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Dirk Franken

University of Fribourg, Departement of Philosophy, Fellow

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I'm a post doc in Philosophy. Currently, I'm at the University of Heidelberg. My main research areas are: metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language
Address: Leckgadumstraße 4, 59494 Soest

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Papers by Dirk Franken

The Argument from Pain: A New Argument for Indirect Realism

Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2016

The author puts forward and defends a new argument for indirect realism called the argument from ... more The author puts forward and defends a new argument for indirect realism called the argument from pain. The argument is akin to a well-known traditional argument to the same end, the argument from hallucination. Like the latter, it contains one premise stating an analogy between veridical perceptions and certain other states and one premise stating that those states are states of acquaintance with sense-data. The crucial difference is that the states that are said to be analogous to veridical perceptions are pain-states instead of hallucinations. This difference makes the argument from pain immune to the standard objections against the argument from hallucination.

Was sich aus dem Privatsprachenargument lernen lässt: Eine indirekte Verteidigung der Sinnesdatentheorie

Was sich aus dem Privatsprachenargument lernen lässt: Eine indirekte Verteidigung der Sinnesdaten... more Was sich aus dem Privatsprachenargument lernen lässt: Eine indirekte Verteidigung der Sinnesdatentheorie. Eine Annahme die von Gegnern und Befürwortern der Sinnesdatentheorie geteilt wird ist, dass Wittgensteins Privatsprachenargument ein Argument gegen diese Theorie ist. Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es zu zeigen, dass (i) die genannte Annahme falsch ist und (ii) diese Tatsache nicht etwa gegen das Privatsprachenargument sondern für die Sinnesdatentheorie spricht. Zunächst werde ich, beruhend auf Wittgensteins Überlegungen zu ostensiven Definitionen, (Abschnitt 1.) diejenige Lesart des Privatsprachenargumentes vorstellen die ich für die stärkste halte. (Abschnitt 2.) Anschließend werde ich skizzieren, wie Wittgenstein, aufgrund einer unausgesprochenen Voraussetzung-die ich die Cartesianismus-Voraussetzung nennen werde-von der richtigen Konklusion des Privatsprachenargumentes zur unhaltbaren These des Expressivismus gelangt. (Abschnitt 3.) Nach einem kurzen Exkurs zum Status der Cartesianismus-Voraussetzung in der Philosophie des Geistes (Abschnitt 4.) werde ich schließlich zu zeigen versuchen, dass allein die Sinnesdatentheorie eine Möglichkeit bereitstellt, dem Expressivsimus zu entgehen ohne die Konklusion des Privatsprachenargumentes aufgeben zu müssen. (Abschnitt 5.) Und noch eine allgemeine Bemerkung: Es ging mir in diesem Aufsatz in erster Linie darum, Zusammenhänge und Verbindungen aufzuzeigen, deren bestehen nicht offensichtlich und möglicherweise sogar überraschend ist. Dadurch war es mir an vielen Stellen nicht möglich, so genau und ausführlich zu sein, wie es für eine wirklich zwingende Argumentation nötig gewesen wäre. Auch an diesen Stellen sollte zumindest erkennbar sein, ob es sich um eine hoffnungsvolle Argumentation handelt oder nicht. 1. Die Möglichkeit ostensiver Definitionen. Die Lesart des Privatsprachenargumentes die ich im nächsten Abschnitt vorstellen möchte, lässt sich am besten vor dem Hintergrund von Wittgensteins Diskussion ostensiver Definitionen verstehen. Ostensive Definitionen sind Definitionen in denen die Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks durch den direkten Verweis auf ein Musters eingeführt wird. Beginnen wir mit einem möglichen Beispiel einer gelungenen ostensiven Definition. Die Bedeutung des Farb-Wortes "Sepia" könnte ungefähr so eingeführt worden sein: Eine Person die den entsprechenden institutionellen Status besaß, zeigte auf folgendes Farbmuster: und äußerte "Dies sei Sepia". Was sind nun die Voraussetzungen dafür, dass eine solche Definition gelingt? Eine unbestrittene Voraussetzung ist, dass der Definierende unvermittelten, sinnlichen epistemischen Zugang zu dem Muster der Definition haben muss. Typischerweise nimmt der Definierende das Muster visuell wahr. Das ist jedoch nicht notwendig. Er könnte es auch fühlen, schmecken usw. Um einen allgemeinen Ausdruck zu haben, werde ich im Folgenden von erfahrungs-artigem epistemischem Zugang sprechen. 1 Damit können wir eine erste Voraussetzung für das Gelingen ostensiver Definitionen formulieren: Vorraussetzung des epistemischen Kontaktes: Der Definierende muss erfahrungsartigen epistemischen Zugang zum Muster der Definition haben. Wittgenstein zeigt jedoch, dass diese Voraussetzung nicht hinreichend ist. Als Ausgangspunkt seiner Argumentation hierfür lässt sich das folgende Prinzip auffassen: Das Prinzip der normativen Kraft der Definition: Eine "Zeremonie" 2 ist nur dann eine gelungene Definition eines Zeichens, wenn sie für alle Gelegenheiten bei denen das Zeichen gebraucht werden kann festlegt, was als sein richtiger Gebrauch gilt. 3 Das Problem auf das Wittgenstein hinweist lässt sich nun so formulieren: Das Erfüllt sein der Voraussetzung des epistemischen Kontaktes ist nicht hinreichend, um dem Prinzip der 1 Mit dieser Ausdrucksweise versuche ich eventuellen Streitigkeiten über den Erfahrungsbegriff aus dem Weg zu gehen. Innere Wahrnehmung beispielsweise sollte man vielleicht nicht als Erfahrung bezeichnen. Sie sind (wären) aber sicher erfahrungs-artig. 2 Der Ausdruck "Zeremonie" ist natürlich in Anlehnung an Wittgensteins Formulierung in dem berühmten Paragraph 258 gewählt: "Aber ich spreche, oder schreibe das Zeichen, und dabei konzentriere ich meine Aufmerksamkeit auf die Empfindung-zeige also gleichsam im Innern auf sie.-Aber wozu diese Zeremonie? Denn nur ein solche scheint es zu sein! [Hervorhebung; D.F.]" (Wittgenstein (1984), Philosophische Untersuchungen, Frankfurt a.M. (Werkausgabe Band 8) (Im Folgenden zitiert als "PU"), § 258) 3 Gegen dieses Prinzip könnte eventuell jemand einwenden, dass es doch auch vage Begriffe gibt, für die gerade nicht für jede Gelegenheit festliegt, was ihr richtiger Gebrauch ist. Dieser Einwand beruht allerdings auf der unnötig starken Annahme, dass der Gebrauch eines vagen Begriffes in Grenzfällen kein richtiger Gebrauch ist. Im Übrigen hängt der Erfolg der folgenden Argumentation nicht davon ob, dass das Prinzip so stark ist, wie es oben formuliert ist.

Against Foundationalism about Persistence-Conditions

In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-condition... more In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions.The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object’s physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments – the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions – which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards a more adequate understanding of what it means for an object to have certain persistence-conditions. I will expound this understanding and suggest, on its basis, an unorthodox, hylomorphist account of the persistence-conditions of objects.

Ontologie der Sprache

Die Ontologie der Sprache ist eine sogenannte ›Bereichsontologie‹. In einer Bereichsontologie geh... more Die Ontologie der Sprache ist eine sogenannte ›Bereichsontologie‹. In einer Bereichsontologie geht es um ontologische Fragen in Bezug auf einen bestimmten Bereich von Gegenstanden. Gemas einem naheliegenden Ansatz, dem dieses Kapitel zunachst folgt, ist die Leitfrage einer Bereichsontologie die Frage nach dem ontologischen Status der Gegenstande des zu behandelnden Gegenstandsbereichs, die Frage also, welcher grundlegenden Kategorie des Seienden die Gegenstande des fraglichen Bereichs angehoren.

Reflexivität und Konstitution

Freie Subjekte in der Welt der Physik

Correction to: Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and Introspection

Acta Analytica

On Good and Bad Reasons for Endorsing Mereological Hylemorphism

Dominika Czakon, Natalia Anna Michna and Leszek Sosnowski (eds.), Roman Ingarden and Our Times, Cracow: Księgarnia Akademicka (publishing house)., 2021

Hylemorphism is the view that an object's essence is-at least in part-determined by what is calle... more Hylemorphism is the view that an object's essence is-at least in part-determined by what is called the object's form. According to the mereological version of hylemorphism, an object's form is also a proper part of the object alongside its physical parts. Whether there are good reasons for this assumption depends not least on the background assumptions about forms and their role in the composition of objects. In the case of contemporary mereological hylemorphists, this background is provided by what I call vertical hylemorphism. I shall first argue that, as long as vertical hylemorphism is accepted, there are no good reasons for endorsing mereologism. Then, I shall point out that there is an attractive, alternative version of hylemorphism-horizontal hylemorphism-which provides good reasons to be endorse mereologism. 1. Vertical Hylemorphism and Mereologism Hylemorphism regarding composite physical objects is the view that such objects are kinds of compounds of matter and form. This meager characterization gives rise to a number of questions, and regarding most of these questions there is disagreement among those endorsing hylemorphism. A particularly important question is: What kinds of things are forms? There are two main camps. So-called power-based hylemorphists say that forms are powers or dispositions, and so-called principle-based hylemorphists say that forms are akin to principles or concepts. My focus in this paper will be on versions of hylemorphism of the principle-based kind. (For this reason, I shall henceforth drop the qualification 'principle-based'.) Even among principle-based hylemorphists there is much disagreement. These disagreements, however, are nested in a common picture about the role of forms and their relation to matter. The core of this picture are two principles which I call Formal Essentialism and Formal Unificatinalism.

Against Modal Dualism

European Journal of Philosophy, 16 Aug. 2021, Early View, doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12701.

Modal dualism is the claim that there is a space of epistemically possible worlds that exceeds th... more Modal dualism is the claim that there is a space of epistemically possible worlds that exceeds the space of metaphysically possible worlds. In the present paper, I argue that modal dualism is false. I do so via an argument that differs from most previous arguments against modal dualism in that it does not rely on controversial semantic or epistemological assumptions like descriptivism, internalism or modal rationalism. The point of my argument is, instead, that modal dualism is internally inconsistent because it is the result of the failure to draw the proper conclusions from the abandonment of these semantic and epistemological assumptions. The relevant inconsistency manifests itself in the modal dualist notion of epistemic modality. For this notion to play the explanatory roles assigned to it by modal dualists, it has to be a notion of a genuinely epistemic kind of modality. But the only way to make sense of such a notion is via just those semantic or epistemological assumptions that the modal dualist is keen to avoid. Anyone willing to abandon these assumptions has to go further and detach the epistemic from the modal altogether.

Problems with Searle’s Account of Intrinsic Intentionality

Thinking About the Real World, 2010

The Apriorists Return

Pragmatic Naturalism, 2013

Subjectivity as the Mark of the Mental

Thinking About the Real World, 2010

Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and Introspection

Perceptual disjunctivism, as I regard it in this paper, is the view that veridical perceptions an... more Perceptual disjunctivism, as I regard it in this paper, is the view that veridical perceptions and hallucinations, while indistinguishable via introspection, are states of fundamentally different kinds. This fundamental difference can be spelled out in various ways. According to the view I will be concerned with (structural disjunctivism, as I shall call it), it is a fundamental difference in the personal-level structure of both states. Against this version of disjunctivism I will raise a new challenge. It is a variant of what can be seen as the standard challenge against disjunctivism: how to do justice to the indistinguishability of (corresponding) veridical perceptions and hallucinations. It differs, however, from common versions of this challenge in where it locates the potential incompatibility of disjunctivism with the relevant fact of indistinguishability. Commonly, it is the disjunctivist assumption of a fundamental difference between both kinds of states which is regarded as incompatible with the indistinguishability of these states. In contrast, I will suggest that (i) if hallucinations and veridical perceptions differed in the way proposed by structural disjunctivism, this difference would induce a corresponding difference in the psychological processes of their introspection and that (ii) the assumption of such a difference in the manner of introspection is most likely incompatible with a properly formulated indistinguishability claim.

Descriptivism Without Quotation

Current descriptivist accounts of proper names entail two claims: (i) that the expressions we kno... more Current descriptivist accounts of proper names entail two claims: (i) that the expressions we know as different proper names are the bearers of different meanings and (ii) that the descriptions corresponding to these meanings contain quotations of the expressions whose meanings they are taken to be. While (ii) is the source of a number of intractable problems, descriptivists feel committed to it because it is the only available option to adhere to (i), which they use to take as a matter of course. In the present paper I will bring up for discussion a, to my knowledge, new descriptivist account, inter-nominal descriptivism, which avoids the commitment to (ii) by rejecting (i). According to this account, all tokens of the expressions known as different proper names express the same descriptive mode of presentation and this descriptive mode of presentation is akin to the character of an indexical. I will try to show that, contrary to first appearance, this idea can be developed in a consistent and plausible manner.

Drafts by Dirk Franken

Deconstructing the Grounding Problem via the Construction of Pluralism

The grounding problem is typically assumed to provide the most serious threat for pluralism, the ... more The grounding problem is typically assumed to provide the most serious threat for pluralism, the view that two distinct objects can coincide permanently. In basic outline, the grounding problem is this. For it to be justified that two permanently coinciding objects are distinct, these objects must differ in some of their properties. However, all properties that pluralists suggest for this role (sorts, identity conditions, modal properties…) seem to be grounded in more fundamental properties; and it is hard to see how objects could differ with respect to the relevant more fundamental properties if they consist of the same matter throughout their existence (i.e. coincide permanently). Instead of adding a further reply to this problem, I want to critically discuss the problem itself. I will argue that the grounding problem can claim legitimacy and seriousness for itself only as long as it is directed to what I call intuition-based pluralism: a kind of pluralism that rests on little more than spontaneous intuitions about possible cases. Having shown this, I will demonstrate that there are other, theory-based, versions of pluralism, and that the grounding problem lacks legitimacy and seriousness once it is posed against these latter versions of pluralism.

On Tahko on Lowe on Essence

In his paper Possibility Precedes Actuality Tuomas Tahko makes the attractive proposal that essen... more In his paper Possibility Precedes Actuality Tuomas Tahko makes the attractive proposal that essences should be understood in terms identity and existence conditions. I first offer a reconstruction of this proposal in light of Lowe's notorious claim that essences are not entities. Proceeding from this, I then bring up several problems with the notion of identity conditions. I conclude that Tahko's idea would fare better without this notion.

Existence and Persistence: On the Double Role of Aristotelian Forms

Hylemorphism is the view that objects are-in some sense-compounds of matter and form. Principle-b... more Hylemorphism is the view that objects are-in some sense-compounds of matter and form. Principle-based hylemorphism is the view that forms are principles of unity. In this paper I want to rise a challenge to contemporary versions of principle-based hylemorphism. The challenge emerges from two assumptions that are commonly acknowledged by principle-based hylemorphists. First, each object has, associated with its sort, certain persistence conditions. Second, for an object to be of a particular sort is for it to have a particular (kind of) form. It follows that there is an intimate relationship between an object's form and its persistence conditions. The challenge for the principle-based hylemorphist is to provide a satisfactory explanation of this relationship. What it needs to answer this challenge depends in part on what persistence conditions are. According to a common understanding, persistence conditions are something like conditions of temporal composition. If this understanding were correct, the standard principle-based hylemorphist could meet the challenge quite easily. I argue, however, that this understanding is not correct. Persistence conditions are not conditions of temporal composition, but conditions of staying in existence. It turns out that, with this understanding in place, standard versions of principle-based hylemorphism are incapable of explaining persistence conditions. However, instead of rejecting principle-based hylemorphism, I suggest a modification that allows to give the required explanation. We should distinguish between two layers of forms: a principle of existence and a principle of persistence. While the former is associated with the object's existence conditions, the latter provides the object with its persistence conditions.

Sortal Essentialism and What It Is to Have Persistence Conditions

There is widespread agreement among essentialists that it is part of an object’s essence to have ... more There is widespread agreement among essentialists that it is part of an object’s essence to have specific persistence conditions. If that is true, it is impossible to understand what an object’s essence is without understanding what it is for an object to have specific persistence conditions. However, even though the answer to this question is far from obvious, it is barely discussed in the essentialist literature. The present paper attempts to (partially) close this gap. I argue that the answer to which most essentialists are committed is false. This answer rests upon the idea that persistence conditions are akin to conditions of temporal composition. It is a consequence of this idea that that for an object to have specific persistence conditions means for it to exist (partly) in virtue of the fulfillment of these conditions. Accordingly, I call this answer the existence-account. As part of my argument against the existence-account, I present what I take to be the correct answer to the question at issue: an object’s persistence conditions are the conditions of the object’s staying in existence, which is why, for an object to have specific persistence conditions, is for it to be such that these conditions are ‘in force.’ For reasons that will become apparent, I call this the persistence-account.

What Is For Me in For-Meness

Recently, the idea that a certain for-meness is part and parcel of all phenomenal consciousness h... more Recently, the idea that a certain for-meness is part and parcel of all phenomenal consciousness has gained a considerable number of adherents. While the answers to the question, what this for-meness is, vary significantly, they all start from the following presupposition: For-meness is a kind of internal self-awareness, that is, what is for-me in for-meness is the subject and its experience. Call this the subject-approach on for-meness. In the present paper I put this approach into question. For one thing, I argue that it is incompatible with the-properly understood-transparency of experiences. For another, I suggest an alternative approach on for-meness: The object-approach. According to the object-approach on for-meness, what is for-me in for-meness is not the subject or the experience, but the immediate objects of the experience.

The Unity of Modal Space

Modal monism, as I understand it, is the view that, if there are conceptually possible worlds, th... more Modal monism, as I understand it, is the view that, if there are conceptually possible worlds, the set of all conceptually possible worlds is the same as that of all metaphysically possible worlds. The relative low popularity of this view seems to have its ground in the fact that the most prominent arguments in its favor rest on controversial semantic or epistemological assumptions. Against this, I will provide an argument that defends modal monism on its own ground, the ground of modal metaphysics. In defending this argument, I will trace back modal monism to a fundamental aspect of the nature of possible world: their being possible truthmakers. Correspondingly, I will argue that modal dualists – the opponents of modal monism – face a dilemma. Depending on their preferred account of concepts, they can, either, make no sense of the notion of a conceptually possible world at all or they can do so only at the price of this notion collapsing into that of conceptual modality.

Transparency and the Structure of Consciousness

In the recent philosophy of mind and perception the phenomenon of transparency of appearing (as I... more In the recent philosophy of mind and perception the phenomenon of transparency of appearing (as I shall call it) has attracted much attention. The debate about this phenomenon revolves mainly around the following questions: Is there such a phenomenon as the transparency of appearing at all? Given there is, how is it correctly characterized? What are the conclusions to be drawn from the occurrence of this phenomenon? Since I am dissatisfied with the answers commonly given to these questions, I will address them anew in this paper. After a short introduction (section 1) I will take a stand regarding the first and the second question (section 2). I will put forward what I take to be the correct characterization of the phenomenon of transparency and I will defend the assumption that states of appearing are indeed transparent in the sense given by this characterization. In addition to this, I will critically examine some alternative characterizations of the phenomenon of transparency. In section 3, then, I will offer a partial answer to the third question. I will set forth in some detail what I take to be the implications of the transparency of appearing regarding the nature of the phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing (the peculiar talk of states of appearing will be introduced in the course of the paper). The outcome will be that accounts that are usually taken to be supported by the transparency of appearing are in fact incompatible with it while at least one account that is often taken to be incompatible with the transparency of appearing is in fact compatible with it.

The Argument from Pain: A New Argument for Indirect Realism

Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2016

The author puts forward and defends a new argument for indirect realism called the argument from ... more The author puts forward and defends a new argument for indirect realism called the argument from pain. The argument is akin to a well-known traditional argument to the same end, the argument from hallucination. Like the latter, it contains one premise stating an analogy between veridical perceptions and certain other states and one premise stating that those states are states of acquaintance with sense-data. The crucial difference is that the states that are said to be analogous to veridical perceptions are pain-states instead of hallucinations. This difference makes the argument from pain immune to the standard objections against the argument from hallucination.

Was sich aus dem Privatsprachenargument lernen lässt: Eine indirekte Verteidigung der Sinnesdatentheorie

Was sich aus dem Privatsprachenargument lernen lässt: Eine indirekte Verteidigung der Sinnesdaten... more Was sich aus dem Privatsprachenargument lernen lässt: Eine indirekte Verteidigung der Sinnesdatentheorie. Eine Annahme die von Gegnern und Befürwortern der Sinnesdatentheorie geteilt wird ist, dass Wittgensteins Privatsprachenargument ein Argument gegen diese Theorie ist. Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es zu zeigen, dass (i) die genannte Annahme falsch ist und (ii) diese Tatsache nicht etwa gegen das Privatsprachenargument sondern für die Sinnesdatentheorie spricht. Zunächst werde ich, beruhend auf Wittgensteins Überlegungen zu ostensiven Definitionen, (Abschnitt 1.) diejenige Lesart des Privatsprachenargumentes vorstellen die ich für die stärkste halte. (Abschnitt 2.) Anschließend werde ich skizzieren, wie Wittgenstein, aufgrund einer unausgesprochenen Voraussetzung-die ich die Cartesianismus-Voraussetzung nennen werde-von der richtigen Konklusion des Privatsprachenargumentes zur unhaltbaren These des Expressivismus gelangt. (Abschnitt 3.) Nach einem kurzen Exkurs zum Status der Cartesianismus-Voraussetzung in der Philosophie des Geistes (Abschnitt 4.) werde ich schließlich zu zeigen versuchen, dass allein die Sinnesdatentheorie eine Möglichkeit bereitstellt, dem Expressivsimus zu entgehen ohne die Konklusion des Privatsprachenargumentes aufgeben zu müssen. (Abschnitt 5.) Und noch eine allgemeine Bemerkung: Es ging mir in diesem Aufsatz in erster Linie darum, Zusammenhänge und Verbindungen aufzuzeigen, deren bestehen nicht offensichtlich und möglicherweise sogar überraschend ist. Dadurch war es mir an vielen Stellen nicht möglich, so genau und ausführlich zu sein, wie es für eine wirklich zwingende Argumentation nötig gewesen wäre. Auch an diesen Stellen sollte zumindest erkennbar sein, ob es sich um eine hoffnungsvolle Argumentation handelt oder nicht. 1. Die Möglichkeit ostensiver Definitionen. Die Lesart des Privatsprachenargumentes die ich im nächsten Abschnitt vorstellen möchte, lässt sich am besten vor dem Hintergrund von Wittgensteins Diskussion ostensiver Definitionen verstehen. Ostensive Definitionen sind Definitionen in denen die Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks durch den direkten Verweis auf ein Musters eingeführt wird. Beginnen wir mit einem möglichen Beispiel einer gelungenen ostensiven Definition. Die Bedeutung des Farb-Wortes "Sepia" könnte ungefähr so eingeführt worden sein: Eine Person die den entsprechenden institutionellen Status besaß, zeigte auf folgendes Farbmuster: und äußerte "Dies sei Sepia". Was sind nun die Voraussetzungen dafür, dass eine solche Definition gelingt? Eine unbestrittene Voraussetzung ist, dass der Definierende unvermittelten, sinnlichen epistemischen Zugang zu dem Muster der Definition haben muss. Typischerweise nimmt der Definierende das Muster visuell wahr. Das ist jedoch nicht notwendig. Er könnte es auch fühlen, schmecken usw. Um einen allgemeinen Ausdruck zu haben, werde ich im Folgenden von erfahrungs-artigem epistemischem Zugang sprechen. 1 Damit können wir eine erste Voraussetzung für das Gelingen ostensiver Definitionen formulieren: Vorraussetzung des epistemischen Kontaktes: Der Definierende muss erfahrungsartigen epistemischen Zugang zum Muster der Definition haben. Wittgenstein zeigt jedoch, dass diese Voraussetzung nicht hinreichend ist. Als Ausgangspunkt seiner Argumentation hierfür lässt sich das folgende Prinzip auffassen: Das Prinzip der normativen Kraft der Definition: Eine "Zeremonie" 2 ist nur dann eine gelungene Definition eines Zeichens, wenn sie für alle Gelegenheiten bei denen das Zeichen gebraucht werden kann festlegt, was als sein richtiger Gebrauch gilt. 3 Das Problem auf das Wittgenstein hinweist lässt sich nun so formulieren: Das Erfüllt sein der Voraussetzung des epistemischen Kontaktes ist nicht hinreichend, um dem Prinzip der 1 Mit dieser Ausdrucksweise versuche ich eventuellen Streitigkeiten über den Erfahrungsbegriff aus dem Weg zu gehen. Innere Wahrnehmung beispielsweise sollte man vielleicht nicht als Erfahrung bezeichnen. Sie sind (wären) aber sicher erfahrungs-artig. 2 Der Ausdruck "Zeremonie" ist natürlich in Anlehnung an Wittgensteins Formulierung in dem berühmten Paragraph 258 gewählt: "Aber ich spreche, oder schreibe das Zeichen, und dabei konzentriere ich meine Aufmerksamkeit auf die Empfindung-zeige also gleichsam im Innern auf sie.-Aber wozu diese Zeremonie? Denn nur ein solche scheint es zu sein! [Hervorhebung; D.F.]" (Wittgenstein (1984), Philosophische Untersuchungen, Frankfurt a.M. (Werkausgabe Band 8) (Im Folgenden zitiert als "PU"), § 258) 3 Gegen dieses Prinzip könnte eventuell jemand einwenden, dass es doch auch vage Begriffe gibt, für die gerade nicht für jede Gelegenheit festliegt, was ihr richtiger Gebrauch ist. Dieser Einwand beruht allerdings auf der unnötig starken Annahme, dass der Gebrauch eines vagen Begriffes in Grenzfällen kein richtiger Gebrauch ist. Im Übrigen hängt der Erfolg der folgenden Argumentation nicht davon ob, dass das Prinzip so stark ist, wie es oben formuliert ist.

Against Foundationalism about Persistence-Conditions

In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-condition... more In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions.The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object’s physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments – the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions – which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards a more adequate understanding of what it means for an object to have certain persistence-conditions. I will expound this understanding and suggest, on its basis, an unorthodox, hylomorphist account of the persistence-conditions of objects.

Ontologie der Sprache

Die Ontologie der Sprache ist eine sogenannte ›Bereichsontologie‹. In einer Bereichsontologie geh... more Die Ontologie der Sprache ist eine sogenannte ›Bereichsontologie‹. In einer Bereichsontologie geht es um ontologische Fragen in Bezug auf einen bestimmten Bereich von Gegenstanden. Gemas einem naheliegenden Ansatz, dem dieses Kapitel zunachst folgt, ist die Leitfrage einer Bereichsontologie die Frage nach dem ontologischen Status der Gegenstande des zu behandelnden Gegenstandsbereichs, die Frage also, welcher grundlegenden Kategorie des Seienden die Gegenstande des fraglichen Bereichs angehoren.

Reflexivität und Konstitution

Freie Subjekte in der Welt der Physik

Correction to: Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and Introspection

Acta Analytica

On Good and Bad Reasons for Endorsing Mereological Hylemorphism

Dominika Czakon, Natalia Anna Michna and Leszek Sosnowski (eds.), Roman Ingarden and Our Times, Cracow: Księgarnia Akademicka (publishing house)., 2021

Hylemorphism is the view that an object's essence is-at least in part-determined by what is calle... more Hylemorphism is the view that an object's essence is-at least in part-determined by what is called the object's form. According to the mereological version of hylemorphism, an object's form is also a proper part of the object alongside its physical parts. Whether there are good reasons for this assumption depends not least on the background assumptions about forms and their role in the composition of objects. In the case of contemporary mereological hylemorphists, this background is provided by what I call vertical hylemorphism. I shall first argue that, as long as vertical hylemorphism is accepted, there are no good reasons for endorsing mereologism. Then, I shall point out that there is an attractive, alternative version of hylemorphism-horizontal hylemorphism-which provides good reasons to be endorse mereologism. 1. Vertical Hylemorphism and Mereologism Hylemorphism regarding composite physical objects is the view that such objects are kinds of compounds of matter and form. This meager characterization gives rise to a number of questions, and regarding most of these questions there is disagreement among those endorsing hylemorphism. A particularly important question is: What kinds of things are forms? There are two main camps. So-called power-based hylemorphists say that forms are powers or dispositions, and so-called principle-based hylemorphists say that forms are akin to principles or concepts. My focus in this paper will be on versions of hylemorphism of the principle-based kind. (For this reason, I shall henceforth drop the qualification 'principle-based'.) Even among principle-based hylemorphists there is much disagreement. These disagreements, however, are nested in a common picture about the role of forms and their relation to matter. The core of this picture are two principles which I call Formal Essentialism and Formal Unificatinalism.

Against Modal Dualism

European Journal of Philosophy, 16 Aug. 2021, Early View, doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12701.

Modal dualism is the claim that there is a space of epistemically possible worlds that exceeds th... more Modal dualism is the claim that there is a space of epistemically possible worlds that exceeds the space of metaphysically possible worlds. In the present paper, I argue that modal dualism is false. I do so via an argument that differs from most previous arguments against modal dualism in that it does not rely on controversial semantic or epistemological assumptions like descriptivism, internalism or modal rationalism. The point of my argument is, instead, that modal dualism is internally inconsistent because it is the result of the failure to draw the proper conclusions from the abandonment of these semantic and epistemological assumptions. The relevant inconsistency manifests itself in the modal dualist notion of epistemic modality. For this notion to play the explanatory roles assigned to it by modal dualists, it has to be a notion of a genuinely epistemic kind of modality. But the only way to make sense of such a notion is via just those semantic or epistemological assumptions that the modal dualist is keen to avoid. Anyone willing to abandon these assumptions has to go further and detach the epistemic from the modal altogether.

Problems with Searle’s Account of Intrinsic Intentionality

Thinking About the Real World, 2010

The Apriorists Return

Pragmatic Naturalism, 2013

Subjectivity as the Mark of the Mental

Thinking About the Real World, 2010

Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and Introspection

Perceptual disjunctivism, as I regard it in this paper, is the view that veridical perceptions an... more Perceptual disjunctivism, as I regard it in this paper, is the view that veridical perceptions and hallucinations, while indistinguishable via introspection, are states of fundamentally different kinds. This fundamental difference can be spelled out in various ways. According to the view I will be concerned with (structural disjunctivism, as I shall call it), it is a fundamental difference in the personal-level structure of both states. Against this version of disjunctivism I will raise a new challenge. It is a variant of what can be seen as the standard challenge against disjunctivism: how to do justice to the indistinguishability of (corresponding) veridical perceptions and hallucinations. It differs, however, from common versions of this challenge in where it locates the potential incompatibility of disjunctivism with the relevant fact of indistinguishability. Commonly, it is the disjunctivist assumption of a fundamental difference between both kinds of states which is regarded as incompatible with the indistinguishability of these states. In contrast, I will suggest that (i) if hallucinations and veridical perceptions differed in the way proposed by structural disjunctivism, this difference would induce a corresponding difference in the psychological processes of their introspection and that (ii) the assumption of such a difference in the manner of introspection is most likely incompatible with a properly formulated indistinguishability claim.

Descriptivism Without Quotation

Current descriptivist accounts of proper names entail two claims: (i) that the expressions we kno... more Current descriptivist accounts of proper names entail two claims: (i) that the expressions we know as different proper names are the bearers of different meanings and (ii) that the descriptions corresponding to these meanings contain quotations of the expressions whose meanings they are taken to be. While (ii) is the source of a number of intractable problems, descriptivists feel committed to it because it is the only available option to adhere to (i), which they use to take as a matter of course. In the present paper I will bring up for discussion a, to my knowledge, new descriptivist account, inter-nominal descriptivism, which avoids the commitment to (ii) by rejecting (i). According to this account, all tokens of the expressions known as different proper names express the same descriptive mode of presentation and this descriptive mode of presentation is akin to the character of an indexical. I will try to show that, contrary to first appearance, this idea can be developed in a consistent and plausible manner.

Deconstructing the Grounding Problem via the Construction of Pluralism

The grounding problem is typically assumed to provide the most serious threat for pluralism, the ... more The grounding problem is typically assumed to provide the most serious threat for pluralism, the view that two distinct objects can coincide permanently. In basic outline, the grounding problem is this. For it to be justified that two permanently coinciding objects are distinct, these objects must differ in some of their properties. However, all properties that pluralists suggest for this role (sorts, identity conditions, modal properties…) seem to be grounded in more fundamental properties; and it is hard to see how objects could differ with respect to the relevant more fundamental properties if they consist of the same matter throughout their existence (i.e. coincide permanently). Instead of adding a further reply to this problem, I want to critically discuss the problem itself. I will argue that the grounding problem can claim legitimacy and seriousness for itself only as long as it is directed to what I call intuition-based pluralism: a kind of pluralism that rests on little more than spontaneous intuitions about possible cases. Having shown this, I will demonstrate that there are other, theory-based, versions of pluralism, and that the grounding problem lacks legitimacy and seriousness once it is posed against these latter versions of pluralism.

On Tahko on Lowe on Essence

In his paper Possibility Precedes Actuality Tuomas Tahko makes the attractive proposal that essen... more In his paper Possibility Precedes Actuality Tuomas Tahko makes the attractive proposal that essences should be understood in terms identity and existence conditions. I first offer a reconstruction of this proposal in light of Lowe's notorious claim that essences are not entities. Proceeding from this, I then bring up several problems with the notion of identity conditions. I conclude that Tahko's idea would fare better without this notion.

Existence and Persistence: On the Double Role of Aristotelian Forms

Hylemorphism is the view that objects are-in some sense-compounds of matter and form. Principle-b... more Hylemorphism is the view that objects are-in some sense-compounds of matter and form. Principle-based hylemorphism is the view that forms are principles of unity. In this paper I want to rise a challenge to contemporary versions of principle-based hylemorphism. The challenge emerges from two assumptions that are commonly acknowledged by principle-based hylemorphists. First, each object has, associated with its sort, certain persistence conditions. Second, for an object to be of a particular sort is for it to have a particular (kind of) form. It follows that there is an intimate relationship between an object's form and its persistence conditions. The challenge for the principle-based hylemorphist is to provide a satisfactory explanation of this relationship. What it needs to answer this challenge depends in part on what persistence conditions are. According to a common understanding, persistence conditions are something like conditions of temporal composition. If this understanding were correct, the standard principle-based hylemorphist could meet the challenge quite easily. I argue, however, that this understanding is not correct. Persistence conditions are not conditions of temporal composition, but conditions of staying in existence. It turns out that, with this understanding in place, standard versions of principle-based hylemorphism are incapable of explaining persistence conditions. However, instead of rejecting principle-based hylemorphism, I suggest a modification that allows to give the required explanation. We should distinguish between two layers of forms: a principle of existence and a principle of persistence. While the former is associated with the object's existence conditions, the latter provides the object with its persistence conditions.

Sortal Essentialism and What It Is to Have Persistence Conditions

There is widespread agreement among essentialists that it is part of an object’s essence to have ... more There is widespread agreement among essentialists that it is part of an object’s essence to have specific persistence conditions. If that is true, it is impossible to understand what an object’s essence is without understanding what it is for an object to have specific persistence conditions. However, even though the answer to this question is far from obvious, it is barely discussed in the essentialist literature. The present paper attempts to (partially) close this gap. I argue that the answer to which most essentialists are committed is false. This answer rests upon the idea that persistence conditions are akin to conditions of temporal composition. It is a consequence of this idea that that for an object to have specific persistence conditions means for it to exist (partly) in virtue of the fulfillment of these conditions. Accordingly, I call this answer the existence-account. As part of my argument against the existence-account, I present what I take to be the correct answer to the question at issue: an object’s persistence conditions are the conditions of the object’s staying in existence, which is why, for an object to have specific persistence conditions, is for it to be such that these conditions are ‘in force.’ For reasons that will become apparent, I call this the persistence-account.

What Is For Me in For-Meness

Recently, the idea that a certain for-meness is part and parcel of all phenomenal consciousness h... more Recently, the idea that a certain for-meness is part and parcel of all phenomenal consciousness has gained a considerable number of adherents. While the answers to the question, what this for-meness is, vary significantly, they all start from the following presupposition: For-meness is a kind of internal self-awareness, that is, what is for-me in for-meness is the subject and its experience. Call this the subject-approach on for-meness. In the present paper I put this approach into question. For one thing, I argue that it is incompatible with the-properly understood-transparency of experiences. For another, I suggest an alternative approach on for-meness: The object-approach. According to the object-approach on for-meness, what is for-me in for-meness is not the subject or the experience, but the immediate objects of the experience.

The Unity of Modal Space

Modal monism, as I understand it, is the view that, if there are conceptually possible worlds, th... more Modal monism, as I understand it, is the view that, if there are conceptually possible worlds, the set of all conceptually possible worlds is the same as that of all metaphysically possible worlds. The relative low popularity of this view seems to have its ground in the fact that the most prominent arguments in its favor rest on controversial semantic or epistemological assumptions. Against this, I will provide an argument that defends modal monism on its own ground, the ground of modal metaphysics. In defending this argument, I will trace back modal monism to a fundamental aspect of the nature of possible world: their being possible truthmakers. Correspondingly, I will argue that modal dualists – the opponents of modal monism – face a dilemma. Depending on their preferred account of concepts, they can, either, make no sense of the notion of a conceptually possible world at all or they can do so only at the price of this notion collapsing into that of conceptual modality.

Transparency and the Structure of Consciousness

In the recent philosophy of mind and perception the phenomenon of transparency of appearing (as I... more In the recent philosophy of mind and perception the phenomenon of transparency of appearing (as I shall call it) has attracted much attention. The debate about this phenomenon revolves mainly around the following questions: Is there such a phenomenon as the transparency of appearing at all? Given there is, how is it correctly characterized? What are the conclusions to be drawn from the occurrence of this phenomenon? Since I am dissatisfied with the answers commonly given to these questions, I will address them anew in this paper. After a short introduction (section 1) I will take a stand regarding the first and the second question (section 2). I will put forward what I take to be the correct characterization of the phenomenon of transparency and I will defend the assumption that states of appearing are indeed transparent in the sense given by this characterization. In addition to this, I will critically examine some alternative characterizations of the phenomenon of transparency. In section 3, then, I will offer a partial answer to the third question. I will set forth in some detail what I take to be the implications of the transparency of appearing regarding the nature of the phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing (the peculiar talk of states of appearing will be introduced in the course of the paper). The outcome will be that accounts that are usually taken to be supported by the transparency of appearing are in fact incompatible with it while at least one account that is often taken to be incompatible with the transparency of appearing is in fact compatible with it.

John R. Searle: Thinking about the Real World

Das Wesen des Erscheinens: Eine Untersuchung über phänomenales Bewusstsein und die Intentionalität der Erfahrung

Karl Alber Verlag, 2015

Wann immer wir etwas sehen, hören, fühlen oder riechen, erscheint uns etwas. Was aber bedeutet es... more Wann immer wir etwas sehen, hören, fühlen oder riechen, erscheint
uns etwas. Was aber bedeutet es, dass jemandem etwas erscheint?
Was ist der mentale Zustand, in dem sich jemand befindet, wenn
ihm etwas erscheint (der Zustand des Erscheinens)? Diese nur scheinbar harmlose Frage steht im Zentrum der vorliegenden Untersuchung.
Die Antwort, die verteidigt wird, lautet: Zustände des Erscheinens
sind ihrem Wesen nach transparent. D.h. in einem Zustand des Erscheinens sind dem Subjekt dieses Zustandes ausschließlich die Gegenstände dieser Zustände präsent, niemals aber das Subjekt oder der
Zustand selbst (zumindest nicht als solche). Diese Antwort widerspricht einigen in der Philosophie des Geistes tief verwurzelten Auffassungen. Eine davon ist die Auffassung, das phänomenale Bewusstsein von Zuständen des Erscheinens bestünde in irgendeiner
unmittelbaren Bekanntschaft mit eben diesen Zuständen. In Wahrheit, so wird argumentiert, hat das fragliche Bewusstsein eine auf
die Welt gerichtete Struktur. Es ist nichts anderes als das Präsent-Sein
von Gegenständen in Zuständen des Erscheinens.
Dieses Ergebnis hat bedeutende Konsequenzen. Es stellt insbesondere
die klassische Taxonomie mentaler Zustände in Frage. Einerseits lässt
sich die Unterscheidung von intentionalen und phänomenalen Eigenschaften nicht aufrechterhalten. Denn das phänomenale Bewusstsein
von Zuständen des Erscheinens ist eine Art der Intentionalität. Andererseits lässt sich die Einheit des Merkmals der Intentionalität nicht
aufrechterhalten. Denn die Intentionalität von Zuständen des Erscheinens ist von grundsätzlich anderer Art als die Intentionalität
propositionaler Einstellungen. Es wird daher vorgeschlagen, nicht
weiter zwischen intentionalen und phänomenalen Zuständen zu unterscheiden, sondern zwischen verschiedenen Arten intentionaler
Zustände.

Das Wesen des Erscheinens: Eine Untersuchung über phänomenales Bewusstsein und die Intentionalität der Erfahrung (a revised and shortened version is published by Karl Alber in 2015 under the same title.)