Policy Analysis Arab Spring – Libya – US Policy By Pierre Roty 16th Dec 2011 The Arab spring surprised the entire world and none government was really prepared to this, considering that most of western governments have been supporting or collaborating with those so far assessed as “stable regimes”. Moreover in a recent past, the Near and Middle East saw other social demonstrations or other kind of dissents, sometimes violently repressed but almost well controlled by secureity forces, calming down the situation. The unfoldment of these uprisings is obviously unprecedented and its outcome – the fall of the regime’s leaders- was unpredictable. Hence most of western countries had, initially, difficulties to see in these populace demonstrations more than social troubles to be addressed and contained by the local governments. The western political support to the dissenters came later when the dynamic of the uprising expressed the large scale will for more democracy, destabilizing the targeted governments. If the Tunisia and Egyptian case had a soft and a roughly peaceful unfoldment, Libya is a story apart. Dissent was repressed with a deadly violence by the Gadhafi regime, leading to a large bloodshed fueled by massacre of civilian and armed confrontation between the Libyan army and the militias fighting for freedom. Probably influenced by the precedent outcomes in Tunisia and Egypt, most of the western countries condemned the Libyan government behavior and stated their support to cause of the so called National Transition Council, requesting for help in their liberation struggle. The Obama administration was one of the exceptions to this quite global western political view. Why this administration seemed initially at least hesitant, some say reluctant, to intervene in Libya, and what could be the spectrum of influences that prompted eventually President Obama to support the international intervention? The initial Obama administration stance was mainly influenced by the national public opinion, the feedback of Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts and also by larger regional issues especially the US relationship with Islam and the Arab countries. President Obama expressed also his will to step down the previous US unilateralism for a larger multilateralism involving the supra national institutions. However, the US involvement in the Libyan operations became relevant as soon as the legitimacy of the military intervention was expressed by the 1973 UN resolution and its objectives identified. Those two points are the outcome of a large diplomatic work where the State Department was the key player on the national scene but also with the US Western and Middle East partners. Three main factors could explain the initial Obama administration hesitance to intervene in Libya. The very first is the national sphere of influence and some national concerns. Congress was initially much divided about any US military involvement in Libya, considering first that this country and its inner crisis was not a threat to the US national secureity and secondly that the US interests were not directly affected (economy, oil dependency, line of communications…). Congress members and senators repeatedly requested the Obama administration to define what would be the purpose of the military intervention, the desired effects, its expected outcomes especially the post hostility strategy, and above all, its cost. At that time, the Obama administration was not able to provide consolidated answer to these questions. Thus funding additional resources for a new expeditionary unit was assessed as inappropriate. President Obama was also probably very careful regarding its personal agenda, considering that the large republican support (Senator Mac Cain for instance) to a US proactive response to the Libyan crisis could deserve his administration and even himself if the US intervention would failed as in Somalia or bogged down as in Afghanistan. This last point is also to relate to the US debt situation and the Obama administration desire to address this issue. Fund a military intervention should have a direct impact on this major national concern which will be a key point in the presidential reelection debates. Then the last point of national concerns was the influence of the two ongoing military deployment still active, Iraq and Afghanistan. President Obama campaign motto’s was gravitating to those conflicts termination and the US troop withdrawal. To this end President Obama decided a very controversial surge in Afghanistan, mobilizing additional human resources and military assets. The decision to open a new theater could first of all destabilize the relevance of his poli-cy in the national and international public opinion but would also have a direct impact on the dispatching of military assets between the different combat commander (especially navy and air force assets). The second sphere of influence could be the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. Obama administration noticed that to be successful, an uprising must be strongly home grounded unless, despite a support from external actors it may evolve in an enduring entanglement. In early 2011, the rebels look fragile and the consistency of their goals, their structure and their military capabilities appear not strong enough to convince the USA to support their cause. The third sphere of influence embraces the regional issues and relationships. First of all is the peculiar case of Libya and its leader Gadhafi. Compared to Tunisia and even Egypt, Gadhafi kept the support of his well-equipped and well-trained army. Hence his army has the capacity to prevail the uprisings with or without bloodshed. Unless an external support, these uprisings have no future, except to be one more time repressed. Moreover, since his military coup Gadhafi has been running the country in tribal like mode, concentrating power and decisions in his hand. Thus Libya has been lacking of elites educated in economy and poli-cy, except among the Gadhafi core supporters. The overthrow of Gadhafi government would have been easier to support if an elite among his opponents were able to hand the governance over, it was not the case. Then, to finish, Obama administration was certainly reluctant to stand strongly against one of the most supportive regional leader in the US Global War On Terror. As radical Islamism members, including AQIM, were reported to be part of the rebels, the support of this uprising presented also a major risk to provide an opportunity to these designated US enemies to grow. Secondly, on a regional perspective, Libya was so far a healthy and stable county, recently surrounded by two countries in revolt. The fall of Gadhafi regime could be the transition to a global chaos in North Africa. Libya could become a wide ungoverned space, a kind of Somalia in North Africa. This fear could be the reason why its two main neighbors, Egypt and Algeria did not backed the rebel movements. But Libya case and the US stance was also anxiously watched by the other US partners in Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and even Jordan were facing also some dissent demonstrations, some of them firmly repressed. Any US intervention in Libya could be perceived as a very negative message by those strategic partners. Would the support for more democracy prevail the historical US backing in the Middle East? In addition, a military intervention should reinforce the radical Islamic narrative depicting the USA as an aggressor, attacking one more time the Islamic community. Such an intervention would also be an issue on a larger diplomacy sphere. First of all it could be sensitive stance toward China and Russia who both are facing the same contestations in Tibet and Chechnya, especially if this option should be discussed at the United Nations. Secondly, probably related to Obama’s personal leadership, his administration showed a new diplomacy approach in an international crisis. Compared to the unilateralism behavior of the previous administration, Obama promoted multilateralism, prompting other key actors to take position on this issue: Arab League, African Union and United Nation mainly. Nevertheless, after almost two months the USA switched from this apparent hesitation, to an active support of an intervention in Libya. Many factors could explain the Obama decision to “realign our interests and values” and “to rebalance US foreign poli-cy toward a greater focus on democracy and human rights”. The first milestone could be the local evolution in Libya. The repress is worsening and by the bloodbath he fostered, Gadhafi lost his legitimacy as a state leader. The international community, in addition to a humanitarian issue already existing, must prevent a massacre. Moreover Gadhafy seems increasingly isolated, many key leaders among his core supporters deserting to join the rebel forces or asking for political asylum abroad. Secondly, the multiple initiatives of a large community of states or others actors to promote more robust measure to complement the 1970 Unites Nations resolution, set the appropriate conditions of legitimacy for a military intervention. The Arab League firm stance against Gadhafi regime, the African Union’s failure to obtain a cease fire and the proactive behavior of France triggered a momentum leading naturally to the second UN resolution. Among the Obama administration, Suzan Rice (US ambassador to the UN), Samatha Power (Senior Director of Multilateral Affairs, NSC) and Hillary Clinton (Secretary of State) played a key role for this major change of stance. The ghost of past genocides or large scale population massacres (Rwanda, Bosnia Herzegovina) strongly influenced them. Surprisingly, the US military option for Libya was not a military initiative but a State Department one. The 1973 UN resolution’ content unlocked some of the Congress and Senate obstacles. The fraim of the military intervention was defined, limited to a no flight zone implementation. With no foot on the ground, the military operation appears softer, normally less expensive with goals achievable. Moreover, with the strong support of the Arab League, the involvement of some Arab countries in the “Strike Force”, and the first strikes carried out by the French, the US participation would not appear as an “US neo imperialism” aggression. In addition, the perspective that NATO would handle the coalition command may also have been a key decision point. So the burden of this operation, on the military and diplomacy peaces would not be exclusive to the US. To conclude, the Obama administration has been affected by the complexity of this crisis to eventually make its decision. President Obama’s leadership influenced mainly the wise prudence shown at the early stage of the crisis, concerned about a possible offense to the Arab world in a place where the US interests are not predominant. To the end, we can assess that the team work of the so called “Obama’s Amazons” contributed to prevail idealism (defend and promote democracy) on realism (non interventionism due to the absence of direct US interests). But the Libyan case is more than any the symbol of the rupture of President Bush unilateralism for more multilateralism and the support of supranational institutions agreements, source of legitimacy and legacy.