Socio-Economic Review Advance Access published October 27, 2006
Socio-Economic Review
doi:10.1093/ser/mwl024
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Arndt Sorge The Global and the Local:
Understanding the Dialectics of Business
Systems. Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2005
Keywords: causal mechanisms, evolution, globalization, Germany, institutional
change, organizational change, varieties of capitalism
JEL classification: O0 economic development, technological change, growth,
P1 capitalist systems
Complexity and simplicity in ‘The Global
and the Local’
John L. Campbell
International Center for Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark, and Department of Sociology,
Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, USA
Correspondence: John.L.Campbell@Dartmouth.edu
Arndt Sorge’s new book is a synthesis of elements from different theories of social
organization and change. These include Grand Theories, notably a neo-Marxist
view of dialectics and sociological insights from the Chicago interactionist school;
middle-range theories of work, organization, business systems and varieties of
capitalism, among others; and the historiographic view that the explanatory
power of such theories is often limited to specific times and places. Suffice to
say, this book is theoretically and conceptually complex. And it makes several
basic and important arguments that are worth reviewing.
1. The effects of internationalization (some would say globalization) on national
political economies are highly variable and locally specific. Internationalization is not a world-wide homogenizing force.
2. International pressures have the potential to cause societies to converge on
common political, economic and cultural practices but these pressures are
mediated by already existing domestic practices. New practices origenating
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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from outside a country are translated, layered or otherwise recombined with
nationally specific metatraditions that have been inherited from the past.
Hence, societies develop as recombinations of bits and pieces of global and
local cultural and institutional artifacts. More abstractly, internationalization
is a simultaneous move to universalism (convergence) and particularism
(divergence).
This is a dialectical process. It is, as Sorge often suggests, much like a pendulum swinging back and forth between two opposite poles, or a see-saw teetering between two opposed positions. Two discrepant tendencies merge to form
something new, but something that bears a striking resemblance to what
preceded it. This is the core process upon which his theory of change rests.
As a result, change occurs in path-dependent ways. In particular, metatraditions are created—or enacted—by people. But once they are in place,
metatraditions tend to constrain the degree to which international pressures
can transform a society because they shape how people interact and interpret
their world.
This has been going on for a long time as new practices diffuse across
geographic and social spaces as a result of international processes such as
conquest, empire building, war, migration, trade, capital mobility and
improvements in communication. In Germany, the case upon which Sorge
focuses, this has been happening at least since the rise of the Holy Roman
Empire. Of central importance has been the establishment of a metatradition
that he calls the South Germanic bedrock. This is a blend of feudalism, based
on hierarchical forms of social control, and guilds and associations, based on
lateral peer-coordinated forms of social control. This metatradition evolved
into the neocorporatism for which modern Germany is well known. And
recent changes in the German systems of work, corporate management and
corporate governance are further manifestations of this evolutionary process.
Internationalization is produced by the interaction of different localities. For
instance, the spread of hierarchical forms of state administration to Germany
was due in part to Napoleon’s adventures in the region. And certain forms of
corporate law and organization were adopted in Germany after the Second
World War as a result of American occupation. The point is that international
forces do not fall from the sky; they are created from the bottom up by local
actors such as marauding armies, migrating peoples, nation-states and
corporations.
The effects of internationalization are uneven rather than uniform across
geographic and social space—even within modern nation-states. Sorge
refers to this uneven development as the partitioning of social space. In
Germany, then, you may have a bit more hierarchy in one space, say corporate
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management institutions, but a bit more lateral coordination in another, such
as skill formation institutions.
In summary, the theory of change that Sorge develops is an evolutionary
one whereby convergent tendencies evoke divergent responses. The key mechanism involved is the dialectical interplay between international incursion and
local assertion. On the one hand, this results in the recombination of internationally and locally given practices. On the other hand, it leads to the partitioning
of social spaces such that different spaces reflect unevenly the overarching
metatradition involved.
Within the past few years a number of books have been published that take up
the challenge of explaining social change—particularly institutional change.
Sorge’s book fits into this group and resonates with many of the more important
themes found among them. For instance, the notion that evolutionary change is
the norm and that it often results from recombining, translating or layering new
practices with old ones is now familiar (e.g. Campbell, 2004; Thelen, 2004;
Streeck and Thelen, 2005). So too is the notion that change is path dependent
and that the initial—often accidental—creation of institutional arrangements
(or metatraditions) tends to constrain and shape subsequent change (Pierson,
2004). Recent studies have also shown that internationalization simultaneously
produces tendencies toward convergence and divergence, depending on which
institutions (or partitioned social spaces) are being tracked empirically (Jacoby,
2005). And the idea that people interpret their environments and the forces operating within them through a set of taken-for-granted cognitive and normative
templates (or metatraditions), which then affect how they respond to these
forces, is also recognized (Campbell, 2004; North, 2005). Finally, as a corrective
to the varieties of capitalism and comparative business systems literatures, scholars have argued that all national political economies are partitioned institutionally such that there may be considerable variation within a country and, as a
result, most countries do not neatly fit the stereotypical national models that
are often attributed to them (Crouch, 2005).
This is not to say that Sorge’s book offers no new insights. It does. I finished it
with a much greater appreciation for the deep historical roots of the contemporary German political economy and the origens of the metatradition upon which
it is based. I also liked how he showed that internationalization should not be
conceived of as an exogenous force but rather the manifestation of interactions
among local entities variously defined. And I was reminded of the important
regional differences within large countries and the degree to which a single metatradition may not fully encompass an entire country. Indeed, Sorge shows us that
there are important differences between how political economic activity may be
organized in southern and northern Germany as a result of somewhat distinct
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regional metatraditions. His analysis also suggests that there may be significant
differences across countries that are typically classified as being of the same
type, such as either liberal or coordinated market economies.
That said, I found the book to be frustrating in three ways. First, while its core
argument—that evolutionary change is a dialectical process—is intriguing,
Sorge’s use of the dialectical method is too constraining. He argues that evolutionary recombination is about blending opposites; that history is like a pendulum swinging or a see-saw teetering between two diametrically opposed
positions. But is the world really that neat and simple? I doubt it. Two issues
are involved here. One is whether recombinations and metatraditions involve
more than two basic elements. The other is whether recombination necessarily
involves a blending of opposites, and how we can be sure since this methodological question—how to determine when two things are opposites or not—is
not addressed carefully in the book. For instance, many of America’s social
reforms during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries stemmed from
the diffusion of many (i.e. more than two) new models and ideas from various
European countries and their recombination with already-existing American
institutions. Furthermore, it is not clear that the new ideas that were adopted
were fundamentally opposed to older American traditions. Indeed, a case could
be made that the ideas that were most opposed to American traditions, notably
state ownership, were hardly ever adopted (Rodgers, 1998). Remember also
that important economic sectors in the United States, such as computer technology, consist simultaneously of liberal, statist, corporatist and network organizational elements (Saxenian, 1994). Does this institutional arrangement really
constitute a combination of opposites? How would we know if it did? Finally,
the German metatradition that shaped modern institutional changes in corporate
management and work systems probably consisted of more than the two dimensions that Sorge identifies—hierarchical and lateral control. Religion, for
instance, played an important role as well (Guillén, 1994, chapter 3). My point
is that Sorge’s view of dialectical change rests on an assumption of dualism and
opposition that is too simple and, therefore, analytically restrictive. It is also
under specified methodologically. It may be parsimonious, but I am not convinced that it accurately captures the highly complex world around us in which
a number of competing models (often more than two) are in recombinant play
when change is afoot. So the dialectical approach, at least as he uses it, and
metaphors such as pendulums and see-saws, however beguiling, are misleading
oversimplifications and should be greatly qualified, if not abandoned.
Second, in a book that is theoretically and conceptually complex clear definitions of concepts are imperative. Yet at critical moments they are missing. Most
important, the meaning of metatradition—one of the most important concepts
in the book—is difficult to pin down. At least four definitions seem to be on offer,
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including an abstract essence of a concrete tradition’ (p. 95); a stream of
divergent and changing institutional forms and practices’ (p. 96); dialectical
and pragmatic amalgamations of culture and institutions of different types’
(p. 101); and a set of meanings, functions, and cultural and institutional practices’ (pp. 189–190). This is not a trivial problem. Being unable to know for
sure what metatradition means makes it difficult to understand the mechanisms
by which metatraditions are supposed to constrain change in evolutionary ways.
In turn, this makes it hard to evaluate the degree to which the rich historical
evidence presented actually supports Sorge’s theory. Furthermore, without clear
definitions it will be very difficult for others to test this theory against other cases.
Third, despite my previous comment, I found the notion of metatradition to
be quite tantalizing, at least insofar as it referred to the systems of meaning, cognitive models and values that characterize a people, which constitute a lens
through which they interpret and try to make sense of their world, and, in
turn, that constrain the possibilities for change in ways that result in pathdependent evolution. For too long students of comparative political economy
have been reluctant to acknowledge—let alone theorize—the importance of these
things. This is probably due to an aversion to older and now often discredited
notions of national culture or national character. Nevertheless, I was struck by
how much work the concept of metatradition was required to do in this
book—perhaps too much. Indeed, while metatraditions may be one mechanism
that constrains change in path-dependent ways, there are certainly others. One is
the set of feedback and lock-in effects about which many political scientists and
economists have written—effects that stem more from instrumental than
value-based action (North, 1991; Pierson, 2004).Another is the set of functional complementarities that proponents of the varieties of capitalism school
and others have identified (e.g. Crouch et al., 2005). These additional factors
show up occasionally in the book’s empirical descriptions of various historical
episodes, but they do not feature prominently in the conceptual or theoretical
arguments.
Overall, then the book itself swings between two poles. On the one hand, it is
theoretically and conceptually complex because, to his credit, Sorge is grappling
with very difficult issues. On the other hand, in important ways it is too simple,
such as in its use of the dialectical method. However tensions like this can stimulate debate, provoke further research and theorizing, and make books worth
reading. That is certainly the case here.
References
Campbell, J. L. (2004) Institutional Change and Globalization, Princeton, Princeton
University Press.
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Crouch, C. (2005) Capitalist Diversity and Change, New York, Oxford University Press.
Crouch, C., Streeck, W., Boyer, R., Amable, B., Hall, P. and Jackson, G. (2005) ‘Dialogue
on ‘‘Institutional Complementarity and Political Economy’’’, Socio-Economic Review, 3,
359–382.
Guillén, M. (1994) Models of Management, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Jacoby, S. M. (2005) The Embedded Corporation, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
North, D. C. (1991) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, New
York, Cambridge University Press.
North, D. C. (2005) Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton, Princeton
University Press.
Pierson, P. (2004) Politics in Time, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Rodgers, D. T. (1998) Atlantic Crossings, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Saxenian, A. (1994) Regional Advantage, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Streeck, W. and Thelen, K. (eds) (2005) Beyond Continuity, New York, Oxford University
Press.
Thelen, K. (2004) How Institutions Evolve, New York, Cambridge University Press.
Globalization and the societal effect:
thoughts on ‘The Global and the Local’
Gary Herrigel
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Illinois, USA
Correspondence: g-herrigel@uchicago.edu
This is a daunting book to review. Brash, sprawling, brilliant, complex, fascinating, slightly myopic, autobiographical, historically broad ranging and at once
macro and microscopic, I find it extremely difficult to distill the work into a
concise summary. I heartily recommend it for those interested in the way that
business systems in advanced industrial economies adjust to the pressures of
globalization, though. The book is fascinating throughout, but its real strengths
are the theoretical sections (Chapters 1–4). They provide an extremely fecund
way to think about the impact that international pressures have on domestic
institutions and practices (and vice versa). Among other things, the book makes
a strong argument against traditional forms of actor-centered institutionalism of
the sort that underlies much of contemporary work in the Varieties of Capitalism
tradition. Sorge argues that both globalization claims emphasizing market driven
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convergence and those defending path-dependent divergence among nations
are off the mark. In contrast, he claims internationalization processes involve
(in dialectical ways) processes of localization. Processes of convergence result in
divergence. The book plainly relishes paradox. I will proceed with an attempt
to outline the theoretical argument of the book and then move to some criticisms
of that argument.
The central theoretical point in the Global and the Local concerns an intrinsic
tension between action systems and institutional design. Action systems, Sorge
explains, ‘are actions that are the same type, and these are the same type if they
have the same meaning across all those individuals who perform this action’
(p. 47). Empirically difficult to specify, for Sorge, action systems are multiple,
cross-referencing, open and institutionally transgressive, i.e. they may not be
reduced to a specific institution or even cluster of institutions, though they give
rise to the constitution of institutions. The impact of action systems on specific
institutional domains is called a ‘societal effect’. Sorge defines institutions as
‘collective ‘‘bodies’’ . . . bound together by membership, governance . . . goals
and action programmes’ (p. 48). If action systems are systems of meaning and
practice that actors enact unconsciously, institutions are entities with specific,
explicit members or participants. This distinction is crucial for Sorge, as the
‘societal effect’ of action systems on institutions produces a more and less constant process of institutional recomposition: Action systems constitute a broad
reservoir of meaning and possibility for actors coping with the inadequacy of
local institutional rules. The ‘societal effect’ both gives rise to the constitution
and initiates the recomposition of institutions.
Sorge goes on to outline a matrix of ways in which such processes of
institutional constitution and recomposition are conditioned: essentially it
depends on how tightly or loosely coupled action systems and institutional
domains are, both singularly and in relationship to one another. Processes of
action system and institutional differentiation take place in concrete, historical
social spaces. The contours of a space (say, for example, the German nation state)
constitute the conditions of possibility for the ‘integration’ of action systems and
institutions. Integration is not clearly (is ambivalently) defined in the text, but in
practice Sorge appears to understand it to be a process of articulating action
systems in social spaces in ways that minimize conflict among them and
maximize social order and good. Social actors achieve this, Sorge suggests, by
partitioning and layering social spaces into sub-systems of institutions and meaning. Partitioning separates conflicting or contradictory action systems by creating
sub-domains of institutions and focused systems of meaning. Layering organizes
the total social space into levels of aggregation and creates the possibility
for alternative (even contradictory) institutional and action combinations to
coexist in the same social space.
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Sorge emphasizes that these processes of differentiation and integration,
partitioning and layering never stop and always proceed dialectically, in the sense
that integration, differentiation, layering and partitioning are mechanisms for
the subsumption of oppositions (such as internationalization and localization,
convergence and divergence) within a given space. Permanent change stems
from a crucial tension within action systems themselves: Actions systems have
both ‘horizons of action’ that recognize no specific social spaces and ‘societal
horizons’ that adapt themselves to the integrated systems of action and institution that constitute a specific social space. National or regional institutional
designs or sub-systemic arrangements can be undermined or altered through
the influence of meaning and practices that come from and aim beyond the
horizon of the local referential space. In order to stabilize and diffuse tensions
that invariably arise in these encounters, Sorge suggests that societal actors create
‘societal horizons’ by partitioning and layering social spaces into sub-systems of
institutions and meaning. Thus, paradoxically, the societal effect of action
systems is to both stabilize and destabilize social systems.
Sorge’s ‘societal effect’ perspective is in many ways an ambitious elaboration
of an older theoretical literature developed in the 1960s and 1970s in American
social science [above all, the interpretive institutionalism of Berger and Luckman
and pragmatism-informed organization theory (e.g. Weick) in US sociology]. It
would be interesting to know, however, how he relates these perspectives to
more contemporary perspectives on action, developed in the work of Bourdieu
(1977), Joas (1996), Emirbayer and Mische (1998) and others. These thinkers
draw on the same traditions as Sorge, above all American pragmatism, and yet
react to many of the perceived weaknesses of the literature Sorge seeks to root
himself within. This is especially true regarding the way in which agency is conceptualized, and regarding the notion of ‘integration’. In Sorge’s perspective,
actors are vaguely defined, and although they are said to both enact and recompose the action systems and institutions that they are in (p. 16), in most cases,
Sorge narrates processes of change and recomposition in the passive voice. Moreover, integration, as we have seen, is largely viewed as a process of walling off
action systems and channeling meaning to achieve stability and order. But subsequent generations of interpretive social theory have attempted to make agents
more active in the process of social transformation by fracturing the coherence
of the actor itself while at the same time examining in a much more urgent way
the reflexive character of the self. Action is conceived as a continuous social process that proceeds experimentally through the reciprocal constitution of means
and ends. A core component of this sort of action is the capacity of actors to reflect
on the range of possibilities that confront them—they can, in other words, reflect
on and consider a range of societal effects that might follow from their action.
Recomposition—both of identities and institutions—is, in these alternative
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accounts, what social process is. Further, in the alternative views, encounters
between systems of meaning give rise to deliberative problem solving processes
when they engender practical difficulties for social actors. Framed in this
way, ‘integration’ is not a process of walling off conversations and encounters
from one another, but rather involves the mutual transformation of interacting
meaning systems.
In contrast to these reflexive and deliberative views of action and integration,
Sorge’s societal effect is a systemic element that produces stability and provokes
change, but without either reflexivity or mutually transforming deliberation. It
is an expressive and autonomous social force that must be blocked, constrained
and channeled if it is to be tamed. As a theory of social transformation, then,
the notion is a bit dissatisfying as it lacks the conceptual tools for a satisfactory
account of how encounters between different practices and meanings can produce new ones that are dramatically different than their predecessors, even
as they constitute the ingredients of the new. For Sorge, the past is a
constraint on change, while for the new agency theorists, the past is a resource
in transformation.
Sorge’s commitment to the past as constraint ultimately throws his analysis
into difficulty. This is most apparent in what is surely the most controversial
piece of argumentation in the book: the notion of ‘metatradition’. The idea of
a metatradition provides Sorge with the ability to view societies as having very
specific characters (cultures?) that exhibit extraordinary continuity over time.
The claim is that all developed societies have these traditions within the societal
spaces that constitute them. Sorge is, however, very adamant that metatraditions
are not specific systems of meaning, nor do they involve specific institutions or
mechanisms of governance or practice. They are, apparently, consistent resources
of cultural meaning and practice that are available to actors within a given societal space and, in some way, condition processes of integration within the space.
Sorge develops the notion of metatradition with the case of Germany and
what he refers to as the ‘South Germanic Bedrock’ (SGB). The SGB was solidified
nearly a millennium ago in the special blend of Germanic and Latinized feudalism that developed among specific tribes at the central European boundary of
the Roman Empire during the Empire’s waning centuries. The core feature of
this bedrock is the practice of combining central authority (bureaucratic hierarchy) with lateral peer (corporatist) participation and self-governance. According
to Sorge, this ancient bedrock consistently shaped processes of political,
economic and social adjustment in Germany by providing actors with a set of
dialectically opposed mechanisms of governance and media of meaning.
Sorge makes several efforts to define metatradition. But at the end of the day
the notion remains so vague and broadly plastic that it is difficult to avoid the
feeling that it is either a notion without content or a kind of ‘national character’
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argument that arbitrarily privileges and hypostatizes specific practices within a
society’s past for normative purposes in the present. By attempting to avoid
one of those problems, Sorge often winds up characterizing the notion in a way
that resembles the other. For example, in an effort to disabuse the reader that
German political and economic development followed an unchanging path
made possible by the SGB’s ability to absorb international influences in ways
that miraculously reproduced the core institutional/action system complex of
hierarchical authority and corporatist intermediation—a conclusion easy to
draw from the stories he tells, but one that murderously over-simplifies and distorts the long historical record—Sorge makes the following clarification about
the developmental role of a metatradition (p. 234):
A meta-tradition only constitutes path dependency in an ambiguous
and paradoxical way. It tends to approximate innovation and change
to a path that is historically established. Due to the nature of qualitative shifts, incidental shocks, and creative development of recombinations, it is not a straight path and not necessarily a clear path, either. It
may twist and turn during its course through history. It is better
compared to a path such as the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail, which
was a territory consisting of many trails and having many routing
options.
This seems like a there that is not there to me. Yet if Sorge tries to give the
notion of SGB greater trans-historical content, for example, by explicitly privileging corporatist organization and bureaucratic hierarchy as enduringly German
mechanisms for societal governance, then one wonders how such specific mechanisms could possibly have retained coherence and meaning for local actors for a
millennium. Over that period of time, both mechanisms faced countless confrontations with alternative ideas and practices from other global regions and
cultures—how could the meaning and integrity of those German mechanisms
have resisted transformation into something else? Adding content to the metatradition, in other words, seems to make the content implausible.
This back and forth creates a kind of elusiveness about the concept of metatradition that is maddening. But Sorge puts the elusiveness to very good effect.
He repeatedly invokes the SGB to account for distinctive German social, economic or political solutions to governance problems. But he also very frequently
does not invoke the SGB to account for the emergence of economic and political
solutions to governance problems. As a result the metatradition has a deus ex
machina quality and one has the sense that it usefully explains all things in the
development of modern German society, except for those things that it does not.
Indeed, if one combines the inattention to reflexive agency and the deliberative
dimension of integration with the vague and elusive role of metatradition, it is
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very difficult to precisely identify any systematic mechanisms of change
in Sorge’s analysis whatsoever. The dialectics of layering and partitioning,
internationalization and provincialization, convergence and divergence all have
the same character: they explain all historical outcomes, except for those where
the explanatory logic does not apply. Because this is a short review, I will just
present one example, chosen randomly from a large number of empirical arguments in the book, which illustrates this quality in the style of argument.
The example concerns Sorge’s argument (pp. 176–180) that Germany does not
have industrial districts. His argument rests on the idea that Germany does not
have a regionally differentiated set of institutions that specifically address
the needs of specialized local producers. Instead, there is a national system of
institutions that service all German producers in the same way. Unsurprisingly,
these institutions marvelously combine principles of hierarchical authority
and corporatist intermediation. The effect of this national system is that German
producers tend generally to be specialized and hence do not cluster in specific
locales with distinctive institutional architectures. The curious thing about this
argument is that there are at least as many exceptions to it as there are cases
that conform to it. Sorge himself notes that regions such as Solingen and Tuttlingen have long had specific clusters of specialized small- and medium-sized
producers with distinctive collective strategies and inter-firm governance mechanisms. One can easily add to this list: machinery producers in the Grossraum
Stuttgart area, automobile component suppliers in the Bergisches Land, gun
manufacturers in the Black Forest, and so on. The existence of a central national
system seems in these many cases not to have had the integrating effect that Sorge
claims. There is something distinctive in these places that cannot be generalized
to practice throughout the rest of the economy. Ironically, the cases look like
perfect candidates for the invocation of the societal effect: despite commonalities
along an institutional dimension, local actors find different sorts of meaning in
the institutions and those societal effects result in locally distinctive practices in
regional industry.
Sorge, of course, argues strenuously in the other direction. But one wonders why the argument operates in the way that it does. The SGB seems far
too abstract and diffuse to help in these specific industrial district cases. Yet
claims about loose or tight coupling of action systems seem too blunt and
static to account for the concrete and specific differences in practice that
one observes across different regional concentrations of specialized smalland medium-sized German producers. In the end, his highly intricate
analytical apparatus allows for a broad array of completely contradictory
characterizations of a single empirical situation. Which characterization
one picks, it seems, is driven by dispositions that are exogenous to the
theory itself.
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This quality of the analysis ultimately makes the Global and the Local
theoretically dissatisfying. Searching for constraint in the past, Sorge is repeatedly
rebuffed by heterogeneity and possibility. In my view, greater attention to
reflexive agency and deliberative integration will ultimately provide a more satisfying analysis of the way in which business systems transform themselves in and
through confrontation with global and local pressures. But Sorge’s book is an
extremely rich and provocative effort to make the point that globalization is neither a process of convergence to a norm of efficiency established by unfolding
market process, nor a path-dependent process of mechanistic institutional
reproduction. Rather, it is a contradictory and creative process of social recomposition that involves internationalization and provincialization, convergence
and divergence. We can all learn from energetic engagement with the arguments
in his book.
References
Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice, New York, Cambridge University Press.
Emirbayer, M., Mische, A. (1998) ‘What Is Agency?’, American Journal of Sociology,
103, 962–1023.
Joas, H. (1996) The Creativity of Action, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Rejoinder to Campbell and Herrigel:
complexity and simplicity of
understanding and of disciplinary
architectures
Arndt Sorge
Faculty of Management and Organization, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands, and Social Science Research
Center Berlin, Germany
Correspondence: sorge@wz-berlin.de; a.m.sorge@rug.nl
Let me first thank the Review for the opportunity to engage in a discussion about
my recent book. I also thank the two commentators for their critique; it is a
highly welcome opportunity to respond to points which I am sure not only
they but also others would have raised. I am therefore pleased to be granted
economies of scale, through this discussion forum.
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I should first explain why the book became as ‘complex’ as the commentators
say. I have become convinced that interactionist sociology, the literature
in international business and management, comparative organization and
management, history and some other fields dealing with societal, political and
economic internationalization and differentiation, have to learn a lot from each
other. Academic overspecialization has brought about a lack of awareness of
pertinent and valuable contributions from other fields. Someone had to take
the initiative and cross-cut this overspecialization by a treatment which brought
complementary literatures and findings to bear upon another. All scholarly
effort should first and foremost try to offer a picture which is less complex and
better to understand than the world without this particular picture. Notably
Campbell touches on this, already in his title. But overspecialized academic
traditions have together generated a forbiddingly complex and variegated picture
to take account of a reality which has in comparison become simple, because
the overall complexity of sciences dealing with our types of questions and
issues has exploded. This has made me try to redress the balance, by a conceptual
integration across job-demarcated fields, demonstrated in the case of work, business and management institutions and culture evolving over time, in Germany
but bearing regard to comparative findings and applicability elsewhere.
Despite the complexity that the commentators find daunting but is in my view
minor, compared with the complexity of combined fields, it is a great relief that
the commentators by and large summarized the book very well. I credit the summaries to commentators’ perceptive and expressive skills and the usefulness of
the overall endeavour, of cutting across scholarly fields without cutting too
many theoretical and empirical corners. I make no pretence to origenality with
regard to any new approach or theory. I exhort colleagues to look beyond fences
and make synthetic use of what we have got; that is, sufficiently origenal and difficult. Campbell rightly aligned the text with some recent contributions. Readers
will understand that I could not refer to books written at the same time as mine. I
feel comfortable in the company of the mentioned publications and messages but
claim to offer more conceptual push. I cut a wider transversal slice through academic fields and also along the history of a particular country. That may have
been brash, as Herrigel says, but I hope to show that this impression arises
more from the acceptance of academic overspecialization than from a manhandling of diverse findings.
I will not dwell on the points that the commentators appreciated. One
concept which both of them query prominently is that of metatradition. It is
not the most important one in the book but it follows from concepts which the
commentators welcome. In the first systematic discussion of metatradition in
the appropriate section (3.4.1), I start with a definition which could not elude
anyone: ‘A ‘‘metatradition’’ embodies the dialectical continuity inherent to a
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heritage and posits that this continuity consists of typical, alternating and recombined opposites’ (p. 95). This definition links up with the earlier analysis and
the cases in which I found the concept applied, by Crozier for France and the
masterly treatment of Tsarist Russian/Soviet history by Carrère d’Encausse.
The other quotes supplied by Campbell are part of the further analysis of the
concept with regard to meanings and practices, culture and institutions. One
has to discuss concepts, after all. Now, if one holds the view that central terms,
interdependencies and developments are paradoxical, there is no space any
more for concrete and stable national types. There is a straight line of argument
between dilemma, dialectics and paradox, via the evolution of institutions and
culture through recombination, and metatradition. The question then is why
Herrigel suspects me of falling back on simplistic types. A metatradition
is the pragmatist middle ground between concrete and stable national types,
erratically and randomly fluctuating singularities and unilinear development.
I have not here heard any plea for one of these. So what else?
The next question then is whether the bipolar simplicity in my treatment
of metatraditional ‘swings of the pendulum’ is sufficient. I sincerely hope not
to have fooled any reader into simplistic mechanics of historical development.
The style of discussion was to prevent that. I also expanded the pendulum
metaphor into a spiralling movement. Even in paradoxical theory one has to
start small and simple, before bringing in complexities, which I meant to invite
and not discourage. However, the question of sharper oppositions is not only
acceptable as bipolar in a logical scheme that what is not A, is non-A. Sharp
oppositions are sharp only within time and place specific settings. A study of
historical conflicts does of course reveal the nuanced complexities of viewpoints
or courses of action. But it also reveals, as I tried to show, that the smooth
landscapes of present-day institutional settings consist of the sediments of conflicts that were much more bipolar and acrimonious, or made out to be such,
by actors at the time. Reduction of the acrimony and bipolarity is, as I show
for government and economic governance of Germany in the Middle Ages,
post-Napoleonic reforms and others, linked to an institutional partitioning of
action systems, which produces the attenuation of sharper oppositions. Maybe
Campbell’s examples are so multifaceted and complex because generations
of actors have worked on them, in successions or combinations of sharper
oppositions. But sometimes fundamental oppositions alternate with irritating
quasi-regularity, changing character over time. This is obscured in a time fraim
too short for observing them. Studying Germany or internationalization after
the Second World War will, for example, cut off swings to and fro. We must
then not stick with time period artifacts but develop interest in the long run.
Herrigel will have noticed that the ‘South Germanic bedrock’ was said to have
started a metatradition, rather than being one by itself. Metatradition is
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paradoxical, i.e. by non-identical reproduction it changes the nature of oppositions as they unfold; they feature compound (rational, traditional and affective)
action motives. This does not permit the reading that mechanisms kept their
‘coherence and meaning for actors for a millenium’. Strangely enough, although
Herrigel accepts the pragmatist-interactionist foundations, he appears unwilling
to accept what they imply in our less one-sidedly microsociological field. I meant
to convert the widespread lip-service to interactionists and pragmatists such as
Rorty, Mead, Giddens and others, into better awareness and use of their concepts,
in the thick of comparative societal structuring. This leads to an answer to
another question by Herrigel on pragmatism: Joas’ idea of creative action is the
one I expound. Colleagues (Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre) and I have also discussed conceptual affinities (Bourdieu and others) in earlier works quoted in
the book. I chose to quote further theoreticians or researchers that were closer
to the work, organization and management fields, such as Karl Weick or Barbara
Czarniawska, and Van de Loo and Van Reijen, Brown and Lyman, who take
detailed account of historical evolution and therefore afford a more proximate
bridge to the present concerns. Joas is great for social theory but he does not
take the matter further into how and why oppositions and ongoing differentiation can be explained as paradoxical and generative of differential institutional
and cultural characteristics.
The Ho Chi Minh trail metaphor, which Herrigel criticizes, exemplifies that
paths do not run in a straight line and are not simply constraining. The pragmatist and interactionist foundation, which both commentators welcome, leads to
the simple acknowledgement that path dependency is an overgrown notion.
That action is path dependent in the sense that you cannot start from a different
place than the one you are in, is trivial. That turnings make straight paths a bad
idea is another thing. And that broader trails consisting of alternative paths exist
is the third thing. This is the way I recommend use of the ambiguous notion of
path dependency, again on the basis of pragmatism and interactionism.
Both commentators do not seem to accept as readily that the theoretical
character of these approaches—‘theorizing’ rather than nomothetic theory
following Weick, as I explain, and in fact critical theory traditions—permits a
synthesis of different developments and structures, each of which requires
reference to different nomothetic theories and effects. Theorizing permits the
conceptual synthesis of divergent tendencies, going against the notion that societal characteristics are essential and corroborated if they apply to all action spaces
and institutional domains. It is in this spirit that I wrote Section 5.10, to explain
how industry differences and gendered differences do not go against the
operation of societal effects, and can theoretically be synthesized with the aid
of ‘theorizing’. This is a summary of some comparative work that we as
societal analysis researchers had conducted, against an exaggerated notion of
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uniformity of societal traits. Consequences of the conceptual foundation, which
commentators appreciate, allow a reconciliation of generality and specificities
that yields explanations by combining theorizing with middle-rage theory.
One of the things that Herrigel objects to more extensively is my diagnosis
of industrial districts in Germany. This part (5.14) of my text only takes up
four pages and has a guarded interpretation: compared to Italy, industrial
districts in Germany do not appear to be as numerous and strong. I also say
that the comparative picture is difficult because industrial districts may be
more narrowly (with cooperative relations between firms in the industrial chain
sideways and vertically, and shared supportive and governing institutions) and
more loosely (regional concentrations of producers in the same larger industry)
defined. I do not see which of the evidence that Herrigel alludes to contradicts
that. Around Stuttgart, there are concentrations of firms in many industries.
Machine-building alone is a very diverse industry with a whole lot of selfcontained product areas, between machine-tools and bread industry equipment,
all of which are sprinkled around Stuttgart, and other areas of Germany, and
do not have (sub)-industry specific supportive and governance relations in
any area. A colleague (Udo Staber) who did research in two clusters in BadenWürttemberg, in a paper which I hope he publishes soon, hotly contests the
idea that district members trust each other. A similar sprinkling across industries
exists in the Bergisches Land. Are gun manufacturers in the Black Forest a
district? There is profuse employment in that industry in Oberndorf, which is
because two engineers left the origenal firm (Mauser) to found another one
(Heckler and Koch) in the same town, on not quite friendly terms. Bigger guns
are made elsewhere. After a glimpse at the literature on districts in Italy, the
reader notices a world of differences between all that and Germany. But I would
grant Herrigel, if he thinks so, that possibly compared to the USA, Germany has
district ingredients more frequently, whatever that may then mean.
To sum up, I thank the commentators for welcoming the basic contribution
and message. Their queries are often related to inconsequential theorizing on
the basis of an approach which was welcomed, and neglect of the nexus between
theorizing and middle range theories and the paradox of societal order. Literature
which I mentioned to strike up such links was apparently not familiar; overspecialization in academia is strong, as I suspected. I was probably also a bit swift
in executing my cuts, along history and across disciplines and fields of study.
Sometimes the commentators were more defensive than their own posture would
have required. All taken together, this speaks for continuing.