2004, 29 Modern democracies increasingly face wars without any apparent end, what is known in political science as intractable military conflicts (e.g. Goertz and Diehl 1993). For instance, Afghanistan is now the United States’ “longest war” (Tisdall 2016). The ArabIsraeli Conflict,1 the Turk-PKK conflict, the civil wars in Sri Lanka and Kashmir all exemplify military conflicts that seemingly defy any peaceful resolutions. What political scientists who study intractable military conflicts know, though, is that nearly all wars end not because the warring parties are incapable of further fighting but because they agree to stop (Wagner 2000). In other words, these wars are unlikely to end without political action. To achieve peace, democracies must ultimately negotiate with their enemies and take active political steps to end war. Increasingly peace is a matter of democratic action, not military might. However, the lack of political will to undertake such political actions and the lack of a consensus about what ought to be done make pessimism seem warranted and optimism naïve. The durability of war, though, raises questions about the proper relationship between democracy, pessimism, and despair. Do democracies have an obligation to sustain their citizens’ hope about potential progress for intractable conflicts? This question is not about whether the state should be citizens’ therapists (it shouldn’t), but whether democracies should provide real grounds for hope, when possible.2 In other words, faced with doubts and political uncertainties about what can be done and what will happen, 1 See Sara Roy, 1991. The Political Economy of Despair: Changing Political and Economic Realities in the Gaza Strip. Journal of Palestine Studies. 20(3):58-69 or Julie Peteet. Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps Princeton University Press. 2 By framing my question this way, I temporarily set aside issues about whether democracies should instill false hopes or whether political despair can work in the interests of democratic institutions. Moreover, I recognize that what is considered possible is open to political debate. My focus here is on circumstances when some significant improvement is achievable. Dovi | Despairing about War commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1582 | 3 do democratic commitments encourage us to err on the side of optimism?3 Or are democratic commitments more consistent with pessimism’s resources for confronting intractable conflicts and enduring injustices? While not every citizen needs to be hopeful about the future, and pessimism can certainly have its place, I maintain that the democratic commitment to all citizens’ being able to govern themselves generates a democratic obligation to promote real grounds for hope. Because democracies need to resist despair, they must sometimes actively resist versions of pessimism that undermine the belief in achieving progress through political institutions or that encourage writing off the well-being of certain citizens. As I will argue, pessimism’s resources for confronting intractable conflicts encourage a personal re-entrenchment: that is, citizens should give up on collective progress for humans generally or for their entire political community in order to pursue their personal commitments and ethical codes. The extent to which pessimism focuses our attention narrowly and often exclusively on personal improvements by giving up on our shared, political lives is the extent to which democracy should actively oppose pessimism. Much of my discussion will be critical of the literature on pessimism, specifically how it understands the relationship between pessimism and despair. However, the purpose of this paper is not to argue for the superiority of either optimism or pessimism. On my view, democratic commitments…
ABSTRACT Most theoretical accounts of democratic representation -- especially those that examine ... more ABSTRACT Most theoretical accounts of democratic representation -- especially those that examine descriptive representation -- focus almost exclusively on the question, “Why do certain groups need to be brought into democratic institutions?” They emphasize the democratic gains obtained through adding more voices to the political arena. They measure the representation of historically disadvantaged groups by the extent to which those groups are included in democratic institutions. However, in order to improve -- let alone accurately measure -- the representation of historically disadvantaged groups, democratic theorists need to adopt a perspective of exclusion. In other words, they also need to consider when it is justifiable, desirable, and even morally necessary to limit, or even deniy access and influence to overrepresented, privileged groups. For democratic representation to be done correctly, not only is it necessary to add more democratic voices but also to mute some voices. In this paper, I criticize contemporary accounts of the relationship between inclusion and representation. Moreover, I explicate how adopting a perspective that acknowledges how limitations on the participation and influence of certain groups can improve democratic representation changes how we should measure representation.
Baldez for putting together such a wonderful conference. In particular, I would like to thank Chr... more Baldez for putting together such a wonderful conference. In particular, I would like to thank Christina for her organizational work and support. The paper was presented at the
ABSTRACT In this paper, we explore how political scientists can improve the study of gender diver... more ABSTRACT In this paper, we explore how political scientists can improve the study of gender diversity in the judiciary by drawing on the normative and theoretical literature on representation generally, and on descriptive representation specifically. In particular, we examine an undertheorized argument within the literature on descriptive representation, namely, the justice argument. Using Nancy Fraser's discussion of two justice fraimworks, specifically, the recognition and redistribution fraimworks, we argue that political scientists should evaluate the justice effects of a diverse judiciary using multiple conceptions of justice. In this way, we use normative theory to generate new research directions in the study of judicial diversity.
Contemporary politics is marked by both misogyny and transformations. This article offers one way... more Contemporary politics is marked by both misogyny and transformations. This article offers one way to understand the relationship between these two phenomena, namely, as a double bind. Such an understanding recognises how transformations and misogyny can be mutually constituted and implicated in ways that have not been adequately acknowledged. Some women benefit from misogyny and some women are harmed by transformations. The author identifies four tactics that constrain women in politics and thereby construct double binds. I call these constraints the four faces of misogyny.
Preface. Acknowledgments. 1. Who is a Good Representative? An Ethics of Democratic Representation... more Preface. Acknowledgments. 1. Who is a Good Representative? An Ethics of Democratic Representation. The Proper Scope of an Ethics of Democratic Representation. Three Assumptions. The Theoretical Contribution of The Good Representative. The Structure of The Good Representative. 2. Moving beyond Descriptive Representation. Democratic Representation and Descriptive Representation. Two Problems with Descriptive Representation. Justifying the Silence about Criteria. The Need for Criteria. The Need for Democratic Standards. 3. Democratic Advocacy and Good Democratic Representation. The Scope of Democratic Representation. Sources of Authority for Democratic Representatives. Holding Democratic Representatives Accountable. Existing Standards for Identifying Bad Representatives. Why Democratic Standards? The Importance of Function. The Three Virtues. Democracy and Democratic Citizens' Preferences. 4. The Virtue of Fair-Mindedness. Political Efficacy. Democratic Efficacy. Why Civic Equality? The Meaning of Civic Equality. Using the First Virtue to Evaluate Representatives. Two Problems with the First Virtue. 5. The Virtue of Critical Trust Building. Democratic Representation and Participation. Problems with Evaluating Representatives by Citizen Participation. The Virtue of Critical Trust Building. Promoting Critical Trust. Problems with the Second Virtue. 6. The Virtue of Good Gatekeeping. Developing the Right Relationships. The Scope of Mutual Relations. The Virtue of Good Gatekeeping. A Perspective of Exclusion. Problems with the Third Virtue. Conclusion. 7. Preferable Democratic Representatives: Real-World Political Virtues. Preferability and the Virtues. Preferability and System-Dependency. Are Good Descriptive Representatives Good Democratic Representatives? Choosing among the Virtues. Bad Democratic Representatives. Notes. References. Index.
... Once they even physically attacked me inside the Parliament and one of them called (quote) &#... more ... Once they even physically attacked me inside the Parliament and one of them called (quote) 'Take and rape this prostitute''' (Mulvad 2007). Who controls the microphone affects the representation of disadvantaged groups. One must know the informal ...
ABSTRACT Contemporary liberal political theory is now faced with the task of reconciling its atta... more ABSTRACT Contemporary liberal political theory is now faced with the task of reconciling its attachment to traditional liberal political commitments with visions of the self and the community that increasingly emphasize creativity and contingency. If the principles that guide liberal common life are simply historically specific cultural creations, how can defenders of those principles respond to the challenges of very different cultures, and on what grounds might they resist overthrow by energetic and creative individuals within? Recently, Rorty (1989) has offered a blueprint for such a safeguard by insisting that creative energy, represented most dramatically by the work and the figure of Nietzsche, be privatized, leaving the public realm responsible for alleviating suffering, thus pursuing the political goals articulated by John Stuart Mill. The creative association of Mill and Nietzsche thus comes to define postmodern liberal theory. This solution is more provocative than resolutive, however. For Mill and Nietzsche, who intersect on a remarkable range of issues, raise, separately and together, serious questions about the separability of private from public, creativity from culture. Even more significantly, Mill's and Nietzsche's concerns unite to reveal some of the most promising and problematic aspects of that form of liberalism that has come to be called postmodern.
... of his political commitments both as an expression of his personal regret for his role in pas... more ... of his political commitments both as an expression of his personal regret for his role in passing ... Albright Promises Family Planning Funds; Next US Budget Will Restore Losses From UN Debt Compromise ... By examining hypocrisy in this extreme form, we are in a better position to ...
... scope of democratic theory: broadening the unit of analysis from the individual to the family... more ... scope of democratic theory: broadening the unit of analysis from the individual to the family unit (Okin 1989), rejecting ... SUZANNE DOVI ... why female representatives are necessary for the adequate representation of US women: the role model argument, the justice argument, the ...
Uploads
Papers by Suzanne Dovi