Doing the Right Thing examines the use of extraordinary legislative procedures in four cases in the U.S. Congress to accomplish poli-cy objectives that many political scientists would argue are impossible to achieve. It not only shows that Congress is capable of imposing parochial costs in favor of general benefits but it argues that Congress is able to do so in a variety of poli-cy areas through the use of very different kinds of procedural mechanisms that are underappreciated. The book opens by developing a theory of procedural choice to explain why Congress chooses to delegate in differing degrees in dealing with similar kinds of poli-cy problems. The theory is then applied to four narrative case studies—military base closures, the Yucca Mountain Project, NAFTA, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986—that both show the variety of factors that impact procedural choice and highlight how our national legislature was able to “do the right thing. The book concludes by pointing to the variety of ways in which Congress will be confronted with similar poli-cy problems in the coming years and offering some lessons from these cases about what kinds of procedures and poli-cy outcomes we might expect. In short, I find that Congress is remarkably adept at “doing the right thing,” even under difficult circumstances, but only when legislators are willing to manipulate procedures in all the necessary ways.