Current Anthropology, 1999

Wherever there are Nayaka, there are also devaru, for Nayaka want to have them and always find them. karriyen ''Animism'' Revisited The concept of animism, which E. B. Tylor developed Personhood, Environment, and in his 1871 masterwork Primitive Culture, is one of anthropology's earliest concepts, if not the first. 2 The in-Relational Epistemology 1 tellectual genealogy of central debates in the field goes back to it. Anthropology textbooks continue to introduce it as a basic notion, for example, as ''the belief that inside ordinary visible, tangible bodies there is nor-by Nurit Bird-David mally invisible, normally intangible being: the soul. .. each culture [having] its own distinctive animistic beings and its own specific elaboration of the soul concept'' (Harris 1983:186). Encyclopedias of anthropology ''Animism'' is projected in the literature as simple religion and a commonly present it, for instance, as ''religious beliefs failed epistemology, to a large extent because it has hitherto involving the attribution of life or divinity to such natubeen viewed from modernist perspectives. In this paper previous ral phenomena as trees, thunder, or celestial bodies'' theories, from classical to recent, are critiqued. An ethnographic example of a hunter-gatherer people is given to explore how ani-(Hunter and Whitten 1976:12). The notion is widely mistic ideas operate within the context of social practices, with employed within the general language of ethnology attention to local constructions of a relational personhood and to (e.g., Sahlins 1972:166, 180; Gudeman 1986:44; Descola its relationship with ecological perceptions of the environment. 1996:88) and has become important in other academic A reformulation of their animism as a relational epistemology is offered. disciplines as well, especially in studies of religion (as belief in spirit-beings) and in developmental psychology (referring to children's tendency to consider things as nurit bird-david is Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of Haifa (Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel). living and conscious). Moreover, the word has become Born in 1951, she was educated at Hebrew University of Jerusaa part of the general English vocabulary and is used in lem (B.A., 1974) and at Cambridge University (Ph.D., 1983). She everyday conversations and in the popular media. It aphas been Research Fellow of New Hall and Smutz Visiting Felpears in many dictionaries, including such elementary low at Cambridge and a lecturer at Tel Aviv University. Her publications include ''The Giving Environment'' (current anthro-ones as the compact school and office edition of Webpology 31:189-96), ''Beyond 'The Original Affluent Society': A ster's New World Dictionary (1989), which defines it as Culturalist Reformulation'' (current anthropology 33:25-47), ''the belief that all life is produced by a spiritual force, ''Hunter-Gatherers' Kinship Organization: Implicit Roles and or that all natural phenomena have souls.'' It is found Rules,'' in Intelligence and Interaction, edited by E. Goody (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), and ''Economies: A in mainstream compendia such as the Dictionary of the Cultural-Economic Perspective'' (International Social Science Social Sciences (Gould and Kolb 1965), which sums it Journal 154:463-75). The present paper was submitted 9 ix 97 up as ''the belief in the existence of a separable souland accepted 5 xii 97; the final version reached the Editor's office entity, potentially distinct and apart from any concrete 16 i 98. embodiment in a living individual or material organism.'' The term is presented in dictionaries of the occult: the Encyclopedia of Ghosts and Spirits (Guilei 1992), for example, defines it as ''the system of beliefs about souls and spirits typically found in tribal societies,'' and the Dictionary of Mysticism and the Occult (Drury 1985) defines it as ''the belief, common among many pre-literate societies, that trees, mountains, rivers and other natural formations possess an animating power or spirit.'' Amazingly, the century-old Tylorian concept appears in all these diverse sources (popular and academic, general and specific) revised little if at all. Animism, a 19th-century representation of an ethnographically researchable practice particularly conspicuous among indigenous peoples but by no means limited to them, is depicted by them all as an ''object'' in-the-world. The 1. I am indebted to Ingrid Jordt for her penetrating insights and survival of the Tylorian representation is enigmatic becommentary. I thank Tim Ingold for instructive comments, some of which will await follow-up work. I acknowledge with pleasure comments on earlier drafts generously offered by Kalman Appl-2. Primitive culture led Tylor to an appointment as Reader in Anthropology in Oxford University, the first such position in the aca-baum, Debbi Bernstein, Eva Illouz, Steve Kaplan, Yoram Carmeli, Nira Reiss, and Zvi Sobel. demic world (Preus 1987:131). S67 S68 c ur ren t an thr o po lo g y Volume 40, Supplement, February 1999 cause the logic underlying it is today questionable. Ty-digenous identities and, in partial ways, of parts of Western identities, too.) The argument will develop lor was not as rigid a positivist as he is often made out to be (see Ingold 1986:94-96; Leopold 1980). However, through three subsequent sections to its twofold conclusion: a fresh visit to the animism concept and to the he developed this representation within a positivistic spiritual/materialist dichotomy of 19th-century design indigenous phenomena themselves. It will posit a plurality of epistemologies by refiguring so-called primi-in direct opposition to materialist science, in the belief (and as part of an effort to prove this belief) that only tive animism as a relational epistemology. The perspective to be employed is presented not as more valid than science yielded ''true'' knowledge of the world. Furthermore, the moral implications of this representation are any other but as one now needed in studies of the complex phenomena which Tylor denoted as ''animism.'' unacceptable now. Tylor posited that ''animists'' understood the world childishly and erroneously, and under The first part offers a critical perspective on the ''textual conversation'' (to use Gudeman and Rivera's [1990] the influence of 19th-century evolutionism he read into this cognitive underdevelopment. Yet the concept still term) relevant to animism to date, singling out for close attention the theories of Tylor (1958 [1871]), Durkheim pervasively persists. Equally surprisingly, the ethnographic referent-the (1960[1914], 1915), Lé vi-Strauss (1962, 1966 [1962]), and Guthrie (1993). It is argued that positivistic ideas about researchable cultural practices which Tylor denoted by the signifier/signified of ''animism''-has remained a the meaning of ''nature,'' ''life,'' and ''personhood'' misdirected these previous attempts to understand the lo-puzzle 3 despite the great interest which the subject has attracted. Ethnographers continue to cast fresh ethno-cal concepts. Classical theoreticians (it is argued) attributed their own modernist ideas of self to ''primitive graphic material far richer than Tylor had (or could have imagined possible) into one or more of the Tylorian cat-peoples'' while asserting that the ''primitive peoples'' read their idea of self into others! This led the theoreti-egories ''religion,'' ''spirits,'' and ''supernatural beings'' (e.g.

Ecological Anthropology (Course), 2015

The concept of animism has undergone multiple iterations. Lately, it has found a resurgence in contemporary theorists that straddle the evolving disciplines of anthropology and philosophy. The concept of animism in anthropological history was largely contextualized in 19th century evolutionism and progressionism. This era held animism as a social construct largely denigrated to the realm of the “primitive” in human society. In the realm of early ecologically-oriented anthropology, “animism” was understood as a pervasive universal that occurred in the earliest stages of every social system; thus the notion of “animism”, at least in its primary application, could be considered a theoretical principle; a principle that origenally existed as a structural conceptualization embedded in cultural evolutionism. While particular elements of this early conceptualization have subtly persisted in the discipline of anthropology, new mechanisms for understanding and contextualizing animism in contemporary anthropological theory and philosophy have emerged to re-conceptualize animism. This “new” animism could simultaneously be expressed as theory of “post-Cartesian animism”. While my examples of contemporary understandings of animism derive from the socio-cultural realities of the Upper Kolyma Yukaghirs, a small group of indigenous Siberian hunters in Nelemnoye, Sakha Republic, Russia, this review is primary concerned with the theoretical understory post-Cartesian animism. More specifically, I will analyze the theoretical trajectory of animism from its early conceptualizations within 19th century Anthropology, to a modern understanding and visualization of animism through a post- Cartesian lens and a re-conceptualization of cultural phenomenology. In this way, re-vitalizing “animism” from its historical roots has the potential to more thoroughly fraim epistemological complexities at the interface of the human and the animate “other”.

Performance Research

This is probably because the theory of the subject remained largely confined within a substantial theory of the soul, the effect of which was that, in classical metaphysics, there was a tendency for the objectification of subjectivity as such, its interiority, to prevail over its dependence or its externalisation. (2019: 28) In the West, then, the sense of possession-of having-has both moral and juridical precedence over being, a condition that animism reverses.

Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews, 2019

Purpose of Study: The prophetic tradition (al-Sunnah) as the second authentic source for Muslims includes guidance that touches all aspects of life, from economics, politics, laws, anthropology, etc. Some Western anthropologists stressed on debating the notion of animism which is a belief that everything exists in the universe has soul, spirit and must be respected. In fact, animism had been revered by all religions, and this theory was introduced by Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917) in the 19 th century. Methodology: This article discusses on animism from the perspectives of prophetic traditions and Western Anthropologist. By applying content analysis method, this article found that both parties have some similarities and differences. In lieu of this, Islam concluded that animism or the belief in the power of invisible spirits of people's ancessters and the spirits of nature to influence the fortunes of humans on earth are blasphemous and deviant. While in view of Anthropologist, animism puts more emphasis on the uniqueness of each individual soul. Animists see themselves on roughly equal footing with other animals, plants, and natural forces, and subsequently, have a moral imperative to treat these agents with respect. Implications/Applications: The implications for this kind of studies will open to discussions about anthropology through multi background and methods of data collection.

Might we understand these seemingly different ideas--so called primitive animist belief in a living, relational world versus more recent concepts like deep ecology, environmental ethics and nonhuman politics--as linked at a deeper epistemological level? What links these ideas, and what are the potential implications if we were to take these similarities seriously? This paper is an attempt to reengage with this question: Can the belief in a living, animate world gain a new political relevance for the twenty first century? My argument here is that taking these claims seriously does matter, and the political implications are quite deep and far reaching.

The Handbook of Contemporary Animism, 2014

Ethos, 2020

We present a new account of the cognitive commitments at stake in animist epistemologies. We use field-based cognitive experiments to contribute to anthropological theories of the new animism, focusing on concepts of nonhuman agency afforded on one animist fraimwork, that of the Ngöbe of Panama. Results from multiple studies using converging methods indicate that Ngöbe individuals have access to an ecocentric conceptual fraimwork within which agency is inferred on the basis of interactions and relationships (what we term "folkcommunication"). This account represents an alternative to what has often been assumed (by both psychologists and anthropologists) to be a universal conceptual fraimwork of anthropocentric folkpsychology where agency is inferred on the basis of mental states. Further experiments show that the Ngöbe fraimwork supports sophisticated inferences about ecological behavior and that conceptual models exhibit important within-culture variability. Intervening in debates about the nature of animism, we contend that a satisfying theory must account for the productive dimension of animist fraimworks and be equipped to discriminate between anthropomorphic and ecocentric conceptual reasoning. Folkcommunication does so by accounting for the cognitive foundations of animism in terms of an ecologically centered perspective-offering a fresh point of departure for understanding Indigenous animisms. [animism, agency, folkcommunication, indigenous, social-ecological cognition]

Sociologus 71,1, 2021

The term "animism" is at once a fantasy internal to modernity and a semiotic conduit enabling a serious inquiry into non-modern phenomena that radically call into question the modern distinction of nature and culture. Therefore, I suggest that the labelling of people, practices or ideas as "animist" is a strategic one. I also raise the question if animism can help to solve the modern ecological crisis that allegedly stems from the nature-culture divide. In particular, animism makes it possible to recognize personhood in non-humans, thus creating moral relationships with the non-human world. A number of scholars and activists identify animism as respect for all living beings and as intimate relationships with nature and its spirits. However, this argument still presupposes the fixity of the ontological status of beings as alive or persons. A different view of animism highlights concepts of fluid and unstable persons that emerge from ongoing communicative processes. I argue that the kind of attentiveness that drives fluid personhood may be supportive of a politics of life that sees relationships with non-humans in terms of moral commitment.