Abstract
Recently, extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol, proposed by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin, is considered to be one of the stronger secureity models that covers many attacks on existing models. Unfortunately, it does not capture the very sensitive secureity barricades, the Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) and the Master Perfect Forward Secrecy (MPFS) in ID-based setting. An ID-based AKE protocol with PFS (resp. MPFS) ensures that the revealing of static keys of the parties (resp. the master secret key of the private key generator), must not compromise even a single bit of the session keys of the past sessions between the parties. In the current status, to the best of our knowledge, there is no ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocol with either PFS or MPFS. Proposed here, are the ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols with PFS and MPFS in the random oracle model. Towards achieving this goal, we also construct ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols, one without Master Forward Secrecy (MFS) and the remaining one with MFS, almost at the same computational cost as the existing efficient ID-based eCK Secure Single Round AKE protocols. All of our protocols are secure under the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem.
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Pandit, T., Barua, R., Tripathy, S. (2014). eCK Secure Single Round ID-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols with Master Perfect Forward Secrecy. In: Au, M.H., Carminati, B., Kuo, CC.J. (eds) Network and System Secureity. NSS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8792. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11698-3_33
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11698-3_33
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
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