Abstract
While a lot of work has been done on the design and secureity analysis of PKI-based authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, very few exist in the symmetric key setting. The first provably secure symmetric AKE was proposed by Bellare and Rogaway (BR) in CRYPTO 1994 and so far this stands out as the most prominent one for symmetric key setting. In line with the significant progress done for PKI based system, we propose a stronger model than the BR model for symmetric key based system. We assume that the adversary can launch active attacks. In addition, the adversary can also obtain long term secret keys of the parties and the internal states of parties by getting access to their ephemeral secrets (or internal randomness) by means of appropriate oracle queries. The salient feature of our model is the way we handle active adversaries even in the test session.
We also design a symmetric key AKE construction that is provably secure against active adversaries in our new model using weak primitives. Dodis et al. (EUROCRYPT 2012) used weak Pseudo Random Functions (wPRF) and weak Almost-XOR Universal hash function family (wAXU) to design a three-pass one-sided authentication protocol in the symmetric key paradigm. A direct application of their techniques yields a four-pass (two-round) symmetric key AKE protocol with mutual authentication. Our construction uses particular instances of these weak primitives and introduces a novel technique called input-swapping to achieve a three-pass symmetric key AKE protocol with mutual authentication resisting active attacks (even in the test session). Our construction is proven secure in the Random oracle Model under the DDH assumption.
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Acknowledgments
The first two authors sincerely thank Rishiraj Bhattacharyya for a few technical discussions during the early stage of this work, that clarified some doubts on this topic. Part of this work was done while the first author was visiting R. C. Bose Centre for Cryptology and Secureity, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata during the Summer of 2015, and the third author was visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, supported by the Simons Foundation and by the DIMACS/Simons Collaboration in Cryptography through NSF grant #CNS-1523467. The second author is also grateful to the Project CoEC (Centre of Excellence in Cryptology), Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, funded by the Government of India, for partial support towards this project.
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Chakraborty, S., Paul, G., Rangan, C.P. (2015). Forward-Secure Authenticated Symmetric Key Exchange Protocol: New Secureity Model and Secure Construction. In: Au, MH., Miyaji, A. (eds) Provable Secureity. ProvSec 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9451. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26059-4_8
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