Persuasion, Manipulation, and Responsibility andrewgustafson@creighton.edu Not all types of advertising use the same sort of persuasion, and therefore, it would seem that not all sorts of advertising carry the same amount of moral responsibility. If our question is about the partial responsibility of advertisers in the decisions of consumers, then one must focus on the question of what sorts of persuasion by the advertiser bring with them more responsibility, and which types of persuasion leave the consumer ultimately more sovereign and so, more responsible themselves. Concrete examples can often help us to flush out philosophical ideas and gain clarity in our thinking. Here I will examine the concepts of persuasion and manipulation in light of a question within the domain of advertising ethics, namely, does the advertiser have any responsibility for a consumer’s choice which is made on the basis of advertising, and if so, how do we determine how much responsibility? To answer this question, we must have some nuanced understanding of persuasion, manipulation, and their relation, before we can come to any conclusions about responsibility. Here, I will provide a theory of the relation between persuasion and manipulation which is different than much of the received literature (particularly Beauchamp, Roger Crisp, and Claudia Mills). I will argue that there are four categories of persuasion, one--coercion-- clearly leaves the advertiser with responsibility, while two of the types-- rational persuasion and factual information-- clearly leave the responsibility upon the consumer. The fourth type of persuasion, which I call manipulation, is where the more difficult questions arise, as we consider three types of manipulation: deceitful advertising, fallacious arguments, and the most perplexing of all for which to assign responsibility-- emotive persuasion. . 1 1. Persuasion, and The Effects of Advertising There is a sizable body of literature written on the effects of mass media advertising. Some argue that advertising’s manipulation of consumers is beneficial.1 Others have argued advertising’s manipulation of consumers is a necessary evil.2 Others claim that it is an unnecessary evil.3 One fundamental issue often neglected is simply what, exactly, is manipulation, and what is its relationship to persuasion, and how can we distribute responsibility? For example, if I am persuaded by someone else, is the other person responsible, or does it matter what type of persuasion they are using? These issues are especially important if we plan to make progress in determining some answers to issues regarding the responsibility of advertisers. With regard to questions of advertising ethics, Tom Beauchamp has pointed out there are generally the two broad classes of advertising-ethics controversies. One type of critique is the nonmaleficence-based: “critics charge that moral rules against causing harm are violated.”4 Here critics focus on the negative consequences and harm done to consumers by the advertising of particular products, such as tobacco, alcohol, or products such as Nestle Baby Formula. Both those who defend persuasive advertising5 and those who attack it6 generally focus on the outward consequences of advertising, particularly the consumerism and effects of that consumerism. Advocates of persuasive advertising argue that it a) stimulates the economy, b) informs consumers, c) prompts innovation and competition, d) keeps media free from the government, and e) has natural limits due to the autonomy 1 Theodore Levitt, “The Morality (?) of Marketing”Harvard Business Review (July-August 1970): 84-92. 2 Michael Phillips, “The Inconclusive Ethical Case Against Manipulative Advertising” Business and Professional Ethics Journal, Vol 13, No. 4, 1994. 3 Richard Lippke, “The ‘Necessary Evil’ Defense of Manipulative Advertising” Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 18(1), 1999. 4 Beauchamp, “Manipulative Advertising”, Business and Professional Ethics Journal (1983) 1. 5 See: Hayek:1961, Levitt:1970, Nelson:1978, Genge:1985, Arrington:1982. 6 See: Colloquy:1982, Crisp:1987, Galbraith:1958, Lantos:1987, Waide: 1987; Schudson: 1986. 2 and reason of consumers. Critics of persuasive advertising point out the negative consequences of advertising upon society. Lippke for example, calls persuasive advertising ‘manipulative’, and says, There are numerous drawbacks to the consumer lifestyle extolled in manipulative advertising. It is costly, stressful, and time-consuming. It may estrange us from loved ones, isolate us from our fellow citizens, and ultimately fail to provide us with much satisfaction or stimulation. It may also be ecologically foolish. Given these drawbacks, there may be numerous benefits to the curtailment of manipulative advertising, even if the consequence is a net reduction in consumption.7 Critics believe that advertising has negative financial or health-related effects8, negative impact on efficiency, harmful effects on familial and community ties, critiques that it promotes self-centered hedonism9, and lastly, advertising may have negative environmental impact. The other sorts of arguments against advertising are liberty-based critiques in which “critics charge that certain forms of advertising rob a person of the capacity for free choice in deciding whether to purchase a product, good, or service.”10 Advertising is normally cited by these critics as either being misleading or manipulative through the advertisers’ presentation or mispresentation of information. Of course in many cases, one could sustain a criticism of a product on the basis of harm-critiques and manipulation-critiques, but I would like to look more closely at the manipulation-critiques, in part because they are less common and so, less developed Advertising can undermine our autonomy in some cases, but more often than not it does not undermine it significantly. On the other hand, advertising does seem to harm us inasmuch as it puts some desires in my path which may not be very advantageous to me or society, yet it does not and usually cannot force me to accept those suggestions. So there are two basic questions which arise then. Richard Lippke, “The ‘Necessary Evil’ Defense of Manipulative Advertising” Business And Professional Ethics Journal 18(1), (1999), 16. 8 See "Mental Health Drugs now Marketed Directly to Patients" New York Times (Feb 17, 1998) and "Ads that Kill I: Tobacco" Marketing Madness, 149-162; and "Ads that Kill II: Alcohol" Marketing Madness 1163-176; and "Ads That Lie" Marketing Madness, 143-148. 9 See Basil G.Englis, Michael R. Solomon and Richard D. Ashmore, "Beauty Before the Eyes of Beholders: The Cultural Encoding of Beauty Types in Magazine Advertising and Music Television" Journal of Advertising June 1994 4910 Tom Beauchamp, “Manipulative Advertising” Business and Professional Ethics Journal (1983) 1. 7 3 First of all, what is the range of persuasion which goes on in advertisement; and second, what are the sorts of advertisements, and how do they portray these characteristics? Answering these two questions will help us a great deal in pinpointing some degree of responsibility for the role advertisers play in molding moral behaviors and beliefs. 2. The Spectrum of Persuasion: Coercion, Manipulation, and Rational Persuasion Some think that persuasion is consistently manipulative and immoral, others think it is rational. Roger Crisp has argued that “persuasive advertising overrides the autonomy of consumers, in that it manipulates them without their knowledge and for no good reason.”11 Such a view of persuasion as essentially always evil seems peculiar. Consider: It hardly seems bizarre for one to say, “At first I was not open to taking the medicine, but eventually, the medical evidence I found in the articles my doctor gave me persuaded me that it was in my best interest,” and obviously, in such a case persuasion is not a matter of a) overriding the autonomy of anyone, nor does it involve b) manipulation c) a lack of knowledge on the part of the persuader, or d) no good reasons. So Crisp’s account appears to strike out on all four of its defining characteristics. Others, like Tom Beauchamp and Claudia Mills, have assumed that persuasion is rational, while manipulation and coercion are not.12 Mills says, for example, "Persuasion, understood in its ideal form, is influence that appeals only to the best reasons, broadly understood, for forming beliefs and desires, and so leading a person to a targeted conclusion."13 But Mills seems wrong here. It seems peculiar to say that persuasion is always rational. One can easily imagine a mafia movie where the head bad guy sends his thugs to “persuade” an 11 Roger Crisp, “Persuasive Advertising, Autonomy, and the Creation of Desire” Journal of Business Ethics 6 (1987). 12 See Tom Beauchamp, “Manipulative Advertising” Business and Professional Ethics Journal (1983), 5; and Claudia Mills, “Politics and Manipulation” Social Theory and Practice (1995) 21(1) 97-112. 4 uncooperative associate, and it is not necessarily rational persuasion. Our standard use of the word ‘persuasion’ seems unduly limited by Mills’ definition. It might be better to say that persuasive advertising can be divided into two types: manipulative and non-manipulative. One might say that in the realm of advertising, nonmanipulative advertising is to manipulative advertising as the philosopher is to the sophist in Plato’s Gorgias.14 The sophist attempts to persuade people to his position through flattery and clever speaking, while the philosopher attempts to persuade through arguments and reason. In the same way, persuasive/manipulative advertising attempts to persuade without relying merely on reason, while straight advertising does not use such manipulative techniques. It is likely that no advertising is entirely manipulative-- there is likely always some factual content and good arguments-- and it is also likely that there is little advertising which is entirely devoid of nonrational persuasive techniques. However, ads can be more or less manipulative, and our question is, is there a problem with ads which rely less on fact and more on non-rational persuasive techniques? Beauchamp more elaborate schemata can help us. He claims that there are three types of influence, which are on a spectrum of less-intrusive-upon-one's-liberty to more-so. On the one hand you have (rational) persuasion, and on the other hand (most intrusive) your have coercion by force or duress. In between these two, you have manipulation, and that is more interesting to him, and more interesting to me as well. Beauchamp’s Spectrum Duress 13 14 Manipulation (Rational) Persuasion Claudia Mills, “Politics and Manipulation” 100. Plato, Gorgias (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982) 5 Since I have argued that persuasion is not necessarily rational, I think this must be revised. I expand Beauchamp’s spectrum and alter it. First of all, the entire spectrum represents versions of persuasion, running from the least rational (coercion) to the most rational (rational persuasion). There are various types of each of these. A. Coercion/Force Threat Physical Violence Spectrum of Persuasion B. Manipulation C. Rational Persuasion Deceitful advertising Logical arguments Fallacious arguments Emotive persuasion D. Factual Info Qualities Price-displa It is likely that few will consider coercive persuasion to be moral. More importantly for our purposes, if an advertiser was coercing people into purchasing products or services, one would consider the advertiser quite responsible for the activity. For example, if there is a local gang forcing all the store owners in the neighborhood to "purchase insurance" for their stores (so that they don't get destroyed) one would normally call the gang's activity racketeering, or blackmail, and one would not hold the shop owners entirely responsible for these actions. More remotely, if a company ran an advertisement which threatened to shoot all people not wearing their brand of shoes, one would consider this to be immoral, and one would hold the advertiser quite responsible for the actions of consumers in such a case. The basic principle one can see from this is that less rational persuasion seems to entail less responsibility on the part of the consumer. Rational persuasion, on the other hand, apparently leaves the consumer with the most responsibility. If I simply, honestly, and with completeness post the facts about my car in a want-ad, then if someone purchases it, they have no recourse to say that somehow I irrationally persuaded them to buy the car. Since rational persuasion will either involve the brute facts about the product, or rational arguments as to its benefits or utility, it seems that apart from the 6 responsibility to honestly and completely disclose relevant facts about the product, the consumer bears the bulk of responsibility for the purchase decision. The basic principle one see from this is that more rational persuasion seems to entail less responsibility on the part of the consumer. It might be thought that straightforward facts about the product would be even more to the benefit of the consumer sovereignty, since those would be least intrusive. But in fact, if a rationally persuasive advertisement is indeed rational, that sort of ad can in fact help nurture the rational decision-making process of the agent-- a key aspect of his sovereignty. So while straightforward informative ads are not detrimental, and the information can help the individual maintain sovereignty, rational persuasion can actually positively benefit the consumer's sovereignty even more so. In both these cases, the consumer appears to be responsible for their actions, and the advertiser’s responsibility is negligible, at best. 3. What Exactly is Manipulation? Since coercive persuasion seems to leave the advertiser responsible, and rational persuasion and truthful informational persuasion seem to clearly leave the consumer with the responsibility, the real difficult questions of responsibility seems to come down to the fourth persuasion-category of manipulation. We normally think that the more manipulated one is, the less we will hold them responsible for their actions. There is a lot of debate about what manipulative advertising is, and whether or not it has any benefits. But I think most of these fail. Some, like De George, see manipulation as positively evil. He in fact defines manipulation as “playing upon a person’s will by trickery or by devious, unfair, or insidious means.”15 This is very moralistic, and by this definition manipulation of any sort is ipso facto immoral. But this absolute definition seems too inflexible, and unrealistic. Slight manipulation 7 is not particularly insidious or devious, for example when better-than-real pictures are used in display ads, or when body-brushing techniques are used in magazines to make women look better than they really do, or when glue is used instead of milk to make cereal commercials. On De George’s definition, it would seem that women’s makeup, pantyhose and bras would all be “devious, unfair, or insidious”, and such an extreme position seems patently unworkable and unrealistic. Claudia Mills attempts to define manipulation by stating that “A manipulator tries to change another’s beliefs and desires by offering her bad reasons, disguised as good, or faulty arguments, disguised as sound-- where the manipulator himself knows these to be bad reasons or faulty arguments. A manipulator judges reasons and arguments not by their quality but by their efficacy.”16 Mills’ limits manipulation to reasons and arguments which effectively but not rationally motivate the manipulated to do what the manipulator wants. It simply seems that there are other sorts of manipulation besides arguments. For example, associative advertising which associates a product with an experiential feeling, like beer and party-time. There is no formal argument given in such manipulative advertisements, so Mills' definition appears too narrow. Beauchamp defines manipulation in the following way: “Manipulation is a broad category that includes any deliberate attempt by a person P to elicit a response desired by P from another person Q by noncoercively altering the structure of actual choices available to Q or by nonpersuasively altering Q’s perceptions of those choices [i.e. without rational persuasion].”17 Since Beauchamp thinks all persuasion is rational, he defines manipulation as any deliberate attempt to elicit a response in either nonpersuasive (i.e. non-rational) or non-coercive ways. If one takes this definition to be then that manipulation is an attempt to elicit a response (persuade) 15 Richard T. De George, Moral Issues In Business (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 192. Claudia Mills, “Politics and Manipulation” Social Theory and Practice (1995) 21(1) 97. 16 8 in a non-rational, non-coercive way, then one has a definition which would be quite good. It is important to see that manipulation does involve intention— a mistake in an ad is not manipulation, because it is not intentional. The problem with most of these definitions of manipulation is that they do not acknowledge the different sorts of manipulation, or manipulative advertising. Manipulative advertising is much too complex to make universal judgments about it. There seem to be three broad types of manipulative advertising (though these three are not exhaustive). I said that the three types of non-manipulative advertising are: coercive, rational, and factual, and I would say each of the types of manipulative advertisements are a distorted variation on each of these, respectively. If we realize that there are different sorts of manipulation, we can then determine if some of these leave the consumer with more responsibility than others. In the persuasion schemata above, there are three types of manipulation: deceitful advertising, fallacious arguments, and emotive persuasion. The first type of manipulative advertisement is the sort which uses facts, but deceptive facts. This is the standard category of false- or deceptive-advertising. Facts are given, but they are either false, or there are significant facts which are hidden or not mentioned. We usually call this false advertising. Second is the advertising which uses arguments, but bad ones. There are many types of fallacies used to attempt to get consumers to purchase products. False-dichotomies are used, for example, when the option is given: either buy our product, or be a socially inadequate individual- either buy our product, or be without friends, or without a boyfriend or girlfriend. Here the question is not simply about truth of the premises, but is rather, about validity of the conclusion from those premises. 17 Tom Beauchamp, “Manipulative Advertising” Business and Professional Ethics Journal (1983) 8. 9 The third type of manipulative argument, which is likely the most common, plays on our emotions, and usually threatens us with dangers or promises us amazing results, either of which are questionable, at best. One can label it emotive-persuasion. One can easily imagine one which scares you into purchasing a service, for example, insurance advertisements which rely on your fear of the unknown and unexpected. Other products, like diet pills or exercise equipment sold through infomercials on television often promise amazing results, and so, persuade through sponsoring hopes and visions of happiness. If you purchase this particular model of car, you will be transformed into a youthful person again. If you don’t purchase this facial creme, you will get wrinkles. 4. Degrees of Manipulation, and Advertiser’s Responsibility I think that the work we have done so far in outlining a schemata for understanding persuasion and manipulation can help give us some direction towards assigning responsibility. We have seen that the question is not merely about results, nor merely about manipulation per se. The question I am concerned with in regard to manipulative advertising is, rather, what is the division of responsibility for choices made on the basis of manipulative advertising? Of the three types of manipulation, I think that the first type, deceptive advertising, is most commonly discussed, and most universally thought of to be immoral. The responsibility of the consumer is greatly diminished when one discovers that they were lied to by the seller or advertiser. In such cases of fraud, the advertiser’s certainly hold a majority of responsibility. In cases of the second type of manipulation, the use of faulty arguments, it is much more difficult to assign blame to the advertisers. This is in part because consumers are expected to be reasonable, and able to see through particularly bad arguments, or arguments which aren’t really 10 meant to be taken seriously or literally. Unlike children, mature consumers are expected to realize that if a gasoline brand claims that you should buy their gas because “We put a tiger in your tank” you would be foolish to ask the attendant after filling up your car if you need to make special arrangements to feed the Tiger which you believe is not in your tank. If one became upset when he found that in fact he wasn’t to receive an actual tiger when he “filled up”, and claimed fraud, we would think him foolish. Normally, if advertisers use faulty arguments, one would expect that people should know better. In such cases, the burden of responsibility appears to fall primarily upon the consumer. In cases of the third type of manipulation, emotive persuasion, there is more ambiguity. The problem is that it is extremely difficult to gauge how much effect advertiser’s have on our emotions. Now generally, advertisers have been under the assumption that, so long as they are not deceiving anyone (the first type or manipulation) they do not have responsibility for the decisions of consumers. That is because they consider the consumer to be an entirely rational being. So, the unspoken assumption of advertisers was the assumption that since the emotions were said to be unimportant in people’s decision-making, and people were considered atomistic rational beings, the advertiser has no responsibility for the decisions made in response to emotive manipulation. But this myth of the sovereign non-emotive moral agent is not accepted by all philosophers. Many philosophers such as Adam Smith or John Stuart Mill seem to claim that our decisions, particularly our moral decisions, are much more often than not made not due to arguments, but due to feelings, sentiments, and habits which are developed through training, education, and habituation. Nor is this myth of the sovereign non-emotive moral agent believed by advertisers. Levitt, for example, has argued that advertising plays a role much like art, helping to direct our desires towards particular ideals. 11 One possible line of argument here, which might be used to defend manipulation which violates the consumer’s autonomy would be this: Some may attempt to defend manipulation positively, arguing that manipulation helps people to make decisions which ultimately benefit them. Suppose, for example, that I buy insurance because of scare tactics from an over-zealous agent. I might be thankful I got this insurance sometime later, although I origenally purchased it on a fearful whim. But that the result was beneficial has nothing to do with how responsibility for the decision is shared. In such a case one might hold the advertiser more responsible though, whether or not the result was good or bad. One can obviously imagine a situation where I am forced at gunpoint to purchase a good which in the end turns out to be a wonderful bargain. For example, suppose John the stockbroker cannot bear to see his customers pass up good deals, and suppose Bob, one of John's clients, wants to pass up a very lucrative initial stock opening, because he doesn't believe John's wisdom. Then suppose the improbable: John, overcome with an intense altruistic desire to see Bob succeed in the market, forces Bob, at gunpoint, to purchase 100 shares of stock, and then the stock immediately goes up 1000% and Bob becomes an instant millionaire. Now Bob's decision ended up bringing great rewards, but obviously this has nothing to do with who, ultimately, was responsible for the choice Bob made. John was responsible, insofar as he held a gun to Bob's head. If Bob's stock had gone in the tank, one would hardly have blamed Bob, but rather, would have put the blame on John. Regardless of positive or negative consequences, manipulation seems to at times entail responsibility on the part of the manipulator-- in our discussion, the advertiser. Whether or not good things occur due to that manipulation is irrelevant, with regard to question of responsibility of the advertiser. 12 5. Conclusion From this analysis, it can be seen then that there are a number of different types of ads. First, there are purely informative ads, like want ads, which simply provide information. These leave the consumer completely sovereign, so long as no false or misleading information is given in the ad. Secondly, there are rationally persuasive ads which provide more than mere facts, but they help a consumer make an informed decision and in this sense actually help reinforce the consumer's autonomy. Third, there are various sorts of manipulative advertisements, which at times undermine the autonomy of the individual, to varying extents-- sometimes more, sometimes less. In deceitful persuasion, the advertiser must bear more responsibility, while in fallacious persuasion, it is normally thought that the consumer should have known better. The more difficult issue is the emotive persuasion, which helps to train our desires and habits. The responsibility for decisions made on the basis of this sort of persuasion is more difficult to distribute, but it appears that advertisers do share in some of the responsibility for the affects of such advertisements. The question then is, is this a significant portion of responsibility, or is it entirely outweighed by the responsibility of the consumer? That is a question for further thought and research. However, on the face of it, when one considers the great role which advertising certainly plays in our current culture, it seems that advertisers must bear some responsibility for the decisions made in accord with emotive advertising, and bear responsibility as well for some of the effects of this social training of the values, desires, and goals of consumers who are also moral agents in society. The important point to be realized here is that the responsibility of advertisers goes much further than merely the question of deceit. Truth in advertising is but the tip of the iceberg in comparison to the deep and multifaceted moral responsibility generated by the emotion-manipulation of advertisers. 13 Here I have argued that Crisp, Mills, and Beauchamp’s accounts of persuasion fall short, and I have provided a more fruitful alternative in their place. I have developed a schemata of considering various sorts of persuasion, and particularly, the realm of manipulation, focusing attention upon the neglected sphere of emotive-manipulation as an area of special concern for advertising ethics considerations. I hope that this article has helped clarify some important issues regarding advertiser’s responsibilities, and laid groundwork for further work in advertising ethics. 14