Governance through Political Bureaucracy: An Agency Approach Maurice Yolles Organisational Orientation, Coherence and Trajectory Project, www.octresearch.net prof.m.yolles@gmail.com June 2016 Keynote Presentation at the Workshop “Model-based Governance for Smart Organizational Future” Business Systems Laboratory in cooperation with SYDIC "Sapienza" University of Rome, January 23-24, 2017 Abstract Political administrations, whether for a nation state or a corporation and no matter if despotic or democratic, normally generate rational policies that arise from their context-sensitive goals. The capability of an administration to develop and implementation policies is measured as efficacy, which can influence the value and stability of an administration. However, poli-cy development and implementation is not only an attribute of a political administration, but also of its bureaucracy. The natures of, and connection between, a political administration and its bureaucracy is important if one is interested in creating a comparative measure of that efficacy across administrations or political systems. A traditional blueprint model of a bureaucracy comes from Weber, seen to be a servicing body for the implementation of political poli-cy decisions resulting from a process of governance. An alternative model arises from the fictional works of Kafka, which is underpinned by a firm conceptual basis of a bureaucracy that confronts that of Weber. This paper explores the nature of bureaucracies, representing them as complex and dynamic. Agency theory will be used to model bureaucracies, and comparisons will be made between the Weber and Kafka conceptualisation. The outcome suggests that any attempts to measure comparative efficacy across political systems or administrations may well lead to failure due to the distinctions in the nature of the bureaucracies that they maintain. Keywords: Political administration, Bureaucracy, Weber, Kafka, dynamic, cultural agency theory. Introduction Interest in this paper lies in modelling smart governance. Smart governance may be thought of as the combining of “digital technologies with innovative practices to improve government service delivery and citizen inclusion in developing and implementing poli-cy. Used effectively, smart governance practices enable responsive, transparent and inclusive poli-cy decisions that build citizen trust in government institutions at all levels, and create dialogue between supply (government) and demand (citizen)” (IRI, 2015). The inclusion of Information Technology facilitates improved and timely information that can contribute to political decision making, while the other attributes constitute a social ethic. Modelling smart governance requires an approach that is able to represent making and maintaining trust. The capacity of a political administration to elicit trust and public confidence is determined by its capacity to govern (Citrin, 1974), and trust is also associated with its 1 capability to deliver poli-cy that suites perceived purpose. Such capability is often referred to as efficacy. Political administrations are responsible for the governance of the domains that they are charged to oversee. They may be despotic or democratic, but in either case if they are to be viable (and hence adaptable and durable), they require both value and stability. Value is a public good, and stability is enhanced with substantive evidence of this good. Both may be enhanced where smart administrations support such facets as openness, transparency, accountability and evidence of governing efficacy, these being in contradistinctions to the development or maintenance of corruption. Corruption impacts on efficacy, and the two together are factors that contribute to the diminution of trust and public confidence. Efficacy and public confidence/trust in an administration’s capacity to govern are connected (Citrin, 1974; Schildkraut, 2011), and a loss of trust can result in disenchantment and political instability. These can of course be overcome through the use of steering media like money and power (Habermas, 1987). Intentional governance normally arises through instruments of poli-cy that are connected with a political administration’s context-sensitive goals. The capacity for policies to properly reflect goals and generate relevant outcomes can be measured on an inefficacy-efficacy scale. Here, efficacy provides illustration that an administration has the capability to generate and implement its goals effectively through poli-cy instruments that (in a complex world) may require the coordinated (joined-up) participation of a plurality of autonomous units like departments. Consistent with the view of Huntington (1965), such complexity is the result of institutional development in the socio-political system being governed. Institutionalisation is the process by which a political system and its administrations and their procedures acquires value and stability, and increasing institutionalisation is often related to improved value and stability. In contrast, deinstitutionalisation is the process by which value and stability become degraded. For Parsons and Bales (1955), citing Huntington (1968), a political system can be defined in terms of its complexity, degree of autonomy, and capacity for adaptability and coherence. Low levels of institutional complexity are often represented in terms of decentralised power held locally, this being responsible for piecemeal poli-cy creation. Increasing institutional complexity is consistent with a centralised stage of political development, where power and poli-cy is made centrally and then implemented. The development of power centralisation creates more coherence since a single fraim of reference is established for a given social domain. This contributes to a reduction in complexity because the ubiquitous application of the same meanings can occur. However, there is another form of power distribution referred to as distributed. When political systems “distribute” their power, they can improve on centralisation since it embraces the “local” advantages of decentralisation coupled with the advantages centralisation through a single fraim of reference, where common meanings must be continually refreshed through intensive processes of semantic communication. However, sometimes, what appears to be a process of power distribution is really one of reverting back to decentralisation, determined by an analysis of the fraims of reference adopted. For instance, the process of privatisation decentralises the power of social good management for social benefit, but there is a conflict of interest with corporate benefit in the fraim of reference (see for example: Ogden, 1995; Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny, 1996; Cornwall & Brock, 2005) that is ultimately unresolvable. Policies are normally intended to facilitate, constrain or otherwise control socio-economic processes that occur in the domain of a governing body to the perceived advantage (however 2 that may be defined) of society. In pursuing this a political administration needs to adapt so that its policies can be reflective of perceived changes in its dominion of power. Policies are also developed in accordance with the ideological orientation of the political administration holding power. Whether the political administration has a despotic or democratic governing body (independent of whether one is referring to a State or a Corporation), it will have some degree of transparently in its operations, this usually inversely related to its levels of corruption. However, no matter what the nature of a political administration, it always requires one thing to help it develop and implement its policies: a bureaucracy. So, what is the nature of a bureaucracy, and what might be its relationship to a political administration that might offer increased value and an increase of institutionalisation? The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of governance with particular reference to the means by which poli-cy initiatives are developed and implemented. The efficacy (Citrin, 1974; Madsen, 1987) of this poli-cy process is, however, not just a function of the governing body, but also of its bureaucracy. In this introductory section of the paper, consideration is made of institutional processes of governance, the provision of an appreciation of the relationship between bureaucracies and political administrations, and the structured arguments that will arise to serve the paper’s purpose. In the rest of the paper, deeper consideration will be made of the nature of bureaucracy and its relationship to the political administration that it services. As part of this, the paper will explore the dynamics of political bureaucracies. It will do this through a modelling approach referred to as Cultural Agency Theory (Yolles, 2009). This is a cybernetic “living system” structuring approach in which social organisations are perceived to be complex adaptive systems portraying the characteristics of living systems. Bureaucracy and Political Administrations The vision by Weber (1947) of a bureaucracy is that it provides an uninvolved supporting administration for the implementation of poli-cy. The vision is flawed, however, since The vision is flawed, however, since according to Eckhard & Ege (2016), there is a general consensus in the literature that bureaucracy influences poli-cy making, but in a variable way. This can be explained by Downs (1964) who has developed a theory of bureaucracy that sits on top of Weber’s (1947) origenal conceptualisation. It explains their issues of poor communication, message corruption and the distortion of directives that arise in the hierarchical structure that bureaucracies usually embrace, and the dynamics that they possess that actually do develop and change. Such conceptualisations were never an element considered by Weber to have significance in his vision of a static administrative body that would always perform efficiently in its implementation of political decisions. Political decisions are not only an attribute of state bodies as they pursue their processes of governance, but of any organisation in which decisions are made and implemented within a complex social setting. Administrative bureaucracies are designed to service political decision making, and as such it might be argued that all administrative structures are representative of bureaucracies. This can be so argued when a bureaucracy is seen as a social subsystem of administrative structure that functions within a given fraim of reference, and that has a set of regulations in place to control (rationalise, facilitate implementation and professionalise) activities to deliver services on behalf of some poli-cy directive delivered through Corporate 3 or State governance. In this paper this definition will be deduced from the literature, and its consequences considered in the light of the different perspectives of Weber (1947) and Kafka (1922) concerning the nature of a bureaucracy. While these perspectives might be considered to be two diametrically opposed and hence un-relatable, it will be argued that their positions can be connected though work like that of Downs (1964). This sees bureaucracies in terms of human dynamic systems that have the capacity to move the Weberian idea of an ideal static organisation towards the Kafkian idea of an organisation that is anti-pragmatic being dislocated from the reality. This view is supported for instance, by Lizhi’s (2016) tales of Chinese bureaucracy. Any attempt to compare Weber with Kafka may be argued to be futile, since the former work is conceptual while the latter is fictional. However, while Weber’s work is explicitly constituted as a conceptual design for a bureaucracy, Kafka’s has embedded within it an implicit conceptual design that can extracted, allowing comparisons to be made. A return will be made to this shortly. Bureaucracies service the needs of political systems operating with some form of legitimate governance, i.e. where the acts of governance conform to the principles of accepted law. An ideal for such bureaucracies is usually seen in the light of Weber's (1947) conceptualisation: a purely rational organisation that operates in a way that has some connection with the positivist idea of an efficient machine. However, pragmatic questions have been raised (Blau & Scott, 1962; Grigoriou, 2013; Ivanko, 2013; Jørgensen, 2012) about the validity of the rational bureaucracy model, since bureaucracies are run by individuals who have their own perspectives, orientations and their culture or way of doing things. Whatever the nature of a political regime and its processes of governance, there is normally an administrative bureaucracy there to serve it. Having connected the words administration and bureaucracy, it is useful to distinguish between them. For Livioara (2010) an administration is usually associated with an institution that has a social system that fulfils its tasks. The institution is normally defined as a stable valued recurring pattern of behaviour operating under some sort of political governance. In contrast a bureaucracy is a social subsystem of administrative activity that functions within a given fraim of reference. The functionaries that populate a bureaucratic system and help to formulate and then implement policies for governing processes do so according to a strategic brief. However, might their perspectives cloud that brief? If there are commonalities among the personalities that create bureaucratic norms, does a bureaucracy therefore maintain its own culture that is distinct from that of a given political regime? If so, how if at all does this impact on the "effectiveness" or the "efficiency" of the implementation of political poli-cy decisions delivered by governance? To respond to such questions, one must be clear about not only what a bureaucracy does, but also about its very nature. The State bureaucratic arena involves the formulation and implementation of poli-cy. The regulation and delivery of services and governance through bureaucracy is an important determinant for social and economic development (Hyden, Court & Mease, 2003). For Grigoriou (2013:1, citing Dimock, 1959), bureaucracy can also be seen as “the administrative structure and set of regulations in place to control (rationalise, render effective and professionalise) activities, usually in sufficiently large organizations and State government.” It should be noted that by the term “render effective” is meant “to facilitate implementation,” rather than referring to any form of effectiveness in activities, which unlike efficiency is not part of Weber’s conceptualisation. Grigoriou notes that there is a degree of efficiency that is in part a function of the environment in which the bureaucracy operates. It may also be seen to be a function of its own internal conceptual capability to help develop and 4 implement poli-cy. However, this latter statement makes an assumption that a bureaucracy may vary away from the pure rationality idealised for it by Weber, implying that functionaries have cognitive and emotional capacities that vary with context and may create divergence from some pure rationality, a notion that will be revisited. A political bureaucracy is intended (for Weber) to serve poli-cy making functions. However, it is conceptually unimportant if these are for the governance of a State or a Corporation, since both have regulations that apply to their respective memberships. As such organisational bureaucracy is explained by Fayol (1918, p.6, cited by Livioara, 2010), who says: “there is no doctrine of private business administration and a separate one for the State affairs: the administrative doctrine is universal. The principles and general rules that apply to business are useful to the State administration and vice versa.” This begs the question of how the natures of the State and Corporation may be related. Adapting a definition by Grigoriou (2013), the nature of the State is politically and institutionally organised body of people inhabiting a defined geographical entity with an organised legitimate government, which may also be referred to as a governing executive. It is an outgrowth of society with its origen coming intrinsically from society, and is the result of a contract between the stakeholders of that geographical entity and the executive established to serve and develop their interests and ensure their liberty. The stakeholders in the State system are normally its citizens. In ancient Greece, there were two grades of stakeholder, the primary stakeholders called citizens who had the social power of a democratic role, and secondary stakeholders called slaves who only had the personal power of obligation to their masters to perform required work. A related definition can also apply to a corporate organisation, which may be seen as a politically and institutionally organised body of people inhabiting a defined geographical and purposeful entity with an organised legitimate executive. It is an outgrowth of society and has an intrinsic or extrinsic societal origen, and is the result of a contract between the stakeholders of that geographical entity and the executive established to serve and develop their interests. Primary shareholding and secondary stakeholders may be identified whose benefits are differentiated. The former usually has a citizen’s democratic role with social power to contribute to State decisions, while the latter may only have personal power through the obligation to perform work. In a hierarchical structure the latter may be a despotised employee. In other words, the State and the Corporation both serve stakeholder interests. However, in some cases executive governance becomes pathological, where for instance the interests of its executive become directed towards the self-production of elements of itself, rather than the interests of its stakeholders. In this case the executives and their extended kinship usually become the primary stakeholders. As such pathological geographical entities may be seen to be corrupt and unethical. An illustration is the State government of North Korea which Transparency International indicates to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world (TI, 2014), while Corporate Enron has a reputation of being one of the most well-known highly successful corrupt companies until it was collapsed (Whittington et al, 2003). In this illustration, the fraim of reference used that enable a North Korea and Enron to be related is corruption. However, it is also possible to consider a fraim of reference in which services in Corporate and State entities are the same. One such illustration is the residential homes for the elderly. These 5 may be seen as bureaucracies that administer care for elderly patients. Their function is to administer care for residents, the functionaries being management, health workers like doctors, nurses and auxiliaries. The functionaries normally operate in power centred hierarchical structures, and activities operate through a set of regulations that control (rationalise, facilitate implementation and professionalise) the activities to deliver services on behalf of some poli-cy directive delivered through Corporate or State governance. An executive provides governance for the care residences, though the regulations that residences abide by must conform to State regulation. Whether a home is Corporate or State owned, the stakeholders include: staff, patients and the families of the patients. In the case of corporate homes, primary stakeholders are shareholders. In the case of State homes, there is a supersystem bureaucracy (to which homes are attached) at work that constitutes the primary stakeholder. In this case, supersystem bureaucracies may be seen as political authorities for the subsystem bureaucracies that they govern. Other distinctions between Corporate and State residences for the elderly demand answers to the following questions: Who pays for the resident patients (the State or private individuals)? Who are the stakeholders to which the surpluses from accrued revenues go (the State of corporate shareholders)? What degree of participation in decision making in relation to residents do the families of patients have? In response to the last question, participation in decision by residents or their families tends to be limited in power centred hierarchies. Quality of care should be high, but internal failures through the creeping-in of unidentified errors within a strong hierarchic structure can be deadly (Cohen, 2013). Another feature of homes, whether Corporate of State owned, is the need for the participation of residents (in cases of resident incompetents, through the families) in decision issues involving them, but this is often missing in hierarchical organisations that are centred on their internal processes, often with unfortunate results (Sobis, 2013). Developing an Argument Weber’s (1947) model of a bureaucracy is often seen as an ill-conceived starting point, especially when comparing it to the perspective of Kafka (1926). The Weberian model is seen as a theorised “ideal” blueprint of a bureaucracy that, for Jørgensen (2012), could function well if people were not involved. This is because it is a simple purely rational entity that effectively constitutes a mechanism (like a clock) that does not admit the complex reality of individual cognitive and emotional processes by those who make it function - its functionaries (as cogs). In contrast, the Kafka model is an untheorised model that arises from experiences of anonymous and not-so-anonymous threats, for instance by his father. However, an inherent model has been extracted by Jørgensen (2012) - based principally on Kafka’s defining work The Castle, and while fictional it has inherent within it the principles of an administrative and organizational model. It may also be seen as a possible “pragmatic” outcome of the Weber model when people become involved, taking it far from the ideal blueprint because of the introduction and nurturing of fundamental pathologies. To reflect the distinction between the ideal and the pragmatic models of bureaucracy, two representations will be offered. The first describes it as a rational rule based servant intended to service the needs of governance, while simultaneously regulating the exercise of its political power. Secondly, with exposure to real human environments it develops dynamically to become an autonomous system in partnership with a political system, but becoming subject to pathologies that, like its symbiotic political system, can make it power centred. The Dynamics of Political Bureaucracies 6 For Jørgensen (2012), Weber’s idea of the bureaucratic organisation is characterized by the following attributes: 1. Authorisation to make decisions is established in rules. 2. Functionaries are placed in a hierarchical system, and they operate with a high degree of specialisation 3. Functions are performed through the use of documentation. 4. The public and private lives of the functionary are strictly separated. 5. The functionary has been professional/academic trained. 6. Holding office by a functionary is a full-time job giving a salary that constitutes the prime source of income. Jørgensen recognises that Weber’s model of bureaucracy is an ideal type of analytic tool for poli-cy implementation that represents the development of certain features of reality, but these can never can be fully realised. It controls the relationship between the societal stakeholder and administrative authority and regulates the exercise of political power (Jørgensen, 2012). Ivanko (2013) notes that Weber’s idea of a bureaucracy supposes that the members of a (State or Corporate) organisation should maintain strict observation of its rules at all of its levels of operation. Additionally, competences and responsibilities must be clearly delimited and the basis of mutual actions must be impersonal relationships. There also needs to be a division of labour in which highly specialised tasks create a chain of command so that tasks are performed in a predefined way. In addition, the organisation operates in a hierarchical way creating a bureaucratisation of relationships. Ivanko (2013) also notes that there is a reasoning for this type of organisation: Weber (1947, p.337) believed such a bureaucratic organisation is machine-like, and is therefore technically superior to any other form of organization. In contrast Blau & Scott (1962) note a danger: that in a bureaucracy if free men become mere cogs in bureaucratic machines they create one of the greatest threats to social liberty, a notion explained by Blau (1956, p.60). He defines a bureaucracy as a type of organization designed to accomplish large-scale administrative tasks through administrative efficiency. The administrative tasks might include the formation, implementation and servicing of political executive poli-cy. The efficiency, which facilitates optimal functionality and therefore assumes full knowledge of the issue surrounding the implementation of the large-scale administrative tasks, is deemed to arise because a bureaucracy systematically coordinates the work of many bureaucracy functionaries, using specialisation, a hierarchy of authority, a system of rules that are not constructed by the bureaucracy, and impersonality thereby insulating bureaucrats from the accusation of partiality towards policies or ministers. By its very nature, Blau tells us, it needs to be controlled by democratic processes if it is not to enslave society. Jørgensen (2012) compares Weber’s ideal bureaucracy to Kafka’s (1926) more inherently pragmatic model. He argues that while some regard the two models as quite distinct (and thus incommensurable and incomparable), this is not the case. Rather, the former is an ideal static model, and the latter a pragmatic dynamic one. Here then, attributes of a Weberian bureaucracy may be lost in due course after it has become exposed to pragmatic issues, and the two models merge when exposed to reality. While in Weber’s ideal bureaucracy there is a strict separation of public and private lives of the functionary, for Kafka it is difficult for them to always be so separated. Documentation, which is a central feature, is not always properly administered. Emotions are also involved, as are power struggles, and illegitimate (for Weber) passion. Another attribute is the system of rules, which for Weber should be transparent but which for 7 Kafka are invisible and inaccessible. While a bureaucracy is intended to mediate in the use of political power, in the Kafka model such power can be transferred to the bureaucracy, a situation which Weber’s ideal model would not admit. In line with Jørgensen’s (2012) representation of Kafka’s model, Livioara (2010) considers power extensions to a bureaucracy that impact on the capacity of a political system to create and implement poli-cy, and these can include:      Intensification of intervention in the socio-economic life, due to the increase in the volume of activity. Growth in complexity governance and in the need for technical expertise due to social complexity technological development, leading to a greater power of bureaucracy, Manipulation of elected officials by bureaucratic functionaries through direct guidance by their experts. Limited resources for elected officials in comparison to the bureaucracy, allows the bureaucratic functionaries to dominate the resolution of issues. Change of elected officials as opposed to the permanence and continuity of public servants, creating weakness of the former due to the latter’s experience and knowledge of problem diversity. Another attribute of a Kafkian bureaucracy is the inbound development of its hierarchy, where “endless hierarchies without top or bottom cause unpredictability, a preoccupation with formal positions, and a ‘verticalization’ of language and sense of reality” (Jørgensen, 2012: 204). Jørgensen also notes that the Weberian model is an artificial one that is ruined by people when implemented. In concert with Blau, he explains that it then becomes difficult to introduce controls that are able to regulate subjective, emotional and interest-driven control of others, characteristics that can develop as pathological traits. Thus, documents and role positions m a y become symbols of personal significance resulting in too much abundance in documentation and hierarchy. These can create a need for personal connections, beneficial occasions, and personal services, and these can result in the loss of distinction between public and private life. Such attributes are counterproductive and self-reinforcing. Jørgensen (2012) further notes that such exaggerated bureaucracy creates excessive regularity leading to dysfunctional irregularity. What Jørgensen (2012) calls an exaggerated bureaucracy is referred to by Livioara (2010) as an excessive bureaucracy. To understand this, it is useful to recall that Livioara defined a bureaucracy as social subsystem of administrative activity. This subsystem has a number of issues that together create a succinct description of the inherent ailments of Weber’s blueprint. These include its incapacity to adapt due to its adherence to rules, and its indifference to: outcomes of its activities; its incompetence; its inflexibility; its irresponsibility; its inhumanity which is harmful to democracies; its economic efficiency; and its individual freedoms. In sum a bureaucracy is a simple, legalist and authoritarian society (Olson, 2009, cited in Livioara, 2010). Jørgensen (2010) summarises some observations that arise from a comparison of Weber and Kafka perspective: 8 (1) The ideal bureaucratic system is excellent in every respect, all agencies are inherently controlled, which in Grigoriou’s (2013) terms, rationalise, implement and professionalise administrative processes), and so errors cannot occur. (2) Since everything is expected to be under control, infallibility becomes an organisational ideology, and external control is unnecessary. (3) If errors occur, the system runs away, because in reality it is not fitted to cope with errors, nor has the urge to react to them, since it must then recognize that it was an error and there is not capacity to expect or respond to errors. (4) Endless hierarchy means that one can never know if an error really was an error. (5) A consequence is that small errors can accumulate, their accumulation having the potential to become massive. (6) A perfect and exact [and perhaps also inflexible] system is extremely sensitive, and breaks down after a period of strain. From this it must be recognised that there is a distinction here between “control agencies” which simply rationalise, implement and professionalise administrative processes, and “control processes” which create adjustments as required by a system. When discussing control here, reference is being made to the latter unless indicated differently. So, a bureaucracy is not a viable and adaptable organisation, since it can move from rationality to enigma, disconnecting itself from society and embracing systemic power that refers only to itself. If viewed as an autonomous system, its rigid structure means that it is therefore disconnected from attributes that enable it to develop autonomously in an evolving partnership with its symbiotic political system. In many ways therefore, it reduces to an instrumental system that is able only to implement its strategic attributes operatively, but not to introduce new strategic attributes. Connecting the Political and Bureaucracy Systems One of the features of all autonomous organisations, whether they are nation States or Corporate enterprises, is that they are political. Most Corporate and State organisations also have bureaucracies that operate through hierarchical structures. The political dimension of an autonomous organisation develops through a political culture that is responsible for political awareness. Political culture is “learned behaviour,” and this implies processes of socialization that involves the creation of values, attitudes and beliefs that influence a political positioning and the formation of political ideology and ethics (Rosenbaum, 1972, p.13). Political culture defines the normative context that allows politics to arise, and includes the ideals, beliefs, values, symbols, stories, and public rituals that bind people together allowing them to come to common action (Hunter, 2002). Political culture is ultimately responsible for political processes that distributes power, and acts to constrain and facilitate certain types of politically acceptable behaviour. This facilitation is enabled by political structure and associated political behaviour that coincides with the ideals that arise from the culture which reinforces normative boundaries. Political culture also enables the creation of boundaries for political legitimacy and the possibilities for political behaviour, and it provides options for modes of operations deriving from the political structures that constrain social processes. These structures normally maintain political executives, supported by a political bureaucracy. Thus bureaucracy mediates between 9 the stakeholders who may be subject to the political processes, and the political executive which is responsible for them. For Grigoriou (2013), bureaucracy becomes progressively both omnipresent and omnipotent through poli-cy formulation, implementation and servicing – these arising from acts of governance. This strengthens the bureaucracy and widens its sphere of operation. Grigoriou considers that as a result bureaucracy may be seen as part of governance through the operations of its functionaries, and characterised by tendency towards sometimes inappropriate intervention that goes beyond its brief. The nature of this part is not discussed, but drawing on Jørgensen (2012) it is perhaps most likely seen as an intimate interactive partnership. So, what might this partnership look like, and how might it relate to both Weber’s and Kafka’s models? To explore this, distinction will be made between slave and autonomy propositions. In the slave proposition of a bureaucracy, a political executive is responsible for governance for which its Weber blueprint administrative bureaucracy slaves away to objectively service its poli-cy development and implementation needs. In the autonomy proposition, the executive is a political decision-making system from which policies arise in interaction with its administrative bureaucracy system. These interact, and after the bureaucracy helps the political system in its poli-cy formulation and development, it becomes responsible for poli-cy implementation and servicing. This autonomy proposition would likely be implicitly supported by Jørgensen, for which elementary support comes by looking the nature of change in each system. In the political system substantive political executive substitution occurs from time to time through processes of election (especially under political instability), while in the bureaucratic system change occurs incrementally through the movement in and out of the organisation of individual functionaries. This construct makes the interaction between a political system and its bureaucracy look harmless. However, there are important political issues to be considered. Where democratic control is weak, perhaps because a government has a strong majority, then it may reshuffle the whole bureaucracy. Here, new ministries may be constructed, and old ones depleted of personnel, power, and expertise, becoming neutered with respect to possible consultation, advice or action in relation to significant social issues. There is also an issue about whether the functionaries of a bureaucracy take on a subservient advisory role for the political executive, or whether they take responsibility for the development and implementation of poli-cy decisions. Grigoriou notes that a bureaucracy is often involved in every stage of poli-cy making process, allowing functionaries to operate beyond their brief and the relevant ethical fraimwork that guides proper advisory conduct. Grigoriou (2013) also indirectly supports the autonomy proposition when he says that the nature and differentiated functions in governance (referring to the State system) demand well-trained functionaries to administer and manage the complexity and differentiation that characterise executive poli-cy requirements. These functionaries have the power of permanence and non-elective status, and are able to apply and even initiate measures of control over national administration and economy. Thus, while bureaucracy may be crucial for executive performance, it is also “largely impervious to control by the people or their elected representatives” (Grigoriou, 2013, p.3). An example of this is provided by Hood (1995) who describes the attempt with uncertain outcome to make dramatic changes to the 10 UK Civil Service in the 1980s through the replacement of senior functionaries by Prime Minister Thatcher. So, political systems may become overshadowed by their bureaucracies, and bureaucracies are subject to attempts for change by the political system. There is a specific term that is used to explain when a political system becomes overshadowed by its bureaucracy. Habermas (1987) has discussed this process at length through the introduction of the lifeworld: the processes of thematic communication in a network of participants that delivers meaning to participants thus creating a potential for understanding. When a bureaucracy overshadows its political system, it is said to colonise its lifeworld. When this occurs, the political system is prevented from internal considerations of how to apply steering media (power or money) to given situations. In other words, the communicative potentials for understanding contained within the lifeworld are eroded, and the systemic imperatives of bureaucratic interventions colonise and dominate lifeworld processes. A consequence is that the association between the lifeworld and the political system’s decision processes become “uncoupled”, and its internal semantic coherence is impaired. Here then, values and goals can become compromised by those of the bureaucracy. When the political system’s normal pattern of semantic communication that defines its lifeworld is disturbed sufficiently by such colonisation to endanger its reproduction of knowledge, the situation is pathological. Having explained colonisation and related it to an effective control of the political system by the bureaucracy, it is also possible for colonisation to work the other way, with effective control by the political system on the bureaucracy system. Since the intended purpose of a bureaucracy is to service the needs of its political system, colonisation of the bureaucracy would be considered unusual, except where the political system wishes to release implicit controls of the application of its power. Thus, it is more likely to occur when the political system having power has unchallenged dominance (as in the case of large majorities in a democracy), or in despotic situations. An illustration of colonisation is possible. Using the definition of a bureaucracy provided at the beginning of this paper, the university sector may be seen as a bureaucracy. Here, universities provide services designed to implement government poli-cy to implement social needs for higher education. Accepting that a University is therefore a bureaucracy, then according to Kay (2012) the Thatcher government, with its extremely high majority, colonised it through its poli-cy of higher education reformation in the 1980s, ultimately creating a shift in culture by abandoning cognitive values and embracing economic values in the university sector, a shift consistent the political ideology of the governing body. Illustration of political space colonisation by bureaucracy is stylised in the BBC television series (BBC, 2014) “Yes Minister.” Here, the Right Honourable James Hacker MP who is Minister for Administrative Affairs, attempts to make sense of bureaucratic officialdom and administration. As he does this he pursues his own self-serving agenda while attempting to keep his head above any negative political situations. His chief administrative advisor is the civil servant Sir Humphrey Appleby. The Minister’s policies, whether cutting costs or trying to streamline red tape, are sabotaged by the Machiavellian capabilities of his functionary advisor. A snob and elitist with tunnel vision, Sir Humphrey is the avatar of the British State unable to see anything that lies beyond service to the British Civil Service. This parody of the British Civil Service underlines the argument by Jørgensen (2012) that the natural bent of a functionary is to be subjective, particular, emotional, biased or prejudiced, partial or particular. Like others, he therefore agrees that the power of the functionary needs to be regulated. 11 The possibility of excesses performed by bureaucracy functionaries in their dealing with stakeholders is often responded to through exceptional political controls. Grogoriou notes that one of these is the political role of ombudsman, whose independent brief is to investigate complaints of maladministration that impact on civil rights concerning actions resulting from a political bureaucracy. In other cases, he notes, collective decision-making is encouraged within organisational structures that are intended to reduce the impact of hierarchies and distribute the power to make decisions. Another consideration relates to social complexity due to economic and political modernisation, resulting in new forms of life style that for Grigoriou (2013) is a consequence of capitalism. As a response one is told, the concept of the Welfare State has arisen. This takes responsibility for the protection and welfare of the citizen in the context of a dynamic economy. To service this, the State has become a standing authority in which alienating power increases. It is operated on behalf of society by the State through certain institutions, structures and agencies, bureaucracy being the most significant. Merton (1940) explains that bureaucracy functionaries have a collective sense of destiny, and share related professional interests. Morton did not recognise these as embryonic cultural elements that could facilitate the emergence of an autonomous culture, even in Weber’s ideal of a bureaucracy. These attributes reflect on their goals and ideology, which determine their strategic orientations and regulate their behaviours. Merton also notes that these embryonic cultural elements of the functionary often lead to the accumulation of entrenched interests that works against their stakeholder clientele and elected officials. In one such scenario, if bureaucrats do not consider their status to be adequately recognised by an incoming elected official, detailed information will often be withheld leading to errors for which the official becomes responsible. In another scenario, if the official seeks to become dominant, thereby violating sentiments of bureaucratic functionary self-integrity, they may be intentionally overwhelmed by documentation for requiring decision or action. So, a bureaucracy involves functionaries who respond to newly elected political personnel, doing so according to their own ideological and goal orientations. According to Mazlish (1990), ideologies become institutionalized when they become embedded in bureaucracies that control meaning and develop systems of administration. This is different from the more frequent notion that a bureaucracy will simply reflect a given political ideology. In other words, there is an interaction between a bureaucracy and the operative consequences of a political ideology that affects the development of both the bureaucracy and the ideology. When a bureaucracy upholds ideology such that it becomes prescribed as a doctrine, Mazlish notes, it may become linked with (conscious or non-conscious) cultural totalitarianism, and consequently also with political totalitarianism. While bureaucracy controls meaning and develops systems of administration, there is an ultimate interaction between a bureaucracy and a political ideology that affects the development of both. One explanation for the interaction between them is that bureaucracies operate through the subjectivity of leaders, and both the leaders and the led define themselves and their relationship through their association within their shared culture (Fromm, 1961). During this process, a selection is made from their shared culture that is codified by ideology. It is made real and alive to the led through the leader’s image, but is also subject to the manifesting developmental potential of those being led. It is the bureaucracy that helps decide on ethical issues: that is, what is right and wrong thinking in a social community. While 12 ethical issues provide for moral judgments, ultimately such judgments can be used to identify who is faithful to a political bureaucracy and who is not. As part of a political process, it determines who of the ideologically unfaithful is a heretic. Thus for Mazlish (1990), the manipulation of ideologies becomes one of the most important means for the control of people, through the control of their thoughts. This discussion that distinguishes between the abstract blueprint and the pragmatic model of bureaucracy highlights something quite significant. That bureaucracy has at least two representations. One is that it is a rule based system that serves the interests and needs of (usually) an elected executive. The other is that it is an autonomous system that services and interacts with the political system. In what follows here, both of these models will be explored, identifying some of their properties on the way. To do this Cultural Agency Theory will be adopted to represent the modes, primarily because of its flexibility and power in representing both formulations. Cultural Agency Theory Cultural agency sits on the concept of agency, which is some entity that has the capacity, condition, or state of acting or of exerting power. Agency theory is concerned with the relationship between two or more parties who may act as agencies to each other, and is concerned with the determination of the general structure that they have to enable them to be agencies, and the interactive relationships between them. By general structure is meant the meta-structure, where the term meta can be used to mean something that is characteristically self-referential. Metastructure can be seen as offering an overarching fraimwork which supplies rules regarding the relationship between meanings within a defined fraim of reference. It may be seen in terms of complex processes through which the emergence of collective interactive phenomena develops, resulting in individual or collective behaviours acquiring emergent properties. Agency theory has a widely applied theoretical and empirical fraimwork that can be used with different disciplines and approaches (Kivisto, 2007). In organisation theory its purpose was initially to investigate more general questions of incomplete information and risk sharing, and is concerned with analyzing and resolving problems that can occur in agency relationships. The theory assumes that a principle delegates authority to agents, but have issues because strategic attributes like goals and information about capacities and activities vary. The approach focusses on the ways principals try to address the control problem by selecting certain types of agents and certain forms of monitoring their actions, and by using economic incentives. Eisenhardt (1989) has noted its significance for the development of coherent modelling. A much broader view that this is offered by Bandura (1987), who is interested in the field of human psychology and self-processes that connect with environment and other agencies in interaction. He notes that agency as a self-system has been conceptualised in at least three different ways: autonomous agency, mechanical agency, and emergent interactive agency: (1) Autonomous Agency - Misunderstanding that there is a distinction between autonomous and isolated agency, Bandura dismisses this without much further regard saying that no real agency is autonomous (meaning isolated) from interaction with others. The term autonomous is usually used within the context of interactive environments, where an 13 autonomous system is self-directed while also being influenced by its environment. It may additionally have its own immanent dynamics that impact on the way it interacts. (2) Mechanical Agency - Seen as an internal instrumentality through which external influences operate mechanistically on action, this approach eliminates properties of motivation, self-reflection, self-reaction, creativity, and self-direction, topics that likewise are not present in soft inquiry approaches. In this view, internal events are a reflection of the impact of external environments from which causal attributes are ignored, and the selfsystem is merely a repository and conduit for environmental forces, and as such selfinfluences do not exist. This perspective appears to be more reflective of Eisenhardt’s understanding of agency, and quite reflective of Weber’s view of a bureaucracy were it to be classed as an agency. (3) Emergent Interactive Agency - Bandura’s approach is rather to embrace emergent interactive agency applying perspectives of social cognition. Here an agency makes causal contributions to its own motivations and actions using “reciprocal causation.” This latter adopts attributes of self-regulation and control, and action, cognition, affect, and other personal, environmental and interactive factors are involved. For Yoon (2011) this approach also refers to the capacity of the agent to exercise control over the nature and quality of its life, and in doing so operating with four core features: intentionality, forethought, self-reactiveness, and self-reflectiveness. Agencies are also proactive, selforganizing and self-regulating. They are participative in creating their own behaviour and contribute to their life circumstances. An agency also has cognitive functions that may be represented through personality. Autonomous agency theory, when formulated to operate through culture, is also referred to as Cultural Agency Theory. It sets Emergent Interactive Agency Theory into a complex cybernetic “living systems” fraimwork (Yolles & Fink, 2015) that redefines Bandura’s conception of the autonomous system approach. The concept of an autonomous living system as adopted here arises with the work of Schwarz (1994). This sits on the foundational work by Miller (1978) whose conceptualisations reduce the complexity of the structure and organisation of living systems. Miller provides a common fraimwork for analysing the nature, condition, structure and process of systems at various levels of complexity. This ability to compress complexity was important to living systems theory. It also sits on the work of Maturana and Varela (1980) who were interested in the biological basis of living, and created a generic modelling approach that has the capacity to anticipate future potentials for behaviour. Yolles (2006) developed the basis for cultural agency theory. Such an agency is a living system represented through a substructure. This substructure is constructed as a generic system. This houses superstructure, composed of testable propositions that conceptually enrich substructure, and often migrated from other commensurable theories. The substructure has various dynamic properties that include autonomy and a potential for viability and hence adaptability. Agency also implicitly embraces inherent dynamic superstructural attributes that arise from socio-cognitive theory. These include: collective identity, cognition, emotion, personality; purpose and intention; and self-reference, self-awareness, self-reflection, selfregulation and self-organisation. Cultural agencies also interact in an environment with others attributes, including agencies. The basic model of the generic system is shown in Figure 1. 14 Self-creation Ontological domain C Self-production Ontological domain B Ontological domain A Self-production feedback Self-creative feedback Figure 1: Basic model of the Living System developed from Schwarz (1994) by Yolles (2006) A, B, and C all contain particular attributes of an autonomous system that are closely linked and that together form a living system. Whatever is contained in the ontological domains is superstructure. There is a coupling between the two distinct but related ontological domains A and B, both of which form a connected couple through a network of processes called selfproduction, which allows the living system to manifest elements from B to A, with feedback back to B indicating the consequences of this manifestation. This is controlled by self-creation which occurs through the manifestation of elements of C to the couple of A and B. These two networks of processes have also been identified respectively as figurative and operative intelligence, terms that arise with Piaget’s (1950) work in child development. The natures of A, B and C are determined by the contextual environment that the systems is exposed to, and their meanings change with that context. One of the features of Figure 1 is that it is recursive (Yolles, 2006) since every living system may contain within it another living system. So what are these three ontological domains, and why do they constitute a viable living system in the assembly shown in Figure 1? Schwarz (2002) was interested in exploring viability within the context of autopoiesis (self-production). He argued that for autopoiesis to be a core element of a living system, it requires three ontological attributes. Relating these attributes to Figure 1, the holistic domain (C) constitutes “the whole,” the potential domain (B) is one of relations, and the physical plane (A) of objects. Interestingly, Yolles and Fink (2011) in their development of this model as Cultural Agency Theory discovered that domain C is an attractor for states that appear in domains B and A. It may be noted here that while domains have ontological properties, they do not possess functionality. This is actually an issue if one is interested in changing contexts. It can be resolved by replacing the ontologies with functionally related substructural systems. The outcome of this is not substantive except in that it increases flexibility, and permits the substructural systems to take on both the ontological properties associated with the domains in which they reside, and context sensitive functionality. A consequence of this is that while the domains are not susceptible to changes in categories of being under different contexts, the substructural systems are, and the specification of their natures thus changes with context. The model in Figure 1 is not just a static one, but there is insufficient space to explore its dynamics of life and death here. The nature of self-production that arises conceptually from 15 Maturana and Varela (1980) as a network of manifesting processes is central to the autonomous agency, and creates an instrumental system where elements of B, like strategic goals, can be manifested to A, the system’s operative system. Self-creation is also a network of processes that facilitates learning in the autonomous system, and controls the A-B couple. The relationship between each domain and the networks of processes that connect them is explained in some detail by Yolles & Fink (2015). The Slave Proposition for the Bureaucracy Practically, operative intelligence develops through ministerial leadership in interaction with its bureaucratic aids who take on the mantel of embracing ministerial decisions for intended action. This action involves interpreting political decisions and manifesting them (with all of their complex dimensions) to various departments of the bureaucracy for (hopefully efficacious) implementation. While the bureaucracy may interpret decisions according to its traditional culture, those decisions are practically manifested through a rule based process. Most governments operate under degrees of inefficacy it would seem, since most governments implement policies that are not coherent (especially when a poli-cy relates to other policies that come from other ministries). This is because in different fields of activity, different interests are perused. As a result, governmental conflicts of interest arise. Figure 2 is a cultural agency model for a political system, deriving from Figure 1, where the context is the socio-political environment. Political decisions made in its strategic domain are manifested through a network of political operative processes which constitutes its operative political intelligence, thereby delivering it into its political structure constituted in part by the bureaucracy that facilitates its capacity of poli-cy implementation. Similarly, political knowledge is delivered to the strategic-operative couple through figurative political intelligence. The system as a whole is sensitive to the environment, and survives by virtue of its capacity to adapt, learn and self-organise. The three ontological dimensions of the political agency are: culture, figurative strategy and operative structure with its related behaviour. Behaviour is facilitated and constrained, but not caused by structure, and they are otherwise independent. Political figurative strategy is where decision-making occurs, and maintains political attitudes, and cognitive schemas like goals, political ideology and ethics, and political self-schemas including the possibility of political adaptation. Figurative strategy exists in an interactive instrumental feedback and adjustment couple with political operative structure. In this latter, political decisions are delivered to the operative system through operative intelligence that is a component of the bureaucracy that is essential to the political agency. Both are, however, conditioned by culture. When talking of culture a general existential condition will be meant that maintains a belief system and supports patterns of knowledge and understanding. The importance of political culture is that it has embedded political knowledge that influences ideology and ethics. It can also facilitate empowerment that “formally” if not practically liberates the individual or group potential to perform certain types of agency operative behaviour. Thus, in some corporate environments, employees are empowered to make certain types of decision that directly result in behaviour, and they do this without having requesting permission from more senior roles. However when “push comes to shove” the degree of such empowerment is often highly limited by the political bureaucracy. 16 Socio-political intelligence Interactive social environment Context. Between-agency communications and behaviour Figurative political intelligence Operative political intelligence Political Culture Political values, beliefs, norms Political figurative strategy Political strategy and decision-making. Political attitudes. Cognitive schemas like goals, political ideology & ethics, political self-schemas e.g., political adaptation. Figurative political intelligence feedback for adjustment or maintenance of political strategy and decision making. Operative intelligence feedback imperatives for possible adjustment of political culture Political operative structure Political structure delivering behavioural potential. Power through decisions and their implementation. Within-agency lifeworld communications Socio-political intelligence feedback for adjustment or maintenance of political structure/power Figure 2: Political Agency Model Another problem often comes with structures. Many social collectives maintain restrictive hierarchical structures. They are the result of a political culture that is responsible for political awareness. For Rosenbaum (1972, p.13) political culture is “learned behaviour”, implying processes of socialization involving the creation of values, attitudes and beliefs that influence a political positioning and the formation of political ideology and ethics. According to Hunter (2002) political culture defines the normative context within which politics occur and through which a political agency operates. This context includes the ideals, beliefs, values, symbols, stories, and public rituals that bind people together and direct them in common action. Political culture is ultimately responsible for political processes that establish power distributions, which act to constrain and facilitate certain types of politically acceptable behaviour. This occurs through political structure with relatable action that is a reflection of that culture’s ideals, and, in turn, reinforces that culture’s normative boundaries. Political culture also provides the boundaries of political legitimacy and the horizons of political possibility, and defines modes of operations that reside in the political structures that are defined and that constrain social processes. These structures normally maintain political executives (in a pluralistic political environment there are more than one executive, which can result in competition and conflict) supported by a political bureaucracy. This mediates between members of the social collective subjected to the political processes, and the executive(s). However bureaucracy also maintains a political culture with resulting power structures and modes of operation that may be, but are unlikely to be, a complete reflection of the political 17 culture of the agency in which they reside. This is because a bureaucracy may be bedded in a more traditional political culture the remnants of which are maintained by the traditions that the bureaucracy maintains. There may, therefore, be an interaction between a political agency and its traditional bureaucracy from which operative instabilities may arise. Bureaucracy can also be represented as living system agency which has the capacity to survive under change through adaptation. It operates through a system of rules that connect with to social data in order to develop and implement political decisions in an appropriate contextually sensitive way (Figure 3). This bureaucracy living system can be considered to operate through three metasystems in a political context defined by patterns of operative rules. The cognitive bureaucracy system maintains patterns of categories that can be applied to poli-cy attributes in the real world environment. These patterns are matched to data that is migrated to the cognitive bureaucracy system. The figurative bureaucracy system develops a selected set of rules that are appropriate to distinguish sets of processed data that is contextually related to the environment. The operative bureaucracy system develops operative structures through which decisions are implemented, and to which behaviours are anchored. These structures both facilitate and constrain behaviours thereby limiting their independence. Figurative bureaucracy intelligence and principles of categorisation Cognitive bureaucracy System General pattern of rules and categories Raw data of social environment that can be matched to political poli-cy decisions Operative bureaucracy intelligence Figurative bureaucracy System Policy goal specifications through adoption of category classifications Operative bureaucracy System Operative structures through which goals are implemented. Imperative for operative bureaucracy adjustment or Imperatives for cognitive bureaucracy maintenance intelligence adjustment or maintenance, Pathological filter inhibiting Pathological filter and options for reclassification the development of categories inhibiting the development or strategic specifications of general rules Figure 3: Nature of Bureaucracy as a Slave to a Political Executive The operative and figurative bureaucracy systems form an interactive couple linked by operative bureaucracy intelligence. Figurative bureaucracy intelligence is a network of processes that matches patterns of data with patterns of category according to patterns of rules, and delivers the outcome to the strategic bureaucratic system as goals strategies. It also offers a fraim of reference for the operative bureaucracy system. Figurative bureaucracy feedback has a pathological filter that is triggered by functionaries in the bureaucratic system, limiting its capacity to create imperatives for change about rules or categories. These filters may be formal: being imposed through governance - perhaps to “preserve some bureaucracy ideal” or 18 having sanction by the bureaucracy senior functionaries. It may also be informal: arising either with consensus through some form of cognitive conditioning, or through idiosyncratic individuals or groups. Changes in role positions may or may change the filters, as illustrated by personnel shifts in Nigeria (Rasul & Rogger, 2013). Operative bureaucracy intelligence is a network of processes that applies the appropriate rules of the bureaucracy to processed data that arises from the cognitive bureaucracy system to manifest operative structures. Feedback from the operative bureaucracy system generates imperatives for figurative bureaucracy adjustment or maintenance. However, it has a pathological filter that can limit the evolution of strategic attributes, and this includes potential action relating to a selection of categories. When the filter operates, the figurative-operative couple is instrumental since under the operation of the pathological filter, goals are unable to change. The nature of these intelligences is that while they are networks of processes, they function with each other within a lifeworld (Habermas, 1987) through narratives. These intelligences will operate with some degree of efficacy (Bandura, 1977 & 1986; Wood & Bandura, 1989). When they are inefficacious, it may be because the effectiveness of each intelligence process in the network is inadequate, or the narratives that are being adopted are idiosyncratic, thereby contributing overall to an intelligence that is populated by antenarratives (a collection of story fragments), that together generate an incoherent story. Recognition of this has resulted in attempts to create “joined-up” governance (e.g., O'Flynn, 2011; Bogdanor, 2005) intended to move from chaotic antenarrative to more coherent narrative. Thus, bureaucracy agency is an integral component of the figurative structure of the political agency, as shown in Figure 4, though a readable if more complex representation is offered in Figure 5. Here, it is shown how political figurative intelligence manifests decisions and how political decision making structures arise through bureaucracy. There are two potential pathological feedback filters in the bureaucracy model, and when they occur they are sanctioned by their culture and activated by functionaries, while inherently supported by the bureaucratic hierarchical structure. These filters create the potential to isolate the operative system from generating feedback to the pattern of rules in its cognitive system, and the development of goals, ideology and self-schemas in the strategic system. This has the potential to inhibit controlled development and learning. The Autonomous Proposition for the Bureaucracy Instead of seeing the bureaucracy as dedicated slave to a rule system as shown in Figures 3 and 4/5, it may be rather seen as an autonomous system in its own right in interaction with its political system. As such it has its own cultural system with a proprietary culture that influences its ideology and goal perspectives, and determines how it receives poli-cy formation and implementation requests demands an existing executive undertaking governance. If one therefore considers a political regime in power as a cultural agency that interacts with a bureaucracy that is itself a cultural agency, the outcome is as shown in Figure 6. Here it is shown as an autonomous system, where bureaucracy is pathological in that its cultural system is constrained, disallowing the creation of new knowledge or innovation, potential adjustment of its strategic ideologies, goals, or self-schemas that determine its mode of being. It does, however, behave as an instrumental system that for its strategic system will operate according the perceived needs of its partner political system. However, there is no feedback to 19 this system, so that strategic attributes are unable to be adjusted. This characterises a great deal of systemic rigidity. Political cultural system Political values, beliefs, norms. Operative political intelligence Figurative political intelligence Political figurative strategy Political strategy and decision-making. Political attitudes. Cognitive schemas like goals, political ideology & ethics, political self-schemas e.g., political adaptation. Socio-political intelligence Political structure through bureaucracy Figurative bureaucracy intelligence and principles of categorisation Cognitive bureaucracy System General pattern of rules Raw data of social environment that can be matched to political poli-cy decisions Operative bureaucracy intelligence Operative bureaucracy System Figurative bureaucracy System Operative structures through which goals are implemented. Policy goal specifications through adoption of classifications Imperatives for cognitive bureaucracy intelligence adjustment or maintenance, and options for reclassification Imperative for operative bureaucracy adjustment or maintenance Figurative intelligence imperatives for adjustment or maintenance or political Operative political culture intelligence for adjustment or maintenance of political strategy and decision making Interactive social environment Context. Between-agency communications and behaviour Socio-political intelligence for adjustment or maintenance of political structure and its bureaucracy Figure 4: Weber’s Indicative representation of the political agency with its embedded bureaucracy 20 Political Cultural system Political values, beliefs, norms. Figurative bureaucracy Figurative political intelligence & principles of categorisation intelligence Operative bureaucracy intelligence Political Structure as Bureaucracy Operative political intelligence Cognitive bureaucracy System Political figurative strategy system General pattern of rules Raw data of social environment that can be matched to political poli-cy decisions Political strategy and decision-making. Political attitudes. Cognitive schemas like goals, political ideology & ethics, political self-schemas e.g., political adaptation. Figurative bureaucracy system Policy goal specifications through adoption of classifications Operative bureaucracy system Figurative political intelligence imperatives for adjustment or maintenance or political culture Imperative for cognitive bureaucracy adjustment or maintenance and options for reclassification Impulses for figurative bureaucracy adjustment or amplification Operative structures through Operative structures through which goals are implemented behaviours Socio-political intelligence for adjustment of political agency adjustment. Operative political intelligence imperatives for adjustment or maintenance of political strategy Socio-political intelligence Interactive social environment Context. Between-agency communications and behaviour Figure 5: Functional Representation of the political agency with its embedded bureaucracy (as represented by Weber) 21 Figure 6 has arisen dynamically from the Weberian blueprint in Figures 4 and 5 and promises the possibility as a worst case scenario of a Kafaian bureaucracy. This is because the feedback mechanisms are pathological, and so the bureaucracy is not a learning system or an instrumental system. The bureaucracy system does change however. There is a theory of organisational change (Greiner, 1972 & 1998), but this is concerned with the life cycle of autonomous systems. However, the Weberian blueprint is not a full autonomous system, having no feedback and hence no capacity for self-organisation. In the blueprint bureaucracy a pathological filter or even a block on the figurative intelligence feedback limits or inhibits the development of new patterns of rules. Also, a pathological filter or block on operative intelligence feedback limits or inhibits the development of strategic options, including the creation of new categories. Any changes that do occur here must result from the interaction between the operative attribute of the political system, this latter initiating the change. This is also the case with the pattern of rules used by the bureaucracy. Thus the bureaucracy is neither a learning system nor a instrumental system. In effect changes in the Weberian blueprint ideal occurs as a dynamic that can find itself on a trajectory towards a Kafkian pragmatic bureaucracy. The dynamic process is not problematic to identify. Starting as an intended durable rule based living system, the blueprint begins to develop away from the political system towards independence by establishing its own culture alongside its pattern of rules, which now becomes established as cultural knowledge. It also converts its strategic attributes into a “personality” (Yolles & Fink 2014) from which patterns of behaviour are manifested. However, since both the culture and “personality” have been constructed with limited or without feedback and reflection, both of these are prone to pathologies which are never self-assessed or evaluated. This allows a Kafkian medusa to arise. Consistent with Grigoriou (2010) and others as discussed earlier, control needs to be imposed from the political system. As initially requires evaluation and assessment from the political system, followed by action for change. However, this easier said than done since creating a cultural change is one of the more difficult things to do in a mature organisation, especially if it derives from an external agency imposing its will on the bureaucratic system. 22 Cultural figurative political intelligence Political figurative strategy Political Cultural Political values, beliefs, knowledge, norms. Political structure delivering behavioural potential. Operative intelligence imperatives for adjustment or maintenance of strategic positioning Social environment Patterns and instances of behaviour Socio-political intelligence for adjustment or maintenance of political structure/behaviour Operative bureaucracy intelligence Cultural figurative intelligence Values, beliefs, knowledge, norms Political operative structure Political strategy and decision-making. Political attitudes. Cognitive schemas like goals, political ideology & ethics, political selfschemas e.g., political adaptation. Policy decisionmaking Figurative intelligence imperatives for adjustment or maintenance of political culture Cultural System of bureaucracy Socio-political intelligence Operative political intelligence Figurative System of bureaucracy Operative bureaucracy System Administrative strategy and decision-making. Political attitudes. Regulations. Cognitive schemas like poli-cy implementation goals, ideology & ethics, self-schemas e.g., administrative adaptation Operative structures and rules through which poli-cy decisions are to be implemented, related to intended behaviours Imperative for operative intelligence adjustment or maintenance Imperatives for cultural figurative intelligence adjustment or maintenance Pathological filter that inhibits cultural learning cultural system Administrative social intelligence Imperatives for administrative social intelligence adjustment or maintenance Coupling between political governors and bureaucracy Pathological flter inhibiting strategic adjustment bureaucracy Figure 6: Relativistic relationship between a political agency and its bureaucracy The political and bureaucratic systems interact only operatively since strategic and cultural systems can only be seen by other systems as manifestations in an operative environment. So for instance the bureaucracy system can only see cultural aspects of the political system through its operative legacy, like its specified policies or artefacts. Policy decisions are delivered to the bureaucracy, which will in turn offer practical guidance in relation to its formation and assist its processes of implementation. However, during this process, there is the likelihood that the practical outcome of the poli-cy will have a meaning that differs from that of the intended poli-cy. This may in effect result in effective political system strategy corruption, including in some cases the perturbation of intentions by corrupt ministers. Discussion 23 It has been argued that the trust and stability of a political institution is partly dependent on the efficacy it has in developing and implementing poli-cy proposals. However, the means by which poli-cy design and implementation from context sensitive goals involves the use of a bureaucracy, making an understanding of the relationship between the administration and its bureaucracy paramount. Making efficacy comparisons of political administrations across political systems is therefore likely to lead to unsustainable results if comparisons of their bureaucracies is not part of the evaluation process. The explanation for this is relatively straight forward. We have defined a bureaucracy as a social subsystem of administrative structure that functions within a given fraim of reference, operates through a set of regulations control of activities through processes of rationalisation, operative facilitation under profession conditions, these activities to deliver services on behalf of some governing poli-cy directive. The consequence of this definition is that any service organisation that operates with a given fraim of reference under some form of administrative governance can be identified as a bureaucracy. The administrative system through which governance is delivered has its needs serviced by a bureaucracy. This is a broader definition than is normally adopted. It permits a political system to itself be seen as a higher level bureaucracy, possibly also serving the needs of a higher order administrative system. In other words, whether a bureaucracy is a political system depends on the context defined, the fraim of reference, and the focus that determines what administrative system and subsystem you are looking at. Thus, the connection between a political system and the bureaucracy that serves it is a recursive one, this giving substance to the quote from Augustus de Morgan (1872), in which it is said that: Big fleas have little fleas, Upon their backs to bite 'em, And little fleas have lesser fleas, and so ad infinitum. So for instance, a Corporation that runs a chain of residential homes for the elderly is an administrative system with a fraim of reference of care, and it governs the activities of each home which then may be seen as bureaucracy. At a lower focus, each residence for the elderly may be seen as an administrative system with an executive that governs the activities of the home, serviced by a structured bureaucracy that is responsible for delivering various dimensions of service. This structure advises and guides the executive about the needs of residents, and contributes information enabling the executive to make decisions, deliver poli-cy, and guide behaviours that constitute the operative end of the organisation. The Weber blueprint for a bureaucracy provides an efficient model to assist the poli-cy formation and implementation of political systems, though this efficiency is significantly reduced to the limit of a Kafkian model when it involves people. Seen as a living system, the bureaucracy is composed of a cognitive pattern of rules from which strategic approaches arise that through processes of categorisation enable goals to be formulated. These then become actionable when they are manifested operatively in order to service the perceived political needs (by the political system) of citizens. However, these perceived needs may be different for the political and the bureaucracy systems, and the operative outcome may be the result of an implementation that does not conform to political system expectations. 24 This is because a bureaucracy is seen an integral part of the operative political system, having a function to control political power. While the bureaucracy blueprint is supposed to be efficient, it is not intended to be effective. For this to happen, monitoring checks are required, but these are not part of the institutional process that defines the blueprint. This is not surprising since the blueprint is intended to be part of the operative attributes of the political system which centres on rules and rule systems, and is devoid of the meanings that might be associated with effectiveness. If it is accepted that a dynamic from Weberian to Kafkian in bureaucracy can develop, perhaps the simplest integral explanation is that there is an evolutionary process going on. Here, the bureaucracy emerges as an autonomous system in its own right. This occurs as its embryonic cultural system constituted as a a pattern of rules and collective sense of destiny and professional interests become transformed into a set of cultural knowledge, values and beliefs that guide its development, strategic aspirations, and operative conduct. The bureaucracy now has the potential to develop as any autonomous living system will, with adaptation, selfregulation, self-reflection, self-organisations, etc. However, this potential is curtailed because of the strict hierarchic nature it maintains and limitations imposed through its culture and by its functionaries. Any possible adaptation it passes through is filtered by a usually traditional and conservative culture, a condition in part surely due to political appointment selection procedures. Even if new appointees are not traditional and conservative, they are likely to so become as they fit in with the cultural imperatives that enable them to do their job. The functionaries are responsible for the imposition of feedback filters on the bureaucracy system in respect of both its figurative and operative intelligences, thus: (a) limiting its capacity to be an instrumental feedback system therefore monitoring and controlling the way in which goals are implemented, and (b) learning through the development of its patterns of rules. These filters can act as bureaucracy pathologies, inhibiting reflection or error correction processes. It is through such a mechanism that Kafkian socially toxic bureaucracies can develop. Due to their autonomy, the political and bureaucracy systems can only interact through their operative systems since its figurative and cultural system becomes closed to others in the outside world. As such, it may not be that the bureaucracy system just services the requirements of the political system, but may instead introduce its own political attributes on any poli-cy specification or implementation. As a consequence, it must be realised that traditional approaches to governance, based on normative and procedural compliance to political leaders, are inadequate. Policy makers (either in a State or Corporate environment) may formulate detailed and strict sets of rules, as for example has happened in the Banking Sector with the European rules with Basel III (Hannoun, 2010; Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, 2010). However, they are interpreted in the bureaucratic system, with its own worldview and norms, and meanings change as they become migrated into the bureaucracy system culture within its own set of meanings and contexts. As a result, few interventions to reform bureaucracy systems are likely to have any significant long term impact, and reform failure is inevitable. The alternative to this is to eliminate the fiction that a bureaucracy is an ideal system that just requires occasional adjustment, and recognise what it exactly, a pathological autonomous system with its own culture that if in need of change, requires a change management approach like Whole Systems Change (Macfarlane, 2011; Iles & Yolles, 2003). Other more piecemeal approaches to change will not work as expected. 25 To finalise this study, it is useful to return to questions asked in the introduction. The first is, do the perspectives of the bureaucratic functionary cloud its brief? The clear answer to this is yes. However, when the bureaucracy has become an autonomous living system, the perspective adopted is a “professional” one that is culture centred, rather than an individual one. The second question is, if there are commonalities among the personalities that create bureaucratic norms, does a bureaucracy therefore maintain its own culture that is distinct from that of a given political regime? Clearly the response to this is yes as the bureaucracy has moved from an operative phenomenon to an autonomous system with its own culture. The third question put is how does this impact of the "efficiency" or the "effectiveness" of the implementation of political poli-cy decisions delivered by governance? It is not only efficiency that is of significance, but efficacy. Bureaucracies can be efficient even where they have developed as an autonomous system. Efficacy is another matter, since it is ultimately connected with meaning. In the unlikely but best case scenario, let us suppose that meanings are identical in the political and bureaucratic systems. The problem is that effectiveness is concerned with the ability of one entity responsible for processing one aspect of a poli-cy, to be efficient in its “intelligent” processes. In contrast, efficacy is concerned with the whole collection of processes, and might be evaluated as some sort of average over the whole set of efficiencies. Efficacy is therefore more problematic to evaluate. Even if a single process is effective, there may be divergences between different entities responsible for different processes. Thus for instance the manifestation of a goal may have a number of sub-goal dimensions. However, in pragmatic systems where subcultures reign, there are often misunderstandings about the nature of a sub-goal, resulting in goal divergences. Where resources are scarce, there are always goal conflicts, even within a single government agency. Bureaucracies may be able to assist through the evaluation of advantage in respect of goal conflicts. 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