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# **ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY 2020 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT**

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A REPORT FROM THE  
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION  
TO THE 117TH CONGRESS





# Executive Summary

Since 2004, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has conducted the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) following each federal general election. The EAVS asks all 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories—American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands—to provide data about the ways Americans vote and how elections are administered. Since 2008, this project has included a separate survey, the Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), that collects information about state election laws, policies, and practices.

The EAVS provides the most comprehensive source of state and local jurisdiction-level data about election administration in the United States. These data play a vital role in helping election officials, policymakers, and other election stakeholders identify trends, anticipate and respond to changing voter needs, invest resources to improve election administration and the voter experience, and better secure U.S. elections infrastructure. The EAVS data make it possible to examine the details of the U.S. election infrastructure and to produce a generalizable understanding of core aspects of the election process and the management challenges faced by election officials. The survey provides policymakers and the public with critical information every two years about how federal elections are conducted, and it helps the EAC fulfill its congressionally mandated reporting requirements. The EAVS is also invaluable to election officials who use the data to manage election oversight, conduct issue analysis and strategic planning, and create training and promotional materials. The EAC also uses EAVS data to create clearinghouse resources to advance the agency's mission and to better support election officials and voters as well as to inform lawmakers and national-level stakeholders about the impact of federal voting laws and the changing landscape of U.S. elections.

The 2020 general election was heavily affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic and the ensuing public health emergency necessitated a variety of changes to existing election practices to accommodate social distancing and to slow the spread of the virus among voters, poll workers, and election officials and staff. In response, many states took action to expand the availability of in-person voting before Election Day and mail voting. Because of its status as the most comprehensive survey of election administration in the United States, the 2020 EAVS serves as a record of the extraordinary efforts by the nation's election officials and poll workers to ensure that the 2020 general election was conducted in a safe and secure manner. To this end, the EAC is pleased to present to the 117th Congress its report on the 2020 EAVS.

This report describes in detail how the 2020 federal general election was administered and how voters cast their ballots. Data from the EAVS and the accompanying Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey) are used to provide an overview of each of the following aspects of the election process:

- Turnout, voting methods, polling places, poll workers, and election technology are covered in Chapter 1, “Overview of Election Administration and Voting in the 2020 General Election”;



- Key laws, rules, policies, and procedures that govern U.S. elections are covered in Chapter 2, “Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey”;
- Voter registration and list maintenance are covered in Chapter 3, “Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond”;
- Voting by individuals covered under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) is described in Chapter 4, “Military and Overseas Voting in 2020: UOCAVA”; and
- Finally, the methodology of the EAVS and a description of the survey questions are discussed in Chapter 5, “Survey Methodology and Procedures.”

## Voting and Election Administration Findings

The 2020 EAVS confirms that the 2020 general election saw the highest turnout of any federal general election recorded by the EAVS to date, with 67.7% of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) casting ballots that were counted, an increase of 6.7 percentage points from 2016 levels. Nearly every state saw an increase in turnout compared to the 2016 EAVS. Furthermore, more than 209 million people were active registered voters for the 2020 general election, which represents an all-time high, and more than 161 million voters cast ballots that were counted for this election.

This election also saw sweeping changes in how voters cast their ballots. In the 2016 EAVS, 54.5% of voters cast their ballots in person on Election Day, and in the 2018 EAVS, 58.2% of voters did so. In 2020, only 30.5% of voters cast their ballots in person on Election Day. The percentage of the electorate that voted a mailed ballot increased to 43.1% of the electorate, nearly a 20-percentage-point increase from 2016 levels. Jurisdiction-level analysis shows that the largest increases in mail voting rates occurred in jurisdictions in states that newly instituted all-mail elections in 2020 and in jurisdictions in states that removed requirements to provide an excuse to request a mailed ballot. Although the total number of mailed ballots transmitted in 2020 was more than double the number transmitted in 2016, the percentages of mailed ballots that were returned by voters, that were counted, and that were rejected did not change significantly at the national level.

States reported a total of 132,556 polling places at which 775,101 poll workers assisted voters with in-person early and Election Day voting. The data also show a shift in the age distribution of poll workers, with the percentage of poll workers ages 18 to 25 and 26 to 40 increasing to 6.2% and 15.0%, respectively, and the percentage of poll workers ages 61 to 70 and 71 and older decreasing, to 27.3% and 20.1%, respectively. Jurisdictions also reported that poll worker recruitment was less difficult in 2020 than it was in 2016. In survey comments, many jurisdictions cited cross-cutting effects on their recruitment efforts. Jurisdictions reported that the COVID-19 pandemic made it difficult to retain long-time, older poll workers and caused last-minute poll worker shortages, but the efforts of the EAC, state election offices, and other organizations to encourage qualified individuals to serve as poll workers were cited as helping contribute to an oversupply of poll workers in some areas.

States reported that the use of electronic poll books (or e-poll books) increased since the 2018 EAVS, and 17 states used e-poll books in all of their jurisdictions. Scanners and ballot marking devices (BMD) continued to be the most common types of voting equipment used, and the use of

direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines that were not equipped with a voter-verified paper audit trail (DRE without VVPAT) also continued to decline. In 2020, only 32 jurisdictions across the country relied solely on voting machines with no paper backup.

## Election Administration Policy Survey Findings

To provide context to the data that states report in the EAVS, the EAC collects information about states' election policies. Two-thirds of states reported having top-down registration systems hosted on a single, central platform or mainframe that is maintained by the state with information supplied by local jurisdictions; the remaining one-third of states reported having bottom-up or hybrid databases. To keep their voter registration rolls accurate and up to date, most states reported sharing information with motor vehicle agencies, government entities that maintain death records, and agencies that maintain felony or prison records. The percentage of states offering both same-day registration (51.8%) and online registration (80.4%) increased since the 2018 Policy Survey.

The Policy Survey also recorded an increase in state policies that make it safer for voters to cast a ballot or to reduce potential lines and crowds at in-person polling places. In 2020, a total of 14 states reported having all-mail elections, in which all registered voters or all active registered voters were automatically sent a mailed ballot—10 of these states conducted all-mail elections statewide, whereas four of the states did so only in select jurisdictions. This was an increase from the 2018 Policy Survey, which found that three states administered their elections entirely by mail and four states had all-mail elections in select local jurisdictions. In addition, 69.6% of states did not require voters to provide an excuse to be able to vote a mailed ballot (seven states had removed the excuse requirement since the 2018 Policy Survey), and 51.8% of states reported that there were some circumstances under which voters could receive ballots electronically. However, the Policy Survey did not collect information on whether policy changes made for the 2020 general election were permanent or temporary, or whether the changes were made in direct response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Nearly all states reported that voting systems must be tested and certified before approval, with the most common certification requirements being testing by an EAC-accredited voting system test laboratory (VSTL), certification according to the EAC-adopted Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VMSG), and both state and federal certification. In 2020, of the 40 states that reported using e-poll books, 55% required testing and certification to the state's specifications before purchasing the e-poll books.

In the post-election period, 78.6% of states reported that they required a tabulation audit to verify the voting equipment used to count ballots worked properly. Of these states, about three-quarters required a traditional tabulation audit (which examines a sample of ballots from a fixed percentage of randomly selected voting districts or voting machines), whereas about one-fifth of the states required a risk-limiting tabulation audit (in which statistical methods are used to select the audit sample size). All states reported having a mechanism for conducting election recounts, although the circumstances under which a recount would be conducted varied by state.



## The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) Findings

The 2020 EAVS data show the active voter registration rate for the 2020 general election was 88.2% of the CVAP, which represents an increase of 3.5 percentage points since the 2016 EAVS. More than 103 million voter registration applications were submitted between the close of registration for the 2018 general election and the close of registration for the 2020 general election, which represents a 33.8% increase in the number of registration applications received in the period leading up to the 2016 general election. Of the registration applications received, the most common outcome was an update to the voter's existing registration record that did not involve a cross-jurisdiction change of address. This type of update accounted for nearly half of the registration applications received. New and valid registrations that resulted in the creation of a new voter registration record within the jurisdiction accounted for nearly one-third of the applications received.

As with previous iterations of the EAVS, state motor vehicle departments accounted for the largest share of these registration applications (39.3%). The second-most common source of these applications was online registration, which accounted for 28.2% of applications. Online registration also saw the fastest growth of any registration source tracked by the EAVS.

The 29 states and territories that allow same-day voter registration (SDR) reported receiving more than 1.6 million SDRs during the voting period for the 2020 general election, approximately double the number received during the 2018 EAVS. SDR allows individuals to register to vote on the same day that they cast their ballot for an election. Nationwide, more SDRs were received on Election Day than were received during early voting.

Pursuant to the NVRA requirements, states reported sending more than 28 million confirmation notices and removing more than 18 million voter registration records from their voter registration rolls between the close of registration for the 2018 general election and the close of registration for the 2020 general election. The most common reasons cited for removing voter registration records were failure to respond to a confirmation notice and to vote in the two most recent federal general elections, moving from the jurisdiction in which the voter was registered to vote, and the voter's death.

## The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) Findings

States reported transmitting more than 1.2 million ballots to UOCAVA voters—a population that includes members of the uniformed services absent from their voting residence, their eligible family members, and U.S. citizens living overseas who receive special protections under the federal UOCAVA law. Of those transmitted ballots, more than 900,000 were returned by voters and nearly 890,000 were counted in the election.

Continuing a trend that began with the 2016 EAVS, in 2020, overseas citizens made up a larger proportion of the UOCAVA population than did uniformed services members and their eligible family members. In 2020, overseas citizens accounted for 57.4% of registered UOCAVA voters, and

uniformed services members accounted for 42.3%. Three states—California, Florida, and Washington—accounted for slightly more than 40% of all the registered UOCAVA voters reported nationwide.

Among uniformed services voters, postal mail transmission was the most common method reported (accounting for nearly half of the ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters), whereas overseas citizens more commonly received their ballots through email (accounting for 70.9% of ballots transmitted to overseas citizens).

Nearly 98% of UOCAVA ballots returned by voters were reported as counted, with just over 2% of returned ballots reported as rejected. Nationwide, more than 33,000 Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) were reported as received. This form may be submitted by UOCAVA voters as an emergency backup ballot in case their official ballot is not received by local election officials in time to be counted. The FWAB allowed nearly 24,000 UOCAVA voters to have their votes counted in the 2020 general election.



This report by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission is the result of a contract to collect and analyze data for the 2020 Election Administration and Voting Survey. The contract was performed by Fors Marsh Group LLC, an applied research company based in Arlington, VA.

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# Chapter 1. Overview of Election Administration and Voting in the 2020 General Election

## Key Findings

The 2020 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) collected data on ballots cast, voter registration, overseas and military voting, voting technology, and other important issues related to voting and election administration. The 2020 general election was especially impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused drastic changes to how the election was administered and how voters cast their ballots. Notable findings from the 2020 EAVS include:

- More than 209 million people were active registered voters for the 2020 general election, an all-time high for the EAVS.
- Voter turnout for the 2020 general election reached the highest level documented in any EAVS thus far, at 67.7% of the citizen voting age population (CVAP). Turnout increased 6.7 percentage points from 2016 levels, and nearly all states reported an increase in turnout. More than 161 million voters cast ballots that were counted for the 2020 election.
- For the first time, a majority of voters cast their ballots before Election Day. Slightly more than 43% of voters participated with a mailed ballot, and 30.6% of ballots were cast through in-person voting before Election Day. Ballots cast on Election Day at a physical polling place comprised 30.5% of the turnout for the 2020 general election.
- The number of mailed ballots transmitted to voters more than doubled from 2016 to 2020, and the percentage of mailed ballots that were returned by voters, that were counted, and that were rejected held steady with 2016 levels.
- The COVID-19 pandemic appears to have been associated with a change in both poll worker recruitment and the resulting age distribution of the poll worker workforce. States reported that the ages of their poll workers skewed younger during the 2020 general election compared to during the 2016 general election. However, states and jurisdictions reported that recruiting poll workers for this election was slightly easier due to national and state efforts that encouraged voters to serve as poll workers.
- The most common types of election equipment that were used were paper ballot scanners and ballot marking devices (BMD). The use of direct-recording electronic machines that were not equipped with a voter-verified paper audit trail (DRE without VVPAT) continued to decline among jurisdictions since the 2018 general election, and the use of electronic poll books (e-poll books) continued to increase. More than 30% of jurisdictions reported using e-poll books (an increase of more than 5 percentage points from 2018), and 17 states reported that all jurisdictions used e-poll books.



## Election Administration in the United States

The United States is notable for having a largely decentralized system for administering federal elections. Local jurisdictions have the primary responsibility of administering state and federal elections and of tabulating, reporting, and certifying results. The U.S. Constitution and various federal laws govern specific aspects of federal elections, and a small number of federal agencies—such as the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)—play a supportive role in election administration. Broad legal and procedural authority rests with the states,<sup>1</sup> territories, the District of Columbia, and local jurisdictions. As a result, a wide variation exists among and within state election policies and practices, and the policies and practices are constantly evolving. Nevertheless, U.S. elections generally follow a standard process. As shown in Figure 1, the election process can be viewed as a cycle.


1. The legal and procedural framework for elections is generally established in advance of a general election. This framework includes determining voter eligibility rules; how, when, and where voters may cast their ballots; and what technology will be used to support elections. Supported by state election offices, most of these policies and procedures are implemented by election officials at the local level (e.g., county, township, municipality).
2. To participate in elections, eligible citizens typically must register to vote, pursuant to the eligibility rules established by federal law and by their state.<sup>2</sup> In many states, voters must register in advance of a set registration deadline; in others, eligible individuals may register and cast a ballot on the same day, whether during an early voting period or on Election Day. Depending on state policy, eligible citizens may have multiple avenues for submitting their registration applications, including by mail, fax, or email; online registration websites; in person at an election office, at a motor vehicle office, at other state government agency offices, or at an armed forces recruitment office; or through a registration drive. States are also required to periodically examine their voter registration rolls and remove the records of voters who are no longer eligible, for instance, because the voter no longer resides in the state or jurisdiction in which they are registered, the voter has failed to respond to a notice sent to them by mail and has not voted in the two most recent federal general elections, the voter is deceased, or the voter has received a criminal conviction that disqualifies them from voting. The voter may also directly inform the election office of a change in residency, which begins the process of designating a voter as inactive and ultimately removing them from the voter registration roll. The process of updating voter registration rolls and removing ineligible voters is referred to as list maintenance.
3. When a federal general election is approaching, voting begins well in advance of Election Day for many voters, including eligible military voters and overseas citizens who are absent from their voting residence, for whom the right to participate in federal elections is protected under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). In addition, all

<sup>1</sup> Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data.

<sup>2</sup> North Dakota is the only state that does not require citizens to register before casting a ballot in an election.

states provide avenues for voters to cast ballots before Election Day. This may include voting a mailed ballot, casting a ballot in person at a dedicated early voting site, or receiving and casting a ballot at an election office. Some states allow any eligible voter to cast their ballot before Election Day, whereas others restrict early voting and mail voting only to certain segments of the population, such as voters who are absent from their home jurisdiction on Election Day, voters with illnesses or disabilities, voters over a certain age, or voters who provide a statutorily valid excuse. The voting options that are available to voters and the timelines for mail voting and in-person early voting vary by state and by local jurisdiction.

**Figure 1. The U.S. Election Process**



4. Voters who do not cast ballots beforehand may vote on Election Day at in-person voting sites staffed by poll workers. In most states, individuals whose eligibility cannot be verified at the



time of voting may cast a provisional ballot. Election officials then investigate the eligibility of individuals who cast provisional ballots to determine whether their ballots should be counted, either in full or in part, or rejected.

5. After the polls close on Election Day, the process of counting ballots to determine the final election results begins. This may also be referred to as tabulation or canvassing. State policies vary on when counting may begin—some states may begin pre-processing mailed ballots (e.g., opening envelopes, verifying the mail voter’s eligibility to cast a ballot, removing ballots from secrecy envelopes to prepare them for counting) before Election Day, whereas other states require that in-person polls must be closed before any ballots can be counted. Depending on state law and on what equipment is used to process the ballots, ballot counting may take several days to complete.
6. Once the unofficial results of the election are known, state and local election officials review the results for accuracy and certify them as final. After this is complete, many states conduct audits of their election results and voting equipment to ensure that the established election procedures were followed and that the equipment functioned correctly. Certain election races may also be recounted if the margin of victory is close; if a candidate, party, or other authorized group requests a recount; or if a court orders a recount to be conducted.

The election process can be viewed as a cycle in the sense that the experiences from previous elections are used to inform decision-making for the legal and procedural framework for subsequent elections. Often, the successful approaches and innovations implemented in one state or local jurisdiction during an election are adopted by other states or localities in subsequent elections.

The COVID-19 pandemic was declared in March 2020 and impacted nearly all aspects of the 2020 voting process, from dates and deadlines to how voters were able to register to vote, options to cast a ballot, and how long it took to count the ballots. In some cases, certain state policies, such as those concerning mail and absentee voting, were expanded temporarily for the 2020 election cycle to address the COVID-19 restrictions.<sup>3</sup> Throughout the election, state and local election administrators, staff, and poll workers worked heroically to ensure voters were able to exercise their right to vote in a safe and secure manner.

## The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Since 2004, the EAC has conducted the EAVS following each federal general election.<sup>4</sup> The EAVS asks all 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and the five U.S. territories—American Samoa,

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<sup>3</sup> The 2020 Policy Survey and EAVS did not collect information on when a policy change was made, why it was made, or whether the change was temporary or permanent.

<sup>4</sup> The EAVS does not collect data on primary elections, run-off elections, or special elections. The data provided by states were only for the November 3, 2020, federal general election.

Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands<sup>5</sup>—to provide data about the ways in which Americans vote and how elections are administered.

The EAVS provides the most comprehensive source of state and local jurisdiction-level data about election administration in the United States. These data play a vital role in helping election officials, policymakers, and other election stakeholders identify trends, anticipate and respond to changing voter needs, invest resources to improve election administration and the voter experience, and better secure U.S. elections infrastructure. The EAVS data make it possible to examine the details of the U.S. elections infrastructure and to produce a generalizable understanding of the core aspects of the election process and the management challenges faced by election officials. The survey provides policymakers and the public with critical information every two years about how federal elections are conducted, and it helps the EAC fulfill its congressionally mandated reporting requirements. The EAVS is also invaluable to election officials themselves. These officials use the EAVS to manage election oversight, conduct issue analysis and strategic planning, and create training and promotional materials.

The EAC also uses the EAVS data to create research and clearinghouse resources to advance the agency's mission and to better support election officials and voters as well as to inform lawmakers and national-level stakeholders about the impact of federal voting laws and the changing landscape of U.S. elections. The EAVS helps the EAC meet its mandate under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and to review procedures with respect to the administration of federal elections. The EAVS sections related to voter registration and UOCAVA voting allow states to satisfy their data reporting requirements established, respectively, by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and UOCAVA. The EAVS also helps FVAP fulfill its obligations under UOCAVA to reduce obstacles to ensure military and overseas voting success by collecting data about how UOCAVA voters participate in elections.

The EAVS data collection effort consists of two separately administered surveys: the Policy Survey and the EAVS. The Policy Survey, which is due in advance of each federal general election, collects data on state election policies and procedures to provide context for the quantitative data included in each state's EAVS submission. The EAVS, which is due after each federal general election is complete, collects data on voter registration, UOCAVA voters, mail voting, in-person voting and polling operations, provisional ballots, voter participation, and election technology. Complete details about the methodology of the 2020 Policy Survey and the EAVS, including an outline of the survey questionnaires, the data collection templates, the data validation process, and technical assistance provided to respondents, can be found in Chapter 5, "Survey Methodology and Procedures," of this report.

Providing EAVS data is frequently a joint task undertaken by state and local jurisdiction election officials. Although 25 states and territories were able to provide all EAVS data from their centralized election database, 31 states and territories relied on local jurisdictions to provide responses to some

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<sup>5</sup> Puerto Rico provides EAVS data only in presidential election years, as it does not hold elections for federal candidates in midterm election years. American Samoa did not participate in the 2016 EAVS. The Northern Mariana Islands participated in the EAVS for the first time in 2020.



or all of the EAVS questions. An analysis of how states provide EAVS data can be found in Chapter 2 of this report.

Chapter 1 of this report covers turnout and modes of voting in the 2020 general election, polling places and poll workers, and election technology. This chapter also comprises a non-exhaustive overview of the data provided by states and jurisdictions in the EAVS. State election policies and practices are featured in Chapter 2, “Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey.” Voter registration is covered in greater detail in Chapter 3, “Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond.” UOCAVA voting is discussed further in Chapter 4, “Military and Overseas Voting in the 2020 General Election: UOCAVA.”

## Overall EAVS Response Rates

The analysis in this report is based on information and data submitted and certified by the 50 U.S. states, five territories, and the District of Columbia. These 56 entities comprised 6,460 jurisdictions.<sup>6</sup> The state-level response rate was 100% (56 of 56 entities provided data), and the jurisdiction-level response rate was 100% (6,460 of 6,460 jurisdictions provided data).<sup>7</sup> During the data collection period, efforts were made to maximize the completeness and accuracy of the data reported. These efforts are outlined in the methodology of this report (Chapter 5). Instances when a state’s data were not included in a calculation because of missing data or data quality issues are described in the footnotes and table notes that accompany the analysis in this report.

## Turnout in the 2020 General Election

According to the EAVS data submitted by states, there were 228,004,364 voters who were registered to vote in the United States as of November 3, 2020. Of this total, 209,441,338 were considered active voters, which means they had no additional processing requirements to fulfill before voting, and 18,523,963 were considered inactive voters, which means they required address verification under the provisions of the NVRA before they would be permitted to vote.<sup>8</sup> As a percentage of the 2019 CVAP estimate calculated by the U.S. Census Bureau, 88.2% of voting age

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<sup>6</sup> What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For the 2020 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to counties. The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin reported data on the township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, because this information was only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state. Two jurisdictions in Wisconsin were consolidated or annexed into other jurisdictions partway through 2020. See Appendix A in Chapter 5 of this report for a breakdown of the number of jurisdictions reported in each state and the response rate by survey section for each state.

<sup>7</sup> Appendix A of Chapter 5 of this report contains an analysis of state-level response rates to each section of the EAVS.

<sup>8</sup> The total number of registered voters was collected in item A1a of the EAVS. The total number of active voters was collected in item A1b. The total number of inactive voters was collected in item A1c. According to the 2020 Policy Survey, six states (Guam, Idaho, North Dakota, New Hampshire, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming) did not distinguish between active and inactive voters in their registration records. These states were not required to provide data in item A1c of the EAVS. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.



## Calculating Turnout Rates

When assessing election administration, one primary outcome of interest is voter turnout, which is calculated by dividing the number of people who participated in an election by the number of people who could have participated. The EAVS provides a measure of the total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted in an election (item F1a) for the numerator in this equation. However, multiple denominators can be used:

- **Number of registered voters or active voters.** The number of people a state reports as registered and eligible to vote (A1a in the EAVS). Some states separately report the number of active voters who have no additional processing requirements to fulfill before voting (A1b in the EAVS). This number is available for states and sub-state EAVS jurisdictions.

$$\frac{F1a \text{ of EAVS}}{A1a \text{ or } A1b \text{ of EAVS}} \times 100 = \text{Registration Turnout Rate}$$

- **Citizen voting age population (CVAP).** The estimate of the total number of U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older based on the U.S. Census Bureau's ACS. This number is available for states and most sub-state EAVS jurisdictions but not for U.S. territories, except for Puerto Rico.

$$\frac{F1a \text{ of EAVS}}{CVAP} \times 100 = \text{CVAP Turnout Rate}$$

- **Voting Eligible Population (VEP).** The measure of the CVAP minus those who are ineligible to vote (such as persons with disqualifying felony convictions) and persons who are in the military or citizens living overseas. This number is available for states, but not territories or for sub-state jurisdictions.

$$\frac{F1a \text{ of EAVS}}{VEP} \times 100 = \text{VEP Turnout Rate}$$

Relying on the number of registered or active voters can be problematic for calculating turnout because it is often challenging for states to keep voter registration rolls fully up to date (see Chapter 3 of this report for a discussion of list maintenance practices). Using VEP as the denominator in turnout calculations would somewhat overrepresent voter turnout—since EAVS data explicitly include persons covered by UOCAVA—and would restrict the ability to estimate turnout for sub-state jurisdictions. Although each denominator has its limitations, the EAC uses CVAP to calculate turnout in this report because of its availability for the majority of jurisdictions that report EAVS data and because it provides a more accurate picture of the population covered by the EAVS. Appendix D of Chapter 5 of this report contains recommendations on how to calculate additional EAVS rates.

citizens were registered as active voters for the 2020 general election.<sup>9</sup> This is an increase of 3.6 percentage points from the 2016 CVAP active voter registration rate of 84.6%. Further details about

<sup>9</sup> This report uses the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimate for 2019 instead of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP is as current as possible. The CVAP estimates for 2020 were not available by the time this report was finalized. The active CVAP registration rate was calculated as the total number of active voters (A1b of the EAVS) divided by CVAP. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in this calculation because the U.S. Census Bureau does not calculate a CVAP for these territories. North Dakota was not included



voter registration, including how voters registered to vote, the use of same-day voter registration (SDR), and list maintenance, can be found in Chapter 3 of this report.

States also reported that a total of 161,303,109 voters cast ballots that were counted for the 2020 general election. This represents a CVAP turnout rate of 67.7% nationwide.<sup>10</sup> Turnout for the 2020 general election increased 6.7 percentage points from the 2016 CVAP turnout rate of 61%.<sup>11</sup> Despite many election administration challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 election had the highest turnout rate of any EAVS to date.

Figure 2 shows that nearly all states experienced higher turnout rates in 2020 than they did for the 2016 general election. Twenty-one states had more than 70% of their CVAP cast a ballot that was counted for the 2020 general election; only four states had turnout over 70% for the 2016 election. In addition, three states—Utah, Hawaii, and Texas—had turnout increases of more than 10 percentage points compared to the 2016 general election. The states with the highest turnout increases tended to be those that made mail voting easy for voters. Hawaii and Utah had both enacted all-mail elections in 2019, and Nevada, New Jersey, and Vermont did the same as a temporary measure in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Arizona, California, Montana, and Washington had already been conducting their elections predominantly or entirely by mail before 2020. Michigan automatically sent mailed ballot request forms to all registered voters for the 2020 general election. These states, along with Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas, each had turnout increases of more than 8 percentage points from 2016 to 2020. Only one U.S. territory—Puerto Rico—reported a decrease in turnout since the 2016 general election.

Another notable finding from the 2020 EAVS was a change in how voters cast their ballots. Historically, the majority of voters have cast their ballots in person at a physical polling place on Election Day. This method of voting was used by 54.5% of voters in 2016 and by 58.2% of voters in 2018. However, in 2020, the percentage of these voters fell to 30.5%.<sup>12</sup> For the first time in EAVS history, a majority of voters did not cast their ballots in person on Election Day; in 2020, Election Day in-person voting was less commonly used than mail voting or in-person early voting. The nationwide number of voters who vote in person on Election Day has likewise been steadily decreasing, from 72,393,400 in 2016 to 67,133,886 in 2018 and to 47,148,389 in 2020. This is despite an overall

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
in this calculation because this state does not have voter registration. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>10</sup> The total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted was reported in item F1a of the EAVS. The CVAP turnout rate was calculated by dividing F1a by CVAP. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in this calculation because the U.S. Census Bureau does not calculate CVAP for these territories. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>11</sup> For the 2020 EAVS, the question about voter participation was reworded. In 2016, this question collected data on ballots cast (independent of outcome), whereas in 2020, it collected data on ballots cast and counted. Thus, it is likely that the 2016 turnout calculation was higher than it would have been if the 2020 question wording had been used, thus, underestimating the true turnout change from 2016 to 2020.

<sup>12</sup> Election Day in-person turnout was calculated by dividing the total number of Election Day in-person voters who cast a ballot that was counted (item F1b of the EAVS) by the total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted (item F1a). Oregon and Washington did not report any in-person Election Day voters because these states conduct their elections almost entirely by mail. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

**Figure 2. Nearly All States Experienced Turnout Increases in the 2020 General Election**




Source: The CVAP turnout was calculated as  $F1a/CVAP \times 100$  for both 2016 and 2020. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included, as CVAP is not available for these territories. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating turnout. Change between 2016 and 2020 is measured in percentage points.



increase in 2020 in the number of states with a policy that allows for vote centers (either on a statewide level or in certain jurisdictions), which allow voters to cast their ballots at any polling location or vote center within their jurisdiction rather than at an assigned polling location. Twenty-one states reported allowing vote centers for the 2020 general election compared to 17 states in 2018.<sup>13</sup>

The percentage of voters who used a mailed ballot to vote surged, from 24.5% in 2016 and 25.6% in 2018 to 43.1% in 2020. The number of voters who used in-person early voting also increased from previous years, although the increase was not as large. In 2016, 25.3% of voters cast their ballots early in person, and 22% did so in 2018, compared to 30.6% for the 2020 general election. The

**Figure 3. Mail Voting Was the Most Common Way for Voters to Cast Their Ballots in 2020**



Source: Election Day turnout was calculated as  $F1b/F1a \times 100$  for all years. Mail turnout was calculated as  $(F1d+F1g)/F1a \times 100$  for all years. In-person early turnout was calculated as  $F1f/F1a \times 100$  for all years. UOCAVA, provisional, and other turnout was calculated as  $(F1c+F1e+F1h)/F1a \times 100$  for all years. Casewise deletion was used at the state level (percentages for each mode of voting were calculated independently, and only states that reported data for a given mode were included in the analysis), and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.

<sup>13</sup> Information on vote center policies was provided in Q13 of the 2018 Policy Survey and Q25 of the 2020 Policy Survey. Six states that did not offer vote centers in 2018 did so in 2020, and two states that offered vote centers in 2018 did not in 2020.

EAVS data confirm that the ways voters cast their ballots changed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many states took steps to reduce crowding at in-person polling places on Election Day by expanding the use of mail and early voting, and the EAVS data also confirm that voters made use of these options. Figure 3 shows the most commonly used modes of voting for the 2016, 2018, and 2020 general elections.

## Voting by Mail

All states and territories and the District of Columbia offer their citizens the opportunity to cast their ballots by mail in federal general elections, although the number of citizens who cast their ballots using this method and the circumstances under which citizens can vote a mailed ballot vary widely among states. Some states use the term “absentee voting” instead of “mail voting.”<sup>14</sup> For purposes of this report, mail voting refers to the process by which:

1. An individual receives a ballot in the mail before the election. In some states or jurisdictions, election offices automatically send a mailed ballot to all registered voters (often referred to as “all-mail elections”), whereas others automatically send mailed ballots only to individuals on a permanent mail voting list. In other states, individuals must file an application to request a ballot for each election for which they wish to vote a mailed ballot.<sup>15</sup>
2. The individual marks the mailed ballot with their preferences at home instead of at an election office or polling location.
3. The individual returns the voted ballot to election officials, typically by sending the voted ballot through the mail, by returning the voted ballot to an in-person voting site or election office, or by depositing the voted ballot in a secure designated drop box.<sup>16</sup> The options voters have for returning voted mailed ballots are dictated by state policy.

The 2020 Policy Survey results show that many states made changes to their mail voting policies since the 2018 general election. However, the Policy Survey did not record precisely when these changes were made, the reason behind the policy changes, or whether the policy changes were permanent or temporary. In 2020, 39 states did not require an excuse for voters to request a mailed ballot; six of these states and one territory (Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, South Carolina, Virginia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) required an excuse in 2018 but not in 2020. In addition, 14 states conducted all-mail elections. Ten states (California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, New Jersey, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Washington) conducted all-mail elections on a statewide basis, and four states did so in select jurisdictions (Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, and Nebraska). However, states and jurisdictions that conducted their elections by mail

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<sup>14</sup> In recognition of the fact that many states no longer require a person to be absent from their election jurisdiction in order to be permitted to cast a ballot by mail, the EAVS uses the term “mail voting.”

<sup>15</sup> In some states, applications to vote by mail are valid for multiple elections, such as for the duration of a two-year election cycle or for all elections within a calendar year. The 2020 EAVS and Policy Survey did not collect data on how long mailed ballot applications are valid for.

<sup>16</sup> The 2020 EAVS did not collect information on which states used drop boxes, how many drop boxes were in use, or how many ballots were returned via drop boxes.



typically also offered some form of in-person voting. For a more thorough look at the policies surrounding mail voting, please see Chapter 2, “Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey.”

States reported that 69,486,968 ballots were cast using a mailed ballot and counted for the 2020 general election, more than double the number of ballots cast using a mailed ballot for the 2016 general election (33,140,080).<sup>17</sup> The mailed ballot voting turnout rate increased by nearly 20 percentage points, from 24.5% in 2016 to 43.1% in 2020.

**Table 1. Jurisdictions Saw Large Increases in Mail Turnout From 2018 to 2020**

Type of Jurisdiction	2018 Average Mail Turnout	2020 Average Mail Turnout	Turnout Change
Jurisdiction was in a state that introduced a statewide all-mail election in 2020	9.9%	72.0%	62.1%
Jurisdiction was in a state that required an excuse for mail voting in 2018 but did not in 2020	5.9%	30.8%	24.9%
Jurisdiction was in a state that did not conduct all-mail elections in either 2018 or 2020	11.4%	30.6%	19.2%
Jurisdiction was in a state that did not change its excuse policy for mail voting from 2018 to 2020	10.2%	25.8%	15.6%

*Source: The mail turnout rate for both 2018 and 2020 was calculated as  $(F1d+F1g)/F1a \times 100$ . Jurisdictions’ classification on their state’s all-mail election policy was based on their state’s responses to Q9a of the 2018 Policy Survey and Q18a of the 2020 Policy Survey; jurisdictions in states that had all-vote-by-mail elections in select jurisdictions only were excluded from the analysis of mail voting policies. Jurisdictions’ policies on whether to require an excuse for mail voting were based on their state’s responses to Q8 of the 2018 Policy Survey and Q17 of the 2020 Policy Survey; jurisdictions in states that conduct all-mail elections, either statewide or in select jurisdictions, were excluded from the analysis of mail voting excuse policies. Casewise deletion was used at the jurisdiction level (only jurisdictions that reported data in F1d and/or F1g as well as reported data in F1a in both 2018 and 2020 were included in the analysis). All mail turnout increases from 2018 to 2020 were statistically significant at  $p < 0.001$ .*

Jurisdiction-level analysis also shows large increases in mail voting from the 2018 to the 2020 general elections across a variety of policy configurations, particularly where mail voting was made more widely available. These increases are shown in Table 1. The largest increases occurred in states that did not have all-mail elections in 2018 but implemented this type of voting on a statewide level in 2020. Jurisdictions in these states had an average mail turnout level of 9.9% in 2018, which increased to 72% for the 2020 general election—an increase of 62.1 percentage points. The next largest increase occurred in jurisdictions whose states removed the requirement to provide an excuse in order to request a mailed ballot in 2020. These jurisdictions had an average mail turnout rate of 5.9% in 2018 and 30.8% in 2020, an increase of 24.9 percentage points. States that did not change their policies on all-mail elections or excuse-required mailed ballot voting also saw increases

<sup>17</sup> The total number of mail votes was calculated by adding the number of voters who cast a mailed ballot and whose ballots were counted (item F1d of the EAVS) and the number of voters who cast a mailed ballot in a jurisdiction that conducts elections entirely by mail and whose ballots were counted (item F1g of EAVS). Mail turnout was calculated by dividing this figure by the total number of ballots that were cast and counted (item F1a of EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations.

in their mail voting rates from 2018 to 2020, but these average increases were smaller, at 19.2 percentage points and 15.6 percentage points, respectively.

States reported transmitting a total of 90,687,978 mailed ballots to non-UOCAVA voters for the November 2020 general election, of which 70,551,227 were returned by voters. This means that 77.8% of the transmitted mailed ballots were returned by voters, and of the returned ballots, 98.8% were counted and 0.8% were rejected.<sup>18</sup> Although the number of mailed ballots that were transmitted more than doubled since 2016—when 41,651,526 transmitted mailed ballots were reported—the mailed ballot return, count, and rejection rates were not significantly different between the 2016 and 2020 general elections at the national level.<sup>19</sup>

Table 2 shows the most common reasons reported for rejecting mailed ballots in the 2020 general election. In this election, rejections for having a non-matching signature accounted for nearly one-third (32.8%) of the total rejected mailed ballots. The next most common reason (22.5%) was “other,” which comprised reasons such as the voter was not eligible to vote in the jurisdiction, the ballot was missing an important document (such as an affidavit or certification), the document was incomplete or insufficient, there were identifying marks on the ballot, the ballot was missing a secrecy envelope or was outside of the secrecy envelope, or a combination of reasons.<sup>20</sup> Other common reasons for rejection included that the voter had already voted in person (13.5%), the ballot was received after the state’s deadline for submitting a mailed ballot (12.1%), and there was no voter signature on the mailed ballot or the mailed ballot envelope (12.1%).

Additional information about mail voting in the 2020 general election, including statistics by state, can be found in Appendix A of this chapter.

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<sup>18</sup> The mailed ballot return rate was calculated by dividing the total number of mailed ballots returned by voters (item C1b of EAVS) by the total number of mailed ballots transmitted (item C1a of EAVS). The mailed ballot count rate was calculated by dividing the number of counted mailed ballots (item C3a) by the total number of mailed ballots returned by voters (item C1b). The mailed ballot rejection rate was calculated by dividing the total number of mailed ballots rejected (item C4a) by the total number of mailed ballots returned by voters (item C1b). A total of 0.4% of the mailed ballots returned by voters (C1b) were not classified as having been either counted (C3a) or rejected (C4a). Alabama did not provide sufficient data to calculate the mailed ballot count and rejection rates. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations. The EAVS data also show that nationwide, 1.4% of the transmitted mailed ballots were returned as undeliverable (C1c/C1a); 3.6% were surrendered, spoiled, or replaced (C1d/C1a); 0.5% were surrendered at the polls, so the voter could cast a provisional ballot (C1e/C1a); 16.8% had an unknown status, which included voters who were transmitted a mailed ballot but chose not to vote (C1f/C1a); and 1% of mailed ballots reached some other status  $([C1g+C1h+C1i]/C1a)$ . Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations.

<sup>19</sup> The comparisons were statistically insignificant at  $p > 0.05$ .

<sup>20</sup> In the 2020 EAVS, states reported other reasons for rejecting mailed ballots in items C4p\_Other, C4q\_Other, and C4t\_Other.



**Table 2. The Most Common Reason for Rejecting Mailed Ballots Was for a Non-Matching Signature**

Reason	Percentage of Rejected Ballots
Non-matching signature	32.8%
Other reason given	22.5%
Voter already voted in person	13.5%
Ballot not received on time/missed deadline	12.1%
No voter signature	12.1%
No witness signature	5.6%
Ballot returned in an unofficial envelope	4.2%
Multiple ballots returned in one envelope	2.1%
First-time voter without proper identification	2.0%
Voter deceased	1.6%
Ballot missing from envelope	1.5%
Envelope not sealed	0.9%
No resident address on envelope	0.8%
No ballot application on record	0.6%
No election official's signature on ballot	0.1%

Source: Rejections for non-matching signature was calculated as  $C4e/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections for other reasons was calculated as  $(C4p+C4q+C4r)/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because the voter already voted in person was calculated as  $C4m/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because the ballot was not received on time was calculated as  $C4b/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because the ballot lacked a voter signature was calculated as  $C4c/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because the ballot lacked a witness signature was calculated as  $C4d/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because the ballot was in an unofficial envelope was calculated as  $C4g/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because multiple ballots were returned in a single envelope was calculated as  $C4k/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because the first-time voter did not provide proper identification was calculated as  $C4n/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because the ballot was from a deceased voter was calculated as  $C4l/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because the ballot was missing from the envelope was calculated as  $C4h/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because the envelope was not sealed was calculated as  $C4i/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because there was no resident address on the envelope was calculated as  $C4j/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because there was no ballot application on record was calculated as  $C4o/C4a \times 100$ . Rejections because there was no election official's signature on the ballot was calculated as  $C4f/C4a \times 100$ . Casewise deletion was used at the state level (percentages for each rejection reason were calculated independently and only states that reported data for a given reason were included in the analysis), and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.

## In-Person Voting Before Election Day

Most states allow some kind of in-person voting before Election Day. This type of voting generally falls into two categories:

- A voter may go to a polling place before Election Day, receive a ballot, vote their ballot while at the polling place, and place their completed ballot into a ballot box or tabulator.



- A voter may go to an election office to pick up a ballot over the counter. In some states, the voter may be able to take their ballot home with them, whereas in other states, the ballot must be completed in the office. The ballot is then sealed in an envelope and tabulated along with ballots that are returned to the office by mail according to local procedures.

The type of in-person voting that takes place before Election Day and the populations that may use this method of voting are determined by state law. Different states use the terms “in-person early voting” and “in-person absentee voting” to describe both of the voting methods described above, although other terms exist as well (see Chapter 2 of this report).<sup>21</sup> Some states offer both types of voting activities. For example, voters in Ohio may go to their county’s designated early voting site, vote in person, and cast their ballot on a direct-recording electronic device or scan their ballot in a precinct scanner. Voters also have the option of completing a ballot request form, picking up a ballot from their county’s election office, and returning their ballot in person, by drop box, or by mail at a later date.

Fifty-five of the states and territories (all but New Jersey) reported offering some form of in-person voting before Election Day to their population for the 2020 general election. Of these states, 12 required voters to provide an approved excuse to cast an early ballot, and 43 states allowed for no-excuse early voting.<sup>22</sup> Overall, three more states offered no-excuse early voting for the 2020 general election compared to the 2018 general election. Further details about state policies on early voting can be found in Chapter 2 of this report.

For the 2020 general election, states reported that 41,266,229 ballots were cast through in-person early voting and were counted, a 71.1% increase compared to the number cast by this method for the 2016 general election (24,124,466). Although the rate of early voting increased from 2016 to 2020, from 25.3% to 30.6%, the rate of increase was not as large as it was for mail voting.<sup>23</sup>

It should be noted that some states may have reported mailed ballots returned via drop box with other early ballots. Currently, the EAVS does not collect data on the number of ballots returned via drop box, and some states’ data collection practices do not distinguish between early ballots and ballots returned via a drop box.

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<sup>21</sup> The EAVS questions use the term “in-person early voting” to refer to all types of in-person voting that take place before Election Day. The question instructions specify that in-person absentee voting should be reported as in-person early voting in EAVS data. However, some states’ data management systems do not distinguish in-person absentee voters from mail voters, so not all states with in-person absentee voting were able to report data on how many of their voters voted in this way.

<sup>22</sup> The terminology a state used to refer to the process of allowing individuals to cast their ballots in person before Election Day was collected in item Q24 of the 2020 Policy Survey. Data on whether a state required a voter to provide an excuse to cast a ballot in person before Election Day was collected in item Q24a.

<sup>23</sup> The total number of in-person early ballots cast and counted was collected in item F1f of the EAVS. The early voting turnout rate was calculated by dividing this figure by the total number of ballots that were cast and counted (item F1a of the EAVS). Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island did not report data in F1f, either because they did not offer in-person early voting (in the case of New Jersey) or because the number of in-person early voters could not be tracked separately from other modes of participation. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.



## Provisional Voting

HAVA introduced provisional voting as a way for a voter to cast a ballot when the voter's registration status cannot be verified at the time of voting, when there is some indication the voter may have already cast another ballot (for instance, by mail), or when the voter's eligibility to vote is challenged. Provisional ballots are kept separate from other election ballots and are later fully counted, partially counted, or rejected depending on whether the provisional voter's eligibility can be verified in the days following the election according to the state's rules for this process. The provisional ballot process helps ensure each qualified voter casts only one ballot that is counted and allows the voter additional time to prove their eligibility to vote if necessary. Certain states are exempt from HAVA's provisional ballot requirements because they allowed SDR at the time the law was enacted. In addition, North Dakota is exempt from this provision of HAVA because it does not require citizens to register to vote.

In the 2020 Policy Survey, 49 states and territories and the District of Columbia reported offering provisional ballots to voters. Five states and one territory—Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Puerto Rico—did not.<sup>24</sup> States reported that the most common reasons for offering a voter a provisional ballot included that an election official challenged a voter's eligibility to vote (46 states), the voter was not on the list of eligible voters (43 states), the voter lacked proper identification (40 states), the voter did not reside in the precinct in which they were attempting to vote (40 states), and another person (not an election officer) challenged a voter's eligibility to vote (28 states).<sup>25</sup> If a voter cast a provisional ballot in the wrong precinct, four states reported that they would fully count the entire ballot, 20 states would partially count the ballot (e.g., only count the items on the ballot for which the voter would have been eligible had they voted in the correct precinct), and 26 states would reject the entire ballot.<sup>26</sup> For more information on provisional voting policies, including the deadlines by which provisional ballots needed to be adjudicated, please see Chapter 2 of this report.

States reported 1,316,945 provisional ballots were cast and counted for the 2020 general election. This represents a slight decline from previous years: 1,483,708 provisional ballots had been cast in 2018 and 1,897,631 in 2016. Provisional voting as a percentage of turnout has continued its rate of decline in presidential elections, from 1.7% in 2012 to 1.4% in 2016 to 0.8% in 2020.<sup>27</sup> The rate of provisional voting declined twice as fast between the 2016 and the 2020 general elections as it did between the 2012 and the 2016 general elections.

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<sup>24</sup> Information on states' use of provisional voting was collected in Q32 of the 2020 Policy Survey.

<sup>25</sup> Information on the circumstances under which a state uses provisional ballots was collected in Q32a of the 2020 Policy Survey.

<sup>26</sup> Information on how a state would treat a provisional ballot cast in the wrong precinct was collected in Q32c. Percentages were calculated using the number of states who reported using provisional voting in Q32.

<sup>27</sup> The total number of provisional ballots cast and counted was collected in item F1e of the EAVS. The provisional voting turnout rate was calculated by dividing this figure by the total number of ballots that were cast and counted (item F1a of the EAVS). Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota, New Hampshire, and Vermont did not report data on provisional ballots in the 2020 EAVS because, as confirmed in the Policy Survey, these states do not offer provisional ballots to voters. Puerto Rico reported in the Policy Survey that it does not offer provisional ballots but reported data on provisional ballots in the EAVS. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

Nationally, 78.3% of provisional ballots were counted,<sup>28</sup> either in full or in part, with 21.3% being rejected.<sup>29</sup> The most common reasons that states reported for rejecting provisional ballots included that the voter was not registered in the state (accounting for 54.8% of rejections), “other reasons” (21.2%), the voter attempted to vote in the wrong jurisdiction (12.4%), the voter had already cast a ballot through another mode of voting (5%), the voter attempted to vote in the wrong precinct (4.8%), the voter failed to provide sufficient identification (3.4%), the envelope or ballot was incomplete or illegible (3.3%), and the voter’s signature did not match the signature on record (2.2%).<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, 0.9% of the provisional ballots reached another adjudication aside from being either counted or rejected: the largest numbers of these ballots came from Ohio, Texas, Missouri, and Illinois.<sup>31</sup>

## UOCAVA and Other Modes of Voting

Absentee and mail voting have long been used to provide individuals in the military or U.S. citizens who live overseas or who are absent from their residence with a way to participate in federal elections. The distinct needs of members of the uniformed services and overseas citizens remain an area of critical concern in election administration, and these individuals are given special voting protections under UOCAVA and its amendments.<sup>32</sup> UOCAVA voters are provided certain rights to fully

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<sup>28</sup> The total number of counted provisional ballots was calculated by summing the number of provisional ballots fully counted (item E1b of the EAVS) and the number of provisional ballots partially counted (item E1c). The percentage of counted provisional ballots was calculated by dividing the sum of E1b and E1c by the sum of all provisional ballot adjudications (items E1b, E1c, E1d, and E1e). Maine reported in its EAVS survey comments that all provisional ballots are counted. The data that New Jersey reported in E1e (provisional ballots that reached another adjudication) were included in this calculation, because the state explained in its survey comments that this item included provisional ballots that were accepted in part or in full. The data that El Dorado, San Bernardino, and Stanislaus counties in California reported in E1e were included in this calculation for the same reason. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations.

<sup>29</sup> The total number of rejected provisional ballots was collected in item E1d of the EAVS. The percentage of rejected provisional ballots was calculated by dividing this figure by the sum of all provisional ballot adjudications (items E1b, E1c, E1d, and E1e). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>30</sup> The number of provisional ballots rejected because the voter was not registered in the state was collected in item E2b of the EAVS. The number of provisional ballots rejected because the voter attempted to vote in the wrong jurisdiction was collected in item E2c. The number of provisional ballots rejected because the voter attempted to vote in the wrong precinct was collected in item E2d. The number of provisional ballots rejected because the voter did not provide sufficient identification was collected in item E2e. The number of provisional ballots rejected because the envelope and/or ballot were incomplete or illegible was collected in item E2f. The number of provisional ballots rejected because the voter’s signature did not match the signature on record was collected in item E2i. The percentage of provisional ballots rejected for each of these reasons was calculated by dividing the figure by the total number of provisional ballots rejected (item E2a). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations.

<sup>31</sup> The total number of provisional ballots that reached an adjudication aside from being counted or rejected was collected in item E1e of the EAVS. The percentage of other provisional ballots was calculated by dividing this figure by the sum of all provisional ballot adjudications (items E1b, E1c, E1d, and E1e). As explained in footnote 28, the E1e data for the state of New Jersey and the counties of El Dorado, San Bernardino, and Stanislaus in California were included in the calculation for counted provisional ballots. Ohio explained in its survey comments that this data included provisional ballots cast under an APRI exception but did not provide a definition for this term. Missouri explained in its survey comments that this data included provisional ballots supplied to voters who were registered but did not have a form of identification. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>32</sup> The uniformed services are the armed forces—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard—as well as the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Commissioned Officer Corps, and the U.S. Merchant Marine. Uniformed services members, their spouses, and their eligible dependents are, together, referred to as uniformed services voters. Overseas citizens are U.S. citizens living outside of the United States who are not uniformed services voters and are also protected by UOCAVA.



participate in federal elections and are given special considerations as to when their ballots are sent, how their blank ballots can be transmitted, and how and when they may return their voted ballots.

For the 2020 general election, states reported 938,297 UOCAVA ballots that were cast and counted. This total represents a sizeable increase from 2016 and 2018, when 649,427 and 358,137 UOCAVA ballots were cast, respectively. However, despite the increase in the number of voters who participated in the 2020 general election, UOCAVA voting as a percentage of the overall electorate stayed relatively the same in 2020. In 2016, 0.5% of voters were UOCAVA voters, and in 2020, UOCAVA voters comprised 0.6% of the electorate.<sup>33</sup> Nationwide, 97.6% of the UOCAVA absentee ballots that were returned by voters were counted, and 2.1% of the returned ballots were rejected.<sup>34</sup>

Chapter 4 of this report contains a complete discussion of the EAC's history of collecting data on voters covered by UOCAVA; a full analysis of the data collected about these voters and their ballots in 2020, including ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected; and the use of the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB). Chapter 2 of this report contains a complete discussion of state policies regarding UOCAVA voting.

In addition to ballots that were cast at a physical polling place on Election Day, by mail, by in-person early voting, and by provisional voting, states had the opportunity to report data on any other modes of voting that were offered in the state in 2020.<sup>35</sup> A total of 1,290,577 ballots were reported as cast and counted that could not be categorized according to one of the modes listed in the EAVS question. The highest numbers of these votes were reported in California (923,698 ballots), Florida (184,533 ballots), North Carolina (168,900 ballots), and Wisconsin (7,387 ballots). The most common reasons for reporting data in this item included mailed ballots that could not be distinguished as being from UOCAVA or non-UOCAVA voters, conditional voter registration (CVR) voters in California, curbside absentee voters in North Carolina, and "other," "unknown," or "not categorized" ballots.

## Polling Places and Poll Workers

For an election, each voter is assigned to a precinct according to their residential address as listed in their voter registration record. A precinct is a contiguous, bounded geographic area that is the basis for determining the contests and issues on which the voters legally residing in that area are eligible to vote.<sup>36</sup> Precincts are then assigned to a polling place, which is a physical location where in-person voting takes place. As previously discussed, some states use an early voting or vote center model

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<sup>33</sup> The total number of UOCAVA ballots that were cast and counted was collected in item F1c of the EAVS. The UOCAVA turnout rate was calculated by dividing this figure by the total number of ballots that were cast and counted (item F1a of the EAVS). Rhode Island did not report data in F1c. Their survey comment stated, "According to RI general law, all UOCAVA mail ballots are consolidated into one mail ballot category." Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>34</sup> The total number of UOCAVA absentee ballots that were returned by voters was collected in item B9a of the EAVS. The number of UOCAVA ballots counted was collected in item B14a, and the number of UOCAVA ballots rejected was collected in item B18a. The UOCAVA ballot count rate was calculated by dividing B14a by B9a, and the rejection rate was calculated by dividing B18a by B9a. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation; this calculation also did not include returned UOCAVA ballots that were not categorized as either counted or rejected.

<sup>35</sup> Ballots cast by another mode that were counted were recorded in item F1h of the EAVS.

<sup>36</sup> Some states use the terms "ward" or "voting district" to describe their voting precincts.

that allows voters to vote at any polling location within their jurisdiction rather than at a specifically assigned polling place.

States reported 176,933 precincts that were used for the 2020 general election. States reported that 107,457 polling places were used on Election Day and that 25,099 polling places were used during the early voting period, for a total of 132,556 polling places for the 2020 general election.<sup>37</sup> States also provided information on whether their polling places were located at election offices or at other sites, such as libraries, schools, or mobile voting locations. There continues to be differences in where states locate their early voting polling locations, as opposed to their Election Day polling locations. States reported that nationwide, 42.8% of early voting sites were located at election offices, and 57.3% were located at other sites.<sup>38</sup> However, for Election Day polling places, only 9.6% of polling places were located at election offices, and 93.8% were reported as being located at other sites.<sup>39</sup>

Many of the laws, rules, policies, and procedures governing elections are enforced, in practice, by the poll workers who assist with elections.<sup>40</sup> These poll workers are typically not full-time election workers or employees of election offices; rather, they are recruited and trained to assist in the voting process during an election. Typical activities that poll workers assist in include verifying the identities

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<sup>37</sup> The total number of precincts was collected in item D2a of the EAVS. The total number of Election Day polling places was collected in item D3a. The total number of early voting polling places was collected in item D4a. Kansas and Washington did not provide data on the number of Election Day polling places. Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Oregon did not provide data on the number of early voting polling places; several of these states noted that early voting opportunities are limited to special circumstances, so the number of early voting sites was not tracked. Before this report's finalization, Virginia notified the EAC that the statewide number of early voting polling places in D4a was 208, not 133. Data users should note that the question numbering in this section changed in 2020; these questions were numbered differently in the 2016 and 2018 EAVS. However, a year-over-year analysis of polling places as reported in the EAVS is cautioned against, as these items have been underreported in previous years.

<sup>38</sup> The number of early voting polling places located at election offices was collected in item D4c of the EAVS. The number of early voting polling places located at other sites was collected in item D4b of the EAVS. The percentage of early voting polling locations located at each type of site was calculated by dividing the EAVS item by the sum of D4b and D4c. This denominator was used instead of the reported total number of early voting polling locations (item D4a), because some states provided a total in D4a but not a breakdown in D4b and D4c. Of the states that reported offering in-person early voting, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Wisconsin did not provide any data on early voting polling places in D4a, D4b, or D4c. Several of these states noted in their survey comments that early voting was offered only in very limited circumstances. Georgia and Rhode Island provided data on the total number of early voting polling places in D4a but did not provide a data breakdown in D4b and D4c. New Jersey did not provide data because it did not offer in-person early voting. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations, and because each category was calculated independently, the percentages do not sum to 100%.

<sup>39</sup> The number of Election Day polling places located at election offices was collected in item D3c of the EAVS. The number of Election Day polling places located at other sites was collected in item D3b of the EAVS. The percentage of Election Day polling locations located at each type of site was calculated by dividing the EAVS item by the sum of D3b and D3c. This denominator was used instead of the reported total number of Election Day polling locations (item D3a), because some states provided a total in D3a but not a breakdown in D3b and D3c. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations, and because each category was calculated independently, the percentages do not sum to 100%. Of the states that reported offering in-person early voting, Kansas and Washington did not provide any data on Election Day polling places in D3a, D3b, or D3c: Washington noted that data were not provided because the state votes almost entirely by mail. The District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, the Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Puerto Rico, Tennessee, and the U.S. Virgin Islands provided data on the total number of Election Day polling places in D3a but did not provide a data breakdown in D3b and D3c.

<sup>40</sup> Some states and jurisdictions use other titles for poll workers, such as election judges, booth workers, wardens, or commissioners. The EAVS instructions stated that observers stationed at polling places, regular office staff who did not fulfill poll worker functions during the election, or temporary election staff who were not hired specifically to serve voters in either early or Election Day voting should not be counted as poll workers for purposes of the EAVS.



of those who come to vote, assisting voters with signing documents required to cast a ballot, providing ballots and setting up voting equipment, and performing other functions as dictated by the state or local election authority.

States reported the number of early voting and Election Day poll workers separately, and they also reported the total number of poll workers who assisted with the 2020 general election. States reported that a total of 775,101 poll workers assisted with the 2020 general election. This included 690,346 poll workers who assisted with Election Day voting and 135,105 poll workers who assisted with early voting.<sup>41</sup> Among states that reported data on poll workers for both the 2016 and the 2020 EAVS, there was no statistically significant change in the number of poll workers reported.<sup>42</sup>

Thirty-six states also reported information on the ages of their poll workers.<sup>43</sup> Among these states, the majority of poll workers were over the age of 40 in the 2020 general election, with nearly half of them over 60 years old. However, Figure 4, which compares the age distribution of poll workers in the 2016 general election to those in the 2020 general election, shows slight but statistically significant shifts in the age categories over time. In 2020, the percentage of poll workers who were ages 18 to 25 and 26 to 40 increased, and the percentage of poll workers who were ages 61 to 70 and 71 or older decreased compared to 2016.<sup>44</sup> Notably, the percentage of poll workers who were ages 26 to 40 nearly doubled, from 8% in 2016 to 15% in 2020.

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
<sup>41</sup> The total number of poll workers who assisted with the 2020 general election was collected in item D7a of the EAVS. The total number of poll workers who assisted with Election Day voting was collected in item D5. The total number of poll workers who assisted with early voting was collected in item D6. D7a does not match the sum of D5 and D6, because in D7a, each poll worker was to only be counted once even if they assisted with both early voting and Election Day voting. Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin were unable to provide poll worker data. Alabama, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Mississippi, New Jersey, and North Dakota did not provide data on the number of early voting poll workers. North Dakota did not provide data on the number of Election Day poll workers. New Hampshire provided data on the minimum number of poll workers required at each polling location by law but noted that it may not reflect the number of poll workers who actually assisted.

<sup>42</sup> *T* tests conducted on the national number of poll workers in 2016 and 2020 were statistically insignificant at  $p < 0.05$ .

<sup>43</sup> Poll worker age data were reported in item D7 of the EAVS for 2020, with D7a corresponding to the total number of poll workers who assisted with the 2020 general election and items D7b–D7g corresponding to age categories. The denominator used in this calculation was the sum of the age categories in D7b–D7g. Poll worker age data were reported in items D3 and D4 for 2016, with D3a corresponding to the total number of poll workers and items D4a–D4f corresponding to age categories. The denominator used in this calculation was the sum of the age categories in D4a–D4f. In 2020, South Carolina only reported poll workers who were under the age of 18 and did not provide data for any other age categories. South Carolina was excluded from the calculations of the percentage of poll workers by age. Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin were unable to provide data on the ages of their poll workers. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations.

<sup>44</sup> *T* tests conducted that compared the percentage of poll workers in the 18 to 25, 26 to 40, 61 to 70, and 71 or older age categories between 2016 and 2020 were statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$ , with most being  $p < 0.01$ . Other age groups did not have a statistically significant change.

**Figure 4. Poll Worker Age Distribution Was Slightly Younger in 2020 Than in 2016**




Source: The percentage of poll workers under age 18 was calculated as  $D7b / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$  for 2020 and  $D4a / (D4a + D4b + D4c + D4d + D4e + D4f) \times 100$  for 2016. The percentage of poll workers ages 18–25 was calculated as  $D7c / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$  for 2020 and  $D4b / (D4a + D4b + D4c + D4d + D4e + D4f) \times 100$  for 2016. The percentage of poll workers ages 26–40 was calculated as  $D7d / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$  for 2020 and  $D4c / (D4a + D4b + D4c + D4d + D4e + D4f) \times 100$  for 2016. The percentage of poll workers ages 41–60 was calculated as  $D7d / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$  for 2020 and  $D4d / (D4a + D4b + D4c + D4d + D4e + D4f) \times 100$  for 2016. The percentage of poll workers ages 61–70 was calculated as  $D7e / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$  for 2020 and  $D4e / (D4a + D4b + D4c + D4d + D4e + D4f) \times 100$  for 2016. The percentage of poll workers ages 71 or older was calculated as  $D7g / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$  for 2020 and  $D4f / (D4a + D4b + D4c + D4d + D4e + D4f) \times 100$  for 2016. Casewise deletion was used at the state level (percentages for each age category were calculated independently and only states that reported data for a given age category were included in the analysis), and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.

The survey comments many jurisdictions provided indicated that this age shift was partially attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) stated that older adults are at greater risk of severe illness from COVID-19, with adults 65 years or older in the highest risk category. This risk category overlaps with the group of adults who typically make up the majority of poll workers in federal general elections. The 2020 EAVS data confirm that a number of older poll workers did not assist with the 2020 general election and that many younger adults took their places.



The COVID-19 pandemic also affected state and local efforts to obtain a sufficient number of poll workers to assist with the 2020 general election. Although poll worker recruitment remains a challenge, with 52% of jurisdictions reporting that it was either very difficult or somewhat difficult to obtain a sufficient number of poll workers, Figure 5 shows that poll worker recruitment has gotten less difficult since the 2016 general election.<sup>45</sup> In their survey comments, many jurisdictions cited cross-cutting effects on their recruitment efforts. Some long-time poll workers who had served in previous elections were unable to do so for the 2020 general election; some were unable to work because of age-related COVID-19 risks, and in many cases, jurisdictions needed to replace workers who called out sick close to the election to quarantine after COVID-19 exposure. On the other hand, many jurisdiction officials praised the efforts of the EAC and state election offices that encouraged

**Figure 5. Poll Worker Recruitment Was Less Difficult in 2020 Than in 2016**



Source: Ease of recruiting poll workers was collected in item D8 in the 2020 EAVS and D5 in the 2016 EAVS. For both years, jurisdictions that responded, “not enough information to answer,” “data not available,” “does not apply,” or left this item blank were excluded from this analysis.

<sup>45</sup> Data on the ease of recruiting poll workers were collected in item D8 of the 2020 EAVS and item D5 of the 2016 EAVS. In 2020, 3,436 of 6,460 jurisdictions (53.2%) responded “not enough information to answer,” “data not available,” “does not apply,” or left this item blank. The comparison between 2016 and 2020 data was statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ .



qualified individuals to sign up as poll workers. Some jurisdictions noted that they had overwhelming interest from those who view assisting with elections as a way to help their community and recruited more poll workers than they had available slots to fill.

Notably, ease of poll worker recruiting appears to be highly correlated with the size of the jurisdiction. Jurisdictions that had 10,000 or fewer registered voters reported having an easier time recruiting poll workers than did jurisdictions with more than 10,000 registered voters.<sup>46</sup>

## Election Technology

The use of technology in polling places and vote tally locations varies widely across and within the states. The EAVS collects data on the type of voting equipment that is used and the type of voting that the equipment is used for, the specific makes and models of the equipment and how many are deployed, and whether electronic poll books (or e-poll books) are used to assist at polling places. The voting equipment landscape continues to evolve with each election.

### Voting Equipment

The EAVS collects data on the use of six types of voting equipment that voters can use to cast their ballots:<sup>47</sup>

- Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting equipment, not equipped with a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT)<sup>48</sup>
- DRE voting equipment, equipped with a VVPAT<sup>49</sup>
- Electronic system that produces a paper record but does not tabulate votes. These are often referred to as ballot marking devices (BMD)<sup>50</sup>
- Scanner (optical/digital) that tabulates paper records that voters mark by hand or via a ballot marking device<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> For this comparison, jurisdictions were classified according to the total number of registered voters as reported in item A1a of the EAVS. This comparison was statistically significant at  $p < 0.001$ .

<sup>47</sup> Two jurisdictions in Arkansas and 21 jurisdictions in Kansas did not provide any information about their voting equipment in the EAVS. Two jurisdictions in Missouri did not provide responses on the use of DREs with VVPAT (F6 in the EAVS), and an additional jurisdiction in Missouri did not provide responses on the use of ballot marking devices (BMD; F7 in the EAVS) or scanners (F8 in the EAVS). Five jurisdictions in Texas did not provide responses on the use of DREs without VVPAT (F5 in the EAVS), DREs with VVPAT, BMDs, or scanners. Twenty-six jurisdictions in Utah responded “data not available” to questions about BMDs, and one responded “data not available” to questions about scanners (F8 in the EAVS). In Vermont, 101 jurisdictions responded “does not apply” to questions about scanners, and 145 jurisdictions did not provide responses to questions about hand counting ballots (F11 in the EAVS). No jurisdictions in Kansas provided responses to questions about the use of BMDs or hand counting ballots. Two jurisdictions—Maine – UOCAVA and Kalawao County, Hawaii—responded “does not apply” to all of these questions; however, that is because these jurisdictions report EAVS data with other jurisdictions in their state (see Chapter 5 for more details).

<sup>48</sup> Data on DREs without VVPAT were collected in items F5a, F5b, F5c, and F5d of the EAVS.

<sup>49</sup> Data on DREs with VVPAT were collected in items F6a, F6b, F6c, and F6d of the EAVS.

<sup>50</sup> Data on BMDs were collected in items F7a, F7b, F7c, and F7d of the EAVS.


<sup>51</sup> Data on scanners were collected in items F8a, F8b, F8c, and F8d of the EAVS.



- Punch card machines<sup>52</sup>
- Lever machines<sup>53</sup>

The EAVS also collects information on whether jurisdictions hand count paper ballots without the use of an optical or digital scanning system.<sup>54</sup>

**Figure 6. Scanners and BMDs Were the Most Commonly Used Voting Methods in 2020**



Percentage of States with At Least One Jurisdiction Using the Voting Method in the 2020 General Election

Source: The use of scanners was collected in item F8a of the 2020 EAVS. Use of BMDs was collected in item F7a. Use of hand counting was collected in item F11a. Use of DRE with VVPAT was collected in item F6a. Use of DRE without VVPAT was collected in item F5a. States in which at least one EAVS jurisdiction reported using the voting equipment are included in this graph. Kansas did not respond to F7a or F11a.

<sup>52</sup> Data on punch card machines were collected in items F9a, F9b, F9c, and F9d of the EAVS. No jurisdictions have reported using this equipment since before the 2016 EAVS.

<sup>53</sup> Data on lever machines were collected in items F10a, F10b, F10c, and F10d of the EAVS. No jurisdictions have reported using this equipment since before the 2016 EAVS.

<sup>54</sup> Data on hand counting paper ballots were collected in items F11a and F11d of the EAVS.

Nationally, states reported deploying 369,366 pieces of voting equipment to cast and tabulate votes for the 2020 general election.<sup>55</sup> Figure 6 shows the number of states that reported using voting equipment in at least one jurisdiction. Most jurisdictions and states used more than one type of equipment. The most commonly used types of equipment were scanners (used in 55 states) and BMDs (used in 45 states). Twenty-one states reported hand counting ballots without using any equipment to assist, and 20 states used DREs equipped with a VVPAT.

The use of DREs without VVPAT has been a particular concern to some experts, because these machines do not include a paper record of the votes that are cast, which raises security issues and can make it difficult to conduct certain types of post-election audits. In the 2018 EAVS, 14 states reported using DREs without VVPAT in at least one of their jurisdictions. The 2020 EAVS data show that only nine states now use this equipment in at least one of their jurisdictions: Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Texas. Of these states, Louisiana reported using DREs without VVPAT in each of its jurisdictions. Five states that reported using DREs without VVPAT in 2018 discontinued using those machines by the 2020 general election (Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina).

**Table 3. DRE Without VVPAT-Only Jurisdictions Declined Between 2018 and 2020**

State	2018		2020	
	Number of Jurisdictions	Percentage of Jurisdictions	Number of Jurisdictions	Percentage of Jurisdictions
Arkansas	1	1.3%	0	--
Indiana	16	17.4%	12	13.0%
Kansas	7	6.7%	0	--
Kentucky	5	4.2%	0	--
Pennsylvania	50	74.6%	0	--
Tennessee	6	6.3%	1	1.1%
Texas	32	12.6%	19	7.5%

*Source: The number of jurisdictions that reported using only DRE without VVPAT voting machines was based on responses to items F5a, F6a, F7a, and F8a of the 2018 and 2020 EAVS. The percentage of jurisdictions using only DRE without VVPAT was calculated by dividing by the total number of jurisdictions in the state. One county in Florida that reported using a DRE without VVPAT in 2018 was not included in this table, because the county had listed a make and model of a scanner in item F5b\_1 in its 2018 data, which indicates a possible data entry error. None of the counties in Kansas that did not provide voting equipment information for the 2020 EAVS reported using DREs without VVPAT in the 2018 EAVS.*

<sup>55</sup> The number of voting machines deployed was reported in items F5c\_1, F5c\_2, F5c\_3, F6c\_1, F6c\_2, F6c\_3, F7c\_1, F7c\_2, F7c\_3, F8c\_1, F8c\_2, F8c\_3, F9c\_1, F9c\_2, F9c\_3, F10c\_1, F10c\_2, and F10c\_3 of the EAVS. These items were summed for each jurisdiction to arrive at this total. American Samoa did not report the number of voting machines deployed, because this territory only uses hand-marked paper ballots that are manually counted. Oregon and Wisconsin reported that they do not track the number of voting machines deployed. Before this report's finalization, Virginia notified the EAC that the statewide number of BMDs in F7c\_1, F7c\_2, and F7c\_3 was 2,533, not "data not available."



The number of jurisdictions that reported using only DREs without VVPAT and not using any other type of voting equipment also declined between 2018 and 2020. Table 3 shows that for the 2020 general election, only three states reported having jurisdictions that used only DREs without VVPAT as their voting equipment, and in each of those states, the percentage of their jurisdictions that used only DRE without VVPAT has also decreased since 2018.

## Electronic Poll Books

When voters go into polling places, their identity is checked against voter registration information that is contained in poll books to ensure they are registered to vote and did not already cast a ballot during in-person early voting or with a mailed ballot. These poll books can be paper based and printed before the election, or they can be electronic. The use of e-poll books has steadily increased in recent elections. For the 2016 general election, 1,146 jurisdictions (17.7%) reported using e-poll books; this number rose to 1,684 (26.1%) in 2018 and to 1,991 (30.8%) in 2020. The number of jurisdictions that used e-poll books in 2020 represents an 18.2% increase from 2018.

As of the 2020 general election, 38 states reported using e-poll books in at least one of their jurisdictions, and 16 states and territories (Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) and the District of Columbia reported using e-poll books in all of their jurisdictions. Of the jurisdictions that reported using e-poll books, the most common usages were to sign voters in at polling places (98.9%), update voter history (87.8%), and look up polling places (79.5%), and 20.7% of jurisdictions reported using e-poll books for other uses as well.<sup>56</sup>

The 2020 Policy Survey also collected information on whether states have a testing or certification process in place for e-poll books.<sup>57</sup> Of the 39 states that provided a response to this question, 12 states (30.8%) indicated that the testing and certification process is required by statute, 10 states (25.6%) indicated that the testing and certification process is required by a formal administrative rule or as guidance, and 17 states (43.6%) indicated that testing and certification of e-poll books is not required.<sup>58</sup> The EAC does not currently provide testing or certification of e-poll books; any testing that states perform on their equipment is performed to the state's specifications.

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<sup>56</sup> Use of e-poll books to sign voters in was reported in item F3a of the EAVS. Use of e-poll books to update voter history was reported in item F3b. Use of e-poll books to look up polling places was reported in item F3c. Use of e-poll books for other purposes was reported in item F3d. A jurisdiction was considered to have used e-poll books in 2020 if it responded "yes" to at least one of these items.

<sup>57</sup> Q16 of the 2020 Policy Survey collected information on whether the state, or any jurisdiction in the state, used e-poll books. Colorado, Hawaii, and Massachusetts reported in the Policy Survey that they used e-poll books but did not report data on the usage of e-poll books in item F3 of the EAVS; Colorado noted in a comment in the Policy Survey that "CO's statewide voter registration system has an application that allows judges at vote centers to look up in-person voters and see whether they've returned a ballot. There is no testing and certification because the application is developed and maintained by our VR development team in our IT department." Puerto Rico reported data on the usage of e-poll books in the EAVS but reported not using e-poll books in the Policy Survey.

<sup>58</sup> Q16a of the 2020 Policy Survey collected information on what kind of testing or certification is required for e-poll books. Illinois did not provide a response to this question.

## Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

Overview Table 1: 2020 EAVS at a Glance

State	Total Jurisdictions	Total Active Registered Voters	Total CVAP	Total Voter Turnout	Turnout as % of Active Registration	Turnout as % of CVAP
Alabama [1]	67	3,438,213	3,731,336	2,329,047	67.7	62.4
Alaska	1	595,647	533,151	361,400	60.7	67.8
American Samoa [2]	1	16,341	--	11,944	73.1	--
Arizona	15	4,275,729	5,137,474	3,420,481	80.0	66.6
Arkansas	75	1,408,061	2,235,415	1,209,997	85.9	54.1
California	58	21,795,538	26,032,160	17,720,746	81.3	68.1
Colorado	64	3,803,762	4,244,210	3,320,607	87.3	78.2
Connecticut [1]	169	2,335,860	2,619,474	1,863,479	79.8	71.1
Delaware	3	711,287	725,178	514,656	72.4	71.0
District of Columbia	1	517,890	536,768	346,491	66.9	64.6
Florida	67	14,517,002	15,507,315	11,137,676	76.7	71.8
Georgia	159	7,194,889	7,581,837	5,023,812	69.8	66.3
Guam [2]	1	55,896	--	29,377	52.6	--
Hawaii [3]	5	759,971	1,014,035	580,098	76.3	57.2
Idaho	44	1,029,763	1,282,630	878,527	85.3	68.5
Illinois	108	9,103,542	9,088,036	6,140,545	67.5	67.6
Indiana	92	4,170,353	4,978,356	3,103,284	74.4	62.3
Iowa [1]	99	2,094,770	2,348,787	1,700,130	81.2	72.4
Kansas [4]	105	1,764,949	2,103,748	1,379,623	78.2	65.6
Kentucky	120	3,319,307	3,367,502	2,149,444	64.8	63.8
Louisiana	64	2,963,901	3,463,372	2,169,354	73.2	62.6
Maine	497	1,135,008	1,078,770	822,534	72.5	76.2
Maryland	24	4,142,347	4,316,921	3,059,603	73.9	70.9
Massachusetts	351	4,400,254	5,057,192	3,658,005	83.1	72.3
Michigan [5]	83	7,209,300	7,562,464	5,579,317	77.4	73.8
Minnesota	87	3,731,016	4,157,556	3,290,013	88.2	79.1
Mississippi [1]	82	1,982,632	2,246,323	1,334,155	67.3	59.4
Missouri [1]	116	3,963,980	4,650,318	3,201,458	80.8	68.8
Montana [1]	56	675,971	831,760	612,141	90.6	73.6
Nebraska	93	1,168,708	1,388,950	966,786	82.7	69.6
Nevada	17	1,835,401	2,111,932	1,407,761	76.7	66.7
New Hampshire [1], [6]	320	1,087,145	1,070,215	814,499	74.9	76.1
New Jersey [7]	21	5,896,836	6,170,130	4,494,659	76.2	72.8
New Mexico	33	1,255,669	1,522,171	928,230	73.9	61.0
New York	62	12,362,997	13,810,830	8,701,749	70.4	63.0



State	Total Jurisdictions	Total Active Registered Voters	Total CVAP	Total Voter Turnout	Turnout as % of Active Registration	Turnout as % of CVAP
North Carolina	100	6,607,121	7,729,644	5,543,405	83.9	71.7
North Dakota [8]	53	--	567,545	364,499	--	64.2
Northern Mariana Islands [2]	1	18,526	--	13,355	72.1	--
Ohio	88	8,073,829	8,879,469	5,974,121	74.0	67.3
Oklahoma	77	2,021,846	2,875,059	1,564,886	77.4	54.4
Oregon [9]	36	2,944,588	3,162,204	2,396,123	81.4	75.8
Pennsylvania [10]	67	8,280,348	9,810,201	6,973,951	84.2	71.1
Puerto Rico [11]	1	2,355,894	2,579,596	1,296,169	55.0	50.2
Rhode Island [1]	39	735,195	800,798	519,412	70.6	64.9
South Carolina	46	3,535,061	3,892,341	2,523,856	71.4	64.8
South Dakota	66	578,683	653,394	427,406	73.9	65.4
Tennessee	95	4,226,928	5,129,580	3,074,692	72.7	59.9
Texas	254	15,279,870	18,875,542	11,449,044	74.9	60.7
U.S. Virgin Islands [2]	1	53,341	--	18,064	33.9	--
Utah	29	1,713,297	2,134,249	1,542,529	90.0	72.3
Vermont [12]	246	440,920	498,705	368,075	83.5	73.8
Virginia [13]	133	5,763,187	6,226,623	4,487,338	77.9	72.1
Washington [14]	39	4,892,871	5,409,035	4,116,055	84.1	76.1
West Virginia	55	1,062,685	1,420,289	801,667	75.4	56.4
Wisconsin [15]	1,851	3,834,164	4,412,888	3,308,331	86.3	75.0
Wyoming	23	303,049	434,852	278,503	91.9	64.0
U.S. Total	6,460	209,441,338	237,998,330	161,303,109	76.8	67.7

State	Total In-Person Election Day Ballots Cast and Counted	Total Mailed Ballots Cast and Counted	Total In-Person Early Ballots Cast and Counted	Total Polling Places	Total Poll Workers
Alabama [1]	2,014,242	300,684	--	2,045	16,128
Alaska	157,220	92,471	82,451	584	3,077
American Samoa [2]	10,310	905	455	42	256
Arizona	371,565	2,931,175	69,063	928	7,482
Arkansas	258,836	84,910	830,561	20,889	6,549
California	1,124,389	14,515,783	966,201	5,655	48,221
Colorado	89,789	3,092,904	108,856	642	7,185
Connecticut [1]	1,188,283	667,403	--	718	3,590
Delaware	345,809	161,135	5,236	267	3,157
District of Columbia	29,036	229,459	80,959	127	4,467
Florida	1,942,102	4,546,896	4,332,912	4,858	44,857
Georgia	980,627	1,311,361	2,704,002	2,755	27,474
Guam [2]	16,167	108	12,966	27	465
Hawaii [3]	4,522	548,636	24,214	16	64
Idaho	384,319	345,636	145,388	754	5,815
Illinois	2,049,927	2,037,583	2,005,711	19,684	46,711
Indiana	1,201,154	535,942	1,354,897	2,137	17,557
Iowa [1]	698,557	994,300	--	1,329	8,685
Kansas [4]	505,132	463,909	375,196	--	8,412
Kentucky	477,612	631,497	1,024,965	879	8,528
Louisiana	1,182,672	162,692	817,951	2,096	16,980
Maine	311,560	359,331	151,535	1,040	6,054
Maryland	439,094	1,502,852	987,373	401	14,033
Massachusetts	1,256,443	1,521,052	852,926	1,611	13,044
Michigan [5]	2,286,764	2,741,668	529,015	4,950	35,825
Minnesota	1,380,309	1,286,660	607,304	2,581	29,785
Mississippi [1]	1,085,337	234,500	--	1,776	11,358
Missouri [1]	2,288,607	899,695	--	2,326	19,075
Montana [1]	9,497	597,912	--	43	1,592
Nebraska	417,349	485,195	51,537	1,015	7,810
Nevada	128,729	664,461	540,767	307	4,653
New Hampshire [1], [6]	554,315	253,932	--	308	--
New Jersey [7]	987	4,178,875	--	1,549	7,603
New Mexico	142,470	323,661	456,280	883	4,165
New York	4,284,263	1,763,448	2,502,161	5,124	118,378
North Carolina	896,818	974,351	3,460,562	3,203	26,608
North Dakota [8]	91,803	183,161	87,882	128	1,607
Northern Mariana Islands [2]	3,970	12,321	8,130	11	189



State	Total In-Person Election Day Ballots Cast and Counted	Total Mailed Ballots Cast and Counted	Total In-Person Early Ballots Cast and Counted	Total Polling Places	Total Poll Workers
Ohio	2,344,886	2,135,600	1,345,715	3,651	47,761
Oklahoma	1,114,001	275,017	167,516	2,032	6,552
Oregon [9]	--	2,379,544	--	36	--
Pennsylvania [10]	4,214,277	2,623,867	--	9,246	--
Puerto Rico [11]	1,092,637	145,244	48,724	1,612	--
Rhode Island [1]	198,611	318,313	--	500	3,594
South Carolina	1,182,726	428,704	894,078	2,091	17,135
South Dakota	208,396	122,525	93,469	573	2,675
Tennessee	766,552	216,074	2,071,168	2,066	17,831
Texas	1,707,821	982,362	8,660,809	9,604	49,441
U.S. Virgin Islands [2]	8,119	1,670	8,173	12	190
Utah	81,970	1,386,385	35,048	196	1,619
Vermont [12]	90,959	272,318	2,033	521	--
Virginia [13]	1,657,228	983,907	1,798,050	2,587	30,403
Washington [14]	--	4,050,981	183	66	--
West Virginia	396,926	142,191	256,113	1,421	8,324
Wisconsin [15]	1,337,269	1,298,346	651,791	2,467	--
Wyoming	135,426	85,454	55,903	187	2,137
U.S. Total	47,148,389	69,486,966	41,266,229	132,556	775,101

Overview Table 1 Calculation Notes:

- Total Jurisdictions** uses a count of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code by state.
- Total Active Registered Voters** uses question A1b.
- Total CVAP** uses the 2019 1-year estimate of the CVAP from the U.S. Census Bureau.
- Total Voter Turnout** uses question F1a.
- Turnout as % of Active Registration** uses question F1a divided by A1b.
- Turnout as % of CVAP** uses question F1a divided by the CVAP estimate.
- Total In-Person Election Day Ballots Cast and Counted** uses question F1b.
- Total Mailed Ballots Cast and Counted** uses the sum of questions F1d and F1g.
- Total In-Person Early Ballots Cast and Counted** uses question F1f.
- Total Polling Places** uses the sum of questions D3a and D4a.
- Total Poll Workers** uses question D7a.

Overview Table 1 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation. For example, since there was no CVAP estimate for most U.S. territories, their turnout data (F1a) were not used for the calculation of "Turnout as % of CVAP" at the national level.



- The CVAP is an estimate of the number of U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older in the state. This report used the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimate for 2019 instead of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as possible. The estimate for the year 2020 was not available by the time this report was finalized. The 2019 1-year CVAP does not include data that were collected as part of the decennial Census conducted in 2020. Some states may have reported more active registered voters than CVAP because the 2019 CVAP is being compared to 2020 data.
- The Total Voter Turnout column includes voters who cast a ballot that was counted. The Total Mailed Ballots Cast and Counted column does not include UOCAVA voters.

**[1]** Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island did not report data in F1f, because the number of in-person early voters could not be tracked separately from other modes of participation.

**[2]** American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands did not have a CVAP available to use for the turnout as a percentage of CVAP calculation.

**[3]** For Hawaii, the numbers reported for the City and County of Honolulu include all mailed ballot envelopes received and validated by the county. Certified turnout results were determined through subsequent ballot envelope processing and counting by the State of Hawaii, pursuant to Hawaii State Law.

**[4]** Kansas did not provide data on polling places.

**[5]** Michigan noted in its survey comments that “walk-in absentee voting prior to Election Day is considered early voting in [Michigan]. These absentee ballots are not tabulated until Election Day.” Data on these walk-in absentee voters was reported in F1f.

**[6]** New Hampshire provided information on the minimum number of early voting and Election Day poll workers required by law but noted that it may not reflect the number of poll workers actually deployed.

**[7]** New Jersey did not report data in F1f, because the state did not offer in-person early voting.

**[8]** North Dakota does not have voter registration.

**[9]** Oregon is a vote-by-mail state and does not have traditional early voting or traditional polling places.

**[10]** Pennsylvania reported that the state cannot systematically track data on poll workers.

**[11]** Puerto Rico reported that data on poll workers are not available and that poll workers were volunteers, not PR-SEC employees (the abbreviation was not defined by the state).

**[12]** Vermont did not provide data on the number of poll workers. Prior to this report being finalized, Vermont provided updated statewide totals for most items in F1 but was unable to provide jurisdiction-level data that could be incorporated into the EAVS. The statewide vote totals are:

- Total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted (F1a): 371,452
- Voters who cast a ballot at a physical polling place on Election Day and whose ballots were counted (F1b): 91,079
- UOCAVA voters who cast a ballot via an absentee ballot or FWAB and whose ballots were counted (F1c): 2,719
- Voters who cast a mailed ballot and whose ballots were counted (F1d): 225,621
- Voters who cast a ballot at an in-person early voting location and whose ballots were counted (F1f): 2,033

**[13]** Before this report’s finalization, Virginia notified the EAC that the statewide number of early voting polling places in D4a was 208, not 133.

**[14]** Washington is a vote-by-mail state. Voters can register and vote on or before Election Day. The total in F1g (voters who cast a mailed ballot in a jurisdiction that conducts elections entirely by mail and whose ballots were counted) includes in-person voters that were issued a mailed ballot packet at a voting center



that they could deposit into a ballot drop box or mail. Totals in F1f (voters who cast a ballot at an in-person early voting location and whose ballots were counted) include voters who used a disability access unit.

**[15]** The number of jurisdictions in Wisconsin changed several times over the two-year period covered by the 2020 EAVS due to incorporations, mergers, and similar mechanisms. Wisconsin canvass data tracks individual contests, and therefore, the total ballots cast in any election is highly unlikely to match the total votes cast in any one contest. Wisconsin voters are not required to vote in each contest on the ballot and undervotes are the likely cause of total ballots cast data being higher than the number of votes in a contest.

Overview Table 2: Voter Turnout by Mail

State	Total Mail Voters	% Turnout by Mail	Total Mailed Ballots Transmitted	Total Mailed Ballots Returned	% Mailed Ballots Returned
Alabama [1]	300,684	12.9	170,616	158,321	92.8
Alaska	92,471	25.6	121,223	97,344	80.3
American Samoa	905	7.6	911	911	100.0
Arizona	2,931,175	85.7	3,529,586	2,938,896	83.3
Arkansas	84,910	7.0	120,369	117,555	97.7
California	14,515,783	81.9	23,228,899	15,398,923	66.3
Colorado	3,092,904	93.1	3,904,381	3,122,440	80.0
Connecticut	667,403	35.8	832,542	673,899	80.9
Delaware	161,135	31.3	187,360	163,234	87.1
District of Columbia	229,459	66.2	416,660	235,486	56.5
Florida	4,546,896	40.8	6,065,500	4,750,645	78.3
Georgia [2]	1,311,361	26.1	1,759,036	1,316,165	74.8
Guam	108	0.4	193	129	66.8
Hawaii	548,636	94.6	748,944	551,383	73.6
Idaho [3]	345,636	39.3	407,323	344,893	84.7
Illinois	2,037,583	33.2	2,233,578	2,013,990	90.2
Indiana	535,942	17.3	547,602	538,860	98.4
Iowa	994,300	58.5	1,050,593	997,652	95.0
Kansas [4]	463,909	33.6	362,948	295,021	81.3
Kentucky	631,497	29.4	666,472	634,595	95.2
Louisiana	162,692	7.5	218,057	163,656	75.1
Maine	359,331	43.7	373,478	362,594	97.1
Maryland	1,502,852	49.1	1,699,070	1,505,791	88.6
Massachusetts	1,521,052	41.6	1,679,267	1,531,001	91.2
Michigan	2,741,668	49.1	3,009,891	2,762,148	91.8
Minnesota	1,286,660	39.1	1,545,345	1,295,908	83.9
Mississippi	234,500	17.6	247,855	239,488	96.6
Missouri	899,695	28.1	935,659	905,132	96.7
Montana	597,912	97.7	704,040	599,505	85.2
Nebraska	485,195	50.2	508,049	486,844	95.8
Nevada	664,461	47.2	1,833,795	670,091	36.5
New Hampshire	253,932	31.2	263,447	255,935	97.1
New Jersey	4,178,875	93.0	6,053,283	4,228,687	69.9
New Mexico	323,661	34.9	373,548	339,906	91.0
New York	1,763,448	20.3	2,366,172	1,832,724	77.5
North Carolina	974,351	17.6	1,350,883	981,816	72.7
North Dakota	183,161	50.3	214,506	183,544	85.6



State	Total Mail Voters	% Turnout by Mail	Total Mailed Ballots Transmitted	Total Mailed Ballots Returned	% Mailed Ballots Returned
Northern Mariana Islands [5]	12,321	92.3	1,670	1,670	100.0
Ohio	2,135,600	35.7	2,314,198	2,144,504	92.7
Oklahoma	275,017	17.6	344,600	280,106	81.3
Oregon	2,379,544	99.3	2,924,063	2,397,091	82.0
Pennsylvania	2,623,867	37.6	3,120,999	2,653,688	85.0
Puerto Rico [6]	145,244	11.2	22,403	22,402	100.0
Rhode Island	318,313	61.3	318,313	318,426	100.0
South Carolina	428,704	17.0	447,697	430,229	96.1
South Dakota	122,525	28.7	132,529	123,406	93.1
Tennessee	216,074	7.0	229,768	218,149	94.9
Texas	982,362	8.6	1,208,665	988,364	81.8
U.S. Virgin Islands	1,670	9.2	1,846	1,682	91.1
Utah	1,386,385	89.9	1,752,928	1,396,681	79.7
Vermont	272,318	74.0	313,193	273,784	87.4
Virginia	983,907	21.9	1,099,502	990,198	90.1
Washington	4,050,981	98.4	5,042,956	4,082,581	81.0
West Virginia	142,191	17.7	150,202	142,445	94.8
Wisconsin [7]	1,298,346	39.2	1,441,825	1,305,082	90.5
Wyoming	85,454	30.7	89,540	85,627	95.6
U.S. Total	69,486,966	43.1	90,687,978	70,551,227	77.8

State	Mailed Ballots Counted		Mailed Ballots Rejected	
	Total	% of Returned	Total	% of Returned
Alabama [1]	--	--	--	--
Alaska	96,701	99.3	643	0.7
American Samoa	905	99.3	6	0.7
Arizona	2,931,164	99.7	7,732	0.3
Arkansas	84,232	71.7	7,561	6.4
California	15,305,243	99.4	92,924	0.6
Colorado	3,092,904	99.1	29,536	0.9
Connecticut	667,403	99.0	6,496	1.0
Delaware	161,135	98.7	2,099	1.3
District of Columbia	234,758	99.7	728	0.3
Florida	4,740,149	99.8	13,919	0.3
Georgia [2]	1,311,361	99.6	4,804	0.4
Guam	108	83.7	21	16.3
Hawaii	548,636	99.5	2,747	0.5
Idaho [3]	352,641	102.2	3,613	1.0
Illinois	1,986,445	98.6	33,853	1.7
Indiana	535,942	99.5	2,918	0.5
Iowa	994,300	99.7	2,592	0.3
Kansas [4]	24,924	8.4	1,361	0.5
Kentucky	631,497	99.5	3,101	0.5
Louisiana	161,292	98.6	2,364	1.4
Maine	359,331	99.1	1,326	0.4
Maryland	1,502,852	99.8	2,939	0.2
Massachusetts	1,521,052	99.4	9,949	0.6
Michigan	2,741,668	99.3	20,480	0.7
Minnesota	1,286,660	99.3	9,248	0.7
Mississippi	233,925	97.7	5,563	2.3
Missouri	899,695	99.4	5,437	0.6
Montana	597,912	99.7	1,593	0.3
Nebraska	485,195	99.7	1,649	0.3
Nevada	664,461	99.2	5,630	0.8
New Hampshire	253,932	99.2	2,003	0.8
New Jersey	4,178,875	98.8	49,812	1.2
New Mexico	328,631	96.7	17,008	5.0
New York	1,763,448	96.2	66,746	3.6
North Carolina	974,351	99.2	7,465	0.8
North Dakota	183,152	99.8	392	0.2
Northern Mariana Islands [5]	1,193	71.4	144	8.6



State	Mailed Ballots Counted		Mailed Ballots Rejected	
	Total	% of Returned	Total	% of Returned
Ohio	2,135,600	99.6	8,904	0.4
Oklahoma	275,017	98.2	5,089	1.8
Oregon	2,379,544	99.3	17,547	0.7
Pennsylvania	2,619,517	98.7	34,171	1.3
Puerto Rico [6]	22,402	100.0	--	--
Rhode Island	318,313	100.0	113	0.0
South Carolina	425,701	98.9	4,528	1.1
South Dakota	122,525	99.3	789	0.6
Tennessee	216,074	99.0	2,090	1.0
Texas	982,362	99.4	8,304	0.8
U.S. Virgin Islands	1,670	99.3	12	0.7
Utah	1,386,385	99.3	10,296	0.7
Vermont	272,318	99.5	1,465	0.5
Virginia	983,907	99.4	6,291	0.6
Washington	4,051,164	99.2	31,417	0.8
West Virginia	142,191	99.8	254	0.2
Wisconsin [7]	1,302,101	99.8	2,981	0.2
Wyoming	85,454	99.8	173	0.2
U.S. Total	69,560,318	98.8	560,826	0.8

Overview Table 2 Calculation Notes:

**Total Mail Voters** uses the sum of questions F1d and F1g.

**% Turnout by Mail** uses the sum of questions F1d and F1g divided by question F1a.

**Total Mailed Ballots Transmitted** uses question C1a.

**Total Mailed Ballots Returned** uses question C1b.

**% Mailed Ballots Returned** uses question C1b divided by question C1a.

**Mailed Ballots Counted, Total** uses question C3a.

**Mailed Ballots Counted, % of Returned** uses question C3a divided by question C1b.

**Mailed Ballots Rejected, Total** uses question C4a.

**Mailed Ballots Rejected, % of Returned** uses question C4a divided by question C1b.

Overview Table 2 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentages of mailed ballots counted and rejected may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- The Total Mail Voters column reflects the number of voters who cast a ballot by mail that was counted. It does not include voters who cast a UOCAVA ballot or FWAB.

- The Total Mailed Ballots Transmitted column captures the total number of mailed ballots that states reported transmitting, regardless of whether the ballot was returned or not. The number of ballots transmitted typically exceeds the number of ballots returned because some voters who transmitted a mailed ballot choose to vote by another mode or to not vote at all. Total Mailed Ballots Returned typically exceeds Total Mail Voters because some returned mailed ballots are rejected for not meeting state requirements. Mailed Ballots Counted may not match Total Mail Voters because states may have different methodologies for calculating these numbers.
- The Total Mailed Ballots Returned column includes both counted and rejected ballots that were returned to election offices.

**[1]** Alabama reported mail and early in-person voting data together as the Total Mail Voters (300,684). Both are considered absentee voting; thus, the data for transmission method are commingled and cannot be reported separately.

**[2]** Data on rejected mailed ballots for Georgia include rejected ballots entered by counties into the state voter registration system as of February 2021, which does not necessarily include all ballots rejected by counties.

**[3]** Butte County and Valley County in Idaho responded “Data not available” to the number of mailed ballots received (C1b) but reported data for the number of mailed ballots counted (C3a). Madison County and Valley County in Idaho reported more mailed ballots counted than mailed ballots received. Because of these responses, the total number of mailed ballots counted exceeds the number of mailed ballots received at the state level for Idaho, and the percentage of returned ballots that were counted exceeds 100%.

**[4]** Kansas did not provide any survey comments to explain why the data reported in the Total Mail Voters column exceeds that of the Total Mailed Ballots Transmitted column, nor why the percentage of mailed ballots counted and rejected does not sum to 100%. Some jurisdictions that reported data on Total Mail Voters did not provide data for Total Mailed Ballots Transmitted.

**[5]** The Northern Mariana Islands did not provide any survey comments to explain why the data reported in the Total Mail Voters column exceeds that of the Total Mailed Ballots Transmitted column, nor why the percentages of mailed ballots counted and rejected does not sum to 100%.

**[6]** Puerto Rico reported “data not available” in question C4. In addition, this territory noted in a survey comment that the Total Mail Voters column may include ballots for non-federal elections and that its response in the Total Mail Voters and % Turnout by Mail columns includes “voters who [cast] their vote early but in their home, not in a polling location.”

**[7]** Local election officials in Wisconsin were still recording voter participation method at the time data was provided for this report; therefore, the Total Mail Voters data were incomplete. These data are currently available from the state.



Overview Table 3: In-Person Voting and Other Modes of Voting

State	In-Person Election Day Voters		In-Person Early Voters		Provisional Voters	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	2,014,242	86.5	--	--	8,840	0.4
Alaska [2]	157,220	43.5	82,451	22.8	11,509	3.2
American Samoa	10,310	86.3	455	3.8	12	0.1
Arizona	371,565	10.9	69,063	2.0	30,151	0.9
Arkansas [3]	258,836	21.4	830,561	68.6	5,082	0.4
California [4]	1,124,389	6.3	966,201	5.5	216,781	1.2
Colorado	89,789	2.7	108,856	3.3	150	0.0
Connecticut [1]	1,188,283	63.8	--	--	104	0.0
Delaware	345,809	67.2	5,236	1.0	107	0.0
District of Columbia	29,036	8.4	80,959	23.4	1,738	0.5
Florida [5]	1,942,102	17.4	4,332,912	38.9	7,169	0.1
Georgia	980,627	19.5	2,704,002	53.8	9,347	0.2
Guam	16,167	55.0	12,966	44.1	71	0.2
Hawaii	4,522	0.8	24,214	4.2	6	0.0
Idaho [6]	384,319	43.7	145,388	16.5	0	0.0
Illinois	2,049,927	33.4	2,005,711	32.7	42,003	0.7
Indiana	1,201,154	38.7	1,354,897	43.7	1,348	0.0
Iowa [1]	698,557	41.1	--	--	1,293	0.1
Kansas	505,132	36.6	375,196	27.2	36,107	2.6
Kentucky	477,612	22.2	1,024,965	47.7	77	0.0
Louisiana	1,182,672	54.5	817,951	37.7	658	0.0
Maine	311,560	37.9	151,535	18.4	108	0.0
Maryland	439,094	14.4	987,373	32.3	108,478	3.5
Massachusetts [7]	1,256,443	34.3	852,926	23.3	1,724	0.0
Michigan [8]	2,286,764	41.0	529,015	9.5	77	0.0
Minnesota [6]	1,380,309	42.0	607,304	18.5	--	--
Mississippi [1]	1,085,337	81.4	--	--	11,358	0.9
Missouri [1]	2,288,607	71.5	--	--	2,139	0.1
Montana [1]	9,497	1.6	--	--	364	0.1
Nebraska	417,349	43.2	51,537	5.3	9,998	1.0
Nevada	128,729	9.1	540,767	38.4	66,359	4.7
New Hampshire [1], [6]	554,315	68.1	--	--	--	--
New Jersey [9]	987	0.0	--	--	293,894	6.5
New Mexico [10]	142,470	15.3	456,280	49.2	687	0.1
New York	4,284,263	49.2	2,502,161	28.8	84,884	1.0
North Carolina [11]	896,818	16.2	3,460,562	62.4	16,388	0.3
North Dakota [6]	91,803	25.2	87,882	24.1	--	--



State	In-Person Election Day Voters		In-Person Early Voters		Provisional Voters	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands	3,970	29.7	8,130	60.9	24	0.2
Ohio	2,344,886	39.3	1,345,715	22.5	126,066	2.1
Oklahoma	1,114,001	71.2	167,516	10.7	1,986	0.1
Oregon [12]	--	--	--	--	45	0.0
Pennsylvania [13]	4,214,277	60.4	--	--	106,951	1.5
Puerto Rico	1,092,637	84.3	48,724	3.8	8,977	0.7
Rhode Island [1], [14]	198,611	38.2	--	--	2,488	0.5
South Carolina	1,182,726	46.9	894,078	35.4	5,442	0.2
South Dakota	208,396	48.8	93,469	21.9	65	0.0
Tennessee	766,552	24.9	2,071,168	67.4	6,222	0.2
Texas	1,707,821	14.9	8,660,809	75.6	37,760	0.3
U.S. Virgin Islands	8,119	44.9	8,173	45.2	94	0.5
Utah	81,970	5.3	35,048	2.3	31,652	2.1
Vermont [6]	90,959	24.7	2,033	0.6	--	--
Virginia	1,657,228	36.9	1,798,050	40.1	15,825	0.4
Washington [15]	--	--	183	0.0	43	0.0
West Virginia	396,926	49.5	256,113	31.9	4,222	0.5
Wisconsin [16]	1,337,269	40.4	651,791	19.7	57	0.0
Wyoming	135,426	48.6	55,903	20.1	15	0.0
U.S. Total	47,148,389	30.5	41,266,229	30.6	1,316,945	0.8



State	UOCAVA Voters		Other Voters	
	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	5,281	0.2	--	--
Alaska [2]	13,519	3.7	4,230	1.2
American Samoa	214	1.8	--	--
Arizona	18,527	0.5	--	--
Arkansas [3]	30,512	2.5	174	0.0
California [4]	93,452	0.5	923,698	5.2
Colorado	28,908	0.9	--	--
Connecticut [1]	7,689	0.4	--	--
Delaware	2,369	0.5	--	--
District of Columbia	5,299	1.5	--	--
Florida [5]	116,364	1.0	184,533	1.7
Georgia	18,475	0.4	--	--
Guam	65	0.2	--	--
Hawaii	2,720	0.5	--	--
Idaho [6]	3,184	0.4	--	--
Illinois	24,297	0.4	--	--
Indiana	9,943	0.3	--	--
Iowa [1]	5,980	0.4	--	--
Kansas	5,434	0.4	--	--
Kentucky	4,664	0.2	--	--
Louisiana	5,919	0.3	--	--
Maine	5,771	0.7	--	--
Maryland	21,806	0.7	--	--
Massachusetts [7]	25,331	0.7	529	0.0
Michigan [8]	21,793	0.4	--	--
Minnesota [6]	15,740	0.5	--	--
Mississippi [1]	2,960	0.2	--	--
Missouri [1]	11,017	0.3	--	--
Montana [1]	4,368	0.7	--	--
Nebraska	2,707	0.3	--	--
Nevada	7,445	0.5	--	--
New Hampshire [1], [6]	6,252	0.8	--	--
New Jersey [9]	20,903	0.5	--	--
New Mexico [10]	5,132	0.6	284	0.0
New York	66,993	0.8	--	--
North Carolina [11]	26,386	0.5	168,900	3.0
North Dakota [6]	1,653	0.5	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	0	0.0	--	--

State	UOCAVA Voters		Other Voters	
	Total	%	Total	%
Ohio	21,854	0.4	--	--
Oklahoma	6,366	0.4	--	--
Oregon [12]	16,534	0.7	--	--
Pennsylvania [13]	28,014	0.4	842	0.0
Puerto Rico	587	0.0	--	--
Rhode Island [1], [14]	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	12,906	0.5	--	--
South Dakota	2,951	0.7	--	--
Tennessee	14,676	0.5	--	--
Texas	60,292	0.5	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	8	0.0	--	--
Utah	7,474	0.5	--	--
Vermont [6]	2,986	0.8	--	--
Virginia	32,328	0.7	--	--
Washington [15]	64,848	1.6	--	--
West Virginia	2,215	0.3	--	--
Wisconsin [16]	13,481	0.4	7,387	0.2
Wyoming	1,705	0.6	--	--
U.S. Total	938,297	0.6	1,290,577	2.5

Overview Table 3 Calculation Notes:

**In-Person Election Day Voters, Total** uses question F1b.

**In-Person Election Day Voters, %** uses question F1b divided by question F1a.

**In-Person Early Voters, Total** uses question F1f.

**In-Person Early Voters, %** uses question F1f divided by question F1a.

**Provisional Voters, Total** uses question F1e.

**Provisional Voters, %** uses question F1e divided by question F1a.

**UOCAVA Voters, Total** uses question F1c.

**UOCAVA Voters, %** uses question F1c divided by question F1a.

**Other Voters, Total** uses question F1h.

**Other Voters, %** uses question F1h divided by question F1a.

Overview Table 3 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- Question F1f includes all voters who participated in the election in person prior to Election Day. This includes in-person early voting, in-person absentee voting, and any other terminology the state used to refer to in-person early voting (as reported in question Q24 of the 2020 Policy Survey).



- Question F1h was not mandatory. States only reported data in this item if they offered another mode of voting aside from those listed in questions F1b–F1g or if there were counted ballots that could not be categorized in questions F1b–F1g.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentages of turnout by mode in this table and the previous table may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.

[1] Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island did not report data in F1f, because the number of in-person early voters could not be tracked separately from other modes of participation.

[2] Alaska’s F1h data included ballots transmitted by electronic transmission (online or fax) delivery.

[3] Arkansas’s F1h data included nursing home patients who refused their ballots and votes by bearer, “admin,” or delivered by another person.

[4] California’s F1h data included conditional voter registration (CVR) voters, SDR voters, manual voter history updates, “confidentials,” mailed ballots from domestic and UOCAVA voters that could not be separated by mode, and other counted ballots not reported in other F1 items.

[5] Two counties in Florida—Duval and Indian River counties—combined their reported number of UOCAVA and domestic mailed ballots in F1h in lieu of reporting them separately within F1c and F1d, respectively.

[6] Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Vermont are exempt from the NVRA requirement to offer provisional ballots. North Dakota is exempt from offering provisional ballots because it does not require voter registration.

[7] Massachusetts’s F1h data included “non-UOCAVA AV [absentee voting] ballots not returned by mail.”

[8] Michigan’s data in the In-Person Early Voters columns reflect those who voted absentee at the local clerk’s office prior to Election Day.

[9] New Jersey did not report data in F1f because the state did not offer in-person early voting.

[10] New Mexico’s F1h data included ballots cast because of “emergency (medical reasons).”

[11] North Carolina’s F1h data included curbside absentee voters.

[12] Oregon is a vote-by-mail state and traditional early voting does not exist.

[13] Pennsylvania reported that the state cannot systematically track data on poll workers. Pennsylvania’s F1h data included ballots for which “vote method not identified in the system.”

[14] Rhode Island reported that data for question F1c is unavailable.

[15] Washington is a vote-by-mail state. Voters can register and vote on or before Election Day. Totals in F1f (voters who cast a ballot at an in-person early voting location and whose ballots were counted) include voters who used a disability access unit.

[16] Wisconsin reported that state statute does not require the state to track data on poll workers. Wisconsin’s F1h data included ballots for which voter method data was not yet available.

Overview Table 4: Polling Places and Poll Workers

State	Total Precincts	Total Polling Places		Total Poll Workers	
		Election Day	Early Voting	Election Day	Early Voting
Alabama [1]	2,111	1,976	69	16,028	–
Alaska [2]	441	420	164	2,817	260
American Samoa	41	41	1	0	256
Arizona	1,494	767	161	7,409	1,091
Arkansas	2,519	11,055	9,834	6,440	2,379
California	20,497	3,704	1,951	46,762	25,680
Colorado [3]	3,215	341	301	7,185	7,185
Connecticut [1], [4]	718	718	–	3,590	–
Delaware	439	264	3	3,157	3
District of Columbia	144	95	32	2,407	2,549
Florida	6,128	4,433	425	42,247	11,173
Georgia [2]	2,648	2,419	336	22,401	5,073
Guam	67	22	5	485	48
Hawaii [2], [5]	250	8	8	64	64
Idaho	948	722	32	5,532	303
Illinois [2]	10,075	17,169	2,515	43,299	3,412
Indiana	5,169	1,835	302	15,313	2,211
Iowa [1]	1,681	1,329	–	8,632	1,003
Kansas [6]	2,601	–	–	5,789	1,120
Kentucky	3,692	682	197	7,947	4,658
Louisiana [2], [7]	3,934	1,991	105	16,980	–
Maine [8]	551	520	520	6,054	–
Maryland [9]	1,991	320	81	12,469	8,210
Massachusetts [2], [10]	2,173	1,220	391	13,044	–
Michigan [11]	4,751	3,367	1,583	35,825	0
Minnesota [2]	4,110	2,344	237	28,646	1,139
Mississippi [1]	1,776	1,776	–	11,358	–
Missouri [1]	4,373	2,326	–	19,075	–
Montana	663	21	22	1,592	1,427
Nebraska	1,379	922	93	7,695	115
Nevada	1,990	217	90	2,692	2,200
New Hampshire [1], [2]	340	308	–	3,576	–
New Jersey [2], [12]	6,346	1,549	–	7,603	–
New Mexico	1,949	664	219	3,631	953
New York	15,551	4,838	286	73,198	15,065
North Carolina [13]	2,663	2,752	451	24,742	12,310



State	Total Precincts	Total Polling Places		Total Poll Workers	
		Election Day	Early Voting	Election Day	Early Voting
North Dakota [2], [14]	422	110	18	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands [2]	7	7	4	135	54
Ohio [15]	8,933	3,563	88	47,761	0
Oklahoma	1,950	1,950	82	5,993	559
Oregon [16]	1,328	36	--	--	--
Pennsylvania [2], [17]	9,158	9,155	91	--	--
Puerto Rico [2], [18]	1,365	1,259	353	--	--
Rhode Island [2]	461	461	39	3,516	78
South Carolina [19]	2,262	1,975	116	16,618	517
South Dakota	715	506	67	2,562	177
Tennessee	1,961	1,852	214	16,641	2,757
Texas	9,949	6,580	3,024	41,092	17,740
U.S. Virgin Islands [2]	12	9	3	150	40
Utah	2,943	123	73	2,015	521
Vermont [2], [20]	275	275	246	--	--
Virginia [21]	2,454	2,454	133	27,984	2,419
Washington [22]	7,436	--	66	--	--
West Virginia	1,706	1,361	60	8,143	271
Wisconsin [23]	3,698	2,467	--	--	--
Wyoming	480	179	8	2,052	85
<b>U.S. Total</b>	<b>176,933</b>	<b>107,457</b>	<b>25,099</b>	<b>690,346</b>	<b>135,105</b>

State	Poll Workers' Ages					
	% Age <18	% Age 18-25	% Age 26-40	% Age 41-60	% Age 61-70	% Age 71+
Alabama [1]	2.5	2.9	7.9	25.7	31.4	29.6
Alaska [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--
American Samoa	0.0	20.7	25.4	42.6	11.3	0.0
Arizona	1.1	4.4	12.3	27.7	30.3	24.1
Arkansas	0.7	4.3	6.8	21.8	36.3	30.0
California	12.7	9.5	22.8	30.4	16.3	8.3
Colorado [3]	6.8	3.6	8.9	24.5	32.7	23.5
Connecticut [1], [4]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	3.6	6.7	11.7	32.1	29.9	15.9
District of Columbia	1.8	8.8	49.6	24.6	11.4	3.7
Florida	0.9	4.3	10.8	30.5	29.9	23.6
Georgia [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Guam	0.0	24.5	25.8	32.3	9.0	8.4
Hawaii [2], [5]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Idaho	5.3	4.4	8.6	21.4	39.3	21.0
Illinois [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Indiana	4.3	7.0	17.4	31.7	24.1	15.4
Iowa [1]	0.3	3.9	10.9	25.8	34.1	24.9
Kansas [6]	4.0	3.9	12.9	24.4	29.6	25.1
Kentucky	0.2	6.2	13.2	37.4	26.5	16.4
Louisiana [2], [7]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maine [8]	0.6	4.4	11.4	33.0	31.8	18.7
Maryland [9]	2.8	6.6	13.8	41.3	25.0	10.5
Massachusetts [2], [10]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Michigan [11]	3.9	3.8	6.6	22.9	33.6	29.1
Minnesota [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Mississippi [1]	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	50.2	44.8
Missouri [1]	5.4	6.1	10.1	24.2	30.5	23.8
Montana	0.0	2.0	7.5	27.8	35.7	27.0
Nebraska	1.1	4.1	17.0	31.1	26.3	20.4
Nevada	4.1	10.0	14.0	27.5	25.1	19.3
New Hampshire [1], [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Jersey [2], [12]	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Mexico	2.8	6.7	11.6	27.9	30.1	20.9
New York	0.4	8.5	22.2	29.7	22.1	17.1
North Carolina [13]	2.9	4.6	11.7	30.3	31.3	19.2
North Dakota [2], [14]	--	--	--	--	--	--



State	Poll Workers' Ages					
	% Age <18	% Age 18-25	% Age 26-40	% Age 41-60	% Age 61-70	% Age 71+
Northern Mariana Islands [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio [15]	2.1	5.4	14.1	32.1	28.6	17.8
Oklahoma	0.0	2.1	6.3	18.5	31.6	41.4
Oregon [16]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania [2], [17]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Puerto Rico [2], [18]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina [19]	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	0.0	1.3	7.6	21.2	38.4	31.6
Tennessee	3.6	4.4	9.2	23.8	32.7	26.3
Texas	6.7	9.5	14.4	27.9	26.0	15.5
U.S. Virgin Islands [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utah	1.2	11.7	25.3	40.9	15.8	5.2
Vermont [2], [20]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia [21]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Washington [22]	--	--	--	--	--	--
West Virginia	0.0	5.3	13.1	30.1	28.6	22.8
Wisconsin [23]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming	1.3	3.0	9.7	24.5	38.2	23.3
U.S. Total	3.2	6.2	15.0	28.4	27.3	20.1

Overview Table 4 Calculation Notes:

**Total Precincts** uses question D2a.

**Total Polling Places, Election Day** uses question D3a.

**Total Polling Places, Early Voting** uses question D4a.

**Total Poll Workers, Election Day** uses question D5.

**Total Poll Workers, Early Voting** uses question D6.

**Poll Workers % Age <18** uses question D7b divided by the sum of questions D7b-D7g.

**Poll Workers % Age 18-25** uses question D7c divided by the sum of questions D7b-D7g.

**Poll Workers % Age 26-40** uses question D7d divided by the sum of questions D7b-D7g.

**Poll Workers % Age 41-60** uses question D7e divided by the sum of questions D7b-D7g.

**Poll Workers % Age 61-70** uses question D7f divided by the sum of questions D7b-D7g.

**Poll Workers % Age 71+** uses question D7g divided by the sum of questions D7b-D7g.

Overview Table 4 Data Notes

**General Notes:**

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.



- Because percentages for each age category were calculated independently, the percentages for each age category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- In calculating percentages for poll worker age categories, the sum of questions D7b–D7g was used instead of D7a because some states did not report data in all age categories.

**[1]** Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, and New Hampshire did not report complete data on early voting because some of this data could not be tracked separately from Election Day voting data.

**[2]** Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Vermont do not track data on the ages of their poll workers.

**[3]** Colorado did not distinguish between early voting and Election Day voting in collecting information on poll workers. Because Colorado counties automatically mail ballots to every active voter and most voters choose to vote the mail ballot, a large number of poll workers are needed to process the mail ballots. That work begins in the early voting period and continues through Election Day and the eight-day post-election period when military and overseas voters can return their ballot and voters with signature or ID issues can cure their ballots.

**[4]** Connecticut provided data on the total number of poll workers in question D7a but was unable to provide the age breakdown in questions D7b–D7g.

**[5]** In Hawaii, in-person voting locations are called Voter Service Centers and provide accessible in-person voting, SDR, and collection of voted ballots.

**[6]** Kansas did not report data on the number of polling places in questions D3 and D4.

**[7]** Louisiana reported both its early voting and Election Day poll workers in question D5.

**[8]** Maine reported that data on the number of early voting poll workers in question D6 was not available.

**[9]** The number of Election Day voting locations in Maryland for the 2020 general election was greatly reduced due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the lack of poll workers. The 320 Election Day voting locations reported in D3a all served as county-wide vote centers. In a typical election, the number of Election Day polling places generally corresponds to the numbers of precincts, and each polling place only serves the precinct(s) assigned to it.

**[10]** Massachusetts reported that “Those who worked early voting were not called ‘poll workers’ and varied each day of early voting.”

**[11]** Michigan reported data in D4 and noted that “early voting takes place at a clerk’s office or their satellite offices for in-person absentee voting only.” All Michigan jurisdictions reported zero for the number of early voting poll workers in D6; regular office staff operated clerk’s offices and satellite locations.

**[12]** New Jersey did not report data in questions D4a nor D6 because the state did not offer in-person early voting.

**[13]** Precinct, polling place, and early voting site counts are based on data that election officials entered into North Carolina’s Statewide Election Information Management System (SEIMS) and may be marginally different than the number of sites that were actually open during early voting and Election Day voting.

**[14]** North Dakota provided data on the total number of poll workers in question D7a but was unable to provide the totals for Election Day and early voting poll workers in questions D5 and D6 or the age breakdown in questions D7b–D7g.

**[15]** Ohio reported zero early voting poll workers with a comment that regular office staff operated the early voting sites.

**[16]** Oregon is a vote-by-mail state and does not have or track traditional poll workers for in-person voting.

**[17]** Pennsylvania provides in-person absentee and mail-in voting at county election offices and satellite county election offices. Absentee and mail-in ballots cast in person are secured until Election Day to be tabulated by the county board of elections. Pennsylvania reported that the state cannot systematically track data on poll workers.



[18] Puerto Rico reported that data on poll workers are not available and that poll workers were volunteers, not PR-SEC employees.

[19] South Carolina only reported poll workers who were under the age of 18 and did not provide data for any other age categories. South Carolina's data on poll worker ages has been excluded from this table.

[20] Vermont did not provide data on the number of poll workers.

[21] Virginia does not capture or track information on the age of poll workers. Before this report's finalization, Virginia notified the EAC that the statewide number of early voting polling places in D4a was 208, not 133.

[22] Washington is a vote-by-mail state and does not have traditional polling places. Washington has voting centers that are open for the entire voting period, not just a single day. Each county is required to have two certified election administrators and can hire election workers to assist with processing returned ballots.

[23] Wisconsin state statute does not require the state to track data on early voting physical polling locations and poll workers. Partial data are available through the state.

Overview Table 5: Election Technology and Voting Methods

State	Total Number of Voting Machines Deployed	DRE without VVPAT		DRE with VVPAT	
		Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	4,864	--	--	--	--
Alaska	758	--	--	152	20.1
American Samoa [1]	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona	1,539	--	--	19	1.2
Arkansas	4,480	76	1.7	92	2.1
California	33,163	--	--	23	0.1
Colorado	1,851	--	--	--	--
Connecticut	2,154	--	--	--	--
Delaware	1,057	--	--	1,050	99.3
District of Columbia	694	--	--	--	--
Florida	14,015	--	--	67	0.5
Georgia	30,824	--	--	--	--
Guam	11	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	292	--	--	276	94.5
Idaho	1,506	--	--	72	4.8
Illinois	20,043	--	--	2,215	11.1
Indiana	14,868	5,775	38.8	956	6.4
Iowa	2,874	--	--	--	--
Kansas [2]	5,871	43	0.7	4,700	80.1
Kentucky	4,246	528	12.4	570	13.4
Louisiana	9,828	9,747	99.2	--	--
Maine [3]	1,088	--	--	--	--
Maryland	3,651	--	--	--	--
Massachusetts	4,386	--	--	--	--
Michigan	8,118	--	--	--	--
Minnesota	5,710	--	--	--	--
Mississippi	7,048	5,820	82.6	20	0.3
Missouri	5,346	--	--	330	6.2
Montana	248	--	--	--	--
Nebraska	1,422	--	--	--	--
Nevada	5,765	--	--	5,646	97.9
New Hampshire	652	--	--	--	--
New Jersey	2,207	1,495	67.7	632	28.6
New Mexico	1,461	--	--	--	--
New York	18,792	--	--	--	--
North Carolina	9,468	--	--	--	--
North Dakota	524	--	--	--	--



State	Total Number of Voting Machines Deployed	DRE without VVPAT		DRE with VVPAT	
		Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands [4]	4	--	--	--	--
Ohio	25,164	--	--	7,028	27.9
Oklahoma	2,263	--	--	--	--
Oregon [5]	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	24,413	--	--	--	--
Puerto Rico	6,075	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island	612	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	16,873	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	630	--	--	--	--
Tennessee	9,199	5,483	59.6	--	--
Texas	42,151	20,978	49.8	2,211	5.2
U.S. Virgin Islands	80	--	--	--	--
Utah	41	--	--	--	--
Vermont [6]	530	--	--	--	--
Virginia [7]	4,057	--	--	--	--
Washington	186	--	--	--	--
West Virginia	5,401	--	--	1,887	34.9
Wisconsin [8]	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming	863	--	--	--	--
U.S. Total	369,366	49,945	13.5	27,946	7.6

State	Ballot Marking Devices		Scanners		Hand Counting (Total Jurisdictions)
	Total	%	Total	%	
Alabama	2,044	42.0	2,820	58.0	0
Alaska	289	38.1	317	41.8	1
American Samoa [1]	--	--	--	--	1
Arizona	1,093	71.0	427	27.7	1
Arkansas	3,373	75.3	939	21.0	5
California	31,770	95.8	1,370	4.1	0
Colorado	1,668	90.1	183	9.9	1
Connecticut	--	--	2,154	100.0	0
Delaware	--	--	7	0.7	3
District of Columbia	562	81.0	132	19.0	0
Florida	4,723	33.7	9,225	65.8	0
Georgia	27,078	87.8	3,746	12.2	0
Guam	8	72.7	3	27.3	0
Hawaii	--	--	16	5.5	0
Idaho	881	58.5	553	36.7	12
Illinois	9,313	46.5	8,515	42.5	0
Indiana	4,807	32.3	3,330	22.4	0
Iowa	1,402	48.8	1,472	51.2	0
Kansas [2]	--	--	1,128	19.2	--
Kentucky	564	13.3	2,584	60.9	3
Louisiana	--	--	81	0.8	0
Maine [3]	496	45.6	592	54.4	187
Maryland	1,729	47.4	1,922	52.6	0
Massachusetts	2,173	49.5	2,213	50.5	58
Michigan	3,367	41.5	4,751	58.5	0
Minnesota	2,794	48.9	2,916	51.1	2
Mississippi	507	7.2	701	9.9	0
Missouri	2,402	44.9	2,614	48.9	1
Montana	136	54.8	112	45.2	10
Nebraska	1,265	89.0	157	11.0	0
Nevada	80	1.4	39	0.7	0
New Hampshire	310	47.5	342	52.5	123
New Jersey	--	--	80	3.6	0
New Mexico	--	--	1,461	100.0	33
New York	7,768	41.3	11,024	58.7	62
North Carolina	6,001	63.4	3,467	36.6	0
North Dakota	260	49.6	264	50.4	0
Northern Mariana Islands [4]	--	--	4	100.0	0



State	Ballot Marking Devices		Scanners		Hand Counting (Total Jurisdictions)
	Total	%	Total	%	
Ohio	12,510	49.7	5,626	22.4	0
Oklahoma	--	--	2,263	100.0	0
Oregon [5]	--	--	--	--	0
Pennsylvania	10,860	44.5	13,553	55.5	0
Puerto Rico	--	--	6,075	100.0	1
Rhode Island	78	12.7	534	87.3	0
South Carolina	14,129	83.7	2,744	16.3	0
South Dakota	533	84.6	97	15.4	0
Tennessee	2,205	24.0	1,511	16.4	11
Texas	15,250	36.2	3,712	8.8	15
U.S. Virgin Islands	50	62.5	30	37.5	0
Utah	29	70.7	12	29.3	0
Vermont [6]	312	58.9	218	41.1	101
Virginia [7]	--	--	4,057	100.0	0
Washington	108	58.1	78	41.9	0
West Virginia	2,743	50.8	771	14.3	0
Wisconsin [8]	--	--	--	--	705
Wyoming	496	57.5	367	42.5	0
U.S. Total	178,166	48.2	113,309	30.7	1,336

Overview Table 5 Calculation Notes:

**Total Number of Voting Machines Deployed** uses the sum of questions F5c\_1, F5c\_2, F5c\_3, F6c\_1, F6c\_2, F6c\_3, F7c\_1, F7c\_2, F7c\_3, F8c\_1, F8c\_2, F8c\_3, F9c\_1, F9c\_2, F9c\_3, F10c\_1, F10c\_2, and F10c\_3.

**DRE without VVPAT, Total** uses the sum of questions F5c\_1, F5c\_2, and F5c\_3.

**DRE without VVPAT, %** uses the sum of questions F5c\_1, F5c\_2, and F5c\_3 divided by the total number of voting machines deployed (Column 1).

**DRE with VVPAT, Total** uses the sum of questions F6c\_1, F6c\_2, and F6c\_3.

**DRE with VVPAT, %** uses the sum of questions F6c\_1, F6c\_2, and F6c\_3 divided by the total number of voting machines deployed (Column 1).

**Ballot Marking Devices, Total** uses the sum of questions F7c\_1, F7c\_2, and F7c\_3.

**Ballot Marking Devices, %** uses the sum of questions F7c\_1, F7c\_2, and F7c\_3 divided by the total number of voting machines deployed (Column 1).

**Scanner, Total** uses the sum of questions F8c\_1, F8c\_2, and F8c\_3.

**Scanner, %** uses the sum of questions F8c\_1, F8c\_2, and F8c\_3 divided by the total number of voting machines deployed (Column 1).

**Hand Counting (Total Jurisdictions)** uses a count of the number of jurisdictions in each state that responded “yes” to question F11a.

Overview Table 5 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- Although other descriptive tables in this chapter used casewise deletion at the state level in calculating percentages, this table did not. When a state reported not using a type of equipment, the number of devices of that type was filled with zero to better capture at the national level the quantity and percentage that each voting technology accounted for in the 2020 general election.

[1] American Samoa reported only hand counting ballots in the 2020 general election.

[2] Kansas did not respond to question F7a on the use of BMDs or question F11a on the use of hand counting.

[3] The data depicted in this table for Maine underreported the number of BMDs (accessible voting solution) deployed by the state's jurisdictions. Each voting place was provided with at least one BMD, and some larger jurisdictions used multiple devices. In the data previously provided to the EAC, Maine reported that each jurisdiction used only one device. The actual number of devices deployed statewide was 527.

[4] The Northern Mariana Islands reported using BMDs in question F7a and provided a description of "pencils."

[5] Oregon reported in question F8a that each of its jurisdictions used scanners, but for the purposes of this report, data on the number of scanners deployed was not tracked.

[6] Vermont provided a response of "valid skip" for all jurisdictions in question F6a and provided a response of "does not apply" for 41.1% of its jurisdictions in question F8a.

[7] Virginia reported using BMDs in all 133 of its jurisdictions, but initially did not report jurisdiction-level data on the number of BMDs deployed. Before this report's finalization, Virginia notified the EAC that the statewide number of BMDs in F7c\_1, F7c\_2, and F7c\_3 was 2,533.

[8] Wisconsin does not permit the use of DREs without a VVPAT. Wisconsin also does not permit the use of punch card machines or lever machines. The state tracks the machine types employed in each jurisdiction and not the number of machines deployed in each jurisdiction.



# Chapter 2. Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey

## Key Findings

The 2020 Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey) asked states to identify the election laws and procedures that govern voter registration, election technology, voter eligibility, modes of voting, and election audits in their state. Notable findings from this survey include:

- In 2020, more states reported providing Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) responses at the state level for every EAVS section compared to 2018.
- Fourteen states reported conducting all-mail elections for the 2020 general election, either statewide or in certain jurisdictions. This is double the number of states from the 2018 Policy Survey, but in some cases, all-mail voting was implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and it was not a permanent change.
- More states reported having an online voter registration system in the 2020 Policy Survey (45 states) compared to in the 2018 Policy Survey (40 states). In the majority of cases, individuals can use this system to register to vote and to update their registration.
- About half of the states reported allowing non-military voters residing in the United States to receive their ballots through an electronic format, such as email, fax, through an online voter registration portal, or through a mobile phone app, under certain circumstances.
- Roughly half of the states reported allowing permanent absentee status when a Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) voter registration is submitted via a Federal Post Card Application (FPCA), a decrease from 2018.
- Forty-four states reported requiring a post-election tabulation audit that verifies that voting equipment used during an election properly counts a sample of voted ballots after an election.

## Introduction

Although quantitative data from state<sup>1</sup> and local election officials provide an important window into how the 2020 general election was run, these data must be understood in the context of state laws and policies. In 2008, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) introduced a component of the EAVS that collects information on state election laws. Since 2018, this data has been collected through the Policy Survey, which uses closed-ended questions to capture states' broad policies. It is important to remember that state election laws are nuanced, and this report simplifies them for the purpose of providing an overview of election policies that offers important context to understanding the EAVS data. This report provides an overview and summary of the Policy Survey's findings.

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term "state" can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Policy Survey and EAVS data.



Additional information about state responses is available in Appendix A of this chapter. The 2020 Policy Survey included updates to some of the 2018 items to better capture state policy nuances.

The 2020 Policy Survey collected data on states' election laws, policies, and practices that would be in place for the November 2020 general election. Most states submitted this information before the election. The Policy Survey was also used to validate 2020 EAVS data prior to states certifying their data as final. The goal of the 2020 Policy Survey was to create comparisons between states across broad policy categories and to provide context in understanding the EAVS data submitted by states. Because of the nature of the closed-ended survey questions, some of the nuances in state election policies could not be accounted for. States were encouraged to forward additional information and context behind their Policy Survey responses to allow their data to be interpreted as accurately as possible.

For further information about how the Policy Survey data were collected and used to validate EAVS data, please see Chapter 5 of this report.

## Responding to the 2020 EAVS

The 2020 Policy Survey asked states to describe who provides the data to respond to the questions in each section of the EAVS: the state election office, local election offices, or both the state and local offices. Some states indicated that all sections are completed by the state election office, and some gather data for all sections from their local jurisdictions.<sup>2</sup> Many states answered certain sections at the state level and other sections at the jurisdiction level.

With the exception of sections A and F of the EAVS, roughly half of the states provided responses at the state level, whereas about one-fifth of states reported that responses are provided by local officials. For sections A and F, about 60% of states reported providing responses at the state level, and slightly less than 15% of states reported providing responses at the local level.<sup>3</sup> Roughly one-quarter to one-third of the responses for each section were provided by both state and local officials. In 2020, more states reported providing EAVS responses at the state level for every EAVS section compared to in 2018 (see Table 1).

The findings from this question illustrate the complexities that state and local election officials experience when answering the EAVS. Many states with a large number of jurisdictions reported

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<sup>2</sup> What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For the 2020 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to counties. The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin reported data on the township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, because this information was only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state.

<sup>3</sup> Information on how states answer Section A of the EAVS was collected in item Q3\_1 of the Policy Survey. Information on how states answer Section B of the EAVS was collected in Q3\_2. Information on how states answer Section C of the EAVS was collected in Q3\_3. Information on how states answer Section D of the EAVS was collected in Q3\_4. Information on how states answer Section E of the EAVS was collected in Q3\_5. Information on how states answer the Section F of EAVS was collected in Q3\_6.



providing EAVS data entirely at the local level. Furthermore, some states reported providing EAVS data for some sections at the state level while relying on local officials for other sections.

**Table 1. More States Are Providing EAVS Responses at the State Level**

Number of States Providing EAVS Responses at the State Level		
EAVS Section	Number of States in 2018	Number of States in 2020
Section A	31	34
Section B	27	28
Section C	27	29
Section D	23	26
Section E <sup>4</sup>	25	28
Section F	26	33

Source: Information on answering the EAVS was collected in Q3 of the Policy Survey.

In almost all states, the chief state election official is responsible for certifying the state's EAVS data submission and/or receiving and certifying the spending of Help America Vote Act (HAVA) funds on behalf of the state. In 2020, 75% of states reported that the chief election official selects the state representative for and supervises local election officials' selection as representatives to the EAC Standards Board. The Standards Board consists of 55 state and 55 local election officials who assist the EAC in carrying out its mandates.<sup>5</sup>

## Policies on Voter Registration and List Maintenance

The primary federal law governing voter registration in the United States is the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), which became effective after the 1994 general election.<sup>6</sup> The NVRA expands voter registration opportunities for voters by creating more standardized registration processes and by designating more places as voter registration agencies. It also requires that states conduct a uniform and nondiscriminatory general program to remove from their lists the records of individuals who are no longer eligible to vote.

Congress also passed HAVA in 2002, requiring states to adopt a computerized statewide voter registration list.<sup>7</sup> States use these registration lists to determine who is eligible to participate in elections. States also face the challenge of keeping these lists up to date, as voters commonly move

<sup>4</sup> Minnesota did not provide a response to Section E of this item for the 2020 Policy Survey.

<sup>5</sup> Information on the EAC-related duties of chief state election officials was collected in item Q1a of the Policy Survey. Eleven states provided additional information for cases in which another official performs these functions. The District of Columbia noted that it does not have any local election officials.

<sup>6</sup> Several states are not covered by the NVRA. North Dakota is exempt because it does not have voter registration. U.S. territories are also not subject to the NVRA, and the states of Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are exempt because they had same-day registration (SDR) in 1994 and have continued to make this option available uninterrupted since that time.

<sup>7</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 21083.

to different jurisdictions or states, die, or become otherwise ineligible to vote. North Dakota is the only state that does not require voter registration.

Between 2018 and 2020, some states passed laws allowing individuals to register to vote online, register in person on Election Day, or register through an automated process. In 2020, states reported receiving a record number of registration applications. Further information on state registration data is included in Chapter 3 of this report.

## Database Systems

States responded to the HAVA voter registration requirements in different ways. Some states adopted a single, central platform at the state level that connects to terminals in local jurisdictions. This type of system is typically referred to as a “top-down” voter registration system. Other states implemented a state voter registration database that gathers and aggregates information from their local jurisdictions’ voter registration databases. This type of system is typically referred to as a “bottom-up” system.<sup>8</sup> If a system has a mix of top-down and bottom-up characteristics, then it is referred to as a “hybrid” system. The specific characteristics of hybrid systems vary state by state.

The Policy Survey asks states to report the type of voter registration database they have and how often information is shared between states and local jurisdictions.<sup>9</sup> Figure 1 shows that a majority of states (67.9%) reported having voter registration databases that function in a top-down manner.

About 20% of states reported having a bottom-up registration system that uploads jurisdiction-level information at regular intervals to form the statewide voter registration list, and only 10.7% of states reported having a hybrid system that combines elements of both.<sup>10</sup> In practice, these state registration system categories can be fluid. Some top-down registration systems may implement processes of the bottom-up registration system and vice versa.

States that reported having either a bottom-up or hybrid system were asked to report how often their jurisdictions transmit voter registration information to the statewide database.<sup>11</sup> For these two systems, real-time data transmissions were most common (reported in 58.8% of the states with bottom-up or hybrid systems), whereas 23.5% of the states reported that voter registration information is transmitted daily.<sup>12</sup> Texas reported that information is transmitted both ways: transmissions from “online” counties happen in real time, whereas in “offline” counties, it happens

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<sup>8</sup> For a bottom-up voter registration system to be considered a statewide system, the state database, the data, and the data flow must be defined, maintained, and administered by the state. U.S. Election Assistance Commission. (2005, July). *Voluntary Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter Registration Lists*. [https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac\\_assets/1/1/Implementing%20Statewide%20Voter%20Registration%20Lists.pdf](https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/1/Implementing%20Statewide%20Voter%20Registration%20Lists.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> One state did not provide a response to this item.


<sup>10</sup> Information on the type of voter registration system states have was collected in item Q4 of the Policy Survey.

<sup>11</sup> Minnesota did not provide a response to this item.

<sup>12</sup> Information on how often local jurisdictions transmit information to the state voter registration database was collected in item Q4a of the Policy Survey.



**Figure 1. Over Two-Thirds of States Have Top-Down Voter Registration Systems**



Source: Information on voter registration database system type was collected in Q4 of the Policy Survey. This graph shows the number of states that reported having each type of voter registration database.

daily.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, in Illinois, if the jurisdiction vendor has web services, the information is uploaded in real time, whereas a batch is sent daily from those jurisdictions without web services. The Northern Mariana Islands reported that information is retrieved upon request.

### Data Linkages

Election officials must accomplish two primary activities related to voter registration: adding individuals to the database who are eligible to vote and maintaining the accuracy of the database.<sup>14</sup> A state accomplishes these goals by accessing or “linking” to other databases to verify the voter

<sup>13</sup> The 2016 Statutory Overview found that several Texas jurisdictions use the Texas statewide voter registration database to directly manage registration data, and other Texas jurisdictions manage their own voter registration data using a third-party vendor. Texas refers to these as “online” and “offline” jurisdictions. Although online counties transmit information in real time through an online voter registration system, offline jurisdictions transmit information in batches through a web browser application.

<sup>14</sup> National Research Council. 2010. *Improving State Voter Registration Databases: Final Report*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. <https://www.eac.gov/documents/2010/5/14/improving-state-voter-registration-databases-final-report>.

registration information in its database. The NVRA also outlines steps that states are required to take to keep voter registration information current and to remove ineligible voters and duplicate registrations from the voter lists. This task requires comparing voter lists to records in other databases to prevent duplicate registration records and to avoid adding individuals who are ineligible to register.<sup>15</sup>

As the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) notes, HAVA requires the chief election official in each state to attempt to verify the information for first-time voter registration applications against driver's license numbers in that state's motor vehicle licensing agency's database or against the Social Security Administration's database of social security numbers. If no match is found, election officials in most states attempt to contact the applicant for additional information, but they manage this process in various ways. HAVA requires that applicants who cannot be matched against one of these databases be allowed to vote on Election Day provided they present appropriate identification.<sup>16</sup>

The Policy Survey asks states how they share information electronically with other state and federal government entities.<sup>17</sup> These linkages are illustrated in Figure 2. Most states reported that they link their voter registration data with the agency that handles their state's driver's licenses (85.7%) and with entities that maintain the death records (80.4%). The other most commonly reported linkages were with entities that maintain felony or prison records, such as state courts and parole agencies (62.5%). States that reported linking with the agency that handles driver's licenses most often reported transferring voter registration data daily (63.3%), followed by in real time (18.4%) and by some other measure of time that is neither weekly nor monthly (10.2%). Of the states that reported linking with entities that maintain death records, the most common type of data transfer was monthly (58.7%), followed by weekly (21.7%). States that reported linking registration data with entities that maintain felony records most often reported transferring data monthly (58.3%).<sup>18</sup>

Less commonly reported linkages included entities that maintain records of individuals who are declared mentally incompetent, state public assistance agencies, agencies for people with disabilities, other state agencies that are not required by the NVRA (e.g., public libraries or local government offices), federal agencies, and military recruiting offices.

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.


<sup>16</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 21083.

<sup>17</sup> Although North Dakota does not have voter registration, the state does share information electronically with other government entities and is included in these analyses.

<sup>18</sup> Information on which entities states link their voter registration databases with and how often data transfers occur was collected in item Q5 of the Policy Survey.



**Figure 2. States Most Commonly Link Voter Registration Databases With Government Agencies That Maintain Driver's Licenses and Death Records**



Source: Information on the entities that are linked to state voter registration databases was collected in Q5 of the Policy Survey. This graph shows the number of states that reported linking their voter registration databases with the specified government agency.

### Automatic and Automated Voter Registration

In 2020, 42.9% of states reported that voters may be registered to vote via an automated process, whether online or in person, during a transaction with a state government agency.<sup>19</sup> Examples of these automated processes included those that force a choice, such as when an individual cannot proceed with a transaction without selecting whether or not they wish to be registered to vote, or processes that register a person to vote as a default, after which the individual may choose to opt out. In the event that an individual wishes to decline to register, the vast majority of states reported that they allow the declination to occur at the point of service. About one-third of states reported that they allow declinations via a mailer sent to the individual after the transaction.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Information on automatic and automated voter registration was collected in item Q6 of the Policy Survey.

<sup>20</sup> Information on when an individual can decline to register to vote was collected in item Q6b of the Policy Survey.

States that have some kind of automatic or automated voter registration process linked to a state agency transaction all reported that their state motor vehicle agency participates in this program, and about one-quarter of the states indicated that public assistance agencies also participate. Less common program participants included agencies for people with disabilities and other designated state agencies. Florida also reported linking their voter registration process with tax collector offices and any office that issues state ID cards. Colorado reported linking with the state's Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, and Alaska reported linking with the state's Permanent Fund Dividend Division. Maryland noted the state agencies that participate in the automatic or automated voter registration program are designated by the Maryland General Assembly.<sup>21</sup>

## Preregistration

In the 2020 Policy Survey, most states (87.5%) reported allowing individuals under the age of 18 to preregister to vote and become automatically registered once they turn 18 years old. Over half of states that had a preregistration program reported that they allow individuals to preregister at age 17 (51%), whereas fewer states reported allowing individuals to preregister at age 16 (38.8%). Five states (10.2%) indicated that they allow individuals to preregister at age 17 and a half.<sup>22</sup>

## Online Voter Registration

Arizona became the first state to adopt online voter registration in 2002, and by 2016, the number of states that offered online voter registration jumped to 32.<sup>23</sup> Online voter registration generally mirrors the process of registering to vote using a paper form, but the information that is necessary to process the registration application is completed and submitted electronically, without the need of a paper form to be submitted or created.

Forty-five states (80.4%, an increase from 72.7% in 2018) reported having an online voter registration portal in which individuals can register on their own, fully online, and without having to submit a paper form. In almost all of those states, individuals can both register to vote and update their registration via the system. Two states reported that individuals can only update their registration online and cannot use the online system to submit a new registration application. A majority of states with an online voter registration system (82.2%) reported that only individuals with a valid driver's license or state-issued ID card can use it.<sup>24</sup> Figure 3 shows the prevalence of online voter registration across states.

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<sup>21</sup> Information on which state agencies participate in automatic voter registration was collected in item Q6a of the Policy Survey.


<sup>22</sup> Information on preregistration was collected in item Q10 of the Policy Survey.

<sup>23</sup> "EAVS Deep Dive: Registering to Vote", <https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/09/20/eavs-deep-dive-registering-to-vote/>, U.S. Election Assistance Commission. (2017, September 20). *EAVS Deep Dive: Registering to Vote*: <https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/09/20/eavs-deep-dive-registering-to-vote/>.

<sup>24</sup> Information on states' online voter registration policies was collected in item Q7 of the Policy Survey. Information on whether a driver's license or state-issued ID card is needed to register to vote online was collected in item Q7a of the Policy Survey.



**Figure 3. More Than Three-Quarters of States Offer Online Registration**



Source: Information on online registration policy was collected in items Q7 and Q7a of the Policy Survey.

States were also asked to describe the technological and user experience features of their online, web-based voter registration system and how voters use it. The most common feature was the use of a motor vehicle agency signature to register to vote (84.4%), followed by mobile phone optimization (75.6%) and sending a confirmation email to each registrant (60%). Slightly less than half of all states reported having custom web page URLs to track where the voter came from to enter the online registration process (e.g., a state agency or third-party organization), providing a confirmation number to each registrant, and supporting languages other than English. About one-quarter of states also reported the use of a third-party application programming interface (API), which allows different software components to communicate with each other.<sup>25</sup>

### Same-Day Registration

Instead of requiring voters to register in advance of an election, some states reported allowing individuals to register to vote and to cast a ballot on the same day. Roughly half of the states reported having same-day registration (SDR) or a period of overlap between in-person early voting and the close of voter registration in which a person can register to vote and cast a ballot on the


<sup>25</sup> Information on the features of state online, web-based voter registration systems was collected in item Q7b of the Policy Survey.



same day (see Figure 4).<sup>26</sup> Among states with SDR, it was most common to have SDR on Election Day (72.4%). Additionally, the majority of states indicated that they allow SDR during in-person early voting (69%).<sup>27</sup>

Twelve states reported having SDR during an overlap between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration. Some states noted that SDR only occurs in special cases, such as Alaska and Rhode Island for presidential elections. New residents who move to Nebraska after the close of voter registration can register to vote and can vote only for president in the general election; former residents who move to another state after the close of registration can also vote only for president in the general election. In North Carolina, citizens who have become eligible to vote between the “close of books” and Election Day may register on the same day as they vote.<sup>28</sup>

**Figure 4. Half of the States Offer Some Form of Same-Day Voter Registration**



Source: Information on SDR policy was collected in items Q9 and Q9a of the Policy Survey. “ED” stands for “Election Day.” “Other Cases” includes instances in which states may allow for SDR during in-person early voting only, during an overlap between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration, and other specific cases.

<sup>26</sup> The timeline does not include an overlap between the mail balloting period and the close of voter registration.

<sup>27</sup> Information on state SDR policies was collected in item Q9 of the Policy Survey. Information on the circumstances of SDR was collected in item Q9a of the Policy Survey.

<sup>28</sup> North Carolina did not provide clarification on what was meant by “close of books.”



## State Election Office Website

The 2020 Policy Survey also asked states about which voter information search tools and other tools are available on each state's election office website. Almost all of the states indicated that voters can check their registration status and check their polling site location on the state election office website. Most states reported having tools that track ballot status, including UOCAVA ballots (87.5%), mailed ballots (82.1%), and provisional ballots (51.8%), and that check voter-specific ballot information (76.8%). Additionally, most states reported that their website allows voters to request to receive a mail or absentee ballot (67.9%).<sup>29</sup>

## List Maintenance

The NVRA establishes a process for states to keep their voter registration lists accurate. Under this law, a registrant can be removed from a state's list for the following reasons:

- The registrant requests to be removed;
- The registrant dies;
- The registrant is declared mentally incapacitated, if a state law requires it;
- The registrant is convicted of a specified crime, if state law requires it; or
- The registrant changes residences outside of the jurisdiction, in which case the removal process must be conducted in accordance with procedures set forth in the NVRA.<sup>30</sup>

Under the process established by the NVRA, when a registrant appears to have moved outside of their jurisdiction due to returned or undeliverable mail, the state must follow a specific process to verify that the individual is no longer eligible to vote. An address confirmation procedure must be followed before removing the voter from the registration list.

The 2020 Policy Survey asked states whether they differentiate between active and inactive voters in their voter registration records. Active voters are individuals who require no additional processing before they can vote, whereas inactive voters will require address verification before being permitted to vote. Forty-six states, three territories, and the District of Columbia indicated that they differentiate between the two types of voters, although according to state comments, the definitions for an active and inactive voter vary widely.<sup>31</sup> Guam, Idaho, North Dakota, New Hampshire, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming reported not distinguishing between active and inactive voters. Some states indicated using specific terminology: Nebraska uses "in NVRA" to refer to inactive voters, Texas uses the term "suspense voters," and American Samoa uses the term "purged voter." West Virginia indicated that inactive voters are those "flagged as moving and receiv[ing] a confirmation notice." According to the

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<sup>29</sup> Information on state election office website lookup tools was collected in item Q8 of the Policy Survey.


<sup>30</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 20507

<sup>31</sup> Information on whether states differentiate between active and inactive voters was collected in item Q11 of the Policy Survey. Minnesota is NVRA exempt and does not define inactive voters as "voters who remain eligible to vote but require address verification under the provisions of the National Voter Registration Act," as defined in the EAVS item A1c; therefore, the EAVS item A1c does not apply to the state. Additionally, North Dakota does not have voter registration but does define inactive voters in the state voter file. Inactive voters are defined as those who have never voted before or have not voted in the last two federal elections. Although Wyoming does not keep an inactive list of eligible voters, the statewide voter registration system keeps a historical record of previously registered voters.

NVRA, voters marked as inactive are still able to vote in elections unless they have not voted for two consecutive federal elections and have not updated their information.

Almost three-quarters (70%) of states that reported differentiating between active and inactive voters also reported that they will move an active voter to the inactive voter list if mail that is sent by an election office to the voter's residence is returned as undeliverable, whereas 62% of states reported that they will move an active voter to the inactive voter list if the voter fails to return a confirmation notice. Fifteen states commented with several additional actions, including change in address, not voting in a certain number of elections, determining a person is a felon, determining a person is deceased, and the existence of duplicate voter records.<sup>32</sup>

**Figure 5. States That Differentiate Active and Inactive Voters Will Most Often Reactivate an Inactive Voter if the Voter Initiates a Registration Update**



Source: Information on policy regarding reactivating inactive voters was collected in Q11b of the Policy Survey.

On the other hand, certain actions can result in moving an inactive voter to the active voter list. Figure 5 shows the reasons states report for reactivating inactive voters, if the state differentiates between active and inactive voters. Most states that distinguish between active and inactive voters

<sup>32</sup> Information on moving an active voter to the inactive list was collected in item Q11a of the Policy Survey.



reported that they will move an inactive voter to the active voter list if an individual initiates an update to their registration record (96%), returns a confirmation notice (88%), votes in a federal election (78% for general and 76% for primary), votes in a state or local primary or general election (both 76% respectively), and/or requests a mail or UOCAVA ballot (68%). Furthermore, roughly half of the states reported that they will move an inactive voter to the active voter list if there is an online confirmation of the voter's registration record. Less common reasons for moving an inactive voter to the active voter list included if a voter signs a petition or completes a certificate of candidacy. Thirteen states indicated some other reason, including providing documentation (e.g., appropriate identification or a signed affidavit) at a polling place, submitting a new registration, and receiving an address change through the state motor vehicle agency.<sup>33</sup>

Thirty-five states indicated that only local officials are responsible for modifying or removing voter registration records, and 12 states reported that modifying voter registration records is done by both state and local officials.<sup>34</sup> Alaska, American Samoa, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Guam, South Carolina, and the U.S. Virgin Islands all indicated that they only modify records at the state level.<sup>35</sup> Table 2 illustrates data sources used to identify potentially ineligible voters. Across states, the most common data sources were the state vital statistics office, reports from other states indicating a former resident registered to vote, a voter request for removal, entities that maintain prison records, and any mail (not including ballots) sent from an election office that was returned as undeliverable.<sup>36</sup>

Most states reported sending confirmation notices to voters to help identify individuals who may be ineligible to vote, but the reasons for sending confirmation notices differ by state. Of the states that send confirmation notices, 41 (85.4%) reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to Section 8 (d) (1) (B) and Section 8 (d) (2) of the NVRA, 31 states (64.6%) reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to a state statute, and seven states (14.6%) reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to a formal administrative rule or guidance. Eight states reported that they do not send confirmation notices.<sup>37</sup>

States most commonly reported sending confirmation notices to voters whose mail from an election office was returned as undeliverable (81.3%), to voters whose addresses may have changed (72.9%), to voters who have not voted in two consecutive general elections (41.7%), to voters who have been convicted of a disqualifying felony (35.4%), and to voters who requested removal from the voter registration list (29.2%). Less than one-third of states reported sending confirmation notices to voters who have been declared mentally incompetent, voters who have obtained a driver's license in a new state, and voters who have not made contact with their state for a specified length of time.

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<sup>33</sup> Information on moving an inactive voter to the active list was collected in item Q11b of the Policy Survey.

<sup>34</sup> The District of Columbia and American Samoa noted that they do not have local election officials; Puerto Rico noted that state and local officials have the same roles and responsibilities.

<sup>35</sup> Information on who is responsible for modifying or removing voter registration records was collected in item Q12 of the Policy Survey. Nevada did not provide a response, and North Dakota indicated that this question does not apply because the state does not have voter registration.

<sup>36</sup> Information on the data sources used to identify potentially ineligible voters was collected in item Q14 of the Policy Survey.

<sup>37</sup> Information on whether and how states send confirmation notices to help identify ineligible voters was collected in item Q13 of the Policy Survey.

**Table 2. States Most Often Use State Vital Statistics Office and Reports From Other States to Identify Ineligible Voters**

Source of Data on Potentially Ineligible Voters	Percentage of States That Report Using Data From the Data Source
State vital statistics office death records	92.9%
Reports/notices from other states that a former resident has registered to vote	89.3%
Requests from voters for removal	85.7%
Entities that maintain felony/prison records	82.1%
Other mail from the election office (not ballots) that was returned as undeliverable	69.6%
Newspaper death notices/obituaries	66.1%
National Change of Address (NCOA) reports	58.9%
Data from an interstate data-sharing compact	57.1%
Social Security Administration death records	57.1%
Mailed ballots returned as undeliverable	55.4%
Motor vehicle agencies	46.4%
Entities that maintain records of individuals declared mentally incompetent	42.9%
Applications for mailed ballots	26.8%
Jury questionnaires	26.8%
Returned jury summons	16.1%
State public assistance agencies	16.1%
State agencies that serve persons with disabilities	12.5%
Canvassing	8.9%
Other	8.9%
State agencies that are not specified in the NVRA	7.1%
State tax filings	1.8%

*Source: Information on the data sources used to identify ineligible voters was collected in Q14 of the Policy Survey. This question also collected information on whether states use commercial data sources, but no state selected that option.*

Five states (10.4%) reported that all registered voters routinely receive a non-forwardable notice during a specified increment of time; this time frame ranges from one to four years. Just under 30% of states reported sending confirmation notices for some other reason.<sup>38</sup> For example, some states or certain jurisdictions within states indicated that they routinely send confirmation notices as part of their list maintenance procedures. States that are members of the Electronic Information Registration Center (ERIC) send confirmation notices to individuals who are eligible to vote but are

<sup>38</sup> Information on which voters states send confirmation notices to was collected in item Q13a of the Policy Survey.



unregistered. Other states indicated that notices are sent when there may be a change other than address (e.g., name). Washington, a state in which nearly all voters cast their ballots by mail, reported that the mailing information provided by a returned or forwarded ballot serves as the start of the confirmation process.

## Criminal Convictions and Voting

The NVRA allows states to remove voters from their registration lists if the voter receives a disqualifying criminal conviction or is incarcerated. The Policy Survey asks three questions about removing voters from registration lists due to disqualifying felony convictions and about the restoration of voting rights:

- Which populations have their voting eligibility suspended due to a criminal conviction?
- For how long does a person with a felony conviction lose their right to vote?
- How can a person with a felony conviction become an eligible voter again?

The District of Columbia, Guam, Maine, Puerto Rico, and Vermont reported that they do not limit a person's right to vote based on a criminal conviction. Conversely, 42 states reported that the conviction of any felony will limit a person's right to vote. About one-fifth of states reported that they limit the voting rights of individuals convicted only of certain felonies, and nine states reported that they limit the voting rights of individuals who are convicted of other crimes that are not felonies (e.g., election-related crimes).<sup>39</sup>

There is variation in the disqualification time periods and in the processes for restoring voting rights. Of the states that have some form of felon disenfranchisement, most reported revoking the right to vote during the period of incarceration (90.4%) and/or any period of probation and parole (61.5%). Some states also reported revoking voting rights during an additional length of time (19.2%), such as a statutorily mandated waiting period and/or until the payment of outstanding fines, restitution, or penalties (25%).<sup>40</sup>

The Policy Survey also asks states to indicate how disenfranchised individuals go about restoring their eligibility to vote.<sup>41</sup> Minnesota, Missouri, and the U.S. Virgin Islands reported automatically restoring the previous voter registration of persons with felony convictions once the period of disenfranchisement has passed, requiring no further action by the voter.<sup>42</sup> Of the 49 states that indicated requiring some type of action, 79.6% reported that a person is immediately eligible to vote and must reregister through the same process as the general public. Some states reported having other conditions, such as presenting documentation during the registration process that shows that the person has completed the voter registration requirements (12.2%) and having voting rights

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<sup>39</sup> Information on state policies for suspending or revoking voting rights due to criminal convictions was collected in item Q37 of the Policy Survey. This item does not distinguish a felony conviction from the subsequent period of incarceration.

<sup>40</sup> Information on the length of time a disqualifying felony conviction will restrict voting rights was collected in item Q37a of the Policy Survey.

<sup>41</sup> Due to North Dakota not having voter registration, a person who is no longer incarcerated is automatically eligible to vote without any further action needed. In Delaware, felony convictions result in permanent disqualification from voting.

<sup>42</sup> Guam law prohibits incarcerated persons from voting. However, once the period of incarceration has ended, voting rights are restored. A non-incarcerated felon is able to vote, and the individual is not removed from the voter registration roll.

restored through a formal administrative process (16.3%). Thirteen states provided survey comments that further explained their policies.<sup>43</sup> In Louisiana, for example, if a person is under an order of imprisonment for a felony conviction but “has not been incarcerated pursuant to the order within the last five years,” then that person is eligible to register. Florida and Iowa reported that the type of felony conviction determines the restoration of voting rights. Arizona indicated that for a first felony conviction, civil rights are automatically restored upon the completion of the sentence, parole, probation period, and payment of restitution; otherwise, voting rights must be restored through a formal process.

## Voting by Mail

All states and territories and the District of Columbia offer their citizens the opportunity to cast their ballots by mail in federal general elections.<sup>44</sup> Some states use the term “absentee voting” to refer to mail voting. The 2020 Policy Survey demonstrates that there were wide variations among the states in which voters are eligible to vote by mail, what documentation voters must provide in order to receive a mailed ballot, how mailed ballots may be returned to election officials, and the deadlines for mailed ballots to be postmarked and received by election offices for the 2020 general election. The COVID-19 restrictions pushed many states to expand their mail voting policies, and states reported more than double the number of mailed ballots cast in the 2020 general election compared to the 2016 general election.<sup>45</sup>

In 2020, 39 states reported that they do not require voters to provide a reason for why they are requesting a mailed ballot and for why they cannot vote in person on Election Day; seven of those states reported requiring an excuse in 2018 but not in 2020. Conversely, one-third of states reported requiring voters to provide an excuse, a decrease from 40% in the 2018 Policy Survey responses.<sup>46</sup> Twenty-six states reported that voters can request to be on a permanent absentee list from which they will automatically receive ballots for all future elections. Either any registrant can request to be a permanent absentee voter (21.4% of states) or only individuals who meet specific criteria can request to be a permanent absentee voter (25% of states).<sup>47</sup>

States have special criteria for individuals who make the request to be granted permanent absentee status.<sup>48</sup> The most common requirement was that the requester must have a disability (78.6% of states that have permanent absentee voting); Delaware,<sup>49</sup> Massachusetts, New York, Tennessee, and Wisconsin reported that they will also grant permanent absentee status to those who are infirm,

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<sup>43</sup> Information on state policies for restoring voting rights to persons with disqualifying felony convictions was collected in item Q37b of the Policy Survey.

<sup>44</sup> Some states use the term “in-person absentee voting” to refer to the process by which a voter visits an election office to request a mailed ballot, completes the ballot, and returns the ballot in one trip. However, EAVS considers this to be a form of in-person early voting and asks states to report their data as such.

<sup>45</sup> For more information, see Chapter 1 of this report.

<sup>46</sup> Information on whether states require an excuse for mail voting was collected in item Q17 of the Policy Survey.


<sup>47</sup> Information on whether states have permanent absentee voting was collected in item Q19 of the Policy Survey.

<sup>48</sup> Information on who can become a permanent absentee voter was collected in item Q19a of the Policy Survey.

<sup>49</sup> Delaware also includes federal or state public service workers and their spouses or dependents, members of the uniformed services, and voters who are temporary residents.



**Figure 6. Number of States Offering Entirely Vote-By-Mail Elections Doubled From 2018 to 2020**



Source: Information on the policy of all-mail elections was collected in items Q9 and Q9a of the 2018 Policy Survey and in items Q18 and Q18a of the 2020 Policy Survey.



have a permanent illness, or can provide a note from a medical professional. West Virginia indicated allowing address confidentiality program participants to be permanent absentee voters, and Louisiana indicated requiring individuals to be over a specified age. Despite conducting all-mail elections, Oregon uses the term “absentee voter” for individuals who may be away from their residences when ballots are transmitted.

With 2020’s overall shift toward mail voting, the number of states that conducted all-mail elections, in which all registered voters or all active registered voters are automatically sent a mailed ballot, doubled since the 2018 Policy Survey. Figure 6 shows the 14 states that have some type of vote-by-mail system. Four states reported having some vote-by-mail jurisdictions. Ten states reported having statewide vote-by-mail systems, a significant increase from three states in 2018.<sup>50</sup> The Policy Survey did not record whether the states that altered their all-mail voting policy between the 2018 and the 2020 general elections did so temporarily or permanently or whether the change was made in direct response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It should be noted that although these states mailed registered voters a ballot, most states also provided in-person voting options during early voting and/or on Election Day.

The Policy Survey also collected data on the circumstances under which voters could receive ballots through electronic means. This question applied specifically to non-military voters residing in the United States, as voters who are members of the uniformed services or who are overseas citizens who wish to receive ballots electronically are covered under UOCAVA. Twenty-nine states reported that they allow non-military voters residing in the United States to receive their ballots through an electronic format, such as email, fax, through an online voter registration portal, or through a mobile phone app. Alaska, Guam, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon, and Washington reported that voters may receive a ballot electronically for any circumstance.<sup>51</sup> Other states reported having special circumstances.<sup>52</sup> For example, 19 states indicated allowing voters with disabilities to receive ballots electronically, including seven states where voters must have specific disabilities and 12 states where voters may have any disability status.<sup>53</sup> Massachusetts specified that the voter must have a disability that prevents them from marking a paper ballot independently and privately, and Maine noted that the voter must self-identify as having a print disability.

Hawaii, Nevada, and the U.S. Virgin Islands reported that they allow electronic ballot transmission when a replacement ballot is need, and seven states reported that they allow electronic ballot transmission during emergency situations that hinder in-person voting, such as a natural disaster.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Information on which states have an all-vote-by-mail system was collected in item Q18 of the Policy Survey. Information on whether the state’s all-vote-by-mail system is used only in certain jurisdictions or is statewide was collected in item Q18a of the Policy Survey. California and Utah reported conducting all-mail elections statewide in 2020. In 2018, both states reported that only certain jurisdictions had all-mail elections.

<sup>51</sup> California did not report that voters may receive a ballot electronically under any circumstance but commented that any voter may cast a ballot using a certified, remote-accessible vote-by-mail system regardless of disability status or whether they are an overseas or uniformed services voter.

<sup>52</sup> Information on the circumstances under which voters may receive their ballots electronically was collected in item Q23 of the Policy Survey.

<sup>53</sup> The U.S. Virgin Islands chose both of these response options. Delaware noted that disability status includes those who are ill or temporarily physically disabled. In Pennsylvania, voters may have any disability as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

<sup>54</sup> Hawaii noted that a replacement ballot must be requested within five days of an election.



New York and Mississippi extended their requirements to emergency responders, and in Mississippi, according to the state UOCAVA statute, emergency responders qualify for an electronic ballot if they are deployed outside of their county of residence during an emergency.

## Mailed Ballot Tracking and Deadlines

The 2020 Policy Survey asked states to report on their deadlines for mailed ballots from non-military voters residing in the United States. Ballot deadlines for voters covered by UOCAVA were reported in separate questions, as UOCAVA ballot deadlines are typically different from those for other mailed ballots. The postmark deadline is Election Day for just under half (46.4%) of states; however, Alabama, Iowa, North Dakota, Ohio, and Utah reported having a postmark deadline one day before Election Day.<sup>55</sup> In 55.4% of states, mailed ballots must be received by Election Day, and in 42.9% of states, mailed ballots must be received by a specified number of days after Election Day, with responses ranging from one to 20 days after Election Day.<sup>56</sup> Louisiana reported that mailed ballots must be received by one day before Election Day.<sup>57</sup>

States also reported how long mailed ballots that arrive past the above deadlines are tracked for reporting in Section C of the EAVS.<sup>58</sup> These mailed ballots are tracked indefinitely in 42.9% of states, or until canvassing is complete in 44.6% of states. Five states have a specific length of time for mailed ballot tracking; four of these states reported a date between November 17, 2020, and February 1, 2021.<sup>59</sup>

States vary in what satisfies postmark requirements for mailed ballots.<sup>60</sup> In states that require postmarks, the most commonly reported required feature was a physical postmark (76.7%),<sup>61</sup> followed by hand cancellation or a private express delivery service date stamp (both 44.2% respectively) and postal processing markings (41.9%). Less commonly required features were intelligent barcodes (23.3%) and a date on a voter affidavit (14%).<sup>62</sup> Some states specified other ways of satisfying postmark requirements.<sup>63</sup> Additionally, Ohio indicated accepting an ID tag date, and Kansas indicated accepting any other indicia from the U.S. Postal Service. In California, if the postmark is missing or damaged and no additional information is provided by the U.S. Postal Service or other mail delivery service, the ballot identification envelope will be date stamped upon receipt by an election official on or before Election Day. The District of Columbia Board of Elections reported

<sup>55</sup> Twenty-two states indicated that the item asking for a postmark deadline for voters does not apply to them.

<sup>56</sup> States that reported having a ballot receipt deadline after Election Day require ballots to be postmarked by Election Day.

<sup>57</sup> Information on deadlines for returning mailed ballots was collected in item Q20 of the Policy Survey.

<sup>58</sup> Two states did not provide a response to this item.

<sup>59</sup> Information on the length of time that ballots are tracked for reporting in EAVS Section C was collected in item Q21 of the Policy Survey. Maine reported tracking until November 3, 2022.

<sup>60</sup> Thirteen states reported not requiring a postmark for mailed ballots; six states did not provide a response to this item. South Dakota explained that they do not honor postmarks for ballots; Minnesota also commented that they do not use postmarks.

<sup>61</sup> Florida specified that physical postmarks are only required for 10-day overseas ballots. See <https://dos.myflorida.com/elections/for-voters/voting/military-and-overseas-citizens-voting/> for more detail on these ballots.

<sup>62</sup> In Washington, the postmark requirement may be met by a date on a voter affidavit for UOCAVA ballots that lack a postmark.

<sup>63</sup> Information on mailed ballot postmark requirements was collected in item Q22 of the Policy Survey.

that they make ballot drop boxes available to voters through Election Day, which satisfies postmark requirements.

## UOCAVA Voting

UOCAVA requires that all states offer uniformed services members, their eligible family members, and overseas citizens the ability to vote absentee in all federal elections. UOCAVA-protected citizens have the option of using the FPCA, which serves as both a registration and ballot request application and is accepted in all U.S. states and territories. All states accept FPCAs submitted by postal mail. In addition, the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act amended UOCAVA, requiring that all states offer an electronic means for FPCA submission. UOCAVA voters may submit their FPCA by fax, online (either by email or through the state's online voter registration portal), or by other modes, as allowed by state law.

All states are required to accept FPCAs by postal mail. In 2020, the most common additional methods for accepting FPCAs were email and fax; both modes were allowed in over 90% of states. Twenty-four states (42.9%, an increase from 36.4% in 2018) reported accepting FPCAs submitted through the state's online voter registration portal.<sup>64</sup> Some states reported that FPCAs can be submitted by some other method; South Carolina and Colorado indicated allowing in-person returns, and Louisiana indicated allowing returns by commercial carrier. Oklahoma reported allowing UOCAVA voters to email their ballot materials to FVAP's electronic transmission service, after which the email is converted to fax and sent to the appropriate county election board. Maine specified allowing UOCAVA voters to request an absentee ballot through the state's online absentee ballot request service. A voter registration submitted via FPCA is considered permanent in 53.6% of states (a decrease from 72.7% in 2018) and temporary in 46.4% of states (an increase from 25.5% in 2018).<sup>65</sup>

States differ in the length of time an FPCA absentee ballot request remains valid; that is, the period of time or number of elections for which a voter can retain their UOCAVA status and have an absentee ballot transmitted to them.<sup>66</sup> Almost half (46.4%) of states reported that the length of time the FPCA will serve as a ballot request mechanism is a specified number of calendar years; in most of those states, the length of time is one year, although in North Dakota, Utah, and Virginia, it is two years. In other states, the length of time is measured by the number of general election cycles (12.5%); most of those states specified a length of one general election cycle, although Minnesota and Oklahoma specified two general election cycles. Some states (8.9%) reported that they will use the FPCA as a ballot request mechanism until the voter moves from their residence.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Maryland reported allowing the three listed options if the voter is already registered and is using the FPCA to request an absentee ballot. If the FPCA is used to register, it must be submitted by mail or through Maryland's online voter registration portal. In Wisconsin, non-military UOCAVA voters cannot submit registrations, including the FPCA, by email or fax.

<sup>65</sup> Information on the methods by which UOCAVA voters can submit an FPCA, other than by postal mail, was collected in item Q26 of the Policy Survey. Information on whether a voter registration submitted through an FPCA is permanent or temporary was collected in item Q27 of the Policy Survey.

<sup>66</sup> Information on how long UOCAVA voters remain eligible to receive absentee ballots was collected in item Q28 of the Policy Survey.

<sup>67</sup> This information is provided by the U.S. Postal Service or the voter.



About one-third (32.1%) of states provided a description of another length of time that was unlisted in the Policy Survey question, with some states making distinctions between general and primary elections and others reporting a time linked with either a specific election timeline or a length of time tied to the submission of the FPCA. Nevada reported that voters retain their status until the end of the following calendar year, and Maine reported that the status remains eligible for 18 months. American Samoa, Oregon, and Washington specified a timeline based on changes to a voter's registration record. California, New Jersey, and North Carolina reported that eligibility remains permanent. Voters also continue to remain eligible in Pennsylvania, as long as they are registered to vote and they reapply for an absentee ballot each election cycle. The Northern Mariana Islands also reported that they require all registered voters to request their absentee ballots each election year.

### UOCAVA Voting Deadlines

In addition to reporting deadlines for mailed ballots from non-UOCAVA voters, the 2020 Policy Survey asked states to report deadlines for ballots submitted by both uniformed services voters residing in the United States and overseas UOCAVA voters. States provided information on both postmark deadlines and ballot receipt deadlines, as applicable. In 2020, the postmark deadline was Election Day in about half of the states (48.2%) for domestic uniformed services voters; however, in Iowa, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania, the postmark deadline was one day before Election Day.<sup>68</sup> Just under half of the states (41.1%) reported that ballots had to have been received by Election Day, and 58.9% of the states indicated that the ballots must have been received by a specified number of days after Election Day, with responses ranging from two to 20 days after Election Day.<sup>69</sup>

For overseas UOCAVA voters, Election Day was the postmark deadline in half of the states. The three states mentioned above also reported having a postmark deadline one day before Election Day for these voters.<sup>70</sup> Ballots in 39.3% of the states were required to be received by Election Day; in the remaining 60.7% of states ballots could arrive after Election Day and still remain eligible to be counted, with the deadlines ranging from two to 20 days after Election Day. The majority of states (83.7%) reported that they have the same postmark requirements for UOCAVA ballots and mailed ballots from non-UOCAVA voters.<sup>71</sup> Eight states indicated that the requirements are different.<sup>72</sup>

For more information about how UOCAVA voters participated in the 2020 general election, including ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected, and the use of the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB), see Chapter 4 of this report.

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<sup>68</sup> Twenty-three states indicated that the item asking for a postmark deadline for domestic military UOCAVA voters does not apply to them.

<sup>69</sup> Information on deadlines for ballots submitted by uniformed services voters residing in the United States was collected in item Q29 of the Policy Survey.

<sup>70</sup> Twenty-two states indicated that the item asking for a postmark deadline for overseas UOCAVA voters does not apply to them.

<sup>71</sup> Seven states did not provide a response to this item. West Virginia does not require postmarks.

<sup>72</sup> Information on deadlines for ballots submitted by overseas UOCAVA voters was collected in item Q30 in the Policy Survey. Information on the differences between postmark requirements for UOCAVA and non-UOCAVA voters was collected in item Q31 in the Policy Survey.

## In-Person Voting

The traditional image of voting in America involves voters physically traveling to a polling location and casting their ballots in person. In some cases, however, an individual may vote in person without having to go to a polling place on Election Day.

### In-Person Voting Before Election Day

Most states reported that they allow individuals to cast their ballots in person before Election Day (not including the hand delivery of mailed ballots).<sup>73</sup> This type of voting generally falls into two categories:

- A voter may go to a polling place before Election Day, receive a ballot, vote their ballot while at the polling place, and place their completed ballot into a ballot box or tabulator.
- A voter may go to an election office to pick up a ballot over the counter. In some states, the voter may be able to take their ballot home with them, whereas in other states, the ballot must be completed in the office. The ballot is then sealed in an envelope and tabulated along with ballots that are returned to the office by mail according to local procedures.

Different states use the terms “in-person early voting” and “in-person absentee voting” to describe both of the voting methods above, although other terms exist as well. Some states offer both types of voting activities.

**Table 3. Examples of Unique Descriptions of In-Person Early Voting**

State	Description of In-Person Early Voting
American Samoa	Local absentee voting
Connecticut	Can request an absentee ballot, vote on the spot, and not return it by mail
Georgia	Advance voting
Hawaii	In-person voting
Kansas	In-person advance voting
North Carolina	One-stop and early voting
Oregon	Some populations can go to county elections office and receive a ballot, which they can then use to vote
Pennsylvania	Mailed ballots can be completed over the counter at an election office
Puerto Rico	Voting in their houses via USPS mail
Washington	In-person voting

Source: Information on the descriptions of in-person early voting was collected in Q24 of the Policy Survey.

<sup>73</sup> New Jersey does not have in-person voting before Election Day.



Twenty-nine states (51.8%) reported having in-person early voting, and 27 states (48.2%) reported having in-person absentee voting.<sup>74</sup> Ten states specified unique descriptions for early voting, as seen in Table 3. Twelve states (21.4%) reported requiring an excuse to vote in person before Election Day, a decrease from the 15 states that reported this policy in 2018.<sup>75</sup>

## Vote Centers

The EAC describes vote centers as centralized, consolidated polling sites that serve as alternatives to traditional polling places.<sup>76</sup> Jurisdictions that use vote centers allow voters to cast their Election Day ballots at any vote center in their jurisdiction, rather than needing to vote at a specifically assigned polling place. The 2020 Policy Survey asked whether any of the state's jurisdictions allow voters to cast ballots at any polling place or vote center in their jurisdiction and to describe how vote centers operate.

Over one-third of states (37.5%) reported having vote centers or allowing voters to cast ballots at any polling place in the voter's jurisdiction. Eight of those states (38.1%) indicated that they require the use of vote centers statewide. Another eight reported having vote centers, but jurisdictions have the option not to implement them. Alabama, Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, and Texas (comprising 23.8% of the states) reported having vote centers, but only in jurisdictions that meet specific requirements.<sup>77</sup>

## Voter Identification

Under HAVA, Congress established minimum identification standards that an individual must meet in order to register to vote:

- Individuals who register to vote at their state's motor vehicle agency, another government agency, or using an online registration portal are typically authenticated by presenting appropriate documentation to the government agency and by the state matching the person's driver's license number or last four digits of their social security number to an existing state record.
- Individuals who register by mail and who have not voted before for federal office in their state of residence are required to present, at some point before voting, either a current and valid photo identification or a copy of a utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the person's name and address.

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<sup>74</sup> Information on the terminology used to describe the process of voting in person before Election Day was collected in item Q24 of the Policy Survey. States were able to select multiple response options.

<sup>75</sup> Information on whether an excuse is required to vote in person before Election Day was collected in item Q24a of the Policy Survey.

<sup>76</sup> U.S. Election Assistance Commission. (2017, November 11). *EAVS Deep Dive: Poll Workers and Polling Places: U.S. Election Assistance Commission*. <https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/11/15/eavs-deep-dive-poll-workers-and-polling-places>.

<sup>77</sup> Information on whether any jurisdictions within a state will allow voters to cast ballots at any polling location or vote center in their jurisdiction was collected in item Q25 of the Policy Survey. Information on how vote centers operate was collected in item Q25a of the Policy Survey.

- Individuals who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under UOCAVA or entitled to vote other than in person under the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act or other federal law are exempt from HAVA's identification requirements.

The definition of voter identification varies by state. In some states it can mean a government-issued document with a photograph, whereas in other states, it can mean a voter-executed affidavit affirming identity. For in-person, non-first-time voting whether before or on Election Day, most states (53.6%) reported that they require voters to present a government-issued photo identification as proof of their identity.<sup>78</sup> Twenty states (35.7%) reported allowing voters to present a government-issued, non-photo identification, and 24 states (42.9%) reported allowing non-government-issued, non-photo identification. Some states reported allowing a proof of residence (32.1%), a signed affidavit affirming identity with no further action required (37.5%) or with the requirement of presenting proper identification before a provisional ballot is counted (23.2%), or in some cases, voters may have a person registered to vote within that jurisdiction vouch for their identity (12.5%). Five states (8.9%) reported that they do not have identification requirements for in-person voting.<sup>79</sup>

## Provisional Voting

The EAC has provided best practices on the development of provisional voting procedures and notice to voters to ensure provisional voting procedures are fair, transparent, effective, and consistently applied to all voters in the state. The EAC states in its *Best Practices on Provisional Voting* report:

Section 302 of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) creates the right for potential voters to cast provisional ballots in the event their names do not appear on the registration list or the voters' eligibility is challenged by an election official. The issuance of a provisional ballot is best described as a safety net or fail safe for the voter, in that:

- It maintains the person's intent to vote and selections until election officials determine that the person does or does not have the right to cast a ballot in the election.
- It allows the determination of the voter's eligibility to be made at a time when more perfect or complete information is available either from the voter or from the election jurisdiction.<sup>80</sup>

HAVA specifies minimum requirements for notice to voters and provides opportunities for voters to resolve eligibility issues. Within the federal framework, states have different methods of complying with the provisional notification to voter requirements, using different technology and different timetables. State and local election officials ultimately apply their policies, procedures, and state legal requirements when making a determination as to whether or not to count a provisional ballot. For example, a state that has a stricter standard for the identification of voters than is contained in HAVA would apply its standard to determine if a given provisional ballot meets the state's ID standard.

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<sup>78</sup> Two states did not provide a response to the item asking about identification requirements.

<sup>79</sup> Information on establishing a voter's identity during in-person voting was collected in item Q36 of the Policy Survey.

<sup>80</sup> U.S. Election Assistance Commission. (2017, February 27). *Best Practices on Provisional Voting*. <https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/02/27/eac-best-practices-on-provisional-voting/>.



**Table 4. States That Use Provisional Ballots Most Often Do So When an Election Official Asserts That an Individual Is Ineligible to Vote**

Reason for Offering Voters a Provisional Ballot	Percentage of States That Use Provisional Voting and Offer Provisional Ballots for the Listed Reason
An election official asserts that an individual is not eligible to vote	92%
A voter's name does not appear on the list of eligible voters	86%
A voter does not have proper identification	80%
A voter is not a resident of the precinct in which they are attempting to vote	80%
Another person (not an election official) challenges a voter's qualifications, and the poll worker is not able to resolve the challenge	56%
A voter was issued a mailed ballot, but chooses to vote in person on Election Day and does not have the mailed ballot to surrender to poll workers	54%
A voter has changed their name or address but has not updated their voter registration	52%
A federal or state judge extends polling place hours in a federal election	48%
Other	26%

Source: Information on the circumstances for the use of provisional ballots was collected in Q32a of the Policy Survey.

Fifty states reported using provisional ballots for different reasons. The most common reason was an election official has asserted an individual is not eligible to vote.<sup>81</sup> Table 4 provides a full list of reasons the states use provisional ballots.

If a voter casts a provisional ballot as a result of not having acceptable identification during voting, the deadline by which they must present appropriate identification to election officials to verify their identity and to have their provisional ballot accepted was most commonly reported as a specified number of days after Election Day. The 11 states that have this policy reported a range of one to nine days after Election Day. However, in Massachusetts and Wisconsin, the deadline for adjudicating provisional ballots for the 2020 general election was a specified date: November 6, 2020.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Information on whether states use provisional ballots was collected in item Q32 of the Policy Survey. Information on the circumstances under which a state will use provisional ballots was collected in item Q32a of the Policy Survey.

<sup>82</sup> Information on deadlines for presenting appropriate identification to have a provisional ballot counted was collected in item Q36a of the Policy Survey.



After the election, many states have a limited amount of time in which to adjudicate provisional ballots and decide whether the ballots will be counted (either in full or in part) or rejected.<sup>83</sup> Twenty-six percent of the states that use provisional ballots reported that the deadline is by a specified date; for the November 3, 2020, general election, these dates ranged from November 3, 2020, to November 24, 2020. Most states (70%) indicated that this deadline is specified as a number of days after Election Day, with responses ranging between one day and 28 days.<sup>84</sup>

Eight percent of the states that use provisional ballots reported provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct would be fully counted, and 40% of the states reported that they would be partially counted.<sup>85</sup> Slightly more than half of the states (52%) reported that these ballots would be rejected.<sup>86</sup>

## Election Technology

Voting system testing and certification are required in the majority of states (83.9%) by statute, and a few states (10.7%) indicated that they require testing and certification through a formal administrative rule or guidance. American Samoa, Mississippi, and Oklahoma reported that voting system testing and certification before the system's approval for purchase is not required. The 2020 Policy Survey then asked states to describe their policies regarding the role of the EAC and federal testing and certification. States most commonly reported requiring testing by an EAC-accredited Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL; 45.3%), certification to the EAC-adopted Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG; 43.4%), and/or state and federal certification (41.5%; see Figure 7).<sup>87</sup>

Some states provided clarifying comments: The District of Columbia reported that it requires that voting systems must meet or exceed HAVA standards and/or be federally certified. Similarly, Oregon reported that the system must be EAC certified or examined by a federally accredited VSTL. New York indicated that a secondary source code review is performed by an independent security expert.

Alaska reported that it may approve a voting system upon consideration by an election administrator,<sup>88</sup> and Guam indicated having an independent entity that conducts testing to determine the integrity of voting machines as deemed appropriate by election commissioners. Wisconsin reported having the statutory authority to certify systems without federal certification, but in practice, state testing typically does not start until federal certification is acquired.

Although there is no testing or certification of electronic poll books, sometimes called e-poll books, on the federal level, many states have their own process for testing or certifying these machines

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<sup>83</sup> One state did not provide a response to this item. In Maine, provisional ballots are automatically counted unless a recount results in a contested election and the number of challenged ballots can affect the outcome.

<sup>84</sup> Information on the deadlines for adjudicating provisional ballots is collected in Policy Survey item Q32b.

<sup>85</sup> For example, a state might only count items on the ballot for which the voter would have been eligible had they voted in the correct precinct.


<sup>86</sup> Information on what happens to provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct is collected in Policy Survey item Q32c.

<sup>87</sup> Information on voting system testing and certification policies was collected in items Q15 and Q15a of the Policy Survey.

<sup>88</sup> AK Stat § 15.20.910 (2016)



**Figure 7. States That Require Voting System Testing Most Commonly Require Testing From an EAC-Accredited VSTL**



Source: Information on voting equipment testing and certification policy was collected in Q15a of the Policy Survey.

before approving them for purchase. Of the 40 states (71.4%) that reported using e-poll books either statewide or only in certain jurisdictions, 42.5% indicated that they do not require testing or certification before the e-poll books' approval for purchase.<sup>89</sup> In about one-third of the states that reported having e-poll book requirements, the testing and certification are required by statute, whereas in one-fourth of the states, testing and certification are required by formal administrative rule or guidance.<sup>90</sup>

The 2020 Policy Survey asked whether any jurisdictions in the state use e-poll books and whether testing and certification are required before e-poll books' "approval for purchase." The Policy Survey and EAVS did not collect data on other procedures a jurisdiction may require before authorizing the

<sup>89</sup> Colorado, Hawaii, and Massachusetts reported in the Policy Survey that they use e-poll books but did not report data on the usage of e-poll books in item F3 of the EAVS. Puerto Rico reported data on the usage of e-poll books in the EAVS but reported not using e-poll books in the Policy Survey.

<sup>90</sup> Information on poll books was collected in items Q16 and Q16a of the Policy Survey. Illinois did not provide a response to this item.

use of e-poll books, including but not limited to pre-election testing, secure physical storage, contingency planning, chain-of-custody practices, and poll worker training.

## Recounts, Audits, and Election Certification

Before local election officials certify the results of an election, they take steps to verify that all established election procedures were followed and that all voting equipment functioned properly. Many states require additional post-election verification that the counting process was accurate. These additional verifications may take the form of a partial recount (in which ballots in randomly selected precincts are counted a second time to ensure that the initial tabulation of votes was accurate) or a more detailed audit (in which the entire voting process is reviewed and key steps are verified).

### Recounts

An election recount is a repeat tabulation of all votes cast in an election, and it is used to determine the accuracy of an initial count. The EAVS Policy Survey did not ask if the reasons for a recount were automatic, mandatory, or triggered. The information collected in these questions quantifies what is generally allowed by law in a specified state. Figure 8 displays the reasons why states may have conducted an election recount for the 2020 general election. States reported that the most common reason a recount may be conducted is at the request of an affected candidate or party (55.4%). Less common reasons were if the results of a contest are within a specified margin (37.5%), another person or group requests a recount (30.4%),<sup>91</sup> or if the results of a contest are within a specified margin *and* it is requested by an affected candidate or party (28.6%). Arizona, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Tennessee reported that recounts are only authorized if a court orders it.<sup>92</sup>


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<sup>91</sup> Based on state comments, this reason can include voters or groups of voters, a county board of canvassers, a county election commission, a political party chair, or a person opposing a state or local measure. Washington specified that a group of five or more voters may request a recount for an issue, and Nevada specified that any person or group could request a recount of a ballot measure by November 18, 2020.

<sup>92</sup> Information on state policies regarding election recounts was collected in item Q34 of the Policy Survey.



**Figure 8. Post-Election Recounts Most Often May Be Conducted at the Request of an Affected Candidate or Party**



Source: Information on post-election recount policy was collected in Q34 of the Policy Survey.

### Post-Election Tabulation Audits

A post-election tabulation audit verifies that the voting equipment used to count ballots during an election properly counts a sample of voted ballots after an election. The majority of states (78.6%) indicated requiring some form of post-election tabulation audit, with some variation.<sup>93</sup> States most commonly indicated that a post-election audit is conducted as a statutory requirement, but Missouri and Nebraska stated that they conduct an audit as required by a formal administrative rule or guidance. Tennessee indicated only requiring a post-election tabulation audit for jurisdictions using optical scan voting systems. In Oklahoma, the secretary of the state election board can direct the secretary of a county election board to conduct post-election audits to ensure that voting devices and software correctly tabulated votes. Louisiana reported that it does not statutorily require tabulation audits, but audits are conducted in all parishes. The Policy Survey did not collect

<sup>93</sup> Information on whether a state requires a post-election tabulation audit was collected in item Q35 of the Policy Survey. Louisiana is not included in this calculation because it reported that “Our state does not statutorily require audits, but they are conducted in every parish.”

information on whether these audits were mandatory, triggered, or conducted only in certain circumstances.

The 2020 Policy Survey asked states to report which of the following post-election tabulation audits would be required for the 2020 general election. States could select multiple options as applicable:

- A traditional tabulation audit that comes from a fixed percentage of randomly selected voting districts or voting machines and is compared to the results produced by the voting system;
- A risk-limiting tabulation audit that is a protocol designed to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect election outcome by using statistical methods to select the audit sample size; or
- Another type of audit.

Roughly three-quarters of the states reported requiring a traditional tabulation audit, and about one-fifth of the states reported requiring a risk-limiting tabulation audit.<sup>94</sup> Thirteen states (28.9%) provided comments detailing alternative procedures.<sup>95</sup> For example, California stated that a jurisdiction may choose to conduct a risk-limiting audit instead of a traditional tabulation audit, and Nevada noted that after an initial pilot tabulation audit conducted after the 2020 general election, the state will require risk-limiting tabulation audits starting after the 2022 primary election. Pennsylvania also reported that it piloted a risk-limiting tabulation audit after the 2020 general election in addition to their statutory requirement.

Some states reported having additional steps in their tabulation audit processes. For example, Maryland stated that it conducts a traditional manual audit as well as a completely automated tabulation audit using ballot images. Louisiana noted that its tabulation audit includes a comparison between the number of times a machine was used for voting, the number of voters that signed a precinct register, the names written in the precinct poll books, and the voters who were given credit for voting in the statewide database. Washington reported that local election officials can choose among three methods to meet the state post-election tabulation audit requirement, including the option for a risk-limiting audit.

## Election Certification

Although some local jurisdictions might have earlier deadlines for finalizing election results, elections are not officially certified until the state provides a final result. The 2020 Policy Survey asked states to provide their election certification deadlines for the 2020 general election.<sup>96</sup> The range was broad,<sup>97</sup> with 41 states reporting a date between November 10, 2020, and November 30, 2020.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Information on the type of post-election tabulation audit that states require was collected in item Q35a of the Policy Survey. States were able to make multiple selections in this item's response options.

<sup>95</sup> In Louisiana, post-election tabulation audits were conducted by comparing all voting machine results to the number of voters that signed the precinct register, the names written in the precinct poll books, and the voters given credit for voting in the statewide database. However, Louisiana specified that post-election tabulation audits were not statutorily required for the 2020 general election.

<sup>96</sup> Hawaii does not have an election certification deadline; results are certified within 20 days of the election unless the Supreme Court has contested an election.

<sup>97</sup> The range was as early as November 4, 2020, in Puerto Rico and as late as December 11, 2020, in California.

<sup>98</sup> Information on deadlines for certifying the November 2020 general election results was collected in item Q33 of the Policy Survey.



States provided clarifying comments on their specific policies regarding their certification deadline. For example, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Rhode Island reported not having a specific state certification deadline,<sup>99</sup> and the District of Columbia and Guam noted that their reported dates were tentative deadlines. Additionally, Alaska commented that their reported date was a target deadline, and North Carolina noted their reported deadline was barring recounts or protests in individual races.

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<sup>99</sup> Tennessee and Pennsylvania noted that their reported deadlines apply to county officials, not state officials.

## Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

Policy Survey Table 1: Voter Registration Database Type

State	Top down	Bottom up	Hybrid	If bottom up or hybrid: How often do jurisdictions transmit registration information?
Alabama	✓	--	--	--
Alaska	✓	--	--	--
American Samoa	✓	--	--	--
Arizona	--	--	✓	Real time
Arkansas	--	✓	--	Daily
California	--	✓	--	Real time
Colorado	✓	--	--	--
Connecticut	--	✓	--	Real time
Delaware	✓	--	--	--
District of Columbia	✓	--	--	--
Florida	✓	--	--	--
Georgia	✓	--	--	--
Guam	✓	--	--	--
Hawaii	--	--	✓	Real time
Idaho	✓	--	--	--
Illinois [1]	--	✓	--	Other
Indiana	✓	--	--	--
Iowa	✓	--	--	--
Kansas	✓	--	--	--
Kentucky	✓	--	--	--
Louisiana	✓	--	--	--
Maine	--	--	✓	Real time
Maryland	✓	--	--	--
Massachusetts	✓	--	--	--
Michigan	✓	--	--	--
Minnesota [2]	--	--	--	--
Mississippi	--	✓	--	Real time
Missouri	✓	--	--	--
Montana	✓	--	--	--
Nebraska	✓	--	--	--
Nevada	--	✓	--	Daily
New Hampshire	✓	--	--	--
New Jersey	✓	--	--	--
New Mexico	✓	--	--	--
New York	--	✓	--	Real time
North Carolina	✓	--	--	--



State	Top down	Bottom up	Hybrid	If bottom up or hybrid: How often do jurisdictions transmit registration information?
North Dakota	✓	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands [3]	--	--	✓	Other
Ohio	--	✓	--	Real time
Oklahoma	✓	--	--	--
Oregon	✓	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	✓	--	--	--
Puerto Rico	--	✓	--	Real time
Rhode Island	--	--	✓	Real time
South Carolina	✓	--	--	--
South Dakota	✓	--	--	--
Tennessee	--	✓	--	Daily
Texas [4]	--	--	✓	Other
U.S. Virgin Islands	✓	--	--	--
Utah	--	✓	--	Daily
Vermont	✓	--	--	--
Virginia	✓	--	--	--
Washington	✓	--	--	--
West Virginia	✓	--	--	--
Wisconsin	✓	--	--	--
Wyoming	✓	--	--	--

Policy Survey Table 1 Calculation Notes:

**Top down, Bottom up, and Hybrid** uses question Q4.

**How often do jurisdictions transmit registration information** uses question Q4a.

Policy Survey Table 1 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- States were only able to select single responses to both Q4 and Q4a.

[1] Illinois reported that “If the jurisdiction[']s vendor has web services, the information is uploaded in real time. However, those without web [servers] send a batch every night.”

[2] Minnesota did not provide a response to these items.

[3] In the Northern Mariana Islands, “Information [is] retrieved upon request.”

[4] Texas reported that the approximately 215 counties categorized as “online” counties transmit registration information in real time, whereas the 39 counties categorized as “offline” counties transmit registration information daily.



Policy Survey Table 2: Electronic Information Sharing With Government Entities

State	Motor vehicles agencies	Agencies for people with disabilities	State public assistance agencies	Other state agencies	Federal agencies
Alabama	Daily	--	--	--	--
Alaska [1]	Daily	--	--	Other	--
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona	Real time	--	--	--	--
Arkansas	Daily	--	--	--	--
California	Real time	--	--	--	--
Colorado	Daily	--	--	--	--
Connecticut [2]	Real time	--	--	--	--
Delaware [3]	Real time	--	Other	--	--
District of Columbia [4]	Real time	--	--	--	--
Florida	Daily	--	--	--	--
Georgia	Daily	--	--	--	--
Guam	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii [5]	Other	--	--	--	--
Idaho	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	Daily	Daily	Daily	Real time	--
Indiana	Daily	--	--	--	--
Iowa	Daily	--	--	--	--
Kansas	Daily	--	--	--	--
Kentucky [6]	Real time	Daily	Daily	--	--
Louisiana	Daily	--	--	--	--
Maine	--	--	--	--	--
Maryland [7]	Daily	Daily	Daily	Daily	--
Massachusetts	Daily	--	Daily	--	--
Michigan	Daily	--	--	--	--
Minnesota	Daily	--	--	--	--
Mississippi	Daily	--	--	--	--
Missouri	--	--	--	--	--
Montana	Weekly	--	--	--	--
Nebraska [8]	Other	--	--	--	--
Nevada	Daily	--	--	--	--
New Hampshire [9]	Other	--	--	--	Other
New Jersey	Daily	--	--	--	--
New Mexico	Daily	--	--	--	--
New York	Daily	--	--	--	--
North Carolina	Daily	--	--	--	--



State	Motor vehicles agencies	Agencies for people with disabilities	State public assistance agencies	Other state agencies	Federal agencies
North Dakota	Daily	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands [10]	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	Daily	--	--	--	--
Oklahoma [11]	Other	--	--	--	--
Oregon [12]	Other	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	Daily	Real time	Real time	--	--
Puerto Rico	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island	Real time	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	Weekly	Weekly	Weekly	--	--
South Dakota	Daily	--	--	--	--
Tennessee	Monthly	--	--	--	--
Texas	Daily	--	--	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands [13]	--	--	--	Other	--
Utah [14]	Daily	Weekly	Weekly	Weekly	Weekly
Vermont	Daily	--	--	--	--
Virginia	Real time	--	--	--	--
Washington	Real time	Real time	Real time	Real time	--
West Virginia	Daily	--	--	--	--
Wisconsin [15]	Daily	--	--	--	--
Wyoming	Daily	--	--	--	--

State	Military recruiting offices	Entities that maintain death records	Entities that maintain felony records	Entities that maintain records of individuals declared mentally incompetent
Alabama	--	Daily	Daily	--
Alaska [1]	--	--	--	--
American Samoa	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Arizona	--	--	--	--
Arkansas	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
California	--	Weekly	Monthly	Monthly
Colorado	--	Monthly	Weekly	--
Connecticut [2]	--	Monthly	Monthly	Other
Delaware [3]	--	Monthly	--	--
District of Columbia [4]	--	Other	--	--
Florida	--	Daily	Daily	--
Georgia	--	Weekly	Monthly	Monthly
Guam	--	--	--	--
Hawaii [5]	--	Monthly	--	--
Idaho	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Illinois	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Indiana	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Iowa	--	Monthly	--	--
Kansas	--	Weekly	Weekly	--
Kentucky [6]	Other	Weekly	Weekly	Daily
Louisiana	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Maine	--	Monthly	--	--
Maryland [7]	--	Monthly	Monthly	Other
Massachusetts	--	--	--	--
Michigan	--	Weekly	Daily	--
Minnesota	--	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly
Mississippi	--	Monthly	Daily	--
Missouri	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Montana	--	Monthly	Weekly	--
Nebraska [8]	--	Weekly	Monthly	--
Nevada	--	Daily	--	--
New Hampshire [9]	--	Other	--	--
New Jersey	--	Weekly	Weekly	--
New Mexico	--	--	--	--
New York	--	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly
North Carolina	--	Monthly	Daily	--
North Dakota	--	--	--	--



State	Military recruiting offices	Entities that maintain death records	Entities that maintain felony records	Entities that maintain records of individuals declared mentally incompetent
Northern Mariana Islands [10]	--	--	--	--
Ohio	--	Monthly	--	--
Oklahoma [11]	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Oregon [12]	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	--	Weekly	--	--
Puerto Rico	--	Real time	--	--
Rhode Island	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
South Dakota	--	Daily	Daily	--
Tennessee	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Texas	--	Weekly	Weekly	--
U.S. Virgin Islands [13]	--	--	--	--
Utah [14]	Monthly	Other	Monthly	Other
Vermont	--	--	--	--
Virginia	--	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly
Washington	--	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly
West Virginia	--	Monthly	Monthly	--
Wisconsin [15]	--	Monthly	Daily	--
Wyoming	--	Weekly	Weekly	--

Policy Survey Table 2 Calculation Notes:

- Motor vehicles agency** uses questions Q5a\_1 and Q5a\_2.
- Agencies for people with disabilities** uses questions Q5b\_1 and Q5b\_2.
- State public assistance agencies** uses questions Q5c\_1 and Q5c\_2.
- Other state agencies** uses questions Q5d\_1 and Q5d\_2.
- Federal agencies** uses questions Q5e\_1 and Q5e\_2.
- Military recruiting offices** uses questions Q5f\_1 and Q5f\_2.
- Entities that maintain death records** uses questions Q5g\_1 and Q5g\_2.
- Entities that maintain felony records** uses questions Q5h\_1 and Q5h\_2.
- Entities that maintain records of individuals declared mentally incompetent** uses questions Q5i\_1 and Q5i\_2.

Policy Survey Table 2 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- States were only able to select a single response to Q5a\_2–Q5i\_2.

[1] Alaska reported that electronic information sharing with other, non-NVRA-required state agencies occurs after the March 31 deadline to apply for the Permanent Fund Dividend has passed. This typically involves one data file transfer.

- [2] Connecticut reported sharing electronic information with entities that maintain records of individuals declared mentally incompetent on an as-needed basis.
- [3] Delaware reported that information is transmitted to state public assistance agencies at the moment the information is submitted to the voter portal by a client.
- [4] The District of Columbia reported that information is shared with entities that maintain death records on a quarterly basis.
- [5] Hawaii reported that voter information is shared with its motor vehicle agency upon request.
- [6] Kentucky reported that it shares voter information with military recruiting offices as requests occur.
- [7] Maryland reported that it is notified as needed by the Maryland Judiciary when a person is declared mentally incompetent by order of the courts.
- [8] Nebraska conducts real-time checks of driver's license, state identifications, and SSN information on file with the motor vehicles agency. Daily transfers are conducted with the motor vehicle agency for voter registrations that occur at the agency, surrendered IDs, changed IDs, or SSNs needing verification from the Social Security Administration.
- [9] New Hampshire reported that it shares voter information with the motor vehicles agency, federal agencies, and entities that maintain felony records in a one-way exchange from the agencies to the election office.
- [10] The Northern Mariana Islands did not provide a response to these items.
- [11] Oklahoma reported that offices that have converted to the Department of Public Safety's (DPS) new system share data daily. Offices that have not yet converted to the new system can only send address change data, and that data is sent weekly. Information regarding Oklahoma driver's licenses surrendered in another state is received monthly.
- [12] Oregon reported that information is exchanged with the motor vehicles agency Monday through Friday.
- [13] The U.S. Virgin Islands reported that information is exchanged with other state agencies at the request of the court.
- [14] Utah reported that information is exchanged with entities that maintain death records on a bimonthly basis and entities that maintain records of individuals declared mentally incompetent as needed.
- [15] Wisconsin receives competency data electronically from the courts.



Policy Survey Table 3: Online Voter Registration Policies

State	Individuals can register to vote and update their registration via the system	Individuals can update their registration via the system	State-issued driver's license or ID is required to use this system
Alabama	✓	--	Yes
Alaska	✓	--	Yes
American Samoa	--	--	--
Arizona	✓	--	Yes
Arkansas	--	--	--
California	✓	--	No
Colorado	✓	--	Yes
Connecticut	✓	--	Yes
Delaware	✓	--	Yes
District of Columbia	✓	--	No
Florida	✓	--	Yes
Georgia	✓	--	Yes
Guam	✓	--	Yes
Hawaii	✓	--	Yes
Idaho	✓	--	Yes
Illinois	✓	--	Yes
Indiana	✓	--	Yes
Iowa	✓	--	Yes
Kansas	✓	--	Yes
Kentucky	✓	--	No
Louisiana	✓	--	Yes
Maine	--	--	--
Maryland	✓	--	Yes
Massachusetts	✓	--	Yes
Michigan	✓	--	Yes
Minnesota	✓	--	No
Mississippi	--	✓	Yes
Missouri	✓	--	No
Montana	--	--	--
Nebraska	✓	--	Yes
Nevada	✓	--	Yes
New Hampshire	--	--	--
New Jersey	✓	--	Yes
New Mexico	✓	--	Yes
New York	✓	--	Yes
North Carolina	✓	--	Yes
North Dakota [1]	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--

State	Individuals can register to vote and update their registration via the system	Individuals can update their registration via the system	State-issued driver's license or ID is required to use this system
Ohio	✓	--	Yes
Oklahoma	✓	--	No
Oregon	✓	--	Yes
Pennsylvania	✓	--	No
Puerto Rico	--	--	--
Rhode Island	✓	--	Yes
South Carolina	✓	--	Yes
South Dakota	--	--	--
Tennessee	✓	--	Yes
Texas	--	✓	Yes
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	--
Utah	✓	--	Yes
Vermont	✓	--	No
Virginia	✓	--	Yes
Washington	✓	--	Yes
West Virginia	✓	--	Yes
Wisconsin	✓	--	Yes
Wyoming	--	--	--

Policy Survey Table 3 Calculation Notes:

**Individuals can register to vote and update their registration via the system** uses question Q7.

**Individuals can update their registration via the system** uses question Q7.

**A driver's license or state-issued ID is required to use this system** uses question Q7a.

Policy Survey Table 3 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- States were only able to select a single response to both Q7 and Q7a.

[1] North Dakota does not have voter registration.



Policy Survey Table 4: State Voting by Mail Election Policies

State	Excuse required for mail voting	State or jurisdiction conducts all-mail election	Permanent absentee voting allowed	Who can be a permanent absentee voter
Alabama	✓	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Persons with disabilities
Alaska	--	--	--	--
American Samoa	✓	--	--	--
Arizona	--	--	Yes, any registrant	--
Arkansas	✓	--	--	--
California	--	Statewide	Yes, any registrant	--
Colorado	--	Statewide	--	--
Connecticut	✓	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Persons with disabilities
Delaware	--	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Federal or state workers and their spouses or dependents, members of the uniformed services, voters who are sick or disabled (temporarily or permanently), voters temporarily residing outside the United States and their spouses or dependents
District of Columbia	--	Statewide	Yes, any registrant	--
Florida	✓	--	--	--
Georgia	--	--	--	--
Guam	✓	--	--	--
Hawaii	--	Statewide	--	--
Idaho	--	Only certain jurisdictions	--	--
Illinois	--	--	--	--
Indiana	✓	--	--	--
Iowa	--	--	--	--
Kansas	--	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Persons with disabilities
Kentucky	✓	--	--	--
Louisiana	✓	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Individuals over a specified age, persons with disabilities
Maine	--	--	--	--
Maryland	--	--	--	--



State	Excuse required for mail voting	State or jurisdiction conducts all-mail election	Permanent absentee voting allowed	Who can be a permanent absentee voter
Massachusetts	--	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Persons who provide a note from a medical professional
Michigan	--	--	Yes, any registrant	--
Minnesota	--	Only certain jurisdictions	Yes, any registrant	--
Mississippi	✓	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Persons with disabilities
Missouri	--	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Persons with disabilities
Montana	--	Only certain jurisdictions	Yes, any registrant	--
Nebraska	--	Only certain jurisdictions	--	--
Nevada	--	Statewide	Yes, any registrant	--
New Hampshire	✓	--	--	--
New Jersey	--	Statewide	Yes, any registrant	--
New Mexico	--	--	--	--
New York	✓	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Persons with disabilities, voters who claim permanent illness
North Carolina	--	--	--	--
North Dakota	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--
Ohio	--	--	--	--
Oklahoma	--	--	--	--
Oregon [1]	--	Statewide	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Persons registered as Oregon voters but who are away from their Oregon residences when ballots are available
Pennsylvania [2]	✓	--	Yes, any registrant	--
Puerto Rico	✓	--	--	--
Rhode Island	--	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Persons with disabilities
South Carolina	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	--	--	--	--
Tennessee	✓	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Persons with disabilities, persons who have a doctor certify that they are unable to go to the polls
Texas	✓	--	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	--	--



State	Excuse required for mail voting	State or jurisdiction conducts all-mail election	Permanent absentee voting allowed	Who can be a permanent absentee voter
Utah	--	Statewide	Yes, any registrant	--
Vermont	--	Statewide	--	--
Virginia	--	--	Yes, any registrant	--
Washington	--	Statewide	Yes, any registrant	--
West Virginia	✓	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Persons with disabilities, participants in the West Virginia Address Confidentiality Program
Wisconsin	--	--	Yes, individuals who meet specific criteria	Persons with disabilities; persons who certify that they are indefinitely confined due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability
Wyoming	--	--	--	--

Policy Survey Table 4 Calculation Notes:

**Excuse required for mail voting** uses question Q17.

**State or jurisdiction conducts all-mail election** uses questions Q18 and Q18a.

**Permanent absentee voting allowed** uses question Q19.

**Who can be a permanent absentee voter** uses questions Q19a\_1, Q19a\_2, and Q19a\_3.

Policy Survey Table 4 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- States were only able to select a single response to Q17–Q19. Multiple responses were accepted for the Q19a items.
- The Policy Survey did not collect information on whether changes in states’ laws regarding all-vote-by-mail elections for 2020 were permanent or temporary or whether the changes were made in direct response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

[1] Although Oregon is a vote-by-mail state, there are still individuals who are considered absentee voters. Anyone who is registered as an Oregon voter but is away from their Oregon residence when ballots are available can request to be a permanent absentee voter if Oregon remains their primary residence.

[2] Pennsylvania provides both absentee and mail voting options. Voters who apply for an absentee ballot must give a reason for voting absentee. Voters who apply for a mailed ballot are not required to give a reason.

Policy Survey Table 5: Mail Voting Deadlines for UOCAVA and Non-UOCAVA Voters

State	Mail voters		Domestic military UOCAVA voters		Overseas UOCAVA voters	
	Postmarked by	Received by	Postmarked by	Received by	Postmarked by	Received by
Alabama	1 day before Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	7 days after Election Day	Election Day	7 days after Election Day
Alaska	Election Day	10 days after Election Day	Election Day	10 days after Election Day	Election Day	15 days after Election Day
American Samoa	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Arizona	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
Arkansas [1]	--	Election Day	--	10 days after Election Day	--	10 days after Election Day
California [2]	Election Day	17 days after Election Day	Election Day	17 days after Election Day	Election Day	17 days after Election Day
Colorado	--	Election Day	--	8 days after Election Day	--	8 days after Election Day
Connecticut	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Delaware	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
District of Columbia	Election Day	10 days after Election Day	Election Day	10 days after Election Day	Election Day	10 days after Election Day
Florida [3]	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	10 days after Election Day
Georgia	--	Election Day	Election Day	3 days after Election Day	Election Day	3 days after Election Day
Guam [4]	Election Day	10 days after Election Day	Election Day	10 days after Election Day	Election Day	10 days after Election Day
Hawaii [5]	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
Idaho	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
Illinois	Election Day	14 days after Election Day	Election Day	14 days after Election Day	Election Day	14 days after Election Day
Indiana [6]	--	Election Day	Election Day	10 days after Election Day	Election Day	10 days after Election Day
Iowa [7]	1 day before Election Day	6 days after Election Day	1 day before Election Day	6 days after Election Day	1 day before Election Day	6 days after Election Day
Kansas	Election Day	3 days after Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Kentucky [8]	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	3 days after Election Day	Election Day	3 days after Election Day
Louisiana	--	1 day before Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
Maine [9]	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
Maryland	Election Day	10 days after Election Day	Election Day	10 days after Election Day	Election Day	10 days after Election Day
Massachusetts	Election Day	3 days after Election Day	Election Day	3 days after Election Day	Election Day	10 days after Election Day



State	Mail voters		Domestic military UOCAVA voters		Overseas UOCAVA voters	
	Postmarked by	Received by	Postmarked by	Received by	Postmarked by	Received by
Michigan	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Minnesota [10]	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
Mississippi [11]	Election Day	5 days after Election Day	Election Day	5 days after Election Day	Election Day	5 days after Election Day
Missouri	--	Election Day	Election Day	3 days after Election Day	Election Day	3 days after Election Day
Montana	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Nebraska [12]	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
Nevada	Election Day	7 days after Election Day	Election Day	7 days after Election Day	Election Day	7 days after Election Day
New Hampshire [13]	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
New Jersey [14]	Election Day	7 days after Election Day	Election Day	7 days after Election Day	Election Day	7 days after Election Day
New Mexico [15]	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
New York	Election Day	7 days after Election Day	Election Day	13 days after Election Day	Election Day	13 days after Election Day
North Carolina [16]	Election Day	9 days after Election Day	--	9 days after Election Day	--	9 days after Election Day
North Dakota	1 day before Election Day	6 days after Election Day	1 day before Election Day	6 days after Election Day	1 day before Election Day	6 days after Election Day
Northern Mariana Islands	Election Day	14 days after Election Day	Election Day	14 days after Election Day	Election Day	14 days after Election Day
Ohio	1 day before Election Day	10 days after Election Day	--	10 days after Election Day	--	10 days after Election Day
Oklahoma [17]	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
Oregon [18]	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
Pennsylvania [19]	--	Election Day	1 day before Election Day	7 days after Election Day	1 day before Election Day	7 days after Election Day
Puerto Rico [20]	Election Day	14 days after Election Day	Election Day	14 days after Election Day	Election Day	14 days after Election Day
Rhode Island	--	Election Day	--	7 days after Election Day	--	7 days after Election Day
South Carolina	--	Election Day	--	2 days after Election Day	--	2 days after Election Day
South Dakota [21]	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
Tennessee [22]	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
Texas [23]	Election Day	1 day after Election Day	--	6 days after Election Day	Election Day	5 days after Election Day
U.S. Virgin Islands [24]	Election Day	10 days after Election Day	Election Day	10 days after Election Day	Election Day	10 days after Election Day
Utah [25]	1 day before Election Day	13 days after Election Day	Election Day	13 days after Election Day	Election Day	13 days after Election Day

State	Mail voters		Domestic military UOCAVA voters		Overseas UOCAVA voters	
	Postmarked by	Received by	Postmarked by	Received by	Postmarked by	Received by
Vermont	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day
Virginia [26]	Election Day	3 days after Election Day	Election Day	3 days after Election Day	Election Day	3 days after Election Day
Washington [27]	Election Day	20 days after Election Day	--	20 days after Election Day	--	20 days after Election Day
West Virginia [28]	Election Day	5 days after Election Day	--	5 days after Election Day	--	5 days after Election Day
Wisconsin [29]	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Wyoming	--	Election Day	--	Election Day	--	Election Day

Policy Survey Table 5 Calculation Notes:

**Mail voters, Postmarked by** uses questions Q20\_1\_1, Q20\_1\_10E, Q20\_1\_2, and Q20\_1\_3.

**Mail voters, Received by** uses questions Q20\_2\_1, Q20\_2\_10E, Q20\_2\_2, Q20\_2\_3, Q20\_2\_30E, and Q20\_2\_4.

**Domestic military UOCAVA voters, Postmarked by** uses questions Q29\_1\_1, Q29\_1\_10E, Q29\_1\_2, and Q29\_1\_3.

**Domestic military UOCAVA voters, Received by** uses questions Q29\_2\_1, Q29\_2\_10E, Q29\_2\_2, Q29\_2\_3, Q29\_2\_30E, and Q29\_2\_4.

**Overseas UOCAVA voters, Postmarked by** uses questions Q30\_1\_1, Q30\_1\_10E, Q30\_1\_2, and Q30\_1\_3.

**Overseas UOCAVA voters, Received by** uses questions Q30\_2\_1, Q30\_2\_10E, Q30\_2\_2, Q30\_2\_3, Q30\_2\_30E, and Q30\_2\_4.

Policy Survey Table 5 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- States were able to select multiple responses to each set of postmark and receipt deadline items through Q20, Q29, and Q30, although none of the states did so.

[1] Arkansas noted in a survey comment that mailed ballots must be received by 7:30 p.m. (close of polls).  
 [2] California noted in a survey comment that “For the November 3, 2020, general election, the deadline for a [mailed] ballot to be received by county elections officials is extended from 3 to 17 days after Election Day.”

[3] Florida noted in a survey comment that the deadline for mailed ballots is “7 pm local time deadline for domestic ballots 10 day extension for overseas voters.”

[4] Guam noted in a survey comment that “[B]allots must be received 10 business days after the election.”

[5] Hawaii noted in a survey comment that “Regardless of postmark date, ballots must be received by the County Elections Division by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.”

[6] Indiana noted in a survey comment that the deadline for mailed ballots is “Noon, local prevailing time.”

[7] Iowa noted in a survey comment that “[mailed] ballots must be postmarked or the ImB [Intelligent Mail barcode] tracking bar code must show that the ballot was entered into the mail stream before election day. Ballots must be received by 12:00 noon on the Monday after the election.”

[8] Kentucky noted in a survey comment that “If a [mailed] ballot is postmarked on or before 11/3 it must be received by 11/6. If a ballot is placed in a drop-box or delivered to a Clerk’s office, it must be delivered by 6PM local time, 11/3.”



[9] Maine noted in a survey comment that “[Mailed] ballot[s] must be received by 8:00 pm on Election Day.”

[10] Minnesota noted in a survey comment that for mailed ballots in the 2020 general election, “consent decree changes this to postmarked on or before election day and received by 11/10.”

[11] In Mississippi, ballots returned by mail must be postmarked by Election Day and received by the end of five business days after Election Day. Mail ballots returned by email or fax must be returned by 7:00 p.m. on the date of the election.

[12] Nebraska noted in a survey comment that “[Mailed ballots] must be received by close of polls on election day.”

[13] New Hampshire noted in a survey comment that “Absentee ballots, including all UOCAVA voters absentee ballots, must be received no later than 5 p.m. on Election Day.”

[14] New Jersey noted in a survey comment that the deadline for UOCAVA ballots is “Email and fax 8:00 pm election day.”

[15] New Mexico noted in a survey comment that “ballots must be received by 7pm on election day.”

[16] North Carolina noted in a survey comment that the “change from 3 days to 9 days approved by consent judgment in settlement between NCSBE [North Carolina State Board of Elections] and plaintiffs in the NC Alliance case which included extension of the civilian ballot mail return deadline for 2020. For remaining elections in 2020, a ballot shall be considered postmarked by Election Day if it has a postmark affixed to it or if there is information in BallotTrax, or another tracking service offered by the USPS or a commercial carrier, indicating that the ballot was in the custody of USPS or the commercial carrier on or before Election Day.”

[17] Oklahoma noted in a survey comment that “State law requires that a returned absentee ballot be received in the hands of the County Election Board Secretary by 7 p.m. (CST) on election day for it to be processed and counted.”

[18] Oregon noted that all ballots, including UOCAVA ballots, must be received by 8:00 p.m.

[19] Pennsylvania noted that, by law, civilian ballots must be received by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day to be eligible for canvassing.

[20] Puerto Rico noted in a survey comment that the “PR Electoral Code haven’t established a certain date to finish the General Election Scrutiny (canvass). Electoral Code establish that the ballot must be receive[d] before the General [Election] Scrutiny finished. Refer to Article 10.7 of Act 58 of 2020. Generally it took around 30 days after the election date. We established 14 days because it[’]s one of the options given by the system.”

[21] South Dakota noted in a survey comment that “The voted [mailed] ballot MUST be received by your County Election Official on Election Day in enough time to deliver your ballot to your voting precinct before the polls close.”

[22] Tennessee noted in a survey comment that mailed ballots must be received by “close of polls.”

[23] Texas noted in a survey comment that “For [mailed] ballots arriving by 5 p.m. the day after election day, they must be post marked no later than election day.”

[24] The U.S. Virgin Islands noted in a survey comment that “The [mailed] ballot must be placed in the mail by Election Day (postmark not required) and the ballot has ten (10) days to arrive to our office.”

[25] Utah noted in a survey comment that “20a-3a-401(5)(d)(ii) = if the election officer receives the affidavit no later than 5 p.m. the day before the canvass, count the individual’s [mailed] ballot.”

[26] Virginia noted in a survey comment that “Further extensions apply if the [mailed] ballot was requested prior to the 45-day deadline and not sent by that date.”

[27] Washington noted in a survey comment that “The ballot must be received by the day before the County Canvassing Board certifies the county’s election results. In November 2020, that certification date is November 24, so ballots must be received by November 23. This gives voters a 20-day window for the

November General Election.” For “overseas voters and service voters,” the date on the declaration to which the voter has attested determines the validity of the time of voting for that ballot.

**[28]** West Virginia noted that ballots must be received by the fifth day after the election that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

**[29]** Wisconsin state statutes do not contain a postmark requirement. Absentee ballots may be delivered to the local clerk so long as they are received before polls close.



Policy Survey Table 6: Electronic Ballot Transmission for Voters

State	Voters cannot receive ballots electronically	During emergency situations	When a replacement ballot is needed	Voters with specific disability	Voters with any disability	Any circumstance	Other
Alabama	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	--	--	--	--	--	✓	--
American Samoa	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arkansas	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
California [1]	--	--	--	--	✓	--	✓
Colorado	--	✓	--	--	✓	--	--
Connecticut	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware [2]	--	--	--	--	✓	--	✓
District of Columbia	--	--	--	--	✓	--	--
Florida	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Georgia	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Guam	--	--	--	--	--	✓	--
Hawaii [3]	--	--	--	--	✓	--	✓
Idaho	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Indiana	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Iowa	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kentucky	--	--	--	--	--	✓	--
Louisiana	--	--	--	--	✓	--	--
Maine [4]	--	✓	--	--	--	--	✓
Maryland	--	--	--	--	--	✓	--
Massachusetts [5]	--	--	--	--	--	--	✓
Michigan	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Minnesota	--	--	--	--	✓	--	--
Mississippi [6]	--	--	--	--	--	--	✓
Missouri	--	✓	--	--	--	--	--
Montana	--	--	--	✓	--	--	--
Nebraska	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nevada	--	✓	✓	--	✓	--	--
New Hampshire	--	--	--	✓	--	--	--
New Jersey	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Mexico	--	--	--	✓	--	--	--
New York [7]	--	--	--	--	✓	--	✓
North Carolina	--	--	--	✓	--	--	--
North Dakota	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--



State	Voters cannot receive ballots electronically	During emergency situations	When a replacement ballot is needed	Voters with specific disability	Voters with any disability	Any circumstance	Other
Northern Mariana Islands	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	--	--	--	--	✓	--	--
Oklahoma	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Oregon	--	--	--	--	--	✓	--
Pennsylvania [8]	--	--	--	--	--	--	✓
Puerto Rico	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Tennessee	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Texas	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	✓	✓	✓	✓	--	--
Utah	--	✓	--	--	✓	--	--
Vermont	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia	--	✓	--	✓	--	--	--
Washington	--	--	--	--	--	✓	--
West Virginia	--	--	--	✓	--	--	--
Wisconsin	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--

Policy Survey Table 6 Calculation Notes:

- Voters cannot receive ballots electronically** uses question Q23\_1.
- During emergency situations** uses question Q23\_2.
- When a replacement ballot is needed** uses question Q23\_3.
- Voters with specific disability** uses question Q23\_4.
- Voters with any disability** uses question Q23\_5.
- Voters may receive a ballot electronically for any circumstance** uses question Q23\_6.
- Other** uses question Q23\_7.

Policy Survey Table 6 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- States were able to select multiple responses to Q23 items; however, selecting Q23\_1 excluded all other response choices.
- Q23 collected information on electronic ballot transmission for non-UOCAVA voters only. Voters covered by UOCAVA may receive ballots electronically under the MOVE Act.

[1] In the November 3, 2020, general election, California county election officials permitted any voter to cast a ballot using a certified remote accessible vote-by-mail system.

[2] Delaware specified that voters who are sick or physically disabled, whether temporarily or permanently, can receive ballots electronically.



[3] Hawaii reported allowing voters to receive ballots electronically when a replacement ballot is needed and is requested within five days of the election.

[4] Maine reported allowing voters who self-identify as having a print disability to receive ballots electronically.

[5] Massachusetts specified that voters with a disability that prevents them from privately and independently marking a paper ballot can receive ballots electronically.

[6] Mississippi's UOCAVA state statute allows emergency responders to qualify for electronic ballots if they are deployed outside their county of residence during a state of emergency.

[7] New York reported allowing emergency responders to receive ballots electronically.

[8] Pennsylvania specified that voters with any disability as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act can receive a ballot electronically.

Policy Survey Table 7: In-Person Voting Before Election Day

State	Terminology used to describe casting a ballot in person before Election Day	Excuse required for in-person voting before Election Day
Alabama	In-person absentee voting	✓
Alaska	In-person early voting, in-person absentee voting	--
American Samoa	Local absentee voting	✓
Arizona	In-person early voting	--
Arkansas	In-person early voting	--
California	In-person early voting	--
Colorado	In-person early voting	--
Connecticut [1]	Other	✓
Delaware	In-person absentee voting	✓
District of Columbia	In-person early voting	--
Florida	In-person early voting	--
Georgia	Advance voting	--
Guam	In-person absentee voting	--
Hawaii	In-person voting	--
Idaho	In-person early voting, in-person absentee voting	--
Illinois	In-person early voting	--
Indiana	In-person absentee voting	--
Iowa	In-person absentee voting	--
Kansas	In-person advance voting	--
Kentucky	In-person early voting	--
Louisiana	In-person early voting	--
Maine	In-person absentee voting	--
Maryland	In-person early voting	--
Massachusetts [2]	In-person early voting, in-person absentee voting	✓
Michigan	In-person absentee voting	--
Minnesota	In-person absentee voting	--
Mississippi	In-person absentee voting	✓
Missouri	In-person absentee voting	✓
Montana	In-person absentee voting	--
Nebraska	In-person early voting	--
Nevada	In-person early voting	--
New Hampshire	In-person absentee voting	✓
New Jersey	--	--
New Mexico	In-person early voting, in-person absentee voting	--
New York	In-person early voting	--
North Carolina	In-person early voting, in-person absentee voting, one stop voting, early voting	--
North Dakota	In-person early voting, in-person absentee voting	--



State	Terminology used to describe casting a ballot in person before Election Day	Excuse required for in-person voting before Election Day
Northern Mariana Islands	In-person early voting	✓
Ohio	In-person early voting, in-person absentee voting	--
Oklahoma	In-person absentee voting	--
Oregon [3]	Other	✓
Pennsylvania [4]	Other	✓
Puerto Rico [5]	In-person early voting, other	✓
Rhode Island	In-person absentee voting	--
South Carolina [6]	In-person absentee voting	--
South Dakota	In-person absentee voting	--
Tennessee	In-person early voting	--
Texas	In-person early voting	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	In-person early voting, in-person absentee voting	--
Utah	In-person early voting	--
Vermont	In-person early voting, in-person absentee voting	--
Virginia	In-person early voting	--
Washington [7]	In-person voting	--
West Virginia	In-person early voting	--
Wisconsin	In-person absentee voting	--
Wyoming	In-person absentee voting	--

Policy Survey Table 7 Calculation Notes:

**Terminology used to describe casting a ballot in person before Election Day** uses questions Q24\_1, Q24\_2, and Q24\_3.

**Excuse required for in-person voting before Election Day** uses question Q24a.

Policy Survey Table 7 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- States were able to select multiple responses to Q24 items; however, selecting Q24\_4 excluded all other response items and is not depicted in the table. States were only able to select a single response to Q24a.

[1] Connecticut reported that a person can request an absentee ballot and cast it on the spot and not return it by mail.

[2] In Massachusetts, in-person absentee voting before Election Day requires an excuse but early voting does not.

[3] Oregon reported that members of specific populations (e.g., those who will not be in Oregon or have access to a regular mailing address when ballots are available) can receive and return a ballot at their county election office. They may choose to cast their vote then and there or take it with them and return via mail or drop box.

[4] Pennsylvania's 2019 election reforms allow for absentee and mail-in ballots to be completed over the counter at an election office.

[5] Puerto Rico reported that in addition to in-person early voting, voters may cast their ballot from their residence via mail.

[6] South Carolina requires an excuse for in-person absentee voting; however, this requirement was temporarily suspended for elections held in 2020.

[7] Washington is a vote-by-mail state. In-person voters were issued a vote-by-mail ballot packet at a voting center that they could deposit into a ballot drop box or mail. Alternatively, voters could use a disability access unit to vote in person before Election Day.



Policy Survey Table 8: Election Certification, Recounts, and Audits

State	General election certification deadline	Reasons why a jurisdiction in the state may conduct a post-election recount of ballots					Post-election tabulation audit policy
		Results are within a certain margin	By candidate or party request	Results are within a certain margin and a candidate or party has requested a recount	Request by other person or group	By court order only	
Alabama	11/25/2020	--	✓	--	--	--	Not required
Alaska [1]	11/25/2020	✓	✓	--	✓	--	Required by statute
American Samoa	11/10/2020	--	✓	✓	--	--	Not required
Arizona	11/30/2020	--	--	--	--	✓	Required by statute
Arkansas [2]	11/18/2020	--	✓	--	✓	--	Required by statute
California [3]	12/11/2020	✓	✓	✓	✓	--	Required by statute
Colorado	11/25/2020	✓	✓	--	--	--	Required by statute
Connecticut	11/25/2020	✓	--	--	--	--	Required by statute
Delaware [4]	11/5/2020	✓	--	--	--	--	Required by statute
District of Columbia [5]	11/24/2020	✓	✓	--	--	--	Required by statute
Florida [6]	11/17/2020	✓	--	--	--	--	Required by statute
Georgia [7]	11/20/2020	--	--	✓	✓	--	Required by statute
Guam [8]	11/19/2020	✓	--	--	--	--	Not required
Hawaii [9]	--	✓	--	--	--	--	Required by statute
Idaho [10]	11/13/2020	--	✓	--	✓	--	Not required
Illinois	12/4/2020	--	--	✓	--	--	Required by statute
Indiana [11]	11/16/2020	--	✓	--	✓	--	Required by statute
Iowa	11/30/2020	--	✓	--	--	--	Required by statute
Kansas [12]	12/1/2020	--	✓	--	✓	--	Required by statute
Kentucky	11/23/2020	--	✓	--	--	--	Not required
Louisiana [13]	11/19/2020	--	--	✓	✓	--	Other
Maine [14]	11/23/2020	--	✓	--	--	--	Not required
Maryland	12/8/2020	--	✓	--	--	--	Required by statute
Massachusetts [15]	11/18/2020	--	✓	--	✓	--	Required by statute
Michigan [16]	11/23/2020	✓	✓	--	✓	--	Required by statute

State	General election certification deadline	Reasons why a jurisdiction in the state may conduct a post-election recount of ballots					Post-election tabulation audit policy
		Results are within a certain margin	By candidate or party request	Results are within a certain margin and a candidate or party has requested a recount	Request by other person or group	By court order only	
Minnesota [17]	11/24/2020	✓	✓	--	✓	--	Required by statute
Mississippi	11/13/2020	--	--	--	--	✓	Not required
Missouri	12/8/2020	--	--	✓	--	--	Required by formal rule
Montana	11/30/2020	--	--	✓	--	--	Required by statute
Nebraska [18]	11/30/2020	✓	✓	--	--	--	Required by formal rule
Nevada [19]	11/16/2020	--	✓	--	✓	--	Required by statute
New Hampshire [20]	11/12/2020	--	✓	--	--	--	Not required
New Jersey	12/8/2020	--	--	--	--	✓	Required by statute
New Mexico	11/24/2020	✓	✓	--	--	--	Required by statute
New York	12/7/2020	--	--	--	--	✓	Required by statute
North Carolina [21]	11/24/2020	--	--	✓	--	--	Required by statute
North Dakota [22]	11/13/2020	✓	✓	✓	✓	--	Required by statute
Northern Mariana Islands	11/17/2020	--	--	--	--	✓	Required by statute
Ohio [23]	11/24/2020	✓	✓	--	✓	--	Required by statute
Oklahoma [24]	11/10/2020	--	✓	--	--	--	Other
Oregon [25]	12/3/2020	✓	✓	--	✓	--	Required by statute
Pennsylvania [26]	11/23/2020	✓	--	--	✓	--	Required by statute
Puerto Rico [27]	11/4/2020	✓	--	--	--	--	Not required
Rhode Island [28]	11/20/2020	--	--	✓	--	--	Required by statute
South Carolina [29]	11/13/2020	✓	--	--	--	--	Other
South Dakota	11/10/2020	--	--	✓	--	--	Not required
Tennessee [30]	11/23/2020	--	--	--	--	✓	Other
Texas [31]	12/7/2020	--	✓	--	--	--	Required by statute
U.S. Virgin Islands	11/13/2020	--	✓	--	--	--	Not required
Utah	11/17/2020	--	✓	✓	--	--	Required by statute
Vermont	11/10/2020	--	--	✓	--	--	Required by statute



State	General election certification deadline	Reasons why a jurisdiction in the state may conduct a post-election recount of ballots					Post-election tabulation audit policy
		Results are within a certain margin	By candidate or party request	Results are within a certain margin and a candidate or party has requested a recount	Request by other person or group	By court order only	
Virginia [32]	11/16/2020	--	--	✓	--	--	Required by statute
Washington [33]	12/3/2020	✓	✓	✓	✓	--	Required by statute
West Virginia	12/3/2020	--	✓	--	--	--	Required by statute
Wisconsin [34]	12/1/2020	--	--	✓	--	--	Required by statute
Wyoming [35]	11/11/2020	✓	✓	--	--	--	Other

Policy Survey Table 8 Calculation Notes:

- General election certification deadline** uses question Q33.
- Recount reason, Results are within a certain margin** uses question Q34\_1.
- Recount reason, By candidate or party request** uses question Q34\_2.
- Recount reason, Results are within a certain margin and a candidate or party has requested a recount** uses question Q34\_3.
- Recount reason, Request by other person or group** uses question Q34\_4.
- Recount reason, By court order only** uses question Q34\_5.
- Post-election tabulation audit policy** uses question Q35.

Policy Survey Table 8 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- States were able to specify a calendar date for item Q33, select multiple responses to item Q34, and only a single response to item Q35. Selecting Q34\_5 excluded all other responses to Q34.

[1] Alaska reported that the certification deadline is the target date for the Alaska Division of Elections to certify the election. According to Alaska statute, a defeated candidate or 10 qualified voters who believe there has been a mistake in counting votes in an election may file an application for a recount of votes for any precinct or house district and for any office, proposition, or question. This application must be filed within five days after the completion of state review. However, the application may only be filed within three days after the completion of the state review after the general election for a recount of votes cast for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor. A recount is required if a contest is tied.

[2] Arkansas reported that the County Election Commission may also come to a decision to recount an election.

[3] California reported that anybody who is allowed by state law can request a recount.

[4] The Delaware Boards of Canvass convene at 10:00 a.m. on the Thursday immediately following the federal general election.

[5] The District of Columbia included the November 24 date in a public calendar as a tentative date for certifying results rather than a set deadline.



**[6]** Florida specified that the state Elections Canvassing Commission meets at 9:00 a.m. on the ninth day after a primary election and at 9:00 a.m. on the 14th day after a general election to certify the election. For the November 3, 2020, federal general election, the deadline for jurisdictions to certify their results to the state fell on November 15, 2020.

**[7]** Georgia reported that “In Georgia precincts where paper or scanning ballots have been used, the superintendent may, either of their own motion or upon petition of any candidate or political party, order a recount of ballots for a particular precinct for one or more offices in which it appears an error has been made. In precincts where voting machines were used, if there appears to be a discrepancy or error in the returns recorded for any voting machine, the superintendent may, either of their own motion or upon sworn petition of three electors of any precinct, order a recanvass of the votes shown on that particular machine or machines. This recanvass may be conducted at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the superintendent.”

**[8]** Guam reported that the certification deadline was a tentative date. The Guam Election Commission (GEC) cannot certify a general election until all administrative complaints received within 15 days after the election have been addressed.

**[9]** Hawaii explained that there is no set deadline for certifying election results. If there are no election contests filed with the Supreme Court within 20 days of the election, the results will be certified.

**[10]** Idaho reported that the county board of canvassers must certify results within 10 days of the general election, prior to the state board of canvassers meeting within 15 days of the general election. Idaho reported that a person supporting or opposing a state, jurisdiction, or city measure may request an election recount.

**[11]** The Indiana Election Division (IED) tabulates final results for all federal, statewide, state legislative, and judicial offices and completes that tabulation no later than the last Tuesday of November (i.e., November 24, 2020). The Secretary of State certifies results immediately after receiving IED’s tabulation. For presidential electors, the Secretary of State’s part of the 2020 Indiana Election Commission would be signed by that date. Since the governor is required to issue commissions to each presidential elector by noon on the first Tuesday of December (i.e., December 1, 2020), and in order to issue those commissions the governor must certify his part of the 2020 Indiana Election Commission certificate of ascertainment, the certification of the presidential election results and Indiana electors also occurs on the first Tuesday of December. Indiana reported that a candidate’s political party chair (state chair for federal and statewide candidates or county chair for a state legislative candidate from any jurisdiction where the legislative district is located) may file a recount if the candidate does not file the recount by the candidate recount filing deadline.

**[12]** Kansas county board of canvassers can request a recount within their jurisdictions of any race if there are manifest errors.

**[13]** Louisiana reported that election results are final after compilation and promulgation by the Secretary of State. Louisiana voters that voted in the proposition election may request a recount if the number of absentee and early ballots would make a difference in the outcome of the proposition election. Louisiana does not statutorily require audits, but they are conducted in every parish.

**[14]** Maine reported that the Secretary of State must submit the official tabulation to the governor by the 20th day after the election.

**[15]** Massachusetts local election officials must certify their election results and transmit to the Secretary of the Commonwealth within 15 days after the election. Thereafter, the Secretary of the Commonwealth tabulates the totals and presents them to the governor and the council for certification. Any registered Massachusetts voter can petition for a recount of ballot questions.

**[16]** Michigan specified that recounts are conducted automatically if the statewide vote margin is less than 2,000 votes. Candidates can request a recount regardless of the margin. Groups may request a recount of ballot proposals. The voted ballots in at least one statewide contest must be reviewed as part of an audit



(MCL 168.31a[2]). Separate audit procedures are used to complete both a traditional tabulation audit and a risk-limiting audit. Precincts are randomly selected for audit and all ballots for one statewide race were hand counted and compared to the tabulator totals to complete a traditional tabulation audit. Additionally, ballots for a statewide race are randomly selected from ballot containers statewide using a risk-limiting audit formula, and ballots were reviewed and compared to statewide totals.

[17] Minnesota did not specify the other person or group who may request a recount of votes.

[18] Nebraska specified that if there is a state-level recount, it would be conducted on December 2, 2020, at 9:00 a.m.

[19] In Nevada, any person or group was able to request a recount of a ballot question by November 18, 2020.

[20] New Hampshire specified that its certification dates vary depending on the office. For presidential electors, United States senators, representatives in Congress, state senators, and state representatives, the deadline was December 2, 2020. For governor, executive council, and county officers, the deadline was January 6, 2021.

[21] North Carolina specified that their reported date is barring recounts and/or protests in individual races.

[22] North Dakota specified that a defeated candidate or 10 qualified electors may contest the nomination or election of any person or the approval or rejection of any question or proposition submitted to a vote of the electorate, pursuant to chapters 16.1-04, 16.1-05, 16.1-06, 16.1-07, 16.1-08.1, 16.1-09, 16.1-10, and 16.1-11.

[23] Ohio specified that issue groups may request an election recount.

[24] The Oklahoma County Election Boards certify final election results in their jurisdictions at 5:00 p.m. on the Friday following the general election. In 2020, that was 5:00 p.m. on November 6. The State Election Board certifies final statewide results at 5:00 p.m. on the Tuesday following the general election. In 2020, that was 5:00 p.m. on November 10. The secretary of the state election board shall have the authority to direct the secretary of a county election board to conduct a post-election audit of election results, for the purpose of maintaining the security of the election system by ensuring that voting devices and software used in a particular election correctly tabulated votes.

[25] Oregon reported that any voter can request a recount on a measure. The county clerk may also request a recount of a candidate contest or measure.

[26] Pennsylvania reported that the November 23, 2020, certification deadline was imposed on jurisdiction officials and not on the Secretary of the Commonwealth. Pennsylvania reported that a group of voters may request a recount of specific precincts.

[27] The Puerto Rico Electoral Code does not establish a certain date for certification. However, it does establish partial result certification for the next day. If an election does not require a recount, the winner can be certified by the Puerto Rico State Election Commission.

[28] Rhode Island does not have a specified certification deadline but certified all elections, with the exception of three local races that were awaiting write-in ballots to be tallied on November 20, 2020.

[29] South Carolina reported that post-election hand count audits are required by State Election Commission mandate.

[30] Tennessee's reported deadline applies to the certification of election results by county election commissions. There is no specified deadline for the state to certify results.

[31] The Texas governor's canvass must be performed between 18 and 33 days after the election.

[32] The Virginia State Board of Elections meets on the third Monday in November as required by state law.

[33] In Washington, in addition to the mandatory recounts, if a contest is within a specified margin, a group of five or more voters may request a recount for an issue or question.

**[34]** Wisconsin law permits a recount within specified margins and by a qualified party who makes a request, or when ordered by a court of law.

**[35]** The Wyoming State Canvassing Board meeting was set at 10:00 a.m. on November 10, 2020. Wyoming reported that the post-election tabulation uses the same sample ballots used for the logic and accuracy testing before the election. The county clerk conducts a random audit of ballots by processing the pre-audited group of test ballots on 5% of the automated tabulating equipment for that jurisdiction, but on not less than one machine, within 30 days of any election in which the tabulating equipment was used.



# Chapter 3. Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond

## Key Findings

The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) collected data on voter registration between the 2018 and the 2020 general elections in Section A of the survey. Election officials were asked a variety of questions relating to registration and list maintenance, including the number of persons registered and eligible to vote in the 2020 general election, the number of registration forms processed, the number of confirmation notices sent pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and for other purposes, and the number of records removed from the voter registration rolls. Notable findings from Section A of the 2020 EAVS include:

- The number of registrations received between the 2018 and the 2020 general elections reached 103,701,513, a 33.8% increase in registrations received compared to the period leading to the 2016 general election.
- The states' departments of motor vehicles (DMV) were once again the most commonly used registration source and accounted for 39.3% of the total registrations received between the 2018 and the 2020 general elections.
- Online registration continued to be the second-most used registration method, accounting for 28.2% of the total registrations received, and it was the registration method with the largest growth in the two-year period leading to the 2020 general election.
- The total number of reported active registrants reached 209,441,338 nationwide. The total number of active registrations for the 2020 general election increased 8.3% compared to the 2016 general election.
- States reported removing 18,781,054 voter records from voter registration rolls between the 2018 and the 2020 general elections. More than half of these removals occurred because a registrant failed to return a confirmation notice and did not vote in the following two general elections, or because the registrant moved out of the voting jurisdiction.

## Introduction

Voter registration is required in 49 states,<sup>1</sup> all of the U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia, making registration the first step toward election participation for most voters.<sup>2</sup> Registration serves multiple purposes: It allows election officials to confirm if a person is eligible to vote; permits officials to efficiently allocate resources such as ballots, poll workers, and voting equipment, depending on

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data.

<sup>2</sup> North Dakota is the only state that does not require voter registration.

the number of registrants per precinct and jurisdiction;<sup>3</sup> and allows the tracking of voter participation.

Congress passed the NVRA in 1993 to “establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for federal office.”<sup>4</sup> This act, commonly known as the “Motor Voter Law,” requires that states offer the opportunity to register to vote at their motor vehicle licensing offices (known as the DMV in many states). The law also requires states to offer voter registration at offices that provide public assistance or state-funded programs that primarily engage in providing services to persons with disabilities, and at armed services recruitment offices. The NVRA also provides guidelines on registration list maintenance and sets limits on how voters can be removed from the rolls.<sup>5</sup>

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 charged the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) with collecting data on voter registration and list maintenance procedures. The EAC meets its statutory requirement to report to Congress on the impact of the NVRA via Section A of the EAVS.<sup>6</sup> This chapter of the EAVS report not only fulfills this requirement, but also provides insight about the changes in the registration behaviors of Americans in federal general elections and about the changes in the state policies affecting the registration process.

## Federal Laws Regulating Voter Registration

### The National Voter Registration Act of 1993

The NVRA is the primary federal law governing voter registration in the United States. In this law, Congress provides a clear statement regarding the importance of voter registration:

- (1) the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right;
- (2) it is the duty of the Federal, State, and local governments to promote the exercise of that right; and

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<sup>3</sup> What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For the 2020 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to counties. The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin reported data on the township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, because this information was only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state.

<sup>4</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 20501.

<sup>5</sup> This report generally uses the term “voter registration rolls” to refer to the computerized databases of registered voters that are maintained by states and localities. Other common terms for these databases include “voter registration lists” and “voter registration records.”

<sup>6</sup> Before 2016, the EAC administered a separate survey called the NVRA Survey, which collected similar information. This survey was consolidated with the EAVS for the 2016 general election. Before the creation of the EAC, the NVRA Survey was administered by the Federal Election Commission.



(3) discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter participation in elections for Federal office and disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, including racial minorities.<sup>7</sup>

The primary purposes of the NVRA are:

- (1) to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office;
- (2) to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this Act [NVRA] in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in elections for Federal office;
- (3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and
- (4) to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.<sup>8</sup>

The NVRA's first purpose is to expand opportunities for voters to register by creating more uniform processes for voter registration and designating more places and methods to register to vote. The NVRA requires that states allow multiple methods and places to register to vote, including (1) motor vehicle departments when a person obtains, renews, or updates the address on their driver's license; (2) through the mail, using a standard registration form;<sup>9</sup> (3) at all state offices providing public assistance (e.g., the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program [SNAP]); (4) at all offices that provide state-funded programs focused on services to people with disabilities; (5) at armed forces recruitment offices; and (6) at other state designated offices such as public libraries and local government offices. All these offices are mandated under the NVRA to provide their users with information on voter registration and assistance in the registration process when required.

The NVRA was fully implemented after the 1994 general election. Several states are not covered by the NVRA. North Dakota is exempt because it does not have voter registration. The U.S. territories are also not subject to the NVRA, and the states of Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are exempt because they had same-day registration (SDR) in 1994 and have continued to make this option available uninterrupted since that time.

The NVRA also sets some fundamental guidelines that states must follow. For example, states may set their own deadline for citizens to register to vote in a general election for federal offices, but that deadline can never be more than 30 days before the date of the election. The NVRA also sets the

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<sup>7</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 20501

<sup>8</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 20507

<sup>9</sup> States can make available the standard National Mail Voter Registration Form provided by the EAC (<https://www.eac.gov/voters/national-mail-voter-registration-form>) or their own version of a mail registration form following the NVRA's requirements.

process that states need to follow to maintain their voter registration rolls and to conduct removal processes.

### Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)

HAVA was enacted with the goal of updating the voting administration system in the United States and creating a commission to assist in the administration of federal elections. In addition to legislating the update of the administration process for federal elections in the United States, HAVA mandates that states create and maintain a “computerized statewide voter registration list” that serves as “the official voter registration list for the conduct of all elections for Federal office in the State.”<sup>10</sup> The computerized registration list must be centralized and “defined, maintained and administered at the State level.”<sup>11</sup> However, although the registration list is administered at the state level, local election officials must be able to access the registration list and are required to enter any updated voter registration information in the computerized system. HAVA also specifies that the maintenance of the implemented computerized registration list will be carried out according to the NVRA’s mandates and that duplicate names or registrations will be removed from the state’s registration list.

### State Voter Registration Policies

States have wide latitude on how to conduct their voter registration activities, as long as the state policies do not interfere with federal laws such as the NVRA and HAVA. This flexibility allows states to adapt their laws as they see appropriate to better serve the interests of their citizens. During the period between the 2018 and the 2020 general elections, a number of states changed their laws regarding voter registration, such as implementing online voter registration, allowing voters to register at the polls on Election Day, or implementing automatic registration.<sup>12</sup>

These types of laws usually take years between when they are first proposed and when they are fully implemented. However, states can make short-term changes to their registration policies with the aim of addressing unforeseen circumstances. For example, the state of Massachusetts changed its registration deadline to allow its citizens an additional 10 days to register given the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>13</sup> Additionally, some states briefly extended their registration deadlines due to issues with their online registration sites that made it impossible to register to vote in the hours before the end of the registration period—these issues were in some cases caused by an unprecedented volume of attempted visits.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 21083

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> These registration policies will be covered in more detail in the following section of this chapter. More information on state’s voting and registration policies can be found in Chapter 2 of this report.

<sup>13</sup> Elections Division of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. (2020, September 23). *Important Elections Updates*. <https://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/covid-19/covid-19.htm>.


<sup>14</sup> For example, Florida extended the deadline from October 5 to October 6, 2020, for a web malfunction before the deadline (<https://dos.myflorida.com/communications/press-releases/2020/public-notice-secretary-of-state-laurel-m-lee-provides-update-about-voter-registration-in-florida/>), and a federal court extended Virginia’s registration deadline from October 13 to October 15, 2020, because of an accidentally severed fiber optic cable that disabled the Department of Elections’ website hours before the registration deadline (<https://www.elections.virginia.gov/news-releases/virginia-voter-registration-deadline-extended-by-federal-court.html>).



## The Registration Process

The typical voter registration process is depicted in Figure 1. Citizens in the United States can register to vote using different methods, some of them mandated by federal law and others offered at the discretion of the state. Once a registration form is completed and submitted, the state or local election office must confirm the eligibility of the applicant. Eligible applicants are added to the voter registration rolls and are notified of their registration status, whereas applicants who submitted ineligible or incomplete applications are contacted for further information to complete their applications.

**Figure 1. The Voter Registration Process**



*Note: Figure 1 does not represent automatic registration, in which the voter does not submit a registration application.*



Voter registration also serves to assign each voter to a precinct—a bounded geographic area to which voters are assigned according to their residential address as listed in their voter registration record—so that voters receive the correct ballot. The voter registration system tracks each voter’s electoral participation so that an individual can be given credit for voting in an election, which helps ensure each person casts only one ballot per election.

Every person with a valid registration is considered an active, registered voter. However, at times, a question arises as to whether a person still resides at the address at which they are registered. The election official may receive notification via the U.S. Postal Service national change of address from the voter of a new resident address. In these situations, the state or local election office may send the registrant a confirmation of address notice. In many states, if the person fails to return the form or the form is returned to the election office as undeliverable, the person is placed on a list of inactive voters. Inactive voters are still part of the voter registration rolls and are included in the registration totals in most jurisdictions.<sup>15</sup> However, before they can vote, inactive voters are typically required to show approved documentation of their eligibility (most commonly, proof of living at an address within the voting jurisdiction). In some cases, inactive voters may be required to cast a provisional ballot when their eligibility cannot be established at the polls.

The NVRA also requires states to maintain their voter registration rolls by removing registrants who are no longer eligible to vote. For example, the NVRA provides that if a registrant fails to return a confirmation notice and does not vote in two subsequent federal general elections, the registrant can be removed from the voter registration roll of the jurisdiction that sent the confirmation notice. In addition, a registrant can be removed for other reasons such as death, upon the registrant’s request, or due to a disqualifying criminal conviction or mental incompetence, as provided by a state’s laws. This process is referred to as “list maintenance.” When an individual is removed from the voter registration roll because of a change in residence of the voter under the NVRA process, this is called “address list maintenance.” Election offices may share data with other state agencies or entities that maintain death records or felony and prison records for the purposes of identifying potentially ineligible voters.<sup>16</sup>

## How Americans Registered to Vote for the 2020 General Election

Between the close of registration for the 2018 general election and the close of registration for the 2020 general election, states and territories reported receiving a record 103,701,513 registration applications—26,184,917 more applications than were received in the same period leading up to the 2016 general election.<sup>17</sup> The most used method of registration was the motor vehicle departments, which accounted for 39.3% of the total registrations received (39,705,812 registration

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<sup>15</sup> According to the 2020 Policy Survey, six states (Guam, Idaho, North Dakota, New Hampshire, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming) reported that they do not distinguish between active and inactive voters in their registration records. In the survey comments in the EAVS, Oregon reported, “Do not track number of inactive voters,” and Minnesota stated, “Minnesota is NVRA exempt. Minnesota does not classify voters as inactive per NVRA.”

<sup>16</sup> More information about state policies on voter registration database linkages is found in Chapter 2 of this report.

<sup>17</sup> The total number of registration applications received during the two-year period leading to a federal general election was reported in item A3a in the 2020 EAVS and item A5a in the 2016 EAVS.



applications).<sup>18</sup> Registration by mail accounted for 12.9%, in-person registration accounted for 8.3%, and online registration accounted for 28.2% of the total registration applications.<sup>19</sup> The rest of the registration applications that were received during this period were from sources such as registration drives (2.2%), public assistance offices (1.6%), and armed forces recruiting offices (0.1%) among other sources.<sup>20</sup>

The primary sources of registration have remained fairly consistent throughout multiple elections. For instance, motor vehicle departments have been the most common source of voter registration for over a decade, accounting for more than 30% of the received registrations since at least 2006.<sup>21</sup> Figure 2 shows that other sources for filing registration applications, such as in person at election offices, by mail/fax/email, and other means (e.g., public assistance offices, registration drives), were used at very similar rates as for the 2018 general election.

Online registration has been the second-most popular registration mode since 2016 and accounted for a proportionately larger share of registration applications for the 2020 general election. In 2020, online applications increased 12.1 percentage points compared to the registration period leading to

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
<sup>18</sup> The percentage of registrations received by the motor vehicle department was calculated by dividing the number of registration applications received at motor vehicle departments (item A4d of the EAVS) by the total number of registration applications received (item A3a of the EAVS). American Samoa, Idaho, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation because they did not report data on item A4d. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>19</sup> The percentage of registrations received by mail, in person, and online used items A4a, A4b, and A4c of the EAVS respectively, and were divided by the total number of registration applications received (item A3a of the EAVS). Guam, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received by mail because they did not report data on item A4a. North Dakota and Rhode Island were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received in person because they did not report data on item A4b. American Samoa, Arkansas, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received online because they did not report data on item A4c. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations.

<sup>20</sup> The percentage of registrations received from registration drives, public assistance offices, and armed forces recruiting offices used items A4i, A4e, and A4g of the EAVS respectively, and were divided by the total number of registration applications received (item A3a of the EAVS). American Samoa, Georgia, Guam, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, the U.S. Virgin Islands, West Virginia, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received from registration drives because they did not report data on item A4i. American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received at public assistance offices because they did not report data on item A4e. American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received at armed forces recruiting offices because they did not report data on item A4g. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations. The instructions for this question noted that registration applications should be classified according to the mode used to submit it. For example, if the voter submits a registration form online using the state's online voter registration portal, this is considered an online voter registration. If the voter accessed the online voter registration system at a state public assistance office or at the office of an agency that primarily serves individuals with disabilities, this would also be considered an online registration.

<sup>21</sup> The EAC's National Voter Registration Act Studies, which contain information on voter registration activities prior to 2016 when this information began being included in the EAVS Comprehensive Report, can be found at <https://www.eac.gov/voters/national-voter-registration-act-studies>.

**Figure 2. Motor Vehicle Departments Are the Most Common Source of Registration Applications**



Source: The percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle departments was calculated as  $A4d/A3a \times 100$  for the 2018 and the 2020 EAVS and  $A6d/A5a \times 100$  for the 2016 EAVS. The percentage of registrations received online was calculated as  $A4c/A3a \times 100$  for the 2018 and the 2020 EAVS and  $A6c/A5a \times 100$  for the 2016 EAVS. The percentage of registrations received by mail/fax/email was calculated as  $A4a/A3a \times 100$  for the 2018 and the 2020 EAVS and  $A6a/A5a \times 100$  for the 2016 EAVS. The percentage of registrations received in person was calculated as  $A4b/A3a \times 100$  for the 2018 and the 2020 EAVS and  $A6b/A5a \times 100$  for the 2016 EAVS. The percentage of registrations received by other means was calculated as  $(A4e+A4f+A4g+A4h+A4i+A4j+A4k+A4l)/A3a \times 100$  for the 2018 and the 2020 EAVS and  $(A6e+A6f+A6g+A6h+A6i+A6j+A6k+A6l+A6m+A6n+A6o)/A5a \times 100$  for the 2016 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in these calculations.

the 2018 general election and was the registration source with the largest growth. Some of this growth in online registration applications could have been because of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, as many of the typical in-person modes of registration were restricted starting in March 2020. The percentages of registrations received at motor vehicle departments and in person at election offices saw small decreases from 2018 to 2020.



Another explanation for the growth in the use of online registration between 2018 and 2020 is that three states (Minnesota, New Jersey, and Oklahoma) began to offer online registration.<sup>22</sup> This resulted in a total of 43 states that allowed voters to submit new registration applications online for the 2020 general election.<sup>23</sup> These registrations are typically reviewed electronically, and data from other state databases are used to verify a person's identity, address, and eligibility. Most of the states (81.4%) using online registration reported that applicants must have a driver's license issued by the state to register online.<sup>24</sup> Two more states (Mississippi and Texas) reported that they allow voters to update their registration records online, but voters may not submit new registration applications online.

States reported receiving 27,681,700 online registrations during the 2018–2020 registration period.<sup>25</sup> Nineteen states reported receiving more than 30% of their registrations online in 2020 (see Table 2 of the Appendix). Among states that reported receiving online registrations in 2018 and 2020, only Iowa and Connecticut reported a decrease in the percentage of their registrations received online (a 5.2- and 3.6-percentage-point decrease, respectively), and 26 states reported an increase of 10 percentage points or more.<sup>26</sup> As in 2018, Massachusetts (67.4%) was the state with the highest percentage of online registrations.<sup>27</sup> The first state to implement online registration, Arizona, also remained among the states with the highest levels of registrations received online (45.2%).

## Same-Day Voter Registration

Same-day registration (SDR) allows voters to register to vote and cast their ballot on the same day. SDR can be offered on Election Day, in which case it may be referred to as Election Day registration, or it can be offered during in-person early voting.<sup>28</sup> SDR depends on local laws and, thus, is only allowed in some states and territories. Some states reported allowing SDR in narrow circumstances, such as only for particular elections (e.g., Alaska and Rhode Island reported only allowing SDR for voting for the U.S. President and Vice President) or particular cases (e.g., North Carolina reported

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<sup>22</sup> Information was collected from responses to items Q7 in the 2020 Policy Survey and Q6 in the 2018 Policy Survey. The states of Minnesota, New Jersey, and Oklahoma reported using online registration for the 2020 general election, but not in 2018. Mississippi and Texas reported offering an online option only to update registrations and did not report any online registration in item A4c of the EAVS.

<sup>23</sup> More information about state policies on online registration is found in Chapter 2 of this report.

<sup>24</sup> The percentage of states requiring a driver's license or other ID issued by the state to register to vote used item Q7a in the 2020 Policy Survey and was calculated by dividing the number of states that require a state-issued ID by the total number of states that reported allowing individuals to register to vote online in Q7 of the 2020 Policy Survey.

<sup>25</sup> The total number of online registration applications received during the two-year period leading to a federal general election was reported in item A4c in the 2020 EAVS.

<sup>26</sup> The percentage of registrations received online in 2020 used item A4c of the 2020 EAVS divided by the total number of registration applications received (item A3a of the 2020 EAVS). The calculation of online registrations received in 2018 used the same item number from the 2018 EAVS data set. The comparison subtracted the percentage of registrations received online in 2020 from the percentage of registrations received online in 2018 to obtain the percentage point difference. Texas was not included among the states that received online registrations in 2018 and 2020, because they reported zero as the response for A4c in all of the counties.

<sup>27</sup> Illinois reported 96.4% of online registrations but was omitted here, because it reported more than twice as many registrations in the categories' breakdown than were reported in the item reporting total registrations received (A3a).

<sup>28</sup> Some states may have an overlap between their mail voting period and the close of their voter registration, during which it is possible for a person to register on the same day that they cast a mailed ballot; however, this is not considered SDR for purposes of the EAVS, and many states have noted in the past that it is not possible to track the number of mail voters who register to vote on the same day that they cast their mailed ballot.

allowing SDR to citizens who became eligible to vote due to naturalization or who had their voting rights restored after a conviction or felony and only if they became eligible between the close of books and Election Day).

In 2020, 29 states reported allowing some form of SDR. Twenty-one states reported allowing voters to register to vote on Election Day. Twelve states reported allowing SDR during an overlap between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration, 20 states reported allowing for SDR during in-person early voting, and four states reported allowing for SDR in very specific cases.<sup>29</sup> The states that indicated allowing SDR were mostly the same as in 2018, with the exception of South Carolina, which allowed SDR for the 2018 general election but not in 2020, and American Samoa, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Nevada, which did not allow for SDR in 2018 but did for the 2020 general election.<sup>30</sup>

The total number of SDRs recorded in 2020 was 1,634,346 and accounted for 3.5% of the total registrations received among states allowing for SDR.<sup>31</sup> For the first time, the 2020 EAVS asked states to break down SDRs between those that were received before and on Election Day. Election Day SDRs added up to 934,238, and early voting SDRs summed to 665,108 registrations.<sup>32</sup> There was a wide variability in how the two types of SDRs were distributed among states that reported both, with Election Day SDRs accounting for between 5.9% and 100% of the total SDRs that states reported.<sup>33</sup>

The use of SDR varied considerably, and similar to previous elections, the five NVRA-exempt states—which gained NVRA exemption for allowing SDR continuously since 1994<sup>34</sup>—were among the states where SDR accounted for the largest percentages of registration applications. In Wyoming, 55.6% of the registration applications were SDR, followed by Idaho with 40.7% and Wisconsin with 30.4%.<sup>35</sup> The NVRA states where SDR accounted for the largest portions of their registration applications received were Vermont (24.4%) and Maine (24%). However, for most of the NVRA states, SDR accounted for less than 5% of registration applications.

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<sup>29</sup> These results were obtained from item Q9a of the 2020 Policy Survey. More information about state policies on SDR is found in Chapter 2 of this report.

<sup>30</sup> These results were obtained from item Q9 of the 2020 Policy Survey and item Q7 of the 2018 Policy Survey.

<sup>31</sup> The total number of SDR applications received during the two-year period leading to a federal general election was reported in item A2a in the 2020 EAVS. The percentage of registrations received that were SDRs was calculated by dividing the number of SDRs received (item A2a of the EAVS) by the total number of registration applications received (item A3a of the EAVS). The total and percentage correspond to the 26 states that reported allowing SDR and reported data for it. Guam and Massachusetts, which allow for some form of SDR, reported “Data not available” for this field. American Samoa reported zero total SDRs. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>32</sup> The total number of Election Day SDRs was reported in item A2b in the 2020 EAVS, and the total number of early voting SDRs was reported in item A2c in the 2020 EAVS. The sum of Election Day SDRs and early voting SDRs does not add up to the total SDRs reported because some states either did not break down SDR by type (Alaska) or their submissions in A2b and A2c did not sum to A2a (California, Illinois, and Utah).

<sup>33</sup> The percentage of SDRs that were Election Day SDRs was calculated by dividing the number of Election Day SDR applications received (item A2b of the EAVS) by the total number of SDR applications received (item A2a of the EAVS).

<sup>34</sup> North Dakota is also NVRA exempt because it does not require voter registration, and the U.S. territories are also NVRA exempt.

<sup>35</sup> The percentage of registration applications that were SDRs was calculated by dividing the number of SDR applications received (item A2a of the EAVS) by the total number of registration applications received (item A3a of EAVS).



## Automatic Voter Registration

Beginning in 2016, states started implementing laws allowing for automatic voter registration (AVR). These laws allow for non-registered persons to be added to the voter registration rolls during or after an interaction with a designated state agency, such as the motor vehicle department, unless the person specifically declines to be registered. The most common differences between the types of AVR policies were the point at which the individual must decline or “opt out” of being registered—either at the point of service or at a later time through a mailer sent to the individual—and which state agencies participate in the AVR program.

In 2016, Oregon was the first state to implement AVR at the state level. Since then, 23 states have also started using some form of AVR.<sup>36</sup> For the most part, states reported that individuals must opt out of AVR at the point of service. A very common example is that a person is provided the opportunity to register to vote while completing a transaction at their local motor vehicle department and is asked to provide a response of “yes” or “no” to be able to continue with the voter registration transaction. Only the states of Colorado and Oregon reported not asking individuals during their transactions and later requiring that they actively respond to a mailer if they do not want to be included in the voter registration rolls.<sup>37</sup> All states that reported allowing AVR did so at least through the state’s motor vehicle department, with nine states reporting additional agencies (e.g., agencies for people with disabilities, public assistance offices) participating in the AVR program in their state.<sup>38</sup>

The EAVS does not include any questions about the number of AVRs processed by states. However, the EAVS data show an increase in registrations submitted through motor vehicle departments (which data from the 2020 Policy Survey show is the most common state agency that processes AVRs) between 2016 and 2020. Although the increase of 14.3 million voter registrations processed through the motor vehicle department in this time span is likely the result of multiple factors, AVR may be one of them.<sup>39</sup> When comparing the change in motor vehicle department registrations recorded between 2016 and 2020 among states with and without AVR, states with AVR reported an increase of 80% in the number of registrations received at the motor vehicle department, whereas states without AVR reported a 10.1% increase.<sup>40</sup> These increases may be, in part, driven by the fact that there was a 33.8% increase in the total number of registrations received between 2016 and

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<sup>36</sup> The number of states with AVR was obtained through item Q6 in the Policy Survey. More information about states with AVR is found in Chapter 2 of this report.

<sup>37</sup> Information on the point at which the individual has the opportunity to opt out of AVR was obtained through item Q6b in the Policy Survey.


<sup>38</sup> Information on state agencies participating in the AVR program for each state was obtained through item Q6a in the Policy Survey.

<sup>39</sup> Total registrations received at motor vehicle departments was obtained through items A4d in the 2020 EAVS and A6d in the 2016 EAVS.

<sup>40</sup> The percentage change in total number of registrations received at the motor vehicle department between 2016 and 2020 was calculated by dividing the number of registration applications received at the motor vehicle department in 2020 (item A4d of the 2020 EAVS) by the number of registration applications received at the motor vehicle department in 2016 (item A6d of the 2016 EAVS) for states that did and did not allow for AVR as reported in item Q6 of the Policy Survey. Classification of states as having AVR and not having AVR used item Q6 of the 2020 Policy Survey. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

2020.<sup>41</sup> However, the trend of AVR states having an increase in motor vehicle department registration holds when comparing the percentage of registration applications received through motor vehicle departments in states with and without AVR for the 2016 and 2020 elections. Figure 3 shows that among states without AVR, motor vehicle department registrations accounted for a similar portion of the total registrations in 2016 and 2020. There has been a notable increase among the states that have implemented AVR in recent years.

**Figure 3. Motor Vehicle Department Registrations Accounted for a Larger Portion of Total Registrations Received in AVR States**



Source: The percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle departments was calculated as  $A4d/A3a \times 100$  for the 2020 EAVS and  $A6d/A5a \times 100$  for the 2016 EAVS. Classification of states as having AVR and not having AVR used item Q6 of the 2020 Policy Survey. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

Alaska is the only state that reported AVRs as a separate category in its EAVS data, as this state processes most of its AVRs through the Permanent Fund Dividend program. Alaska reported in its

<sup>41</sup> The percentage change in the total number of registrations received between 2016 and 2020 was calculated by dividing the number of registration applications received in 2020 (item A3a of the 2020 EAVS) by the number of registration applications received in 2016 (item A5a of the 2016 EAVS). North Dakota was not included in this calculation because it does not have voter registration. American Samoa and the Northern Mariana Islands were not included in this calculation because they did not complete the 2016 EAVS. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.



survey comments that in 2016, the state approved a ballot initiative requiring AVR through the Permanent Fund Dividend. Since the implementation of the initiative, the total number of registration applications that the state reported receiving increased from 259,227 in 2016 to 1,079,008 in 2020.<sup>42</sup> AVRs through the Permanent Fund Dividend program accounted for 68.1% of Alaska's total registrations in 2020 and 59.8% in 2018.<sup>43</sup>

## Other Modes of Registration

In addition to in-person, online, mail/fax/email, and motor vehicle department registrations, states reported data on registration applications received from other sources, which in 2020 accounted for 12.9% of the applications received at the national level.<sup>44</sup> Some of these modes of registration are NVRA mandated, such as registrations through armed forces recruitment offices, public assistance offices, and state-funded agencies serving persons with disabilities. These NVRA-mandated modes of registration accounted for 1.8% of the national registrations in 2020.<sup>45</sup> States also reported registrations completed through other modes that are not required by the NVRA and that are authorized at the discretion of the state, such as at registration drives (2.2%) and other agencies required by the state (3%).<sup>46</sup>

## Voter Registration Rates for the 2020 General Election

The NVRA requires each state to report its total number of registered and eligible, active, and inactive registrants for each federal general election.<sup>47</sup> Most states reported the total “registered and eligible” voters as the sum of active and inactive registrants. However, data on registered and eligible voters as reported in the EAVS should be used with caution, as these totals can include registrants who were no longer eligible to vote in that state but who had not been removed from the voter registration rolls because the removal process from the inactive list laid out by the NVRA can take up to two election cycles to be completed.<sup>48</sup> In addition, preliminary data from the 2020 U.S.

<sup>42</sup> The number of total registrations received was obtained from item A3a in the 2020 EAVS and from item A5a in the 2016 EAVS.

<sup>43</sup> Alaska reported data on the number of registrations received through the Permanent Fund Dividend program in item A4j of the 2020 and 2018 EAVS. The percentage of the total registrations that were processed through the Permanent Fund Dividend program was calculated by dividing the number of the program registration applications (item A4j for Alaska in the 2020 and the 2018 EAVS) by Alaska's total registrations received (item A3a in the 2020 and the 2018 EAVS).

<sup>44</sup> The percentage of registrations received by other sources different than in person, online, mail/fax/email, and the motor vehicle department was calculated as  $(A4e+A4f+A4g+A4h+A4i+A4j+A4k+A4l)/A3a \times 100$  for the 2020 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in these calculations.

<sup>45</sup> The percentage of registrations received from NVRA-mandated sources different than in person, mail/fax/email, and the motor vehicle department was calculated as  $(A4e+A4f+A4g)/A3a \times 100$  for the 2020 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in these calculations.

<sup>46</sup> The percentage of registrations received from registration drives and from state agencies not mandated by the NVRA used items A4i and A4h of the 2020 EAVS, respectively, and were divided by the total number of registration applications received (item A3a of the EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations.

<sup>47</sup> Twelve states (American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, the Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Oregon, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) reported only active registrants. North Dakota does not have voter registration and, thus, did not have any data to report.

<sup>48</sup> California, Florida, Kansas, and New York reported more “registered and eligible” voters in their state than the sum of the active and inactive registrants, resulting in 13,704; 13,384; 11,199; and 776 uncategorized registrants, respectively. New Hampshire reported zero registrations in 18 of its 320 jurisdictions. Two jurisdictions in Wisconsin reported zero registrations because they changed their status from town to village and/or merged with other jurisdictions where they reported the corresponding registration data. Kalawao County in Hawaii reported zero registrations because Maui County administers Kalawao County's elections.



Census show that the U.S. population increased by more than 20 million people since the 2010 Census, resulting in a change of apportionment for congressional seats in 13 states;<sup>49</sup> this population increase and mobility may be a contributing factor to the increase of records that states reported having on their voter registration rolls for the 2020 general election.

For the 2020 general election, states reported that 228,004,364 citizens were registered to vote, either as active or inactive voters.<sup>50</sup> This represents a 6.5% increase compared to the number of people who were registered to vote for the 2016 general election.<sup>51</sup> Nationally, 91.9% of all registrants were designated as active, and 9.1% of registrants were designated as inactive.<sup>52</sup> In 2020, the total number of active registrants exceeded the 200 million mark for the first time in EAVS history and accounted for 88.2% of the 2019 citizen voting age population (CVAP).<sup>53</sup> The number of active registrants in 2020 increased 8.3% compared to what states reported for the 2016 EAVS. In 2020, the majority of states reported active registration rates of 80% or more of their 2019 CVAP (see Table 1 in Appendix A of this chapter).<sup>54</sup> Compared to the active registration rates in 2016, 82% of the states reported a higher active registration rate in 2020.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> U.S. Census Bureau. (2021, April 26). *First 2020 Census Data Release Shows U.S. Resident Population of 331,449,281*. <https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/04/2020-census-data-release.html>.

<sup>50</sup> The total number of registered voters was obtained from item A1a in the 2020 EAVS.

<sup>51</sup> The percentage change in the total number of registered voters between 2016 and 2020 was calculated by dividing the total number of registered voters in 2020 (item A1a of the 2020 EAVS) by the total number of registered voters in 2016 (item A1a of the 2016 EAVS).

<sup>52</sup> The percentage of active and inactive registrants used items A1b and A1c, respectively, of the 2020 EAVS and divided these items by the total number of registered voters (item A1a of the EAVS). North Dakota was not included in these calculations because it does not have voter registration. Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, the Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Oregon, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming were not included in the percentage of inactive voters because they did not provide data about inactive voters in item A1c of the 2020 EAVS. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations. The percentages of active and inactive registrants do not add to 100 because of the use of state casewise deletion to calculate percentages at the national level, as discussed in Chapter 5.

<sup>53</sup> The total number of active registrants was obtained from item A1b in the 2020 EAVS. The active CVAP voter registration rate was calculated by dividing the number of active registrants (item A1b in the 2020 EAVS) by the estimated CVAP provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. North Dakota was not included in the calculation because it does not have voter registration. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in the calculation because there is no CVAP information from the Census Bureau for these territories. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations. This report uses the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state CVAP estimate for 2019 instead of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP is as current as possible. The CVAP estimates for 2020 were not available by the time this report was finalized. In calculating the percentage change in the total number of active registrants from the 2016 EAVS to the 2020 EAVS, casewise deletion has been used at the state level.

<sup>54</sup> The percentage of active CVAP voter registration was calculated by dividing the total active registrants (item A1b in the 2020 EAVS) by the total CVAP.

<sup>55</sup> The percentage of active CVAP voter registration change was calculated as the 2020 percentage of active CVAP voter registration ( $[A1b/CVAP] \times 100$ ) for the 2020 EAVS divided by the 2016 percentage of active CVAP voter registration ( $[A3a/CVAP] \times 100$ ) for the 2016 EAVS. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change. North Dakota was not included because it does not have voter registration. Pennsylvania was not included because it did not report total active registrants in 2016, as the state commented that it could not “differentiate between active and inactive from our point in time snapshot of the voter registration numbers.” The U.S. territories of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included because the U.S. Census Bureau does not provide an estimate for their CVAP.



## Calculating Registration Rates

Estimating the percentage of the population that is registered to vote for an election can be approached in different ways using a variety of metrics. There are multiple potential numerators and denominators that can be used.

### Registration Rate Numerator:

- **Total Registrants.** The number of people that states reported as being registered and eligible to vote (A1a in the EAVS). This total includes active and inactive registrants. This metric overrepresents of the actual number of registrants within a state, since some of the people included (particularly inactive registrants) may not be eligible to vote in that jurisdiction.
- **Active Registrants.** The number of people that states reported as being eligible to cast a ballot without the need to provide additional eligibility evidence at the polls (A1b in the EAVS). This total excludes inactive registrants.

### Registration Rate Denominator:

- **Voting Age Population (VAP).** The estimate of the number of persons ages 18 or older provided by the Census Bureau.
- **Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP).** The estimate of the number of American citizens ages 18 or older provided by the Census Bureau. This estimate is more accurate than the VAP in that it restricts the inclusion criteria to being a U.S. citizen, which is mandatory to vote.
- **Voting Eligible Population (VEP).** The estimate created by subtracting from the CVAP the citizens that are ineligible to vote (e.g., persons with disqualifying felony convictions) and persons who are in the military or citizens living overseas. This estimate is provided by the U.S. Elections Project and is available at the state level but not at the jurisdiction level like the VAP and the CVAP estimates.

The combination of active registrants and the CVAP to calculate the registration rate in the EAVS provides a higher level of accuracy than using the total registrations and/or the VAP to calculate the rate at the jurisdiction level when needed, as opposed to the use of the VEP. This calculation, however, has some limitations, such as the potential overrepresentation of total registrants in the active registrant list due to the challenges for states to keep voter registration rolls fully up to date. When analyzing EAVS data, the EAC recommends using the following method to calculate voter registration rates:

$$\frac{A1b \text{ of EAVS}}{CVAP} \times 100 = \text{Active CVAP Voter Registration Rate}$$


See Chapter 2 of this report for a discussion of state policies on voter registration list maintenance.

There was a 3.6-percentage-point increase in the active registration rates at the national level (from 84.6% in 2016 to 88.2% in 2020).<sup>56</sup> At the state level, Georgia and Texas reported the largest

<sup>56</sup> The percentage of active CVAP voter registration for 2020 was calculated as the total active voters (A1b in the 2020 EAVS) divided by the 2019 CVAP. The percentage of active CVAP voter registration for 2016 was calculated as the total active voters (A3a in the 2016 EAVS) divided by the 2015 CVAP. The percentage point change between the 2016 and 2020 active CVAP voter registration rates was calculated by subtracting the 2015 active CVAP voter registration percentage from the 2019 active CVAP voter registration percentage.

increases in active registration rates between 2016 and 2020 (24.5% and 18.8%, respectively), and New York and Puerto Rico reported the largest drops in active registration rates (24.3% and 14.4%, respectively).<sup>57</sup> Figure 4 shows the change in the active CVAP voter registration rate among states from the 2016 general election to the 2020 general election.

**Figure 4. Most States Had an Increase in the Active CVAP Voter Registration Rate From 2016 to 2020**



Source: The percentage of active CVAP voter registration change was calculated as the 2020 percentage of active CVAP voter registration ( $[A1b/CVAP] \times 100$ ) for the 2020 EAVS divided by the 2016 percentage of active CVAP voter registration ( $[A3a/CVAP] \times 100$ ) for the 2016 EAVS. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change. North Dakota does not have a change rate because it does not have voter registration. Pennsylvania does not have a change rate, because it did not report total active registrants in 2016, as the state commented that they could not “differentiate between active and inactive from our point in time snapshot of the voter registration numbers.” The U.S. territories of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands do not have a change rate because the U.S. Census Bureau does not provide an estimate for their CVAP. Cutoff points in the graph were selected to reflect states that decreased, that slightly increased, and that notably increased in terms of the active CVAP registration rate from 2016 to 2020.

<sup>57</sup> New York reported an uncharacteristically high number of active and total registrations in the 2016 EAVS compared to the registrations reported in the general elections of 2014, 2018, and 2020, which led to the drop in active registrants noted in the 2020 EAVS. The percentage of active CVAP voter registration was calculated by dividing the total active registrants (item A1b in the 2020 EAVS) by the total CVAP.



## Types of Registrations Received for the 2020 General Election

When a person submits a registration form, it is processed by the state and can reach one of several outcomes. Valid applications from persons who are eligible and not already registered are considered new applications and are added to the voter registration rolls. Applications submitted by persons already registered to vote at the same address with the same name and personal information are considered duplicates. Applications from already-registered persons wishing to change their name, party affiliation, or address are processed as updates to existing registrations. Applications that do not meet the requirements of eligibility are considered invalid or rejected. When allowed by state law, applications submitted by persons under 18 years old are processed as preregistrations so that they will be registered when they become of voting age.

All registration forms received are processed and scrutinized by election officials to ensure that the information is correct, that only eligible voters are added to the registration rolls, and that duplicate registration records are not created. After the application's review by election officials and following the NVRA's guidelines, states must notify the applicant with the result of their application. For example, a successful application may be notified in the form of a registration card mailed to the applicant or a notice of rejection may be mailed to unsuccessful applicants.

### Valid Registrations

Table 1 displays information on the result of the registration applications that were received by states. Of the more than 100 million registration applications received between the 2018 and the 2020 federal general elections, the most common type of registration was an update to an existing record that did not involve a cross-jurisdiction change of address.<sup>58</sup> These updates usually involve a change of name (such as after a marriage or divorce), party affiliation, or within-jurisdiction change of address; these updates accounted for 49.4% of the registrations processed at the national level.<sup>59</sup> New valid registrations—a registration application received from an eligible person in a jurisdiction where they were not previously registered and that resulted in a new registration record being added to the voter registration roll—made up 32.2% of the registrations received.<sup>60</sup>

Other types of valid registrations reported in the EAVS included a change of address that crossed local jurisdiction borders but was still within the state, which accounted for 9.5% of the total registration applications filed.<sup>61</sup> Some states reported allowing for underage citizens to preregister to vote so that they are automatically added to the voter registration rolls when they turn 18 years old.

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<sup>58</sup> The number of total registration applications was reported in item A3a of the EAVS. The number of registration applications that were a change of name, party, or within-jurisdiction change of address was reported in item A3f of the EAVS.

<sup>59</sup> The percentage of registration applications that were a change of name, party, or within-jurisdiction change of address received was calculated by dividing the number of such registration applications received (item A3f of the EAVS) by the total number of registration applications received (item A3a of the EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>60</sup> The percentage of registration applications that were a new registration was calculated by dividing the number of such registration applications received (item A3b of the EAVS) by the total number of registration applications received (item A3a of the EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>61</sup> The percentage of registration applications that were a cross-jurisdiction change of address was calculated by dividing the number of such registration applications received (item A3g of the EAVS) by the total number of registration applications received (item A3a of the EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

These preregistrations accounted for 1.2% of the total registrations among states that allowed them.<sup>62</sup> Finally, 14.7% of the registrations were labelled as “Other.” This category in the EAVS is used by states to report registrations that were not covered among the standard categories, or in most cases, to report registrations that could not be broken down into the categories provided, such as a change to existing records that some jurisdictions could not determine whether it involved a within or cross-jurisdictional change of address.<sup>63</sup>

**Table 1. Most Registration Applications Were New Applications or Within-Jurisdiction Changes**

Type of Registration Form Received	Percentage of Total Registration Forms Received
Change of name, party, or address (within jurisdiction)	49.4%
New valid registrations	32.2%
Other	14.7%
Duplicate registrations	9.7%
Cross-jurisdiction change of address	9.5%
Invalid or rejected	2.9%
Preregistrations from persons under 18 years of age	1.2%

*Source: The percentage of registrations received that were a change of name, party, or within-jurisdiction change of address received was calculated as  $(A3f/A3a) \times 100$ . The percentage of registrations received that were a new valid registration was calculated as  $(A3b/A3a) \times 100$ . The percentage of registrations received that were a duplicate registration was calculated as  $(A3d/A3a) \times 100$ . The percentage of registrations received that were a cross-jurisdiction change of address was calculated as  $(A3g/A3a) \times 100$ . The percentage of registrations received that were labelled as “Other” registrations was calculated as  $((A3h+A3i+A3j)/A3a) \times 100$ . The percentage of registrations received that were invalid or a rejected registration was calculated as  $(A3e/A3a) \times 100$ . The percentage of registrations received that were a preregistration of persons under 18 years of age was calculated as  $(A3c/A3a) \times 100$ . Casewise deletion was used at the state level in these calculations (percentages for each type of registration were calculated independently and only states that reported data for a given type were included in the analysis), and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.*

## Rejected and Duplicate Registrations

Some of the registration forms received by states do not result in the creation or the update of a registration record. The two types of invalid registration applications that the EAVS collects data on are rejected applications and duplicate applications. The first group includes applications that contain incorrect information, information that cannot be validated against existing state records, or applications from persons who do not meet eligibility requirements. In the period between the close

<sup>62</sup> The percentage of registration applications that were a preregistration of persons under 18 years of age was calculated by dividing the number of such registration applications received (item A3c of the EAVS) by the total number of registration applications received (item A3a of the EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>63</sup> The percentage of registration applications that were categorized as “other” was calculated by dividing the total number of such registration applications received (sum of items A3h, A3i, and A3j of the EAVS) by the total number of registration applications received (item A3a of the EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation. Not all the applications accounted for in the “other” category may be valid; however, they were included in this section because they cannot be fully identified as rejected or duplicate either.



of registration for the 2018 general election and the close of registration for the 2020 general election, states reported rejecting 2,840,590 applications, accounting for 2.9% of the total registration applications received. This percentage is comparable to the percentage of registrations that were rejected in 2018 (3.4%) and 2016 (3.2%).<sup>64</sup>

Duplicate registrations include applications that are exact matches to existing registration records; these can be applications submitted by persons who did not realize they were already registered to vote or who submitted multiple applications through different modes (e.g., submitted an application with the exact same information through the mail and online). States reported receiving 8,827,089 duplicate applications between the 2018 and the 2020 federal general elections, which accounted for 9.7% of the total registrations received.<sup>65</sup> As with rejected applications, the percentage of duplicate registrations registered in 2020 was comparable to those in 2018 (10.2%) and 2016 (7.9%).<sup>66</sup>

A majority of states provided a breakdown of the total, rejected, and duplicate registrations they received and the source of those registrations (e.g., mail, in person).<sup>67</sup> As expected, most registration sources had rejection and duplicate percentages that were similar to the national averages; however, there were a few outliers. For duplicate registrations, the overall percentage at the national level was 9.7%, and most sources reported duplicate percentages similar to the national level, ranging from 5.3% to 13.3%.<sup>68</sup> However, there were exceptions, such as state-designated offices not mandated by the NVRA, that reported lower levels of duplicate registrations (3%). At the other side of the spectrum, registrations received by mail, fax, or email had notably higher levels of duplicate registrations received (19.1%) compared to the national average.<sup>69</sup> Invalid or rejected applications

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<sup>64</sup> The number of total registration application rejections was obtained from item A3e of the EAVS. The percentage of registrations received that were invalid or rejected registrations in 2020 was calculated as the total applications rejected in 2020 (item A3e in the 2020 EAVS) divided by the total registration applications received (item A3a in the 2020 EAVS). The percentage of registrations received that were invalid or rejected registrations in 2018 was calculated as the total applications rejected in 2018 (item A3e in the 2018 EAVS) divided by the total registration applications received (item A3a in the 2018 EAVS). The percentage of registrations received that were invalid or rejected registrations in 2016 was calculated as the total applications rejected in 2016 (item A5e in the 2016 EAVS) divided by the total registration applications received (item A5a in the 2016 EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>65</sup> The number of total duplicate registration applications was obtained from item A3d of the EAVS. The percentage of registrations received that were duplicate registrations in 2020 was calculated as the total duplicate applications in 2020 (item A3d in the 2020 EAVS) divided by the total registration applications received (item A3a in the 2020 EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>66</sup> The percentage of registrations received that were duplicate registrations in 2020 was calculated as the total duplicate applications in 2018 (item A3d in the 2018 EAVS) divided by the total registration applications received (item A3a in the 2018 EAVS). The percentage of registrations received that were duplicate registrations in 2016 was calculated as the total duplicate applications in 2016 (item A5d in the 2016 EAVS) divided by the total registration applications received (item A5a in the 2016 EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>67</sup> Thirteen states did not provide the application source breakdown for duplicate registrations, and 14 states did not provide the application source breakdown for rejected registrations. Data from these states were not included in the ensuing calculations in the paragraph.

<sup>68</sup> The percentage of registration applications received from a source and categorized as duplicate was calculated as follows for each registration source included in the range: in person =  $(A6b/A4b) \times 100$ ; online =  $(A6c/A4c) \times 100$ ; motor vehicle department =  $(A6d/A4d) \times 100$ ; public assistance offices =  $(A6e/A4e) \times 100$ ; state-funded agencies serving persons with disabilities =  $(A6f/A4f) \times 100$ ; armed forces recruitment offices =  $(A6g/A4g) \times 100$ ; registration drives =  $(A6i/A4i) \times 100$ ; Other =  $((A6j+A6k+A6l)/(A4j+A4k+A4l)) \times 100$ . Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>69</sup> The percentage of registration applications that were duplicates was calculated as follows for each registration source mentioned: state-designated offices not mandated by the NVRA =  $(A6h/A4h) \times 100$ ; mail/fax/email =  $(A6a/A4a) \times 100$ . Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

represented 2.9% of registrations at the national level, and most sources reported a rejection percentage close to that, ranging from 1.7% to 4.2% of registrations rejected,<sup>70</sup> except for registration drives (10.1%), and NVRA-mandated public assistance offices (9.1%) that had notably higher levels of applications classified as rejected or invalid.<sup>71</sup>

## Registration List Maintenance

The NVRA requires states to maintain an “accurate and current voter registration roll” to “protect the integrity of the electoral process.”<sup>72</sup> To facilitate this maintenance, the NVRA requires that any change of address submitted to a motor vehicle department must serve as notification of a change of address for voter registration, unless the individual indicates that the change is not for voter registration purposes. The law also requires states and territories to conduct a uniform and nondiscriminatory general program to remove the records of ineligible voters. States and territories have considerable freedom to choose when, where, and how these functions are performed, but must follow the guidelines listed in the NVRA, which describe the need to use confirmation notices and to complete (with few exceptions) systematic removal programs “not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office,”<sup>73</sup> as well as to keep a detailed list of instances in which it is appropriate to remove a record from the voter registration rolls.

## Confirmation Notices

One tool that states may use to keep their voter registration rolls up to date are confirmation notices. These are postage pre-paid and pre-addressed return cards that are sent to registrants who a state suspects are no longer eligible to vote in the jurisdiction in which they are registered. If the registrant does not return the confirmation notice, they can be added to the inactive registrant list and would be asked to provide proof of residence before voting. If the registrant fails to return the confirmation notice and does not participate in the subsequent two consecutive federal elections, then the NVRA grants the state the ability to remove the registrant from the voter registration roll. If the registrant has not moved out of the voting jurisdiction, they must complete and return the confirmation notice no later than the registration deadline of the next election to remain on the list of active registrants.

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<sup>70</sup> The percentage of registration applications received from a source and categorized as invalid or rejected was calculated as follows for each registration source included in the range: mail/fax/email = (A7a/A4a) x 100; in person = (A7b/A4b) x 100; online = (A7c/A4c) x 100; motor vehicle department = (A7d/A4d) x 100; state-funded agencies serving persons with disabilities = (A7f/A4f) x 100; armed forces recruitment offices = (A7g/A4g) x 100; state-designated offices not mandated by the NVRA = (A7h/A4h) x 100; and Other = ((A7j+A7k+A7l)/(A4j+A4k+A4l)) x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.


<sup>71</sup> The percentage of registration applications received from a source and categorized as invalid or rejected was calculated as follows for each registration source mentioned: registration drives = (A7i/A4i) x 100; public assistance offices = (A7e/A4e) x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>72</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 20501

<sup>73</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 20507



**Figure 5. Almost Two-Thirds of Confirmation Notices That Were Sent Had an Unknown Status**



Source: Status unknown (A8e) refers to any notice that was sent to a voter but was not received back confirming registration, confirming invalidation, or returned as undeliverable. This percentage was calculated as  $(A8e/A8a) \times 100$ . The percentage of confirmation notices sent and returned confirming valid registration was calculated as  $(A8b/A8a) \times 100$ . The percentage of confirmation notices sent and returned undeliverable was calculated as  $(A8d/A8a) \times 100$ . The percentage of confirmation notices sent and returned confirming registration should be invalidated was calculated as  $(A8c/A8a) \times 100$ . The percentage of confirmation notices sent and not categorized was calculated as  $(1 - ((A8b+A8c+A8d+A8e+A8f+A8g+A8h)/A8a)) \times 100$ . The percentage of confirmation notices sent and labeled as other was calculated as  $((A8f+A8g+A8h)/A8a) \times 100$ . Casewise deletion was used at the state level (percentages for each category were calculated independently and only states that reported data for a given category were included in the analysis), and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.

Nationally, 28,010,094 confirmation notices were sent between the 2018 general election and the month before the 2020 general election, accounting for 14.3% of the active voters reported by states in 2020.<sup>74</sup> This percentage is slightly higher than what was reported by states in 2018

<sup>74</sup> The total number of confirmation notices sent was reported in item A8a of the EAVS. The number of confirmation notices sent as a percentage of the active registrants was calculated using total confirmation notices sent (item A8a of the EAVS) divided by total active registrants (A1b of the EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation. In 2020, 49 states and territories reported the number of confirmation notices sent during the period of registration for the 2020 general election. North Dakota does not require citizens to register to vote and, thus, does not use confirmation notices. Minnesota, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming are NVRA exempt. Alabama reported that they did “not have a report that has the total number of confirmation notices sent.” Indiana did not provide this information



(11.6%) and in 2016 (10.9%).<sup>75</sup> Figure 5 shows that confirmation notices with an unknown status accounted for 65.8% of the total. The unknown status notices generally included confirmation notices that were sent and never returned to the jurisdiction—allowing states to move the addressees of these notices to the inactive registration list if the state uses that designation. States reported 12.1% of confirmation notices were returned confirming the voter’s continued eligibility, and 8.1% were returned confirming the voter was no longer eligible to vote in the jurisdiction or no longer wanted to be registered to vote.

## Removing Voters From Voter Registration Rolls

The NVRA mandates that registrants may only be removed from the voter registration rolls in these circumstances:

- Upon the death of the registrant;
- Upon the registrant’s written confirmation that their address has changed to a location outside the registrar’s jurisdiction;
- On the request of the registrant;
- For mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided in state law;
- On criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided in state law; or
- On the registrant’s failure to respond to certain confirmation mailings along with failure to appear to vote in two consecutive federal general elections subsequent to the mailing.

Because some of the states’ processes to remove a registrant from the voter registration rolls can take up to two federal general election cycles to complete, it is inevitable that voter registration rolls will contain some number of voter records for individuals who are no longer eligible to vote.

Between the close of registration for the 2018 general election and the close of registration for the 2020 general election, states reported removing 18,781,054 records from their voter registration rolls.<sup>76</sup> This was equal to 8.2% of the total number of voters who were registered in the United States as of the close of registration for the 2020 general election.<sup>77</sup> Almost two-thirds of the states and territories reported removing a number of registrants that added up to between 3% and 10% of their total registered voters. There were some exceptions to this trend: Connecticut’s removals accounted

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because it “does not send the removal notices referenced by the EAC survey.” Forty-four states reported the status of the confirmation notices sent. In addition to the states that did not report on confirmation notices, Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island did not break down the number of confirmation notices sent by status.

<sup>75</sup> The number of confirmation notices sent as a percentage of the active registrants in 2018 was calculated using total confirmation notices sent (item A8a of the 2018 EAVS) divided by total active registrants (A1b of the 2018 EAVS). The number of confirmation notices sent as a percentage of the active registrants in 2016 was calculated using total confirmation notices sent (item A10a of the 2016 EAVS) divided by total active registrants (A3a of the 2016 EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

<sup>76</sup> The total number of registrants removed from the voter registration rolls was reported in item A9a of the EAVS. All states and territories reported data for the items related to voter removal, except for North Dakota, which does not require citizens to register to vote.


<sup>77</sup> The number of registrants removed as a percentage of total registrants was calculated using total registrants removed from the voter registration rolls (item A9a of the EAVS) divided by total registrants (A1a of the EAVS). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.



for the lowest percentage of total registrants at 2.1%, and Puerto Rico reported the highest percentage of removals at 32.3% (see Table 5 of Appendix A in this chapter).

States also reported the reasons for removing records from their voter registration rolls. These reasons for removal are shown in Figure 6. The most common reason was failure to both respond to a confirmation notice and to vote in two consecutive federal general elections, which accounted for 32.1% of removals. Cross-jurisdiction change of address and death of the registrant were the other two major reasons for states' removal of registrants from their rolls (28.5% and 21.4%, respectively).

**Figure 6. Almost One-Third of Removed Registration Records Were a Result of Failure to Respond to a Confirmation Notice**



Source: The percentage of registrations removed because of no response to confirmation notices (and not voting in the following two general elections) was calculated as  $(A9e/A9a) \times 100$ . The percentage of registrations removed because of a cross-jurisdiction change of address was calculated as  $(A9b/A9a) \times 100$ . The percentage of registrations removed because of death was calculated as  $(A9c/A9a) \times 100$ . The percentage of registrations removed because the voter was declared mentally incompetent or because of other reasons was calculated as  $((A9f+A9h+A9i+A9j)/A9a) \times 100$ . The percentage of registrations removed because the voter requested to be removed was calculated as  $(A9g/A9a) \times 100$ . The percentage of registrations removed because of disqualifying felony conviction was calculated as  $(A9d/A9a) \times 100$ . Casewise deletion was used at the state level (percentages for each category were calculated independently and only states that reported data for a given category were included in the analysis), and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.

The majority of states reported that a registrant could be removed from the voter registration rolls if the registrant received a disqualifying criminal conviction and/or was incarcerated,<sup>78</sup> but only 1.6% of the removals were the result of a disqualifying felony conviction.<sup>79</sup> Two states, however, reported that more than 10% of their registration removals happened due to criminal convictions or incarceration. Georgia reported that 10.8% of registrants were removed for this reason, and Kentucky (13.3%) reported the largest percentage of this type of removal. Kentucky also reported criminal conviction as a common reason for registration removal in the 2018 EAVS.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Maine, Vermont, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the District of Columbia reported criminal conviction and/or incarceration was not a reason for voter removal in item Q37 of the 2020 Policy Survey.

<sup>79</sup> The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying felony conviction was calculated as  $(A9d/A9a) \times 100$ . Casewise deletion was used at the state level.

<sup>80</sup> The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying felony conviction in 2018 was calculated as the total registrants removed from the voter registration rolls for this reason (item A9d of the 2018 EAVS) divided by total registrants removed from the rolls (item A9a in 2018).



## Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

### Voter Registration Table 1: Registration History

State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Registrations	Active Registrations	Active Regs. (% of CVAP)	Active Regs. (% of Total)	Inactive Registrations	Inactive Regs. (% of Total)
Alabama	2020	3,731,336	3,717,798	3,438,213	92.1	92.5	279,585	7.5
	2018	3,688,249	3,465,352	3,164,301	85.8	91.3	301,051	8.7
	2016	3,653,381	3,333,946	3,049,655	83.5	91.5	139,638	4.2
Alaska	2020	533,151	646,093	595,647	111.7	92.2	50,446	7.8
	2018	531,653	624,467	571,851	107.6	91.6	52,616	8.4
	2016	528,248	587,303	528,671	100.1	90.0	58,632	10.0
American Samoa [1], [2], [3]	2020	--	16,341	16,341	--	100.0	0	0.0
	2018	--	15,527	8,462	--	54.5	7,065	45.5
	2016	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona	2020	5,137,474	4,728,109	4,275,729	83.2	90.4	452,380	9.6
	2018	4,895,706	4,276,891	3,715,624	75.9	86.9	561,267	13.1
	2016	4,710,448	4,080,680	3,589,084	76.2	88.0	491,596	12.0
Arkansas	2020	2,235,415	1,831,414	1,408,061	63.0	76.9	423,353	23.1
	2018	2,207,894	1,786,840	1,456,887	66.0	81.5	329,953	18.5
	2016	2,185,724	1,765,513	1,422,393	65.1	80.6	343,120	19.4
California [4]	2020	26,032,160	26,157,616	21,795,538	83.7	83.3	4,348,374	16.6
	2018	25,650,455	25,103,559	19,724,297	76.9	78.6	5,379,262	21.4
	2016	25,002,812	24,486,638	19,435,856	77.7	79.4	5,065,746	20.7
Colorado	2020	4,244,210	4,211,528	3,803,762	89.6	90.3	407,766	9.7
	2018	4,057,437	3,953,613	3,426,499	84.4	86.7	527,114	13.3
	2016	3,896,986	3,840,303	3,336,663	85.6	86.9	503,640	13.1
Connecticut	2020	2,619,474	2,524,717	2,335,860	89.2	92.5	188,857	7.5
	2018	2,611,667	2,369,335	2,193,586	84.0	92.6	175,749	7.4
	2016	2,584,884	2,331,684	2,162,797	83.7	92.8	168,887	7.2
Delaware	2020	725,178	739,672	711,287	98.1	96.2	28,385	3.8
	2018	709,999	695,014	672,632	94.7	96.8	22,382	3.2
	2016	697,148	675,663	642,334	92.1	95.1	33,329	4.9
District of Columbia	2020	536,768	625,683	517,890	96.5	82.8	107,793	17.2
	2018	510,514	617,046	511,633	100.2	82.9	105,413	17.1
	2016	504,242	493,287	493,287	97.8	100.0	--	--
Florida	2020	15,507,315	15,231,808	14,517,002	93.6	95.3	701,422	4.6
	2018	15,014,950	14,126,722	13,278,070	88.4	94.0	848,652	6.0
	2016	14,441,877	13,505,571	12,853,866	89.0	95.2	651,705	4.8

State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Registrations	Active Registrations	Active Regs. (% of CVAP)	Active Regs. (% of Total)	Inactive Registrations	Inactive Regs. (% of Total)
Georgia	2020	7,581,837	7,618,436	7,194,889	94.9	94.4	423,547	5.6
	2018	7,362,615	6,944,851	6,437,524	87.4	92.7	507,327	7.3
	2016	7,168,068	6,657,621	5,463,014	76.2	82.1	1,194,607	17.9
Guam [1], [2]	2020	--	55,896	55,896	--	100.0	--	--
	2018	--	55,941	55,941	--	100.0	--	--
	2016	--	51,720	51,720	--	100.0	--	--
Hawaii	2020	1,014,035	832,466	759,971	74.9	91.3	72,495	8.7
	2018	1,025,548	756,751	712,765	69.5	94.2	43,986	5.8
	2016	1,022,704	751,483	666,573	65.2	88.7	84,910	11.3
Idaho [2]	2020	1,282,630	1,029,763	1,029,763	80.3	100.0	--	--
	2018	1,219,481	917,609	917,609	75.2	100.0	--	--
	2016	1,168,843	936,529	936,529	80.1	100.0	--	--
Illinois	2020	9,088,036	9,789,893	9,103,542	100.2	93.0	686,351	7.0
	2018	9,055,927	8,751,060	8,091,045	89.3	92.5	660,015	7.5
	2016	9,017,653	8,843,038	8,055,096	89.3	91.1	787,942	8.9
Indiana	2020	4,978,356	4,692,091	4,170,353	83.8	88.9	521,738	11.1
	2018	4,899,251	4,500,196	4,168,374	85.1	92.6	331,822	7.4
	2016	4,856,797	4,839,038	4,149,560	85.4	85.8	689,478	14.2
Iowa	2020	2,348,787	2,243,758	2,094,770	89.2	93.4	148,988	6.6
	2018	2,325,355	2,193,813	2,037,516	87.6	92.9	156,297	7.1
	2016	2,310,467	2,222,380	2,047,368	88.6	92.1	175,012	7.9
Kansas	2020	2,103,748	1,924,772	1,764,949	83.9	91.7	148,624	7.7
	2018	2,091,261	1,835,473	1,670,217	79.9	91.0	165,256	9.0
	2016	2,074,102	1,785,834	1,601,818	77.2	89.7	184,016	10.3
Kentucky [5]	2020	3,367,502	3,565,428	3,319,307	98.6	93.1	246,121	6.9
	2018	3,350,956	3,402,905	3,402,905	101.6	100.0	0	0.0
	2016	3,329,835	3,306,120	3,306,120	99.3	100.0	--	--
Louisiana	2020	3,463,372	3,093,004	2,963,901	85.6	95.8	129,103	4.2
	2018	3,469,016	2,992,170	2,856,722	82.3	95.5	135,448	4.5
	2016	3,454,978	3,058,741	2,891,902	83.7	94.5	131,339	4.3
Maine	2020	1,078,770	1,138,576	1,135,008	105.2	99.7	3,568	0.3
	2018	1,064,497	1,057,967	1,054,068	99.0	99.6	3,899	0.4
	2016	1,056,410	1,065,100	1,059,270	100.3	99.5	5,830	0.5
Maryland [6]	2020	4,316,921	4,298,942	4,142,347	96.0	96.4	156,595	3.6
	2018	4,310,864	3,954,027	3,954,027	91.7	100.0	--	--
	2016	4,239,987	3,900,090	3,900,090	92.0	100.0	--	--



State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Registrations	Active Registrations	Active Regs. (% of CVAP)	Active Regs. (% of Total)	Inactive Registrations	Inactive Regs. (% of Total)
Massachusetts	2020	5,057,192	4,812,909	4,400,254	87.0	91.4	412,655	8.6
	2018	4,993,001	4,574,967	3,947,897	79.1	86.3	627,070	13.7
	2016	4,924,459	4,534,974	3,994,635	81.1	88.1	540,339	11.9
Michigan [7]	2020	7,562,464	8,105,524	7,209,300	95.3	88.9	896,224	11.1
	2018	7,481,928	7,471,088	6,488,823	86.7	86.9	982,265	13.1
	2016	7,436,478	7,514,055	6,748,385	90.7	89.8	765,670	10.2
Minnesota [2], [8]	2020	4,157,556	3,731,016	3,731,016	89.7	100.0	--	--
	2018	4,079,652	3,422,515	3,422,515	83.9	100.0	--	--
	2016	4,007,159	3,473,972	3,473,972	86.7	100.0	--	--
Mississippi	2020	2,246,323	2,143,149	1,982,632	88.3	92.5	160,517	7.5
	2018	2,234,722	2,079,732	1,880,197	84.1	90.4	199,535	9.6
	2016	2,220,616	2,072,395	1,888,433	85.0	91.1	183,962	8.9
Missouri	2020	4,650,318	4,338,133	3,963,980	85.2	91.4	374,153	8.6
	2018	4,606,843	4,127,333	3,803,881	82.6	92.2	323,452	7.8
	2016	4,567,771	4,215,860	3,812,576	83.5	90.4	403,284	9.6
Montana [9]	2020	831,760	747,439	675,971	81.3	90.4	71,468	9.6
	2018	810,760	706,173	616,642	76.1	87.3	89,531	12.7
	2016	797,198	694,370	574,334	72.0	82.7	120,036	17.3
Nebraska [10]	2020	1,388,950	1,266,730	1,168,708	84.1	92.3	98,022	7.7
	2018	1,368,000	1,219,276	1,096,862	80.2	90.0	122,414	10.0
	2016	1,352,947	1,211,101	1,091,951	80.7	90.2	119,150	9.8
Nevada	2020	2,111,932	2,039,162	1,835,401	86.9	90.0	203,761	10.0
	2018	2,031,213	1,773,566	1,563,750	77.0	88.2	209,816	11.8
	2016	1,942,764	1,678,883	1,468,559	75.6	87.5	210,324	12.5
New Hampshire [2], [11]	2020	1,070,215	1,087,145	1,087,145	101.6	100.0	--	--
	2018	1,048,883	988,148	988,148	94.2	100.0	--	--
	2016	1,035,684	988,398	988,398	95.4	100.0	0	0.0
New Jersey	2020	6,170,130	6,310,564	5,896,836	95.6	93.4	413,728	6.6
	2018	6,199,409	5,869,078	5,456,506	88.0	93.0	412,572	7.0
	2016	6,154,126	5,751,090	5,321,542	86.5	92.5	429,548	7.5
New Mexico [12]	2020	1,522,171	1,360,871	1,255,669	82.5	92.3	105,202	7.7
	2018	1,493,318	1,261,639	698,172	46.8	55.3	563,467	44.7
	2016	1,470,045	1,289,420	1,136,059	77.3	88.1	152,277	11.8
New York [13]	2020	13,810,830	13,555,618	12,362,997	89.5	91.2	1,191,845	8.8
	2018	13,866,648	12,695,763	11,676,266	84.2	92.0	1,019,497	8.0
	2016	13,704,991	16,200,892	16,200,892	118.2	100.0	--	--

State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Registrations	Active Registrations	Active Regs. (% of CVAP)	Active Regs. (% of Total)	Inactive Registrations	Inactive Regs. (% of Total)
North Carolina	2020	7,729,644	7,372,608	6,607,121	85.5	89.6	765,487	10.4
	2018	7,509,879	7,095,209	5,898,244	78.5	83.1	1,196,965	16.9
	2016	7,296,335	6,924,469	5,930,252	81.3	85.6	994,217	14.4
North Dakota [14]	2020	567,545	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2018	564,475	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2016	571,119	-	-	-	-	-	-
Northern Mariana Islands [1], [2], [15]	2020	-	18,526	18,526	-	100.0	-	-
	2018	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2016	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ohio [2], [16]	2020	8,879,469	8,073,829	8,073,829	90.9	100.0	-	-
	2018	8,830,185	8,070,917	8,070,917	91.4	100.0	-	-
	2016	8,765,154	7,861,025	7,861,025	89.7	100.0	-	-
Oklahoma	2020	2,875,059	2,259,107	2,021,846	70.3	89.5	237,261	10.5
	2018	2,835,451	2,120,843	1,857,700	65.5	87.6	263,143	12.4
	2016	2,807,548	2,157,450	1,817,461	64.7	84.2	339,989	15.8
Oregon [17]	2020	3,162,204	2,944,588	2,944,588	93.1	100.0	-	-
	2018	3,060,328	2,748,232	2,748,232	89.8	100.0	-	-
	2016	2,956,232	2,553,810	2,553,810	86.4	100.0	-	-
Pennsylvania [18]	2020	9,810,201	9,035,061	8,280,348	84.4	91.6	754,713	8.4
	2018	9,764,119	8,607,748	7,738,989	79.3	89.9	868,759	10.1
	2016	9,752,322	8,722,975	-	-	-	-	-
Puerto Rico [2], [19]	2020	2,579,596	2,355,894	2,355,894	91.3	100.0	-	-
	2018	2,636,949	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2016	2,686,177	2,867,558	2,867,558	106.8	100.0	-	-
Rhode Island	2020	800,798	809,117	735,195	91.8	90.9	73,922	9.1
	2018	792,337	781,478	737,419	93.1	94.4	44,059	5.6
	2016	784,997	754,065	721,211	91.9	95.6	32,246	4.3
South Carolina	2020	3,892,341	3,854,209	3,535,061	90.8	91.7	319,148	8.3
	2018	3,799,298	3,538,580	3,538,580	93.1	100.0	396,653	11.2
	2016	3,677,799	3,157,027	3,157,027	85.8	100.0	275,292	8.7
South Dakota	2020	653,394	635,256	578,683	88.6	91.1	56,573	8.9
	2018	641,666	594,453	539,788	84.1	90.8	54,665	9.2
	2016	634,140	595,322	544,930	85.9	91.5	50,392	8.5
Tennessee	2020	5,129,580	4,436,727	4,226,928	82.4	95.3	209,799	4.7
	2018	5,016,103	4,163,359	3,764,513	75.0	90.4	398,846	9.6
	2016	4,919,574	4,110,318	3,534,800	71.9	86.0	575,518	14.0



State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Registrations	Active Registrations	Active Regs. (% of CVAP)	Active Regs. (% of Total)	Inactive Registrations	Inactive Regs. (% of Total)
Texas	2020	18,875,542	16,955,519	15,279,870	81.0	90.1	1,675,649	9.9
	2018	18,174,345	15,615,925	13,790,247	75.9	88.3	1,653,986	10.6
	2016	17,523,904	14,382,387	11,942,651	68.2	83.0	1,288,225	9.0
U.S. Virgin Islands [1], [2]	2020	--	53,341	53,341	--	100.0	--	--
	2018	--	51,095	51,095	--	100.0	--	--
	2016	--	46,076	46,076	--	100.0	--	--
Utah	2020	2,134,249	1,861,977	1,713,297	80.3	92.0	148,680	8.0
	2018	2,028,176	1,658,457	1,433,917	70.7	86.5	224,540	13.5
	2016	1,945,001	1,577,069	1,414,758	72.7	89.7	162,311	10.3
Vermont	2020	498,705	489,277	440,920	88.4	90.1	48,357	9.9
	2018	494,550	489,385	447,709	90.5	91.5	41,676	8.5
	2016	494,717	472,289	440,347	89.0	93.2	31,942	6.8
Virginia	2020	6,226,623	5,975,561	5,763,187	92.6	96.4	212,374	3.6
	2018	6,145,893	5,666,627	5,272,602	85.8	93.0	394,025	7.0
	2016	6,062,304	5,604,106	5,066,666	83.6	90.4	537,440	9.6
Washington	2020	5,409,035	5,255,466	4,892,871	90.5	93.1	362,595	6.9
	2018	5,259,892	4,841,431	4,362,480	82.9	90.1	478,951	9.9
	2016	5,081,800	4,872,385	4,277,499	84.2	87.8	594,886	12.2
West Virginia	2020	1,420,289	1,269,024	1,062,685	74.8	83.7	206,339	16.3
	2018	1,428,859	1,245,827	961,894	67.3	77.2	283,933	22.8
	2016	1,451,557	1,254,768	1,142,180	78.7	91.0	112,588	9.0
Wisconsin [2], [20]	2020	4,412,888	3,834,164	3,834,164	86.9	100.0	--	--
	2018	4,375,063	3,442,004	3,442,004	78.7	100.0	--	--
	2016	4,340,567	3,768,373	3,768,373	86.8	100.0	--	--
Wyoming [2]	2020	434,852	303,049	303,049	69.7	100.0	--	--
	2018	428,379	283,941	283,941	66.3	100.0	--	--
	2016	434,584	284,203	284,203	65.4	100.0	--	--
U.S. Total	2020	237,998,330	228,004,364	209,441,338	88.2	91.9	18,523,963	9.1
	2018	234,053,619	211,601,918	190,662,485	82.5	90.1	21,164,394	11.3
	2016	229,705,663	214,109,367	185,714,229	84.6	90.4	18,629,063	11.7

Voter Registration Table 1 Calculation Notes:

**CVAP Total** uses the 1-year ACS CVAP estimate. The 2020 data uses the 2019 CVAP, the 2018 data uses the 2017 CVAP, and the 2016 data uses the 2015 CVAP.

**Reported Registrations** uses question A1a for 2020, 2018, and 2016.

**Active Registrations** uses question A1b for 2020 and 2018 and question A3a for 2016.

**Active Registrations (% of CVAP)** uses question A1b divided by CVAP for 2020 and 2018 and question A3a divided by CVAP for 2016.



**Active Registrations (% of Total)** uses question A1b divided by A1a for 2020 and 2018 and question A3a divided by A1a for 2016.

**Inactive Registrations** uses question A1c for 2020 and 2018 and question A3b for 2016.

**Inactive Registrations (% of Total)** uses question A1c divided by question A1a for 2020 and 2018 and question A3b divided by question A1a for 2016.

#### Voter Registration Table 1 Data Notes:

##### General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the active registration (% of total) and inactive registration (% of total) rates may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- The citizen voting age population (CVAP) is an estimate of the number of U.S. citizens ages 18 years or older in the state. This report uses the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimate for 2019 instead of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as possible. The estimate for the year 2020 was not available by the time this report was finalized. The 2019 1-year CVAP does not include data that were collected as part of the decennial Census conducted in 2020. For consistency, the CVAP for the 2018 and 2016 general elections was the 1-year ACS state estimate for 2017 and 2015, respectively.
- Some states may report an active CVAP registration rate of 100% or more. This is because the 2019 CVAP was used to calculate the 2020 registration rate and because due to federal law, some ineligible voters may take up to two full election cycles to be removed from the voter registration rolls.
- The Reported Registrations column includes both active and inactive voters (if the state uses such a distinction).

[1] The U.S. Census Bureau does not calculate a CVAP for the territories of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

[2] American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, the Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Oregon, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming reported having only active registered voters.

[3] American Samoa did not provide data for the 2016 EAVS.

[4] California adjusted their number of total registrations (A1a) in 2018 after the data were initially released, so the total in this table does not match the total reported in the 2018 EAVS Comprehensive Report. California reported 63,659 fewer registrants in Riverside County in their correction of the 2018 EAVS data.

[5] Kentucky reported having only active voters in the 2016 EAVS and reported having zero inactive voters in the 2018 EAVS.

[6] Maryland reported having only active voters in the 2016 and the 2018 EAVS.

[7] Michigan noted in a survey comment that “Voters reported in A1 are eligible to vote. Those defined as ‘inactive’ need only to confirm their address before receiving a ballot. Participation in past elections is not a factor in defining eligibility.”

[8] Minnesota noted in a survey comment that “Minnesota is NVRA exempt. Minnesota does not classify voters as inactive per NVRA.”



[9] Montana noted in a survey comment that in A1a, the “total registered/eligible voters consists of active and inactive. Montana reports total registered/eligible voters of 752,538. The difference is provisional, late registration and pending.”

[10] Nebraska noted in a survey comment that the state “does not have ‘inactive’ voters. The numbers in line [A1c] reflect the number of voters who were sent a section 8(d)(2) notice and have not responded.”

[11] New Hampshire began a rigorous 10-year verification of the checklist beginning April 1, 2021.

[12] New Mexico’s 2018 EAVS data on the number of active registrations contained an error; the correct number is 1,261,532.

[13] New York reported having only active voters in the 2016 EAVS. This state also reported an uncharacteristically high number of active and total registrations in the 2016 EAVS compared to the registrations reported in the general elections of 2014, 2018, and 2020.

[14] North Dakota does not have voter registration and does not provide data in Section A of the EAVS.

[15] The Northern Mariana Islands did not participate in the 2016 or the 2018 EAVS. For 2020, the Northern Mariana Islands reported in a comment in A1 that “Voter[s] are taken out of the roster once inactive as per our Election Statute.”

[16] Ohio reported “Data not available” for the number of inactive registrations in item A1c in 2020. The state did not report inactive registrations in 2018 and 2016.

[17] Oregon noted in a survey comment that they “do not track number of inactive voters.”

[18] Pennsylvania reported in the 2016 EAVS that the state could not “differentiate between active and inactive from our point in time snapshot of the voter registration numbers.”

[19] Puerto Rico did not participate in the 2018 EAVS because the territory did not hold federal elections in that year.

[20] Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and does not classify inactive voters per NVRA definitions.

Voter Registration Table 2: Application Sources – Total Forms Received

State	Total Applications	Registration Application Source							
		Mail, Email, Fax		In Person at Election Office		Online		Motor Vehicle Department	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	1,439,361	38,936	2.7	121,744	8.5	391,331	27.2	802,149	55.7
Alaska	1,079,008	78,115	7.2	53,787	5.0	127,471	11.8	75,917	7.0
American Samoa	4,741	48	1.0	4,693	99.0	--	--	--	--
Arizona	2,943,553	280,196	9.5	29,111	1.0	1,329,327	45.2	1,022,403	34.7
Arkansas	556,911	114,258	20.5	106,480	19.1	--	--	265,023	47.6
California	13,498,938	666,363	4.9	450,494	3.3	5,975,098	44.3	2,997,325	22.2
Colorado	3,195,131	449,231	14.1	70,691	2.2	873,530	27.3	1,587,291	49.7
Connecticut	1,247,433	129,295	10.4	98,004	7.9	287,480	23.0	395,285	31.7
Delaware	707,749	255,305	36.1	46,356	6.5	151,652	21.4	252,208	35.6
District of Columbia	123,147	8,710	7.1	2,345	1.9	36,437	29.6	53,671	43.6
Florida	9,511,345	1,171,574	12.3	1,114,491	11.7	1,974,596	20.8	3,798,746	39.9
Georgia [2]	4,931,889	381,107	7.7	111,983	2.3	857,096	17.4	3,290,439	66.7
Guam	16,376	--	--	3,223	19.7	1,016	6.2	10,644	65.0
Hawaii	359,832	55,541	15.4	809	0.2	115,116	32.0	94,350	26.2
Idaho [3]	231,491	73,880	31.9	54,736	23.6	98,290	42.5	--	--
Illinois	1,240,995	410,720	33.1	184,666	14.9	1,196,195	96.4	647,798	52.2
Indiana [4]	2,667,738	451,272	16.9	40,514	1.5	537,526	20.1	842,829	31.6
Iowa	738,352	15,131	2.0	29,148	3.9	4,920	0.7	91,701	12.4
Kansas	817,434	148,506	18.2	65,901	8.1	257,786	31.5	257,918	31.6
Kentucky [5]	1,678,038	36,056	2.1	197,837	11.8	335,156	20.0	1,002,181	59.7
Louisiana [6]	998,149	148,232	14.9	157,764	15.8	474,312	47.5	171,370	17.2
Maine	337,136	45,861	13.6	244,664	72.6	--	--	16,686	4.9
Maryland	3,511,883	99,604	2.8	77,617	2.2	1,258,781	35.8	1,983,252	56.5
Massachusetts	2,476,295	135,422	5.5	60,842	2.5	1,669,789	67.4	575,093	23.2
Michigan [7]	2,857,335	174,902	6.1	198,642	7.0	630,628	22.1	1,826,846	63.9
Minnesota	1,566,807	84,277	5.4	433,328	27.7	374,280	23.9	266,120	17.0
Mississippi	453,531	112,267	24.8	138,026	30.4	--	--	164,594	36.3
Missouri	690,757	94,340	13.7	58,855	8.5	262,479	38.0	242,077	35.0
Montana [8]	359,986	138,645	38.5	86,235	24.0	--	--	86,123	23.9
Nebraska [9]	726,896	142,050	19.5	31,768	4.4	226,227	31.1	321,496	44.2
Nevada	1,069,550	111,299	10.4	21,209	2.0	439,355	41.1	255,919	23.9
New Hampshire [10]	810,583	5,783	0.7	804,800	99.3	--	--	--	--
New Jersey	2,959,834	6,710	0.2	162	0.0	284,928	9.6	1,731,406	58.5
New Mexico	570,254	135,472	23.8	54,294	9.5	206,141	36.1	161,184	28.3
New York [11]	2,299,890	586,547	25.5	129,014	5.6	--	--	1,159,254	50.4
North Carolina	5,164,009	1,850,941	35.8	739,381	14.3	444,602	8.6	1,602,654	31.0
North Dakota [12]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--



State	Total Applications	Registration Application Source							
		Mail, Email, Fax		In Person at Election Office		Online		Motor Vehicle Department	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands	1,291	36	2.8	1,291	100.0	--	--	--	--
Ohio	2,995,502	449,093	15.0	350,575	11.7	1,140,233	38.1	696,384	23.2
Oklahoma	666,094	149,584	22.5	84,209	12.6	86,268	13.0	297,675	44.7
Oregon	1,955,345	135,106	6.9	56,931	2.9	579,602	29.6	783,103	40.0
Pennsylvania	3,814,150	355,683	9.3	40,358	1.1	1,237,715	32.5	1,717,266	45.0
Puerto Rico	121,352	--	--	121,352	100.0	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island [13]	425,389	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	2,119,337	416,765	19.7	390,876	18.4	358,852	16.9	901,668	42.5
South Dakota	163,450	40,568	24.8	37,949	23.2	--	--	75,140	46.0
Tennessee [14]	1,595,329	213,506	13.4	164,989	10.3	680,172	42.6	446,003	28.0
Texas	5,147,221	2,074,130	40.3	577,120	11.2	0	0.0	2,042,699	39.7
U.S. Virgin Islands	1,878	--	--	1,692	90.1	--	--	--	--
Utah	2,280,767	55,629	2.4	218,318	9.6	526,018	23.1	366,842	16.1
Vermont	98,866	2,005	2.0	14,715	14.9	34,109	34.5	39,105	39.6
Virginia	3,880,532	176,330	4.5	114,381	2.9	713,010	18.4	2,728,717	70.3
Washington	3,068,727	449,717	14.7	137,107	4.5	769,418	25.1	1,402,506	45.7
West Virginia	517,145	24,332	4.7	21,822	4.2	174,240	33.7	156,752	30.3
Wisconsin [15]	920,760	70,386	7.6	166,419	18.1	560,518	60.9	--	--
Wyoming	86,021	4,035	4.7	81,819	95.1	--	--	--	--
U.S. Total	103,701,513	13,253,501	12.9	8,605,537	8.3	27,681,700	28.2	39,705,812	39.3

State	Registration Application Source							
	Public Assistance Offices		Disability Services Offices		Armed Forces Recruitment Offices		Other State Agencies	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	39,093	2.7	6,477	0.4	292	0.0	16,445	1.1
Alaska	6,090	0.6	59	0.0	3,001	0.3	95	0.0
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona	8,059	0.3	296	0.0	7,754	0.3	13	0.0
Arkansas	18,507	3.3	466	0.1	67	0.0	5,406	1.0
California	177,354	1.3	10,931	0.1	6,669	0.0	116,545	0.9
Colorado	38,028	1.2	2,108	0.1	37	0.0	--	--
Connecticut	5,060	0.4	146	0.0	731	0.1	805	0.1
Delaware	1,006	0.1	773	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0
District of Columbia	197	0.2	54	0.0	207	0.2	1,059	0.9
Florida	31,752	0.3	3,414	0.0	1,298	0.0	776,330	8.2
Georgia [2]	16,419	0.3	33,856	0.7	103	0.0	--	--
Guam	--	--	--	--	--	--	1,493	9.1
Hawaii	533	0.1	--	--	--	--	15	0.0
Idaho [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois	145,211	11.7	4,819	0.4	10,642	0.9	98,720	8.0
Indiana [4]	20,059	0.8	624	0.0	0	0.0	74	0.0
Iowa	1,745	0.2	36	0.0	16	0.0	97	0.0
Kansas	2,348	0.3	109	0.0	79	0.0	2,135	0.3
Kentucky [5]	94,657	5.6	1,848	0.1	1,966	0.1	--	--
Louisiana [6]	32,529	3.3	4,042	0.4	2,915	0.3	6,985	0.7
Maine	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maryland	15,961	0.5	462	0.0	96	0.0	--	--
Massachusetts	30,202	1.2	2,248	0.1	--	--	2,699	0.1
Michigan [7]	4,579	0.2	493	0.0	66	0.0	--	--
Minnesota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Mississippi	13,407	3.0	786	0.2	--	--	--	--
Missouri	28,750	4.2	405	0.1	132	0.0	107	0.0
Montana [8]	2,889	0.8	2	0.0	132	0.0	0	0.0
Nebraska [9]	723	0.1	628	0.1	16	0.0	--	--
Nevada	38,576	3.6	850	0.1	320	0.0	512	0.0
New Hampshire [10]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Jersey	5,650	0.2	37,322	1.3	4,639	0.2	753,056	25.4
New Mexico	12,437	2.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
New York [11]	117,552	5.1	--	--	--	--	74,983	3.3
North Carolina	56,882	1.1	2,070	0.0	9	0.0	4,218	0.1
North Dakota [12]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	214,770	7.2	4,693	0.2	397	0.0	50,967	1.7



State	Registration Application Source							
	Public Assistance Offices		Disability Services Offices		Armed Forces Recruitment Offices		Other State Agencies	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Oklahoma	16,688	2.5	572	0.1	18	0.0	45	0.0
Oregon	7,069	0.4	2,968	0.2	--	--	7,252	0.4
Pennsylvania	76,897	2.0	--	--	12	0.0	--	--
Puerto Rico	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island [13]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	42,870	2.0	480	0.0	433	0.0	--	--
South Dakota	3,406	2.1	51	0.0	4	0.0	1,413	0.9
Tennessee [14]	25,085	1.6	71	0.0	4,496	0.3	10,521	0.7
Texas	152,724	3.0	2,731	0.1	383	0.0	297,434	5.8
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utah	36	0.0	49	0.0	36	0.0	0	0.0
Vermont	--	--	--	--	--	--	327	0.3
Virginia	6,677	0.2	510	0.0	26	0.0	21,345	0.6
Washington	36,187	1.2	1,737	0.1	20,907	0.7	13,028	0.4
West Virginia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wisconsin [15]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
U.S. Total	1,548,664	1.6	129,186	0.1	67,899	0.1	2,264,124	3.0

State	Registration Application Source					
	Registration Drives		Other Sources		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	20,402	1.4	2,492	0.2	0	0.0
Alaska	0	0.0	734,473	68.1	0	0.0
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Arizona	141,550	4.8	124,844	4.2	0	0.0
Arkansas	9,576	1.7	37,128	6.7	0	0.0
California	83,435	0.6	927,582	6.9	2,087,142	15.5
Colorado	86,182	2.7	88,033	2.8	0	0.0
Connecticut	17	0.0	330,610	26.5	0	0.0
Delaware	449	0.1	--	--	0	0.0
District of Columbia	615	0.5	19,852	16.1	0	0.0
Florida	689,415	7.2	23,199	0.2	-73,470	-0.8
Georgia [2]	--	--	240,886	4.9	0	0.0
Guam	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Hawaii	9	0.0	54,611	15.2	38,848	10.8
Idaho [3]	30	0.0	11	0.0	4,544	2.0
Illinois	7,459	0.6	--	--	-1,465,235	-118.1
Indiana [4]	2,879	0.1	771,710	28.9	251	0.0
Iowa	7	0.0	595,551	80.7	0	0.0
Kansas	23,351	2.9	85,601	10.5	-26,300	-3.2
Kentucky [5]	8,337	0.5	--	--	0	0.0
Louisiana [6]	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Maine	10,497	3.1	19,428	5.8	0	0.0
Maryland	--	--	76,110	2.2	0	0.0
Massachusetts	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Michigan [7]	9,521	0.3	11,658	0.4	0	0.0
Minnesota	14,768	0.9	394,034	25.1	0	0.0
Mississippi	--	--	24,451	5.4	0	0.0
Missouri	--	--	3,612	0.5	0	0.0
Montana [8]	20,155	5.6	25,805	7.2	0	0.0
Nebraska [9]	--	--	3,988	0.5	0	0.0
Nevada	135,528	12.7	65,982	6.2	0	0.0
New Hampshire [10]	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
New Jersey	--	--	135,961	4.6	0	0.0
New Mexico	0	0.0	726	0.1	0	0.0
New York [11]	14,048	0.6	--	--	218,492	9.5
North Carolina	172,695	3.3	291,692	5.6	-1,135	0.0
North Dakota [12]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	-36	-2.8
Ohio	88,390	3.0	--	--	0	0.0



State	Registration Application Source					
	Registration Drives		Other Sources		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Oklahoma	--	--	31,035	4.7	0	0.0
Oregon	--	--	383,314	19.6	0	0.0
Pennsylvania	78,724	2.1	307,495	8.1	0	0.0
Puerto Rico	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Rhode Island [13]	--	--	--	--	425,389	100.0
South Carolina	--	--	7,393	0.3	0	0.0
South Dakota	4,290	2.6	629	0.4	0	0.0
Tennessee [14]	--	--	50,486	3.2	0	0.0
Texas	0	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	186	9.9	0	0.0
Utah	3,254	0.1	1,110,585	48.7	0	0.0
Vermont	8,605	8.7	--	--	0	0.0
Virginia	70,524	1.8	49,012	1.3	0	0.0
Washington	31,136	1.0	206,984	6.7	0	0.0
West Virginia	--	--	139,999	27.1	0	0.0
Wisconsin [15]	4,623	0.5	118,814	12.9	0	0.0
Wyoming	--	--	167	0.2	0	0.0
U.S. Total	1,740,471	2.2	7,496,129	8.9	1,208,490	1.2

Voter Registration Table 2 Calculation Notes:

**Total Registration Applications Received** uses question A3a.

**Mail, Email, Fax, Total** uses question A4a.

**Mail, Email, Fax, %** uses question A4a divided by question A3a.

**In Person at Election Office, Total** uses question A4b.

**In Person at Election Office, %** uses question A4b divided by question A3a.

**Online, Total** uses question A4c.

**Online, %** uses question A4c divided by question A3a.

**Motor Vehicle Department, Total** uses question A4d.

**Motor Vehicle Department, %** uses question A4d divided by question A3a.

**Public Assistance Offices, Total** uses question A4e.

**Public Assistance Offices, %** uses question A4e divided by question A3a.

**Disability Services Offices, Total** uses question A4f.

**Disability Services Offices, %** uses question A4f divided by question A3a.

**Armed Forces Recruitment Offices, Total** uses question A4g.

**Armed Forces Recruitment Offices, %** uses question A4g divided by question A3a.

**Other State Agencies, Total** uses question A4h.

**Other State Agencies, %** uses question A4h divided by question A3a.

**Registration Drives, Total** uses question A4i.

**Registration Drives, %** uses question A4i divided by question A3a.

**Other Sources, Total** uses questions A4j, A4k, and A4l.

**Other Sources, %** uses the sum of questions A4j, A4k, and A4l divided by question A3a.



**Not Categorized, Total** uses question A3a minus the sum of questions A4a to A4I.

**Not Categorized, %** uses question A3a minus the sum of questions A4a to A4I, all divided by A3a.

Voter Registration Table 2 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- States have latitude in which registration application sources are offered to their citizens, so long as they do not conflict with federal law. Not all states offer each of the application sources that the EAVS collects data for.
- Questions A4j, A4k, and A4I were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in these items if they offered another application source aside from those listed in questions A4a–A4i or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions A4a–A4i.
- Negative numbers in the Not Categorized application source indicate that the sum of registrations received for each source account for more than the total number of registrations reported received by the state.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of applications received through each source may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.

[1] Alabama noted in a survey comment that the state’s A3a data come from an Election Systems & Software (ES&S) election survey. In addition, unknown applications sources were not identified.

[2] Georgia noted in a survey comment that “Election Day registrations listed in A4j, A5j, A6j, and A7j represent applications submitted to poll workers on Election Day. Georgia law does not allow ‘same day’ registration. Changes made through applications turned in on Election Day are effective for future elections.”

[3] Idaho noted in survey comments for multiple counties that the state switched to a new voter registration system between the 2018 and the 2020 elections, which made it difficult to track some data for these questions.

[4] Indiana noted in survey comments that “The data reported in A4a–I consists of data from county surveys (A4a–b, A4i) and SVRS [statewide voter registration system] (A4c–h, A4j, A4k, A4I). Counties do not always manually track the information requested in A4a–b and A4i and therefore aren’t included in the sums that should match up to A3a.”

[5] Kentucky noted in a survey comment that “[D]rives by advocacy groups or political parties’ is used for high school registrations.”

[6] Louisiana noted in a survey comment that “[V]oters submit registration applications for new registrations as well as for updates or changes to existing registrations. A4 totals reflect both new registrations and changes to registrations.”

[7] Michigan noted in a survey comment that “2020 is the first EAVS since Michigan implemented automatic voter registration and online voter registration, and became a member state of ERC [sic, likely referring to the Electronic Registration Information Center].”

[8] Montana noted in a survey comment that in A4k, online preregistration indicated that a voter still needed to sign and submit a registration form to the county elections office.

[9] Nebraska noted in survey comments that “[O]nline registrations via DMV website are currently in the DMV section; unable to split. Registrations received from drives by advocacy groups or political parties A4i are not separately categorized and are included in A4a.”



[10] New Hampshire noted in survey comments that it is not subject to the NVRA and does not have online voter registration.

[11] New York noted in survey comments that “NYS DMV [New York State Department of Motor Vehicles] does allow voters to submit their registration data online, however it does not automatically register voters. After submittal to the DMV, the information is forwarded to the appropriate county board of elections to approve or deny the voter registration data. NYS BOE [New York State Board of Elections] used the term ‘does not apply’ instead of ‘data not available’ since online voter registration has been passed as law, but the statewide system was not available for the 2020 election year.”

[12] North Dakota does not have voter registration and does not provide data in Section A of EAVS.

[13] Rhode Island reported “data not available” for all modes of registration. The state noted in a survey comment that “[D]ata for this section is unavailable. We rolled out a new voter registration system in December, 2019 so half of the voter registration records were processed in the old system and half in the new system.”

[14] Tennessee noted in survey comments that, for most of its counties, “[D]ata for agencies serving persons with disabilities in [A4]f is included with data for public assistance offices in [A4]e.”

[15] Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and does not classify inactive voters per NVRA definitions, receive registrations from NVRA agencies, or collect data on rejected registrations.

Voter Registration Table 3: Registration Applications Processed

State	Total Applications	Registration Category							
		New Valid Registrations		Change of Name, Party, or Address (within jurisdiction)		Change of Address (cross-jurisdiction)		Preregistrations (under 18 years of age)	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	1,439,361	611,844	42.5	1,231,402	85.6	--	--	--	--
Alaska	1,079,008	69,208	6.4	993,700	92.1	--	--	--	--
American Samoa	4,741	2,263	47.7	133	2.8	160	3.4	0	0.0
Arizona	2,943,553	1,114,852	37.9	1,649,653	56.0	8,988	0.3	1,987	0.1
Arkansas	556,911	237,172	42.6	304,333	54.6	2,547	0.5	0	0.0
California	13,498,938	5,130,351	38.0	2,796,476	20.7	375,969	2.8	101,619	0.8
Colorado [2]	3,195,131	1,486,922	46.5	1,398,963	43.8	217,464	6.8	56,126	1.8
Connecticut [3]	1,247,433	426,102	34.2	609,363	48.8	211,754	17.0	214	0.0
Delaware	707,749	251,286	35.5	248,329	35.1	137,846	19.5	19,045	2.7
District of Columbia [4]	123,147	78,557	63.8	22,754	18.5	0	0.0	0	0.0
Florida	9,511,345	1,757,847	18.5	6,382,594	67.1	1,036,119	10.9	154,986	1.6
Georgia	4,931,889	896,843	18.2	2,840,383	57.6	771,590	15.6	53,882	1.1
Guam	16,376	7,898	48.2	2,288	14.0	2,735	16.7	262	1.6
Hawaii	359,832	115,831	32.2	55,982	15.6	2,260	0.6	4,049	1.1
Idaho [5]	231,491	143,814	62.1	80,981	35.0	14	0.0	4	0.0
Illinois	1,240,995	903,388	72.8	--	--	--	--	--	--
Indiana	2,667,738	795,777	29.8	1,353,935	50.8	--	--	47,781	1.8
Iowa [6]	738,352	110,513	15.0	--	--	--	--	11,640	1.6
Kansas	817,434	282,686	34.6	769,790	94.2	--	--	--	--
Kentucky	1,678,038	265,594	15.8	828,745	49.4	177,953	10.6	--	--
Louisiana [7]	998,149	358,864	36.0	389,116	39.0	--	--	15,662	1.6
Maine	337,136	101,929	30.2	116,732	34.6	95,611	28.4	2,734	0.8
Maryland [8]	3,511,883	387,280	11.0	2,874,580	81.9	192,962	5.5	--	--
Massachusetts	2,476,295	438,236	17.7	1,076,032	43.5	511,823	20.7	49,525	2.0
Michigan	2,857,335	1,390,433	48.7	1,267,324	44.4	--	--	41,248	1.4
Minnesota	1,566,807	541,563	34.6	478,932	30.6	300,457	19.2	11,773	0.8
Mississippi [9]	453,531	443,582	97.8	--	--	--	--	8,949	2.0
Missouri [10]	690,757	690,757	100.0	1,939,231	280.7	--	--	--	--
Montana	359,986	60,304	16.8	150,667	41.9	136,272	37.9	1,536	0.4
Nebraska [11]	726,896	192,426	26.5	412,286	56.7	55,859	7.7	--	--
Nevada	1,069,550	279,912	26.2	728,944	68.2	--	--	10,152	0.9
New Hampshire [12]	810,583	125,916	15.5	575,516	71.0	103,537	12.8	32	0.0
New Jersey	2,959,834	878,539	29.7	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Mexico [13]	570,254	161,546	28.3	387,804	68.0	7,580	1.3	11,648	2.0



State	Total Applications	Registration Category							
		New Valid Registrations		Change of Name, Party, or Address (within jurisdiction)		Change of Address (cross-jurisdiction)		Preregistrations (under 18 years of age)	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
New York	2,299,890	968,849	42.1	1,300,077	56.5	235,248	10.2	214,037	9.3
North Carolina	5,164,009	1,563,573	30.3	1,486,375	28.8	--	--	0	0.0
North Dakota [14]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	1,291	1,210	93.7	47	3.6	17	1.3	50	3.9
Ohio	2,995,502	1,316,156	43.9	1,078,627	36.0	--	--	14,703	0.5
Oklahoma	666,094	314,835	47.3	329,996	49.5	--	--	3,774	0.6
Oregon [15]	1,955,345	354,524	18.1	1,561,949	79.9	--	--	37,726	1.9
Pennsylvania	3,814,150	925,690	24.3	1,587,384	41.6	580,754	15.2	0	0.0
Puerto Rico	121,352	121,144	99.8	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island	425,389	52,401	12.3	296,828	69.8	67,104	15.8	9,028	2.1
South Carolina [16]	2,119,337	190,219	9.0	1,929,118	91.0	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	163,450	64,295	39.3	73,069	44.7	24,733	15.1	1,068	0.7
Tennessee	1,595,329	728,882	45.7	487,345	30.5	--	--	--	--
Texas	5,147,221	2,820,912	54.8	2,257,372	43.9	--	--	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands [17]	1,878	1,084	57.7	769	40.9	25	1.3	--	--
Utah	2,280,767	875,194	38.4	987,599	43.3	88,789	3.9	24,463	1.1
Vermont	98,866	91,710	92.8	0	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
Virginia	3,880,532	604,701	15.6	1,268,274	32.7	484,416	12.5	46,266	1.2
Washington [18]	3,068,727	807,358	26.3	1,489,191	48.5	325,384	10.6	9,242	0.3
West Virginia [19]	517,145	144,808	28.0	323,187	62.5	37,444	7.2	--	--
Wisconsin [20]	920,760	703,492	76.4	12,721	1.4	115,376	12.5	11	0.0
Wyoming [21]	86,021	45,933	53.4	39,921	46.4	--	--	--	--
U.S. Total	103,701,513	33,437,005	32.2	48,476,817	49.4	6,308,790	9.5	965,222	1.2

State	Registration Category							
	Duplicate		Invalid or Rejected		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	16	0.0	7,499	0.5	--	--	-411,400	-28.6
Alaska	6,749	0.6	9,351	0.9	--	--	0	0.0
American Samoa	1,409	29.7	776	16.4	--	--	0	0.0
Arizona	112,693	3.8	53,770	1.8	1,610	0.1	0	0.0
Arkansas	12,764	2.3	95	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
California	1,205,489	8.9	659,648	4.9	3,195,931	23.7	33,455	0.2
Colorado [2]	20,952	0.7	14,704	0.5	--	--	0	0.0
Connecticut [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Delaware	28,664	4.1	22,579	3.2	--	--	0	0.0
District of Columbia [4]	19,579	15.9	2,257	1.8	--	--	0	0.0
Florida	14,071	0.1	196,141	2.1	4,378	0.0	-34,791	-0.4
Georgia	363,649	7.4	5,542	0.1	--	--	0	0.0
Guam	2,635	16.1	558	3.4	--	--	0	0.0
Hawaii	--	--	14,508	4.0	108,714	30.2	58,488	16.3
Idaho [5]	2,751	1.2	257	0.1	574	0.2	3,096	1.3
Illinois	178,728	14.4	56,399	4.5	--	--	102,480	8.3
Indiana	227,505	8.5	31,277	1.2	211,463	7.9	0	0.0
Iowa [6]	44,505	6.0	744	0.1	570,950	77.3	0	0.0
Kansas	30,203	3.7	--	--	--	--	-265,245	-32.4
Kentucky	--	--	405,746	24.2	--	--	0	0.0
Louisiana [7]	14,458	1.4	11,893	1.2	208,156	20.9	0	0.0
Maine	5,492	1.6	466	0.1	14,172	4.2	0	0.0
Maryland [8]	56,487	1.6	574	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
Massachusetts	380,759	15.4	19,920	0.8	--	--	0	0.0
Michigan	156,839	5.5	1,492	0.1	--	--	-1	0.0
Minnesota	233,861	14.9	221	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
Mississippi [9]	--	--	1,000	0.2	--	--	0	0.0
Missouri [10]	--	--	25	0.0	--	--	-1,939,256	-280.7
Montana	10,873	3.0	334	0.1	--	--	0	0.0
Nebraska [11]	65,909	9.1	416	0.1	--	--	0	0.0
Nevada	22,676	2.1	27,866	2.6	--	--	0	0.0
New Hampshire [12]	5,582	0.7	0	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
New Jersey	293,851	9.9	28,687	1.0	1,758,757	59.4	0	0.0
New Mexico [13]	--	--	1,676	0.3	--	--	0	0.0
New York	406,776	17.7	87,046	3.8	--	--	-912,143	-39.7
North Carolina	1,953,012	37.8	161,049	3.1	--	--	0	0.0



State	Registration Category							
	Duplicate		Invalid or Rejected		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
North Dakota [14]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	17	1.3	--	--	-50	-3.9
Ohio	424,893	14.2	161,123	5.4	--	--	0	0.0
Oklahoma	1,257	0.2	16,232	2.4	--	--	0	0.0
Oregon [15]	1,146	0.1	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Pennsylvania	354,136	9.3	314,328	8.2	51,858	1.4	0	0.0
Puerto Rico	208	0.2	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Rhode Island	--	--	28	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
South Carolina [16]	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
South Dakota	160	0.1	18	0.0	154	0.1	-47	0.0
Tennessee	294,536	18.5	84,566	5.3	--	--	0	0.0
Texas	--	--	68,937	1.3	--	--	0	0.0
U.S. Virgin Islands [17]	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Utah	962	0.0	303,760	13.3	--	--	0	0.0
Vermont	5,037	5.1	2,119	2.1	--	--	0	0.0
Virginia	1,413,248	36.4	63,627	1.6	--	--	0	0.0
Washington [18]	430,440	14.0	866	0.0	6,246	0.2	0	0.0
West Virginia [19]	11,420	2.2	286	0.1	--	--	0	0.0
Wisconsin [20]	10,709	1.2	--	--	78,451	8.5	0	0.0
Wyoming [21]	--	--	167	0.2	--	--	0	0.0
U.S. Total	8,827,089	9.7	2,840,590	2.9	6,211,414	14.7	-3,365,414	-3.2

Voter Registration Table 3 Calculation Notes:

**Total Registration Applications Received** uses question A3a.

**New Valid Registrations, Total** uses question A3b.

**New Valid Registrations, %** uses question A3b divided by A3a.

**Change of Name, Party, or Address (within jurisdiction), Total** uses question A3f.

**Change of Name, Party, or Address (within jurisdiction), %** uses question A3f divided by question A3a.

**Change of Address (cross-jurisdiction), Total** uses question A3g.

**Change of Address (cross-jurisdiction), %** uses question A3g divided by question A3a.

**Preregistrations (under 18 years of age), Total** uses question A3c.

**Preregistrations (under 18 years of age), %** uses question A3c divided by question A3a.

**Duplicate Registrations, Total** uses question A3d.

**Duplicate Registrations, %** uses question A3d divided by question A3a.

**Invalid or Rejected Registrations, Total** uses question A3e.

**Invalid or Rejected Registrations, %** uses question A3e divided by question A3a.

**Other Registrations, Total** uses the sum of questions A3h, A3i, and A3j.

**Other Registrations, %** uses the sum of questions A3h, A3i, and A3j, all divided by question A3a.

**Not Categorized Registrations, Total** uses question A3a minus the sum of questions A3b to A3j.

**Not Categorized Registrations, %** uses question A3a minus the sum of questions A3b to A3j, all divided by question A3a.

#### Voter Registration Table 3 Data Notes:

##### General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- Questions A3h, A3i, and A3j were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in these items if there was another registration category aside from those listed in questions A3b–A3g or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions A3b–A3g.
- Negative numbers in the Not Categorized registration category indicate that the sum of registrations received for each category account for more than the total number of registrations reported received by the state.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of applications in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each registration category.

[1] Alabama noted in a survey comment that “Totals are from ES&S [Election Systems & Software] election survey. A3c: we do not have pre-registration. A3f: due to the way we track data for changes to records, the number of changes resulting directly from registration forms could not be separated from the total number of changes made to voter’s records.”

[2] Colorado noted in a survey comment that “[T]he increase in registrations is attributable to multiple factors. Colorado has seen a significant increase in population since 2016. The state conducted three elections in 2020, including the first presidential primary in 20 years. In addition, record turnout for the November 2020 general election contributed to the increased number of registrations. Another factor adding to the increase is the implementation of automatic voter registration in May 2020 in partnership with the Colorado Department of Revenue (CDOR). Automatic update to voter registration through CDOR was also implemented in 2019. This may also contribute to a somewhat inflated number as the addition of a ZIP+4 is counted as an update. Finally, with changes in personnel and as different perspectives are applied to data, queries tend to shift in an effort to obtain more accurate and inclusive data for reporting purposes.”

[3] Connecticut noted in a survey comment that the data necessary to respond to question A3 “is not retained in the system.”

[4] The District of Columbia noted in a survey comment that “A3b and A3c ([preregistrations] under 18, who turned 18) are total new registrations.”

[5] Idaho noted in survey comments for multiple counties that the state switched to a new voter registration system between the 2018 and the 2020 elections, which made it difficult to track some data for these questions.

[6] Iowa noted in a survey comment that “[A]ll other sources category is due to limitation on system to report transaction source of update if it is not a change from previous listed source.”

[7] Louisiana noted in a survey comment that “[A]ddress changes across jurisdictions are counted as new registrations. 16- and 17-year-old citizens can apply to register to vote, but cannot vote until they are 18.”

[8] Maryland noted in a survey comment that “[T]he total of A3a is the sum of A3b, A3[c], A3d, and A3e. Maryland does not consider the registration changes listed in A3f and A3g as registrations, and therefore,



the source of these changes is not recorded. For A3c, individuals can register to vote starting at age 16, however they are not considered ‘pre-registered.’ 16- and 17-year-olds are considered registered voters, they just cannot vote until their 18th birthday.”

[9] Mississippi noted in survey comments that duplicate and rejected registrations are not tracked.

[10] Missouri noted in a survey comment that “[C]hanges of names and address report as separate transactions. In addition to that anytime the LEA [local election administrator] does an address library cleanup process or any change to the voting record it will record as an address change but may not be indicated by the voter. Therefore, we are not including the registration forms for change of name and address is [sic] the total for this section.”

[11] Nebraska noted in a survey comment that “Nebraska law does not allow for pre-registrations for people not of voting age.”

[12] New Hampshire noted in survey comments that “NH uses voter registration forms for name, party, and address changes.”

[13] New Mexico noted that the data for these items are not consistently captured across counties at this time. The Secretary of State’s office is exploring options to capture and include this information in future reports.

[14] North Dakota does not have voter registration and does not provide data in Section A of the EAVS.

[15] In Oregon, the number of cross-jurisdiction address changes is included in the number of overall changes to registrations. The state does not track the number of invalid/rejected registrations.

[16] South Carolina noted in survey comments that for the state’s A3d and A3e responses, “SC has no process to collect data on duplicate registrations or rejected registrations.”

[17] The U.S. Virgin Islands noted in survey comments that “A3c: the data was not tracked. A3d: before any individual is registered to vote, the individual[’s] information is checked in the system to ensure the individual was not previously registered. A3e: a voter will not be registered to vote unless the individual provides the required information (birth paper, U.S. passport, etc.). Before the process begins, the prospective voter is informed what document and information is required to begin the process.”

[18] Washington noted in survey comments that the data reported in this question covered the period “between 2018-10-08 and 2020-11-03.”

[19] West Virginia noted in survey comments that “[D]uplicate registrations are based on DMV and online registrations.”

[20] Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and does not classify inactive voters per NVRA definitions.

[21] Wyoming noted in survey comments that “[M]ultiple changes may have occurred on the same form. A3a includes a total, but the total could be less. For example, a voter could have submitted one form to change their party and address. The data currently reflects that change as 2 forms. A3g. Counties do not receive forms for out-of-county address changes. Those numbers are reflected in new jurisdictions as new registrations.”



Voter Registration Table 4: Voter List Maintenance – Confirmation Notices

State	Confirmation Notices Sent		Result of Confirmation Notice					
			Received Confirmation From Voter				Confirmation Returned as Undeliverable	
			Valid		Invalid			
	Total	% Active Voters	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	--	--	1,826	--	25,755	--	3	--
Alaska	91,667	15.4	1,108	1.2	--	--	30,692	33.5
American Samoa	4,741	29.0	4,741	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Arizona	2,480,620	58.0	75,275	3.0	422,319	17.0	328,161	13.2
Arkansas	432,798	30.7	89,906	20.8	33,312	7.7	45,003	10.4
California [2]	6,682,336	30.7	609,638	9.1	557,041	8.3	477,436	7.1
Colorado	705,625	18.6	13,885	2.0	14,104	2.0	--	--
Connecticut	178,993	7.7	55,787	31.2	92,022	51.4	25,292	14.1
Delaware [3]	89,271	12.6	--	--	--	--	--	--
District of Columbia [4]	571,363	110.3	26,306	4.6	15,582	2.7	72,114	12.6
Florida	1,295,491	8.9	121,655	9.4	142,275	11.0	219,736	17.0
Georgia	1,060,235	14.7	72,979	6.9	4,018	0.4	186,456	17.6
Guam	5,874	10.5	--	--	--	--	1,153	19.6
Hawaii [5]	101,013	13.3	14,576	14.4	4,271	4.2	--	--
Idaho	36,438	3.5	2,912	8.0	--	--	315	0.9
Illinois	5,106,813	56.1	333,135	6.5	181,526	3.6	457,373	9.0
Indiana [6]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Iowa [7]	123,320	5.9	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	227,808	12.9	9,203	4.0	43,892	19.3	16,588	7.3
Kentucky [8]	366,101	11.0	--	--	--	--	--	--
Louisiana [9]	325,975	11.0	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maine [10]	2,147	0.2	0	0.0	733	34.1	--	--
Maryland [11]	238,027	5.7	3,587	1.5	436	0.2	--	--
Massachusetts [12]	608,691	13.8	--	--	--	--	--	--
Michigan	207,229	2.9	1,143	0.6	27,214	13.1	20,030	9.7
Minnesota [13]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Mississippi	82,826	4.2	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri [14]	381,716	9.6	149,017	39.0	39,299	10.3	78,034	20.4
Montana	107,111	15.8	8,491	7.9	2,344	2.2	26,537	24.8
Nebraska	160,117	13.7	27,030	16.9	24,931	15.6	21,046	13.1
Nevada [15]	361,871	19.7	158,854	43.9	26,222	7.2	153,156	42.3
New Hampshire [16]	15,180	1.4	112	0.7	--	--	4,834	31.8
New Jersey [17]	311,385	5.3	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Mexico [18]	136,426	10.9	0	0.0	3	0.0	9,348	6.9



State	Confirmation Notices Sent		Result of Confirmation Notice					
			Received Confirmation From Voter				Confirmation Returned as Undeliverable	
	Total	% Active Voters	Valid		Invalid		Total	%
			Total	%	Total	%		
New York	159,462	1.3	23,345	14.6	31,315	19.6	19,065	12.0
North Carolina	873,911	13.2	--	--	--	--	263,271	30.1
North Dakota [19]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	4,907	26.5	--	--	--	--	50	1.0
Ohio	712,068	8.8	109,453	15.4	34,224	4.8	48,535	6.8
Oklahoma	181,034	9.0	18,688	10.3	2,954	1.6	27,775	15.3
Oregon	329,443	11.2	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	753,942	9.1	74,955	9.9	41,087	5.4	111,594	14.8
Puerto Rico [20]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island	83,980	11.4	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	75,796	2.1	17,001	22.4	487	0.6	1,829	2.4
South Dakota	17,795	3.1	216	1.2	179	1.0	12,298	69.1
Tennessee	137,130	3.2	19,496	14.2	1,724	1.3	23,078	16.8
Texas	1,068,037	7.0	758,850	71.1	111,387	10.4	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands [21]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utah	20,225	1.2	42	0.2	2,306	11.4	17,877	88.4
Vermont	66,126	15.0	21,774	32.9	44,352	67.1	0	0.0
Virginia [22]	189,162	3.3	11,379	6.0	--	--	4,981	2.6
Washington	481,684	9.8	150,796	31.3	44,754	9.3	6,407	1.3
West Virginia [23]	10,291	1.0	68	0.7	227	2.2	434	4.2
Wisconsin [24]	345,893	9.0	21,241	6.1	--	--	93,419	27.0
Wyoming [25]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
U.S. Total	28,010,094	14.3	3,008,470	12.1	1,972,295	8.1	2,803,920	11.9

State	Result of Confirmation Notice					
	Status Unknown		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	59,867	65.3	--	--	0	0.0
American Samoa	0	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
Arizona	1,650,963	66.6	3,902	0.2	0	0.0
Arkansas	264,968	61.2	3,276	0.8	-3,667	-0.8
California [2]	4,508,305	67.5	510,244	7.6	19,672	0.3
Colorado	677,636	96.0	--	--	0	0.0
Connecticut	5,911	3.3	--	--	-19	0.0
Delaware [3]	--	--	--	--	89,271	100.0
District of Columbia [4]	457,361	80.0	--	--	0	0.0
Florida	590,070	45.5	7,030	0.5	214,725	16.6
Georgia	796,782	75.2	--	--	0	0.0
Guam	4,721	80.4	--	--	0	0.0
Hawaii [5]	--	--	42,370	41.9	39,796	39.4
Idaho	33,211	91.1	--	--	0	0.0
Illinois	4,134,779	81.0	--	--	0	0.0
Indiana [6]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Iowa [7]	65,857	53.4	--	--	57,463	46.6
Kansas	7,715	3.4	--	--	150,410	66.0
Kentucky [8]	--	--	--	--	366,101	100.0
Louisiana [9]	--	--	--	--	325,975	100.0
Maine [10]	1,414	65.9	--	--	0	0.0
Maryland [11]	234,004	98.3	--	--	0	0.0
Massachusetts [12]	--	--	--	--	608,691	100.0
Michigan	158,842	76.7	--	--	0	0.0
Minnesota [13]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Mississippi	82,826	100.0	--	--	0	0.0
Missouri [14]	--	--	--	--	115,366	30.2
Montana	69,633	65.0	106	0.1	0	0.0
Nebraska	87,110	54.4	--	--	0	0.0
Nevada [15]	23,639	6.5	--	--	0	0.0
New Hampshire [16]	10,234	67.4	--	--	0	0.0
New Jersey [17]	311,385	100.0	--	--	0	0.0
New Mexico [18]	127,075	93.1	--	--	0	0.0
New York	83,889	52.6	--	--	1,848	1.2



State	Result of Confirmation Notice					
	Status Unknown		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
North Carolina	563,120	64.4	47,520	5.4	0	0.0
North Dakota [19]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	4,857	99.0
Ohio	519,856	73.0	--	--	0	0.0
Oklahoma	131,617	72.7	--	--	0	0.0
Oregon	--	--	329,443	100.0	0	0.0
Pennsylvania	206,085	27.3	320,221	42.5	0	0.0
Puerto Rico [20]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island	--	--	--	--	83,980	100.0
South Carolina	52,132	68.8	4,347	5.7	0	0.0
South Dakota	5,102	28.7	--	--	0	0.0
Tennessee	92,832	67.7	--	--	0	0.0
Texas	197,800	18.5	--	--	0	0.0
U.S. Virgin Islands [21]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utah	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Vermont	0	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
Virginia [22]	172,802	91.4	--	--	0	0.0
Washington	279,727	58.1	--	--	0	0.0
West Virginia [23]	9,408	91.4	154	1.5	0	0.0
Wisconsin [24]	231,233	66.9	--	--	0	0.0
Wyoming [25]	--	--	--	--	--	--
U.S. Total	16,909,911	65.8	1,268,613	9.7	2,074,469	7.4

Voter Registration Table 4 Calculation Notes:

- Confirmation Notices Sent, Total** uses question A8a.
- Confirmation Notices Sent as % of Active Voters** uses question A8a divided by question A1b.
- Confirmation Notices Received - Valid, Total** uses question A8b.
- Confirmation Notices Received - Valid, %** uses question A8b divided by question A8a.
- Confirmation Notices Received - Invalid, Total** uses question A8c.
- Confirmation Notices Received - Invalid, %** uses question A8c divided by question A8a.
- Confirmation Notice Returned Undeliverable, Total** uses question A8d.
- Confirmation Notice Returned Undeliverable, %** uses question A8d divided by question A8a.
- Status Unknown, Total** uses question A8e.
- Status Unknown, %** uses question A8e divided by question A8a.
- Other Confirmation Notices, Total** uses the sum of questions A8f, A8g, and A8h.
- Other Confirmation Notices, %** uses the sum of questions A8f, A8g, and A8h, all divided by question A8a.
- Not Categorized Confirmation Notices, Total** uses question A8a minus the sum of questions A8b to A8h.

**Not Categorized Confirmation Notices, %** uses question A8a minus the sum of questions A8b to A8h, all divided by question A8a.

Voter Registration Table 4 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- Questions A8f, A8g, and A8h were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in these items if there was another confirmation notice status aside from those listed in questions A8b–A8e or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions A8b–A8e.
- Negative numbers in the Not Categorized confirmation notices category indicate that the sum of confirmation notices for each category account for more than the total number of confirmation notices reported by the state.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of confirmation notices in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each confirmation notice category.
- States that are exempt from the NVRA are not required to send confirmation notices pursuant to the NVRA, although they may send confirmation notices (or other similar notices) pursuant to state law or practice. States that do not use confirmation notices typically use other sources of data to identify potentially ineligible voters.

[1] Alabama noted in a survey comment that “[W]e do not have a report that has the total number of confirmation notices sent.” Because Alabama does not report the total number of confirmation notices sent, the number of ‘Not Categorized’ confirmation notices cannot be calculated. For the same reason, their responses were not included when calculating the total ‘Not Categorized’ confirmation notices at the national level.

[2] California has increased list maintenance training statewide to all county elections officials, including training regarding when to send confirmation notices per the NVRA and updated California state law.

[3] Delaware noted in a survey comment that “In 2019, the state of DE changed voter registration vendors from an in-house mainframe system to a cloud based provider. The data request is unavailable due to the differences in the 2 systems. The information requested was not tracked and/or converted to the new system.”

[4] The District of Columbia notes that the data reported in EAVS under A8a (Confirmation Notices Sent) do not comprise list maintenance activities. This has caused confusion when receiving a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for D2 notices, and this number does not match the figure in A8a.

[5] Hawaii noted in survey comments that three of its four counties that submit EAVS data do not “have counts of confirmed, invalidated, undeliverable, or unknown.”

[6] Indiana noted in a survey comment that “Indiana’s understanding is this aligns with voter list maintenance activities. Indiana does not send the removal notices referenced by the EAC survey, Indiana provided the number of voter records cancelled due to being in inactive status for more than 2 federal general elections for question A9e.”

[7] Iowa noted in a survey comment that the state’s “system does not track follow up status information.”

[8] Kentucky noted in a survey comment that “[O]ur system tracks all undeliverable mail to qualify for the 8(d)2 notifications. Two separate batches have been sent during this time period. We have not yet finished scanning and categorizing the returns. Therefore, the only data available is the number sent.”



- [9] Louisiana noted in a survey comment that “[C]onfirmation notices are sent pursuant to 52 USC §20507(d)(2). The Department of State only collects the total number of sent confirmation notices.”
- [10] Maine noted in a survey comment that “A8d: see A8e, voters made inactive if CACC [Change of Address Confirmation Card] undeliverable.”
- [11] Maryland noted in a survey comment that “A8d data is included in A8e.”
- [12] Massachusetts noted in a survey comment that the state “cannot provide data on result of [confirmation] notices.”
- [13] Minnesota is NVRA exempt and responded “Does not apply” to all items regarding confirmation notices (A8).
- [14] Missouri noted in a survey comment that “A8a does not total [because] we do not track all information requested.”
- [15] Nevada reported in survey comments that two of its counties did not track confirmation notices.
- [16] New Hampshire noted in a survey comment that “NH does not send confirmation notices, but does send 30-day letters.”
- [17] New Jersey does not track confirmation notices returned by the voter or returned undeliverable.
- [18] New Mexico noted that the data for these items are not consistently captured across counties at this time. The Secretary of State’s office is exploring options to capture and include this information on future reports.
- [19] North Dakota does not have voter registration and does not provide data in Section A of the EAVS.
- [20] Puerto Rico is NVRA exempt and responded “Does not apply” to all items regarding confirmation notices (A8).
- [21] The U.S. Virgin Islands are NVRA exempt and responded “Data not available” to all items regarding confirmation notices (A8).
- [22] Virginia does not currently track returned confirmation notices.
- [23] West Virginia reported in a survey comment that “[S]ome counties tracked undeliverables as ‘no response,’ so they are included in status unknown totals.”
- [24] Wisconsin is exempt from NVRA; however, the state sent notices to voters who have not voted in a four-year period, as well as Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) mover mailings. Notices are sent to voters who register to vote or whose voter information may be out of date.
- [25] Wyoming is NVRA exempt and responded “Does not apply” to all items regarding confirmation notices (A8).

Voter Registration Table 5: Voter List Maintenance – Removal Actions

State	Voters Removed		Reason for Removal							
	Total	% of Reg. Voters	Moved Out of Jurisdiction		Death		Failure to Return Confirmation Notice		Voter's Request	
			Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	136,557	3.7	9,069	6.6	94,396	69.1	266	0.2	230	0.2
Alaska	53,132	8.2	3,691	6.9	8,485	16.0	30,358	57.1	8,729	16.4
American Samoa	2,124	13.0	0	0.0	336	15.8	1,788	84.2	0	0.0
Arizona	350,841	7.4	82,095	23.4	71,706	20.4	121,011	34.5	28,516	8.1
Arkansas	175,336	9.6	12,448	7.1	37,185	21.2	116,787	66.6	560	0.3
California [1]	1,635,987	6.3	496,397	30.3	355,332	21.7	351,301	21.5	60,293	3.7
Colorado	416,819	9.9	104,155	25.0	62,005	14.9	210,941	50.6	32,908	7.9
Connecticut	53,652	2.1	19,812	36.9	18,986	35.4	3,443	6.4	10,438	19.5
Delaware	39,772	5.4	8,254	20.8	6,210	15.6	24,900	62.6	108	0.3
District of Columbia	67,400	10.8	25,864	38.4	7,979	11.8	33,124	49.1	--	--
Florida	1,009,246	6.6	210,587	20.9	334,033	33.1	320,706	31.8	124,558	12.3
Georgia [2]	505,728	6.6	6,700	1.3	137,645	27.2	257,010	50.8	3,100	0.6
Guam	9,722	17.4	44	0.5	717	7.4	8,961	92.2	--	--
Hawaii	47,670	5.7	4,309	9.0	15,152	31.8	23,620	49.5	4,516	9.5
Idaho	24,639	2.4	739	3.0	431	1.7	9,082	36.9	0	0.0
Illinois	643,336	6.6	305,984	47.6	161,055	25.0	171,920	26.7	--	--
Indiana [3]	1,023,732	21.8	8,716	0.9	4	0.0	94,837	9.3	--	--
Iowa	126,968	5.7	22,424	17.7	52,262	41.2	48,771	38.4	817	0.6
Kansas	134,771	7.0	18,601	13.8	40,484	30.0	65,020	48.2	588	0.4
Kentucky	100,181	2.8	7,534	7.5	77,442	77.3	0	0.0	874	0.9
Louisiana [4]	296,761	9.6	125,794	42.4	72,493	24.4	44,947	15.1	12,479	4.2
Maine	153,846	13.5	122,310	79.5	23,713	15.4	1,942	1.3	709	0.5
Maryland	260,666	6.1	58,583	22.5	73,564	28.2	122,649	47.1	863	0.3
Massachusetts	804,445	16.7	523,079	65.0	89,088	11.1	131,641	16.4	9,136	1.1
Michigan [5]	239,780	3.0	46,047	19.2	187,608	78.2	0	0.0	6,125	2.6
Minnesota [6]	206,475	5.5	72,296	35.0	61,389	29.7	72,090	34.9	--	--
Mississippi	89,640	4.2	17,485	19.5	50,463	56.3	18,500	20.6	1,109	1.2
Missouri	411,661	9.5	119,044	28.9	119,144	28.9	150,562	36.6	2,369	0.6
Montana [7]	73,718	9.9	8,231	11.2	14,758	20.0	38,110	51.7	3,000	4.1
Nebraska	94,352	7.4	18,252	19.3	27,308	28.9	20,697	21.9	23,706	25.1
Nevada	157,592	7.7	41,145	26.1	27,699	17.6	65,045	41.3	22,303	14.2
New Hampshire	140,979	13.0	129,428	91.8	6,255	4.4	--	--	--	--
New Jersey	264,136	4.2	58,588	22.2	114,301	43.3	84,871	32.1	474	0.2
New Mexico	79,636	5.9	4,268	5.4	27,582	34.6	31,919	40.1	10,897	13.7
New York	580,170	4.3	248,905	42.9	158,216	27.3	100,411	17.3	10,439	1.8



State	Voters Removed		Reason for Removal							
	Total		Moved Out of Jurisdiction		Death		Failure to Return Confirmation Notice			
			Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
North Carolina	1,283,363	17.4	506,445	39.5	130,915	10.2	589,764	46.0	3,692	0.3
North Dakota [8]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	5,049	27.3	--	--	108	2.1	4,907	97.2	--	--
Ohio	984,190	12.2	267,042	27.1	170,651	17.3	441,576	44.9	94,541	9.6
Oklahoma	234,034	10.4	91,344	39.0	43,757	18.7	88,285	37.7	959	0.4
Oregon [9]	106,692	3.6	20,197	18.9	58,802	55.1	9,766	9.2	17,457	16.4
Pennsylvania [10]	883,947	9.8	416,884	47.2	196,386	22.2	263,009	29.8	6,376	0.7
Puerto Rico	761,087	32.3	266	0.0	136,822	18.0	623,275	81.9	0	0.0
Rhode Island	49,304	6.1	9,927	20.1	12,366	25.1	21,369	43.3	1,434	2.9
South Carolina [11]	140,077	3.6	33,796	24.1	81,939	58.5	14,749	10.5	570	0.4
South Dakota	24,151	3.8	1,105	4.6	9,994	41.4	10,854	44.9	567	2.3
Tennessee	508,768	11.5	194,624	38.3	83,756	16.5	218,348	42.9	3,499	0.7
Texas	1,751,446	10.3	144,214	8.2	272,826	15.6	505,668	28.9	11,010	0.6
U.S. Virgin Islands [12]	1,931	3.6	275	14.2	1,614	83.6	--	--	42	2.2
Utah	67,468	3.6	12,488	18.5	20,810	30.8	33,956	50.3	185	0.3
Vermont	44,352	9.1	0	0.0	9,605	21.7	18,876	42.6	5,286	11.9
Virginia	879,921	14.7	569,837	64.8	93,716	10.7	188,774	21.5	13,886	1.6
Washington	305,845	5.8	84,754	27.7	61,104	20.0	4,192	1.4	41,969	13.7
West Virginia	94,032	7.4	9,767	10.4	27,536	29.3	53,729	57.1	333	0.4
Wisconsin [13]	198,061	5.2	37,490	18.9	68,968	34.8	75,624	38.2	676	0.3
Wyoming	45,866	15.1	1,176	2.6	3,495	7.6	40,973	89.3	26	0.1
U.S. Total	18,781,054	8.2	5,342,509	28.5	4,020,596	21.4	5,984,924	32.1	582,352	3.5



State	Reason for Removal							
	Felony or Conviction		Mental Incompetence		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	5,573	4.1	127	0.1	26,896	19.7	0	0.0
Alaska	1,869	3.5	0	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
American Samoa	0	0.0	0	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
Arizona	13,476	3.8	418	0.1	33,619	9.6	0	0.0
Arkansas	4,317	2.5	57	0.0	4,419	2.5	-437	-0.2
California [1]	19,069	1.2	672	0.0	352,014	21.5	909	0.1
Colorado	5,183	1.2	--	--	1,627	0.4	0	0.0
Connecticut	973	1.8	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Delaware	300	0.8	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
District of Columbia	433	0.6	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Florida	15,903	1.6	1,993	0.2	2,756	0.3	-1,290	-0.1
Georgia [2]	54,730	10.8	312	0.1	46,231	9.1	0	0.0
Guam	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Hawaii	73	0.2	0	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
Idaho	21	0.1	0	0.0	6,016	24.4	8,350	33.9
Illinois	4,377	0.7	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Indiana [3]	1	0.0	--	--	5,318	0.5	914,856	89.4
Iowa	2,645	2.1	49	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
Kansas	3,377	2.5	20	0.0	7,351	5.5	-670	-0.5
Kentucky	13,358	13.3	973	1.0	--	--	0	0.0
Louisiana [4]	14,817	5.0	115	0.0	26,116	8.8	0	0.0
Maine	--	--	--	--	5,172	3.4	0	0.0
Maryland	3,910	1.5	44	0.0	1,053	0.4	0	0.0
Massachusetts	747	0.1	--	--	50,754	6.3	0	0.0
Michigan [5]	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Minnesota [6]	--	--	--	--	700	0.3	0	0.0
Mississippi	1,240	1.4	33	0.0	810	0.9	0	0.0
Missouri	12,371	3.0	1,566	0.4	6,605	1.6	0	0.0
Montana [7]	69	0.1	4	0.0	9,546	12.9	0	0.0
Nebraska	3,395	3.6	0	0.0	994	1.1	0	0.0
Nevada	1,337	0.8	63	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
New Hampshire	26	0.0	--	--	5,270	3.7	0	0.0
New Jersey	5,902	2.2	0	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
New Mexico	4,970	6.2	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
New York	4,439	0.8	98	0.0	--	--	57,662	9.9
North Carolina	16,788	1.3	0	0.0	35,759	2.8	0	0.0



State	Reason for Removal							
	Felony or Conviction		Mental Incompetence		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
North Dakota [8]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	34	0.7	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Ohio	10,361	1.1	19	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
Oklahoma	3,335	1.4	150	0.1	6,204	2.7	0	0.0
Oregon [9]	--	--	--	--	470	0.4	0	0.0
Pennsylvania [10]	6	0.0	194	0.0	1,092	0.1	0	0.0
Puerto Rico	--	--	697	0.1	27	0.0	0	0.0
Rhode Island	810	1.6	2	0.0	3,396	6.9	0	0.0
South Carolina [11]	7,078	5.1	--	--	1,945	1.4	0	0.0
South Dakota	1,613	6.7	2	0.0	16	0.1	0	0.0
Tennessee	7,354	1.4	--	--	1,187	0.2	0	0.0
Texas	4,697	0.3	730	0.0	812,301	46.4	0	0.0
U.S. Virgin Islands [12]	--	--	0	0.0	--	--	0	0.0
Utah	29	0.0	--	--	--	--	0	0.0
Vermont	--	--	--	--	10,585	23.9	0	0.0
Virginia	10,480	1.2	1,020	0.1	2,208	0.3	0	0.0
Washington	2,767	0.9	170	0.1	110,889	36.3	0	0.0
West Virginia	1,285	1.4	2	0.0	1,380	1.5	0	0.0
Wisconsin [13]	3,855	1.9	112	0.1	11,336	5.7	0	0.0
Wyoming	46	0.1	1	0.0	149	0.3	0	0.0
U.S. Total	269,439	1.6	9,643	0.1	1,592,211	10.4	979,380	5.2

Voter Registration Table 5 Calculation Notes:

**Voters Removed, Total** uses question A9a.

**Voters Removed, % Registered Voters** uses question A9a divided by question A1a.

**Moved Out of Jurisdiction, Total** uses question A9b.

**Moved Out of Jurisdiction, %** uses question A9b divided by question A9a.

**Death, Total** uses question A9c.

**Death, %** uses question A9c divided by question A9a.

**Failure to Return Confirmation Notice, Total** uses question A9e.

**Failure to Return Confirmation Notice, %** uses question A9e divided by question A9a.

**Voter's Request, Total** uses question A9g.

**Voter's Request, %** uses question A9g divided by question A9a.

**Felony or Conviction, Total** uses question A9d.

**Felony or Conviction, %** uses question A9d divided by question A9a.

**Mental Incompetence, Total** uses question A9f.

**Mental Incompetence, %** uses question A9f divided by question A9a.

**Other, Total** uses the sum of questions A9h, A9i, and A9j.

**Other, %** uses the sum of questions A9h, A9i, and A9j, all divided by question A9a.

**Not Categorized, Total** uses question A9a minus the sum of questions A9b to A9j.

**Not Categorized, %** uses question A9a minus the sum of questions A9b to A9j, all divided by question A9a.

#### Voter Registration Table 5 Data Notes:

##### General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- Questions A9h, A9i, and A9g were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in these items if there was another reason for registration removals aside from those listed in questions A9b–A9g or if there were registration removals that could not be categorized in questions A9b–A9e.
- Negative numbers in the Not Categorized registration removals category indicate that the sum of registration removals for each category account for more than the total number of registration removals reported received by the state.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of confirmation notices in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each registration removal category. In addition, not all states may remove registrations for the listed reason.

[1] California has increased list maintenance training statewide to all county elections officials, including training regarding removal actions per the NVRA and updated California state law.

[2] Georgia noted in a survey comment that “A9b represents voters who moved out of the state.”

[3] Indiana noted in a survey comment that “[T]he data reported in A9b–j consists of data from the ad hoc report (A9b–d, A9g–j) and SVRS [statewide voter registration system] (A9e). Indiana provided the number of voter records cancelled due to being in inactive status for more than 2 federal general elections for question A9e. These statistics represent the majority of cancellations for this reason, based on the county user selecting the option to run this process in batch. However, county users have the option to also cancel voters one-by-one for this reason, but those statistics are not included in the counts for question A9e.”

[4] Louisiana noted in a survey comment that “[I]rregularities include voters that were cancelled by the registrar of voters because the registrant provided insufficient or incorrect data, or user processing error. Challenge 21 includes voters who were registered in another state or not a United States citizen, or were otherwise not qualified to be registered for reasons other than change of residence.”

[5] Michigan noted in a survey comment that “A9d: in MI, registered voters cannot cast a ballot while they are incarcerated serving sentence; however, their registration is never cancelled. Felony convictions alone do not disqualify voters from casting a ballot.”

[6] Minnesota noted in a survey comment that “A9d and A9f: voter is not removed but status changes to ‘challenged.’ A9e: did not vote or update registration in prior four years. A9g: voter request not tracked separately, is included in A9h.”

[7] Montana noted in a survey comment that “A9d: felony cancellations as reported in voter registration database.”

[8] North Dakota does not have voter registration and does not provide data in Section A of the EAVS.

[9] Oregon reported in a survey comment that “[I]ncarcerated voters are inactivated not removed.”

[10] Pennsylvania reported in a survey comment that “PA won’t be reporting declared mentally incompetent in future surveys. The cancellation option is no longer available to county officials.”



[11] South Carolina reported in a survey comment that “A9f: it is rare for voters to be removed for this reason and would be included under ‘other’ (A9h).”

[12] The U.S. Virgin Islands reported in a survey comment that the territory “no longer purges voters who did not vote in the past two general election. A voter can only be removed off the voting roll due to their death, request to be removed or move out of territory, or convicted of a felony. The voter will be reinstated once they serve their sentence. ESVI [Election System of the Virgin Islands] is planning to do more outreach to voters including notifying voters of voting centers, their respective voting centers, voter registration status to name a few.”

[13] Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and does not classify inactive voters per NVRA definitions. Only active voters are registered and eligible to vote in Wisconsin. Wisconsin’s registered voters count for this report includes military voters, even though they are not required to “register” in Wisconsin. Wisconsin requires voters to re-register each time their address changes. For the purposes of this report, voters are only counted as being “removed” from the voter rolls if they did not re-register at a new address. Even voters who move within the same jurisdiction must re-register in Wisconsin; therefore, Wisconsin does not track these voters separately.

# Chapter 4. Military and Overseas

## Voting in 2020: UOCAVA

### Key Findings

The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) Section B collected data from states and municipalities on individuals covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) during the 2020 federal general election. Election officials were asked a variety of questions relating to UOCAVA voting practices, including the total number of registered UOCAVA voters, the use of the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA), the quantity and method of ballots transmitted to and returned by UOCAVA voters, and the use of the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB).<sup>1</sup> Among the results of this section, notable findings include:

- Just over 40% of registered UOCAVA voters held legal voting residence in three states: California, Florida, and Washington.
- Continuing a trend that began with the 2016 EAVS, overseas citizens made up a larger percentage of registered UOCAVA voters than did members of the uniformed services.
- More than 1.2 million ballots were transmitted to UOCAVA voters by election offices. More than 900,000 of these ballots were returned by UOCAVA voters and were submitted for counting.
- UOCAVA voters increasingly used electronic methods to receive and return their absentee ballots, but rates differed by UOCAVA voter type, with more overseas citizens using electronic options than uniformed services members, who continue to rely primarily on postal mail.
- The most common reason for UOCAVA ballot rejection was that the ballot was received after a state's UOCAVA absentee ballot receipt deadline.
- FWAB usage continued to increase in 2020, with more UOCAVA voters using this backup ballot to cast their vote than in previous election cycles.

### Introduction

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) to collect data from states<sup>2</sup> and to report on absentee voting by uniformed services members and overseas citizens.<sup>3</sup> Since 2014, the EAC has fulfilled this reporting mandate in partnership with the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), the agency designated to administer UOCAVA on

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<sup>1</sup> The response rate among local jurisdictions for EAVS Section B was 99.9%; five counties in Arkansas did not provide Section B data. In addition, the response rate for individual items varied. Results reported in this chapter include only states for which data are available for a given question. State and national totals include all available jurisdiction-level data. National-level percentages reported in this chapter used casewise deletion.

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data.

<sup>3</sup> The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 52 U.S.C. § 20901. The EAC works with FVAP to collect comprehensive data from the states on all of the ballots sent and received by voters covered under UOCAVA (52 U.S.C. § 20301(b)(11)).



behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Through a memorandum of understanding between the EAC and FVAP, Section B of the EAVS is administered on behalf of both agencies. This agreement allows both the EAC and FVAP to fulfill congressionally mandated requirements to study UOCAVA voting while reducing the data collection and reporting burden on state and local election officials. States are required to report certain election data to the EAC after each federal election.<sup>4</sup>

This chapter examines UOCAVA data from the 2020 EAVS, including use of the FPCA by UOCAVA voters, ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by states, ballots returned by UOCAVA voters, UOCAVA ballots counted, UOCAVA ballots rejected, and usage of the FWAB by UOCAVA voters. Where appropriate, information about state laws and procedures related to UOCAVA voting, collected as part of the EAC's 2020 Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), is presented to provide context for the EAVS results.

## Federal Laws Regulating Military and Overseas Voting

### The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA)

UOCAVA protects the voting rights of members of the uniformed services who are stationed away from their voting residence, the spouses and other eligible family of uniformed services members, and U.S. citizens residing outside of the United States. It requires all states, territories, and the District of Columbia to allow these citizens to register to vote and to cast an absentee ballot for all federal elections.<sup>5</sup> For the estimated 1.4 million uniformed services members and approximately 600,000 military spouses and voting age dependents stationed away from their legal voting residence<sup>6</sup> as well as the estimated 2.9 million voting age U.S. citizens who live, study, or work overseas,<sup>7</sup> the absentee voting process is different from and can be more challenging than the voting process for non-military voters residing in the United States.

Citizens protected by UOCAVA include:

- Members of the uniformed services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, United States Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] Commissioned Officer Corps) who are stationed away from their legal voting residence;
- Members of the U.S. Merchant Marine;
- Eligible family members of the above; and
- U.S. citizens residing outside the United States.

<sup>4</sup> Section 703(a) HAVA amended section 102 of UOCAVA.

<sup>5</sup> Throughout this report, the term "uniformed services voter" refers to U.S. citizens who are active members of the uniformed services or a spouse or dependent family member thereof. "Overseas citizen" refers to non-military U.S. citizens who reside overseas.

<sup>6</sup> Information was provided by FVAP to Fors Marsh Group via email on May 10, 2021, and was current as of March 31, 2021.

<sup>7</sup> Federal Voting Assistance Program, "2018 Overseas Citizen Population Analysis," at <https://www.fvap.gov/info/reports-surveys/overseas-citizen-population-analysis>. The results of the 2020 Overseas Citizen Population Analysis were not available at the time of this report's publication.

Among the challenges UOCAVA sought to address was the wide variability in rules and procedures governing registration and voting across states, which made it difficult for uniformed services members and overseas citizens to navigate the voting process.<sup>8</sup> UOCAVA established the FPCA, which serves as a combination registration and ballot request application that is accepted in all U.S. states and territories. In addition, the FWAB functions as a backup ballot that can be cast by UOCAVA voters who make a timely request for, but do not receive, a regular absentee ballot.<sup>9</sup> Although states and localities still maintain and administer elections according to their own laws and procedures for registration and absentee voting among uniformed services members and overseas citizens, the provisions of UOCAVA established some uniformity in the absentee voting process for these voters.

## The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act of 2009 (MOVE)

Historically, UOCAVA ballots were transmitted from election offices to voters primarily through the mail. Given long mailing times and high mobility rates for this population of voters, this practice meant that many UOCAVA voters were unable to receive and return their absentee ballot before state ballot return deadlines. The MOVE Act amended UOCAVA to establish additional requirements to protect military and overseas citizens' voting rights.<sup>10</sup> These new rules required that all states and territories provide UOCAVA voters with an option to request and receive registration and absentee ballot request materials electronically, directed states to establish an electronic means of transmitting blank ballots to UOCAVA voters, and required states to provide free access to a system whereby voters can verify the status of their ballot. Additionally, absentee ballots must be transmitted no less than 45 days before a federal election to all UOCAVA voters who submit an absentee ballot request before this deadline. These additional provisions aimed to ensure uniformed services members and overseas citizens not only have the right to vote, but that they have sufficient time to receive and return their absentee ballots ahead of state deadlines.

## The UOCAVA Voting Process

Although the specific path may differ depending on the policies and procedures in one's state of voting residence and on a voter's particular situation and preferences, in general, the UOCAVA voting process can be summarized in six basic steps, as illustrated in Figure 1.<sup>11</sup>

1. Register and request an absentee ballot: UOCAVA-eligible citizens can do this either by completing a state application form or an FPCA, the federal form that functions as both a registration and absentee ballot request and is accepted in all states and U.S. territories.
2. Submit the registration and ballot request: Completed applications must be submitted to the appropriate state or local election office by mail or by an electronic means permitted by the

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<sup>8</sup> The United States Department of Justice. (2020, February 18). *The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act*. <https://www.justice.gov/crt/uniformed-and-overseas-citizens-absentee-voting-act>.


<sup>9</sup> Section 103 of UOCAVA provides a mechanism for uniformed services members and overseas citizen voters to cast a FWAB (see 52 U.S.C. § 20303).

<sup>10</sup> Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2008 statutory language can be found at <https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Policies/moveact.pdf>.

<sup>11</sup> Adapted from an FVAP infographic. For more detailed information about state policies related to UOCAVA voting, see Chapter 2 of this report.



Figure 1. The UOCAVA Voting Process



state. All states accept FPCAs by mail; states may also accept FPCAs via email, fax, the state's online voter registration portal, or by another mode.

3. **Application processing:** Once received, registration and absentee ballot request applications are processed by the election office. If an application fails to meet any state requirements (e.g., the form is not completed correctly, is submitted after the registration deadline, or the applicant is deemed ineligible), then it may be rejected. If an application meets all requirements and is accepted, it remains valid as a registration and ballot request, meaning that the voter will retain UOCAVA status and have an absentee ballot transmitted to them for the duration specified by state policy.
4. **Ballot transmission:** Election officials transmit absentee ballots to registered UOCAVA voters no later than 45 days before a federal election (ballots may be transmitted later if the ballot request is submitted by the state deadline but less than 45 days before an election). Ballots



may be transmitted to a voter by mail or through some other state-approved electronic means of transmission, as requested by the voter.

5. Complete and return absentee ballot: UOCAVA voters complete and return their absentee ballot to the appropriate election office for processing. Ballots may be returned and submitted for processing either by mail or through some other means allowed by a state. The FWAB may be used as a backup ballot by UOCAVA voters who do not receive a regular absentee ballot, or if the ballot does not arrive in time to be completed and returned ahead of state deadlines.
6. Ballot processing and counting: Completed absentee ballots that are returned and submitted for counting to an election office must be received by state deadlines and meet other state requirements. State policies on when completed ballots must be postmarked and when they must be returned to an election office in order to be eligible to be counted vary widely.

## UOCAVA Registration and Ballot Requests

The 2016 general election was the first time that registered overseas citizens outnumbered registered uniformed services members covered by UOCAVA. This trend continued in 2020, with uniformed services members or eligible family members accounting for 42.3% of registered UOCAVA voters and overseas citizens accounting for 57.4% of this population.<sup>12</sup>

Registered UOCAVA voters' legal voting residences<sup>13</sup> are disproportionately concentrated in just a few U.S. states. In 2020, the states with the largest numbers of registered UOCAVA voters were Florida (191,628), California (187,213), and Washington (127,976).<sup>14</sup> Together, these three states represented 40.4% of all registered UOCAVA voters reported in the 2020 EAVS. Twenty-two local jurisdictions<sup>15</sup> reported having 10,000 or more registered UOCAVA voters, and seven reported more

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<sup>12</sup> The total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1a of the 2020 EAVS. The number of registered and eligible uniformed services UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1b; the percentage of uniformed services UOCAVA voters was calculated by dividing B1b by B1a. The number of registered and eligible overseas citizen UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1c; the percentage of overseas citizen UOCAVA voters was calculated by dividing B1c by B1a. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. In total, 870 jurisdictions in 10 states did not report data in B1; this count excludes jurisdictions in Maine, which reported UOCAVA data at the state level and not the jurisdiction level. A total of 8,167 registered and eligible voters reported in B1a were not classified as either uniformed services or overseas citizens. These percentages exclude the seven states that did not report the number of registered UOCAVA voters as well as the state and territory that did not subdivide this number by UOCAVA voter type.

<sup>13</sup> According to FVAP's guidance for service members, "Your voting residence is within your state of legal residence or domicile. It is the address that you consider your permanent home and where you had a physical presence. Your state of legal residence is used for state income tax purposes, determines eligibility to vote for federal and state elections, and qualification for in-state tuition rates." For more information, see <https://www.fvap.gov/military-voter/voting-residence>.

<sup>14</sup> The total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters in a state was calculated by summing B1a across all jurisdictions for each state.

<sup>15</sup> What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For the 2020 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to counties. The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin reported data on the township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, because this information was only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state.




than 15,000 registered and eligible UOCAVA voters. These seven jurisdictions accounted for 15.3% of all registered UOCAVA voters (see Table 1).

**Table 1. Seven Jurisdictions Accounted for 15% of All Registered UOCAVA Voters**

Jurisdictions With More Than 15,000 UOCAVA Voters	
Jurisdiction	Number of Registered and Eligible UOCAVA Voters in 2020
Los Angeles County, CA	67,392
King County, WA	31,766
Pierce County, WA	27,023
Miami-Dade County, FL	17,495
New York County, NY	17,008
San Diego County, CA	16,074
Broward County, FL	15,154

Source: Information on the number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was item B1a of the 2020 EAVS. Alaska reported 16,194 total registered UOCAVA voters and reported as a single jurisdiction in the EAVS; however, it was not included in the table because the table focuses on localities rather than complete states.

**Figure 2. Most Jurisdictions Had Fewer Than 50 Registered UOCAVA Voters**



Source: Information for the number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1a of the 2020 EAVS.

Conversely, of the 5,094 local jurisdictions for which the number of registered UOCAVA voters was available, 80.9% reported fewer than 100 registered UOCAVA voters, including 371 jurisdictions that reported having zero UOCAVA voters in 2020. Figure 2 shows the number of registered UOCAVA voters by jurisdiction.

Election offices reported receiving 764,691 FPCAs ahead of the 2020 general election, which was almost double the 420,861 FPCAs that states reported receiving ahead of the 2016 general election. Overall, 30.3% of these registration and absentee ballot requests came from uniformed services members, and 66.9% were submitted by overseas citizens.<sup>16</sup> States reported rejecting 2.7% of the FPCAs received, of which 15.2% were rejected because the election office received the form after their state's absentee ballot request deadline.<sup>17</sup> The FPCA rejection rate among uniformed services members was slightly higher than among overseas citizens, with 3.3% of military FPCAs rejected compared to 2.3% of FPCAs submitted by overseas citizens.<sup>18</sup>

## UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted

In 2020, election offices in the 50 states, five U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia reported transmitting 1,249,601 ballots to UOCAVA voters.<sup>19</sup> Figure 3 shows the number of ballots sent out from election offices or transmitted for each state. The states colored in dark blue represent the states that distributed the most ballots to UOCAVA voters. The states colored in light blue are the states that distributed the fewest ballots to UOCAVA voters.

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<sup>16</sup> Data on the total number of FPCAs submitted was collected in item B2a of the 2020 EAVS. In 2016, this data was collected in item B20a. For 2020, the percentage of FPCAs received from uniformed services members was calculated as B2b/B2a. The percentage of FPCAs received from overseas citizen voters was calculated as B2c/B2a. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.


<sup>17</sup> The total number of FPCAs rejected was collected in item B3a in the 2020 EAVS; the percentage of FPCAs rejected was calculated as B3a/B2a. The percentage of FPCAs rejected because they were received late was calculated as B4a/B3a. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.

<sup>18</sup> The percentage of rejected FPCAs from uniformed services voters was calculated as B3b/B2b. The percentage of rejected FPCAs from overseas citizen voters was calculated as B3c/B2c. Overall, 6.9% of rejected FPCAs were not categorized by UOCAVA voter type. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.

<sup>19</sup> The number of transmitted UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B5a of the 2020 EAVS. The number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters was reported by all but 36 jurisdictions. Rhode Island did not report data on the number of ballots transmitted.



**Figure 3. Ballot Transmissions Were the Highest in States With Large UOCAVA Populations**



Source: Information on the number of transmitted UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B5a of the 2020 EAVS. State-level data were aggregated from jurisdiction data. Cutoff points in the graph were selected to reflect states that had the lowest and highest number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted and to differentiate among the states in between the lowest and highest UOCAVA ballot transmission numbers.


Of the UOCAVA ballots transmitted, 39.4% were sent to uniformed services members, and 60.1% were transmitted to overseas citizen voters.<sup>20</sup> Figure 4 shows that the percentage of ballots transmitted to overseas citizens has continued to rise steadily over the last several election cycles, increasing by 15.4 percentage points since the 2012 general election.

Although the nationwide percentage of ballots sent to overseas citizens was greater than the percentage sent to uniformed services members, the proportion of ballots sent to overseas citizens or uniformed services members varied by state. Kentucky and Louisiana, for example, reported that UOCAVA ballots were split about evenly between uniformed services members and overseas citizen voters; however, the District of Columbia and Massachusetts reported that the vast majority of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to overseas citizens (97.1% and 94.2%, respectively). In Alaska, American Samoa, New Mexico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, more than

<sup>20</sup> The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as B5b/B5a. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizen voters was calculated as B5c/B5a. Casewise deletion was used at the state level when calculating these percentages. An additional 1% of the transmitted ballots could not be classified by voter type.

three-quarters of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to uniformed services members. Figure 5 shows the percentage of ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters versus overseas citizen voters.


**Figure 4. Steady Increase in the Percentage of UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted to Overseas Citizens Relative to Uniformed Services Members**



Source: The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as  $B1b/B1a \times 100$  for the 2012, 2014, and 2016 EAVS and  $B5b/B5a \times 100$  for the 2018 and the 2020 EAVS. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as  $B1c/B1a \times 100$  for the 2012, 2014, and 2016 EAVS, and  $B5c/B5a \times 100$  for the 2018 and the 2020 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages; percentages may not sum to 100%. Ballots that were not classified as being from either overseas citizens or uniformed services voters were not included in this analysis.



**Figure 5. Twenty-Four States Transmitted More UOCAVA Ballots to Uniformed Services Members Than to Overseas Citizens**



Source: The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as  $B5c/B5a \times 100$  for the 2020 EAVS. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as  $B5b/B5a \times 100$  for the 2020 EAVS. The percentage of uncategorized ballots was calculated as  $(B5a-B5b-B5c)/B5a \times 100$  for the 2020 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages; percentages may not sum to 100%. Rhode Island did not report data on the number of ballots transmitted.

## Modes of UOCAVA Ballot Transmission

Over the last several election cycles, the modes by which absentee ballots have been transmitted to voters have changed substantially. Since the passage of the MOVE Act, transmission of ballots to UOCAVA voters has increasingly occurred electronically. Email was the most popular method of ballot transmission for the 2020 general election, with 62.3% of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters via email, 32% transmitted via postal mail, and 7.9% sent to voters through some other mode of transmission (e.g., fax or online systems).<sup>21</sup> By comparison, during the previous presidential election cycle in 2016, among states that provided data on transmission by mode, 59.8% of ballots were transmitted via email, and in 2018, email represented 56.6% of UOCAVA ballots that were transmitted.<sup>22</sup> Figure 6 displays the percentage of ballots transmitted by mail, email, or other modes for the 2020 general election.

Modes of ballot transmission differed based on UOCAVA voter type. The transmission mode among uniformed services members was almost evenly split between mail transmission (47.8%) and email transmission (46.7%). For ballots transmitted to overseas citizens, most ballots were transmitted by email (70.9%) while ballots transmitted by mail accounted for 22.2% of ballots transmitted. For both groups, between 7% and 7.9% of ballots were transmitted by other modes, including fax and online ballot delivery portals.

Overall, 1% of all ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters were returned as undeliverable, including mailed ballots returned to sender, emailed ballots that bounced back, and ballots that were undeliverable by other modes, such as an incorrect fax number.<sup>23</sup>

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
<sup>21</sup> The percentage of ballots transmitted by email was calculated as B7a/B5a for the 2020 EAVS. The percentage of ballots transmitted by postal mail was calculated as B6a/B5a. The percentage of ballots transmitted by other modes of transmission was calculated as B8a/B5a. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in these calculations. All but three states reported ballots transmitted by mode in 2020. Two additional states did not report the number of ballots transmitted by email. These states were excluded from calculations of the percentage of ballots transmitted by a given mode. However, the percentages by mode did not change substantively when transmitted ballots from these states were included in analysis.

<sup>22</sup> Until 2018, questions about mode of ballot receipt and return were asked in relation to the 45-day MOVE Act transmission deadline. Specifically, “How many UOCAVA absentee ballots did your jurisdiction transmit to UOCAVA voters using the following modes of transmission, before and after the 45-day deadline?” Starting in 2018, the survey was updated so that mode questions did not include this distinction. The percentage of ballots transmitted by email was calculated as B7a/B5a for the 2018 EAVS. The percentage of ballots transmitted by email was calculated as B24Total/B1a for the 2016 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in these calculations. In 2016, 27 of the 55 states that answered the EAVS provided information on transmission by mode.

<sup>23</sup> The percentage of ballots returned as undeliverable was calculated as B13a/B5a. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating this percentage. States and jurisdictions vary in the extent to which they are able to capture and report undeliverable ballots, overall and by mode of transmission.



**Figure 6. Modes of Ballot Transmission Differ for Overseas Citizens and Uniformed Services Members**



Source: The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted overall were calculated as  $B7a/B5a \times 100$  for email,  $B6a/B5a \times 100$  for postal mail, and  $B8a/B5a \times 100$  for other modes. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters were calculated as  $B7b/B5b \times 100$  for email,  $B6b/B5b \times 100$  for postal mail, and  $B8b/B5b \times 100$  for other modes. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted for overseas citizens were calculated as  $B7c/B5c \times 100$  for email,  $B6c/B5c \times 100$  for postal mail, and  $B8c/B5c \times 100$  for other modes. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages; percentages may not sum to 100%.

## UOCAVA Ballots Returned and Submitted for Counting

States reported 911,614 regular absentee ballots: 73% of those transmitted to voters (through any mode) were returned and submitted for counting by UOCAVA voters for the 2020 general election.<sup>24</sup> This is a 39% increase over 2016, when 655,844 regular absentee ballots were returned by UOCAVA voters.<sup>25</sup> Figure 7 shows the UOCAVA ballot return totals by state in 2020. The states colored in dark


<sup>24</sup> The total number of returned UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B9a in the 2020 EAVS. The percentage of transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned was calculated as  $B9a/B5a$ . Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating this percentage. More than 82% of jurisdictions reported the number of ballots returned and submitted for counting. FWABs were reported separately from regular UOCAVA absentee ballots and were not included in these figures. Because more than one ballot may be transmitted to an individual voter (e.g., because the original was returned undeliverable or was spoiled and replaced), this rate likely underestimates the rate of ballot return by UOCAVA voters.

<sup>25</sup> The total number of returned UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B2a in the 2016 EAVS.



blue represent the states that had the highest ballot return totals. The states colored in light blue were the states that had the lowest ballot return totals.

**Figure 7. UOCAVA Ballot Return Rates Were the Highest in the Northeast and Midwest**



Source: The percentage of transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters was calculated as  $B9a/B5a \times 100$ . Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the percentages shown in this map. States are grouped by quartiles rounded to the nearest integer.

Of the ballots returned to election offices, 36.3% were returned by uniformed services members, and 62.9% were returned by overseas citizens.<sup>26</sup> Overall, 63.8% of absentee ballots returned and submitted for counting by UOCAVA voters were returned to the election office via postal mail, 37.7% were returned by email, and 16.5% were returned through some other mode (e.g., fax or an online system).<sup>27</sup> Twenty-three states indicated that they do not allow or did not report email ballot return.


<sup>26</sup> The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by uniformed services members was calculated as  $B9b/B9a$ . The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by overseas citizen voters was calculated as  $B9c/B9a$ . Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.

<sup>27</sup> The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by postal mail was calculated as  $B10a/B9a$ . The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email was calculated as  $B11a/B9a$ . The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by some other mode was calculated as  $B12a/B9a$ . Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages. Four states did not report the number of ballots returned by mode and were excluded from all mode analysis. In addition, 23 states did not report ballots returned via email, and 28 did not report ballots returned by some other mode. If all states are included in the analysis, 61.8% of ballots were returned via mail, 23.1% via email, 11.7% by some other mode, and 3.3% of returned ballots were not categorized by mode.



Among the states that reported UOCAVA ballots returned by email, 42.5% of ballots were returned through email, and 45.2% were returned via mail.<sup>28</sup>

**Figure 8. Although Many UOCAVA Voters, Especially Overseas Citizens, Use Email to Return Their Completed Absentee Ballot, Postal Mail Is the Primary Mode of Ballot Return**



Source: The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode overall were calculated as  $B10a/B9a \times 100$  for postal mail and  $B11a/B9a \times 100$  for email. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode for uniformed services members were calculated as  $B10b/B9b \times 100$  for postal mail and  $B11b/B9b \times 100$  for email. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode for overseas citizens were calculated as  $B10c/B9c \times 100$  for postal mail and  $B11c/B9c \times 100$  for email. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages, and because percentages for each type of voter and each mode of return were calculated independently and only states that reported data for a given mode of return were included in the analysis, the percentages do not sum to 100%. Other modes of ballot return are not shown here.

Although postal mail was the most common mode of ballot return for both uniformed services and overseas citizen voters, uniformed services members used email return far less than overseas

<sup>28</sup> Thirty-three states reported at least one email ballot returned (item B11a in the 2020 EAVS). The percentage of ballots returned by email was calculated as  $B11a/B9a$  among states reporting at least one email ballot returned (item B11a in the 2020 EAVS). The percentage of ballots returned by mail was calculated as  $B10a/B9a$  among states reporting at least one email ballot returned (item B11a in 2020 EAVS). Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.

citizens, with just 18.2% using email to return an absentee ballot versus 51% of overseas citizens.<sup>29</sup> Figure 8 displays the method of ballot return for UOCAVA voters by type.

Overall, 889,837 regular absentee ballots returned by UOCAVA voters were counted in the 2020 general election. Of these votes, 63.1% were cast by overseas citizens and 36.5% by uniformed services voters.<sup>30</sup> The overall rejection rate for regular absentee ballots returned by UOCAVA voters was 2.1%, less than half the overall rejection rate of 5.7% reported in 2018.<sup>31</sup> The overall rejection rate did not differ significantly across UOCAVA voter types.<sup>32</sup>

Figure 9 shows the number of rejected UOCAVA ballots returned and submitted by voters for counting in each state. The states that are colored in dark blue represent the states that reported the highest number of rejected ballots, and the states that are colored in light blue reported the lowest number of rejected ballots.

Rejected ballots were divided into three reasons for rejection: missed deadline, problem with voter signature, and lacked postmark.<sup>33</sup> By far the most common reason for rejection was that a ballot was received after a state's deadline for UOCAVA absentee ballot receipt. Of the 19,060 returned UOCAVA ballots rejected, 8,188 were rejected because they were received after the state deadline, which was 43.5% of all UOCAVA ballot rejections.<sup>34</sup> Voter signature problems were responsible for 19.6% of all UOCAVA ballot rejections, 3.3% of ballot rejections were the result of postmark issues, and 47.3% of rejections were caused by some other issue.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email by uniformed services members was calculated as B11b/B9b. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email by overseas citizens was calculated as B11c/B9c. Of note, two of the states with the largest numbers of UOCAVA voters—California and Florida—do not allow email return of absentee ballots.

<sup>30</sup> The total number of UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters and counted was collected in item B14a of the 2020 EAVS. The percentage of ballots that were returned by uniformed services members was calculated as B14b/B14a. The percentage of ballots that were returned by overseas citizen voters was calculated as B14c/B14a. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages. An additional 12,919 (1.5%) UOCAVA absentee ballots counted were not classified by voter type.

<sup>31</sup> Before survey revisions were made in the 2018 EAVS, UOCAVA ballot rejection data included both regular absentee ballots and FWABs, making direct comparisons with years before 2018 complicated. The 2016 ballot rejection rate was calculated as (B16a+B16b+B16c)/B26b and produced an overall rejection rate of 2.4%.

<sup>32</sup> The rejection rate for UOCAVA ballots was calculated as B18a/B9a for the 2018 and 2020 EAVS. The percentage of ballots rejected from uniformed services voters was calculated as B18b/B9b. The percentage of ballots rejected from overseas citizen voters was calculated as B18c/B9c. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages. The rejection rate for returned ballots was 2% for uniformed services members, 2.1% for overseas citizens, and 6.3% among rejected ballots not classified by voter type.


<sup>33</sup> Two states (Mississippi and Rhode Island) and four U.S. territories (American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands) did not report the number of ballots rejected. The number of ballots rejected was reported for 81.7% of jurisdictions nationwide. Most of these jurisdictions also subdivided rejected ballots by reason for rejection. New Jersey was not able to separate regular UOCAVA ballots from FWABs; information on all of the UOCAVA ballots rejected in New Jersey in the 2018 election is available in the survey comments.

<sup>34</sup> The total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected for being received after the state deadline was item B19a of the 2020 EAVS. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected for being received late was calculated as B19a/B18a. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating this percentage.

<sup>35</sup> The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of signature issues was calculated as B20a/B18a. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of postmark issues was calculated as B21a/B18a. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected for other reasons was calculated as B22a/B18a. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages. The increase in "other" reasons for rejection may reflect a large increase in the use of this category by certain states, in particular New York with 2,098 (71.5% of their rejections) and Virginia 2,531 (217.3% of their rejections). These two states accounted for more than half of the total "other" rejections.



**Figure 9. UOCAVA Ballot Rejection Rates Vary Significantly Across States**



Source: The percentage of returned UOCAVA ballots that were rejected includes regular UOCAVA absentee ballots that were rejected (item B18a in the 2020 EAVS), divided by the total number of regular UOCAVA absentee ballots received (item B9a in the 2020 EAVS). Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the percentages shown in this map. Cutoff points in the graph were selected to reflect states that had the lowest and highest percentage of UOCAVA ballot rejection rates and to differentiate among the states in between the lowest and highest UOCAVA ballot rejection rates.

Uniformed services members and overseas citizen UOCAVA ballots were rejected for similar reasons. Missing the deadline was the most common reason for rejection among both populations—44.7% for uniformed services members and 41.3% for overseas citizens. Signature issues were the cause of 27.3% of ballot rejections for ballots returned by uniformed services members, almost twice the percentage of overseas citizen ballots rejected for this reason (13.7%).<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> The percentage of ballots rejected for missing the deadline was calculated as B19b/B18b for uniformed services voters and B19c/B18c for overseas citizens. The percentage of ballots rejected because of signature issues was calculated as B20b/B18b for uniformed services voters and B20c/B18c for overseas citizens. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.

## Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots

If a regular absentee ballot does not arrive in time for an individual to vote, the FWAB functions as a backup ballot that can be used to vote for all federal offices and, in some states, state and local offices as well.

### The Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB)

The FWAB is a special type of UOCAVA ballot that may be used as a backup in the event that a voter's regular absentee ballot does not arrive in time to vote. In most states, a UOCAVA voter must have registered and requested an absentee ballot in order to use the FWAB.

Although the 33,027 FWABs submitted in 2020 made up a relatively small proportion (3.8%) of all the UOCAVA ballots returned, there was a 41.1% increase in the volume of FWABs reported compared to the 2016 presidential election.<sup>37</sup> Despite the increase from previous elections, FWAB usage remains a relatively small proportion of the UOCAVA methods of voting among both uniformed services members and overseas citizen voters. However, the FWAB resulted in 23,897 additional UOCAVA voters' ballots counted in the 2020 general election, with 24.2% of these additional voters from uniformed services members and 73.2% from overseas citizens.<sup>38</sup> Thirteen states and territories reported that they received no FWABs during the 2020 presidential election.<sup>39</sup>

Roughly one in four (8,438 or 25.6%) of the 33,027 FWABs submitted in the 2020 general election were not counted. Of these, 3,965 FWABs—47.1% of the rejected FWABs—were replaced by a regular absentee ballot, making the backup ballot unnecessary.<sup>40</sup> The rate of uncounted FWABs returned by uniformed services members was similar to the rate of uncounted FWABs returned by overseas citizens—27.6% and 21.5%, respectively.<sup>41</sup> The other major reason FWABs went uncounted (and the

<sup>37</sup> The percentage of all ballots returned that were FWABs was calculated using the total number of FWABs received (B23a) divided by the total number of UOCAVA ballots received (the sum of B9a and B23a). Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating this percentage. The total number of FWABs received was collected in item B23a in the 2020 EAVS and the sum of B31a, B31b, B31c, and B31d in the 2016 EAVS. In 2016, states reported receiving 23,412 FWABs. For 2020, the total number of FWABs returned was based on 82.1% of jurisdictions for which this information was available.

<sup>38</sup> The total number of FWABs received and counted was item B24a of the 2020 EAVS. The number of FWABs counted from uniformed services members was item B24b, and the number of FWABs counted from overseas citizens was item B24c. The percentage of counted FWABs returned by uniformed services members was calculated as B24b/B24a. The percentage of counted FWABs returned by overseas citizens was calculated as B24c/B24a. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating this percentage.

<sup>39</sup> American Samoa, Guam, and Puerto Rico reported receiving zero FWABs. Georgia, Iowa, Oregon, and South Carolina reported FWABs with regular UOCAVA ballots because they could not separate the two types.

<sup>40</sup> The number of FWABs rejected because the voter's regular absentee ballot was received and counted was item B26a of the 2020 EAVS. The percentage of rejected FWABs that were rejected for this reason was calculated as B26a/(B25a+B26a+B27a). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the percentage.

<sup>41</sup> The total percentage of FWABs rejected was calculated as (B25a+B26a+B27a)/B23a. The percentage of FWABs rejected from uniformed services members was calculated as (B25b+B26b+B27b)/B23b. The percentage of FWABs rejected from overseas citizen voters was calculated as (B25c+B26c+B27c)/B23c. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.



only other reason states reported via the EAVS) was because they were received after the ballot receipt deadline (13.1% of rejected FWABs).<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> The percentage of rejected FWABs that were rejected because they were received after the deadline was calculated as  $B25a / (B25a + B26a + B27a)$ . Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.

## Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

UOCAVA Table 1: Registered and Eligible UOCAVA Voters

State	Registered UOCAVA Voters						
	All UOCAVA Voters	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama [1]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	16,194	12,285	75.9	3,909	24.1	0	0.0
American Samoa	214	183	85.5	31	14.5	0	0.0
Arizona	21,661	8,187	37.8	13,474	62.2	0	0.0
Arkansas	3,347	1,671	49.9	1,291	38.6	385	11.5
California	187,213	42,249	22.6	144,779	77.3	185	0.1
Colorado	42,291	15,114	35.7	27,177	64.3	0	0.0
Connecticut [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	2,899	640	22.1	2,259	77.9	0	0.0
District of Columbia	6,003	186	3.1	5,817	96.9	0	0.0
Florida	191,628	120,241	62.7	71,387	37.3	0	0.0
Georgia	27,252	14,223	52.2	13,029	47.8	0	0.0
Guam	120	76	63.3	44	36.7	0	0.0
Hawaii	4,835	1,212	25.1	3,262	67.5	361	7.5
Idaho	3,886	1,959	50.4	1,925	49.5	2	0.1
Illinois	30,274	7,585	25.1	22,626	74.7	63	0.2
Indiana	23,188	11,376	49.1	11,812	50.9	0	0.0
Iowa	6,772	2,182	32.2	4,580	67.6	10	0.1
Kansas [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kentucky	6,887	3,402	49.4	3,485	50.6	0	0.0
Louisiana	8,950	4,701	52.5	4,249	47.5	0	0.0
Maine	6,527	1,369	21.0	5,158	79.0	0	0.0
Maryland	27,454	9,228	33.6	18,226	66.4	0	0.0
Massachusetts	29,184	1,719	5.9	27,465	94.1	0	0.0
Michigan	26,866	6,833	25.4	20,033	74.6	0	0.0
Minnesota	19,243	5,230	27.2	14,013	72.8	0	0.0
Mississippi	3,721	2,446	65.7	1,275	34.3	0	0.0
Missouri [1]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Montana	5,110	2,549	49.9	2,561	50.1	0	0.0
Nebraska	3,059	1,206	39.4	1,853	60.6	0	0.0
Nevada	8,847	3,515	39.7	5,332	60.3	0	0.0
New Hampshire	7,165	2,506	35.0	4,659	65.0	0	0.0
New Jersey	26,959	2,654	9.8	24,305	90.2	0	0.0



State	Registered UOCAVA Voters						
	All UOCAVA Voters	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
New Mexico	6,365	4,813	75.6	1,552	24.4	0	0.0
New York	67,931	6,913	10.2	61,018	89.8	0	0.0
North Carolina	33,413	14,886	44.6	18,527	55.4	0	0.0
North Dakota [4]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	25	25	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Ohio [5]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Oklahoma	8,647	5,768	66.7	2,879	33.3	0	0.0
Oregon	20,477	6,370	31.1	14,107	68.9	0	0.0
Pennsylvania	35,597	11,515	32.3	24,082	67.7	0	0.0
Puerto Rico [6]	587	--	--	--	--	587	100.0
Rhode Island [7]	3,084	--	--	--	--	3,084	100.0
South Carolina	15,062	8,147	54.1	6,915	45.9	0	0.0
South Dakota	3,583	2,214	61.8	1,369	38.2	0	0.0
Tennessee	17,927	11,017	61.5	6,910	38.5	0	0.0
Texas	85,972	46,908	54.6	35,574	41.4	3,490	4.1
U.S. Virgin Islands	13	13	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Utah	7,707	3,150	40.9	4,557	59.1	0	0.0
Vermont [8]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia	41,063	14,841	36.1	26,222	63.9	0	0.0
Washington	127,976	84,227	65.8	43,749	34.2	0	0.0
West Virginia	2,531	1,459	57.6	1,072	42.4	0	0.0
Wisconsin	25,956	18,240	70.3	7,716	29.7	0	0.0
Wyoming	1,964	1,095	55.8	869	44.2	0	0.0
U.S. Total	1,253,629	528,328	42.3	717,134	57.4	8,167	0.7

UOCAVA Table 1 Calculation Notes:

**Registered Voters – All UOCAVA Voters, Total** uses question B1a.

**Registered Voters – Uniformed Services Members, Total** uses question B1b.

**Registered Voters – Uniformed Services Members, %** uses question B1b divided by question B1a.

**Registered Voters – Overseas Citizens, Total** uses question B1c.

**Registered Voters – Overseas Citizens, %** uses question B1c divided by question B1a.

**Registered Voters – Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total** uses question B1a minus the sum of questions B1b and B1c.

**Registered Voters – Not Categorized by Voter Type, %** uses question B1a minus the sum of questions B1b and B1c, all divided by question B1a.



UOCAVA Table 1 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

[1] Alabama and Missouri reported that data on the number of registered UOCAVA voters were not available.

[2] Connecticut reported that data on the number of registered UOCAVA voters were “not collected due to COVID.”

[3] Kansas did not provide any response to item B1.

[4] North Dakota does not have voter registration.

[5] Ohio noted in a survey comment that “As Ohio permits UOCAVA voters to register by several means other than a FPCA or FWAP [sic], we cannot accurately provide the actual number of UOCAVA voters in our state.”

[6] Puerto Rico noted in a survey comment that “At this moment, PR SEC doesn’t have the data break down by categories.” This abbreviation was not defined by the state.

[7] Rhode Island noted in a survey comment that “[A]ccording to RI general law all UOCAVA mail ballots are consolidated into one mail ballot category.”

[8] Vermont reported that item B1 did not apply to the state.



UOCAVA Table 2: Federal Post Card Applications (FPCA)

State	FPCAs Received						
	Total FPCAs Received	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized	
		Total	% of Total FPCAs Received	Total	% of Total FPCAs Received	Total	% of Total FPCAs Received
Alabama	3,578	2,320	64.8	1,258	35.2	0	0.0
Alaska	3,001	2,049	68.3	952	31.7	0	0.0
American Samoa	12	8	66.7	4	33.3	0	0.0
Arizona	21,889	6,375	29.1	10,242	46.8	5,272	24.1
Arkansas	956	421	44.0	547	57.2	-12	-1.3
California	117,618	22,131	18.8	85,296	72.5	10,191	8.7
Colorado [1]	11,584	2,288	19.8	9,296	80.2	0	0.0
Connecticut [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	2,918	644	22.1	2,274	77.9	0	0.0
District of Columbia	2,353	186	7.9	2,167	92.1	0	0.0
Florida	39,113	17,839	45.6	21,274	54.4	0	0.0
Georgia	3,945	1,175	29.8	2,770	70.2	0	0.0
Guam	55	35	63.6	20	36.4	0	0.0
Hawaii	4,534	1,106	24.4	2,938	64.8	490	10.8
Idaho	3,285	1,515	46.1	1,770	53.9	0	0.0
Illinois	25,678	5,838	22.7	19,777	77.0	63	0.2
Indiana	7,991	2,359	29.5	5,632	70.5	0	0.0
Iowa [3]	6,772	--	--	--	--	6,772	100.0
Kansas	5,611	2,691	48.0	3,705	66.0	-785	-14.0
Kentucky	7,667	3,738	48.8	3,929	51.2	0	0.0
Louisiana [4]	1,552	--	--	--	--	1,552	100.0
Maine [5]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maryland	27,492	9,239	33.6	18,253	66.4	0	0.0
Massachusetts	25,487	1,295	5.1	24,192	94.9	0	0.0
Michigan [6]	20,945	4,879	23.3	16,066	76.7	0	0.0
Minnesota	19,154	5,217	27.2	13,937	72.8	0	0.0
Mississippi [7]	3,717	--	--	--	--	3,717	100.0
Missouri [8]	1,803	--	--	--	--	1,803	100.0
Montana [9]	3,976	1,989	50.0	1,987	50.0	0	0.0
Nebraska	2,853	1,097	38.5	1,756	61.5	0	0.0
Nevada	8,738	3,448	39.5	5,290	60.5	0	0.0
New Hampshire	7,165	2,506	35.0	4,659	65.0	0	0.0
New Jersey	25,152	2,557	10.2	22,595	89.8	0	0.0
New Mexico	2,159	687	31.8	1,472	68.2	0	0.0

State	FPCAs Received						
	Total FPCAs Received	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized	
		Total	% of Total FPCAs Received	Total	% of Total FPCAs Received	Total	% of Total FPCAs Received
New York	67,931	6,913	10.2	61,018	89.8	0	0.0
North Carolina	25,573	10,088	39.4	15,485	60.6	0	0.0
North Dakota	339	189	55.8	150	44.2	0	0.0
Northern Mariana Islands [10]	25	25	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Ohio [11]	25,719	9,311	36.2	16,408	63.8	0	0.0
Oklahoma	8,311	5,582	67.2	2,729	32.8	0	0.0
Oregon [12]	2,683	--	--	--	--	2,683	100.0
Pennsylvania	32,027	9,330	29.1	22,697	70.9	0	0.0
Puerto Rico [13]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island [14]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina [6], [15]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	74	59	79.7	15	20.3	0	0.0
Tennessee	16,713	10,266	61.4	6,447	38.6	0	0.0
Texas	87,645	45,751	52.2	35,526	40.5	6,368	7.3
U.S. Virgin Islands	6	6	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Utah	4,299	1,208	28.1	3,091	71.9	0	0.0
Vermont [15]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia [6]	40,408	14,524	35.9	25,884	64.1	0	0.0
Washington	27,524	5,206	18.9	22,318	81.1	0	0.0
West Virginia	1,632	823	50.4	809	49.6	0	0.0
Wisconsin [16]	3,886	759	19.5	3,127	80.5	0	0.0
Wyoming	1,143	669	58.5	474	41.5	0	0.0
U.S. Total	764,691	226,341	30.3	500,236	66.9	38,114	5.0



State	FPCAs Rejected							
	Total FPCAs Rejected	% of FPCAs Received	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized	
			Total	% of Received from Uniformed Services	Total	% of Received from Overseas Citizens	Total	% of Total FPCAs Rejected
Alabama	43	1.2	34	1.5	6	0.5	3	7.0
Alaska	57	1.9	45	2.2	12	1.3	0	0.0
American Samoa	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	--
Arizona	42	0.2	18	0.3	20	0.2	4	9.5
Arkansas	7	0.7	6	1.4	7	1.3	-6	-85.7
California	9,602	8.2	2,830	12.8	6,644	7.8	128	1.3
Colorado [1]	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	--
Connecticut [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	11	0.4	2	0.3	9	0.4	0	0.0
District of Columbia	73	3.1	0	0.0	73	3.4	0	0.0
Florida	896	2.3	360	2.0	530	2.5	6	0.7
Georgia	244	6.2	73	6.2	171	6.2	0	0.0
Guam	26	47.3	15	42.9	11	55.0	0	0.0
Hawaii	13	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	13	100.0
Idaho	37	1.1	15	1.0	19	1.1	3	8.1
Illinois	364	1.4	72	1.2	290	1.5	2	0.5
Indiana	74	0.9	15	0.6	59	1.0	0	0.0
Iowa [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	39	0.7	17	0.6	22	0.6	0	0.0
Kentucky	1,415	18.5	740	19.8	675	17.2	0	0.0
Louisiana [4]	2	0.1	--	--	--	--	2	100.0
Maine [5]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maryland	50	0.2	15	0.2	35	0.2	0	0.0
Massachusetts	156	0.6	37	2.9	119	0.5	0	0.0
Michigan [6]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Minnesota	220	1.1	86	1.6	134	1.0	0	0.0
Mississippi [7]	1	0.0	0	--	1	--	0	0.0
Missouri [8]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Montana [9]	5	0.1	3	0.2	2	0.1	0	0.0
Nebraska	13	0.5	7	0.6	6	0.3	0	0.0
Nevada	36	0.4	14	0.4	22	0.4	0	0.0
New Hampshire	4	0.1	0	0.0	4	0.1	0	0.0
New Jersey	14	0.1	1	0.0	13	0.1	0	0.0
New Mexico	442	20.5	214	31.1	228	15.5	0	0.0
New York	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	--

State	FPCAs Rejected							
	Total FPCAs Rejected	% of FPCAs Received	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized	
			Total	% of Received from Uniformed Services	Total	% of Received from Overseas Citizens	Total	% of Total FPCAs Rejected
North Carolina	318	1.2	109	1.1	209	1.3	0	0.0
North Dakota	140	41.3	79	41.8	61	40.7	0	0.0
Northern Mariana Islands [10]	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	--	0	--
Ohio [11]	860	3.3	272	2.9	405	2.5	183	21.3
Oklahoma	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	--
Oregon [12]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	69	0.2	17	0.2	52	0.2	0	0.0
Puerto Rico [13]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island [14]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina [6], [15]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	2	2.7	1	1.7	1	6.7	0	0.0
Tennessee	562	3.4	494	4.8	68	1.1	0	0.0
Texas	3,894	4.4	1,617	3.5	1,258	3.5	1,019	26.2
U.S. Virgin Islands	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	--	0	--
Utah	8	0.2	6	0.5	2	0.1	0	0.0
Vermont [15]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia [6]	121	0.3	52	0.4	69	0.3	0	0.0
Washington	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	--
West Virginia	7	0.4	5	0.6	2	0.2	0	0.0
Wisconsin [16]	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	--
Wyoming	7	0.6	4	0.6	3	0.6	0	0.0
U.S. Total	19,874	2.7	7,275	3.3	11,242	2.3	1,357	6.8

UOCAVA Table 2 Calculation Notes:

**Total FPCAs received** uses question B2a.

**FPCAs received – Uniformed Services Members, Total** uses question B2b.

**FPCAs received – Uniformed Services Members, Pct of Total FPCAs Received** uses question B2b divided by question B2a.

**FPCAs received – Overseas Citizens, Total** uses question B2c.

**FPCAs received – Overseas Citizens, Pct of Total FPCAs Received** uses question B2c divided by question B2a.

**FPCAs received – Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total** uses question B2a minus the sum of questions B2b and B2c.

**FPCAs received – Not Categorized by Voter Type, Pct of Total FPCAs Received** uses question B2a minus the sum of questions B2b and B2c, all divided by question B2a.

**Total FPCAs rejected** uses question B3a.



**Percent of FPCAs received that were rejected** uses question B3a divided by question B2a.

**FPCAs rejected – Uniformed Services Members, Total** uses question B3b.

**FPCAs rejected – Uniformed Services Members, %** uses question B3b divided by question B2b.

**FPCAs rejected – Overseas Citizens, Total** uses question B3c.

**FPCAs rejected – Overseas Citizens, %** uses question B3c divided by question B2c.

**FPCAs rejected – Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total** uses question B3a minus the sum of questions B3b and B3c.

**FPCAs rejected – Not Categorized by Voter Type, %** uses question B3a minus the sum of questions B3b and B3c, all divided by question B3a.

#### UOCAVA Table 2 Data Notes:

##### General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from the states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- Negative numbers in the Not Categorized FPCAs received or rejected categories indicate that the sum of FPCAs for uniformed services members and overseas citizens in that category account for more than the total number of FPCAs reported by the state in the corresponding category.

[1] Connecticut reported that data on FPCAs were not available and that “[N]o distinction [was] made for these voters.”

[2] Colorado noted in a survey comment that “FPCAs are not rejected; if not completed by the voter, the voter is incomplete or pending.”

[3] Iowa reported data on the total number of FPCAs received but not on how many were received by voter type or how many FPCAs were rejected. This state noted in a survey comment that “[S]ystem does not allow me to show breakdown between these two types of UOCAVA voters.” The state also noted that “FPCAs can be accepted up to and including Election Day.”

[4] Louisiana reported data on the total number of FPCAs received and rejected and noted in a survey comment that “[T]he Department of State only collects data for the totals.”

[5] Maine reported that the EAVS items related to FPCAs did not apply to the state.

[6] Michigan, South Carolina, and Virginia reported that data on rejected FPCAs were not available.

[7] Mississippi reported in a survey comment that “FPCA by military or out of county not clearly defined in SEMS [Statewide Elections Management System].”

[8] Missouri reported data on the total number of FPCAs received but not on how many were received by voter type or how many FPCAs were rejected.

[9] Montana noted in survey comments that the state “accepts absentee registrations up until 8PM on Election Day.”

[10] The Northern Mariana Islands reported in survey comments that “[O]ur office did not receive any FPCA applicants.”

[11] Ohio noted for multiple counties that “[T]otal in B3a includes B4a; however, source information [for [military/overseas voters] for B4a is not tracked. [B]ecause of this, B3b + B3c will not always equal B3a.”

[12] Oregon reported in survey comments that the state is “unable to separate uniformed services from non-military overseas” and that data on rejected FPCAs is not tracked.

[13] Puerto Rico reported that data on FPCAs was not available, with a survey comment that “all the requests were made by email.”

[14] Rhode Island noted in a survey comment that “[A]ccording to RI general law all UOCAVA mail ballots are consolidated into one mail ballot category.”

[15] South Carolina and Vermont reported that data on FPCAs were not available.

[16] Wisconsin state statute does not require rejected registrations or FPCAs to be tracked.



UOCAVA Table 3: UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted, Returned, Counted and Rejected

State	UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted	UOCAVA Ballots Returned	UOCAVA Ballots Counted		UOCAVA Ballots Rejected	
			Total	% of Returned	Total	% of Returned
Alabama	6,682	5,144	5,091	99.0	53	1.0
Alaska	16,152	13,598	13,422	98.7	176	1.3
American Samoa	214	214	214	100.0	0	0.0
Arizona	21,679	18,483	18,435	99.7	48	0.3
Arkansas	3,042	2,206	2,104	95.4	465	21.1
California	162,295	97,301	95,872	98.5	1,419	1.5
Colorado	45,558	29,631	28,762	97.1	869	2.9
Connecticut	9,950	7,874	7,689	97.7	185	2.3
Delaware	2,899	2,429	2,305	94.9	124	5.1
District of Columbia	6,003	4,990	4,990	100.0	9	0.2
Florida	144,678	117,965	115,975	98.3	2,127	1.8
Georgia [1]	28,454	18,867	18,475	97.9	392	2.1
Guam	120	69	65	94.2	4	5.8
Hawaii	4,623	3,624	3,503	96.7	36	1.0
Idaho [2]	4,449	3,230	3,442	106.6	90	2.8
Illinois	29,614	24,358	23,302	95.7	462	1.9
Indiana	10,325	8,814	8,773	99.5	34	0.4
Iowa [1]	6,776	6,000	5,980	99.7	29	0.5
Kansas	5,551	4,990	4,980	99.8	23	0.5
Kentucky	6,252	4,669	4,664	99.9	5	0.1
Louisiana [3]	9,131	6,132	5,872	95.8	260	4.2
Maine	6,421	5,701	5,674	99.5	21	0.4
Maryland	29,060	21,593	21,315	98.7	278	1.3
Massachusetts	28,533	24,890	24,685	99.2	140	0.6
Michigan	27,026	22,492	21,464	95.4	1,028	4.6
Minnesota	19,383	15,943	15,407	96.6	536	3.4
Mississippi	3,717	2,967	2,965	99.9	0	0.0
Missouri	13,458	10,821	10,716	99.0	105	1.0
Montana [4]	4,944	4,323	4,312	99.7	11	0.3
Nebraska	2,978	2,643	2,627	99.4	16	0.6
Nevada	8,850	7,258	7,224	99.5	34	0.5
New Hampshire	7,165	6,327	6,167	97.5	160	2.5
New Jersey	26,959	11,732	11,634	99.2	81	0.7
New Mexico	6,292	6,292	5,261	83.6	71	1.1
New York [5]	58,393	69,585	66,706	95.9	2,936	4.2
North Carolina	58,993	26,802	26,386	98.4	416	1.6
North Dakota	1,900	1,633	1,624	99.4	18	1.1



State	UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted	UOCAVA Ballots Returned	UOCAVA Ballots Counted		UOCAVA Ballots Rejected	
			Total	% of Returned	Total	% of Returned
Northern Mariana Islands [6]	25	25	25	100.0	--	--
Ohio	25,742	21,601	21,388	99.0	213	1.0
Oklahoma	8,687	6,355	6,204	97.6	151	2.4
Oregon [1]	20,477	16,751	16,534	98.7	217	1.3
Pennsylvania	33,772	26,952	25,589	94.9	1,363	5.1
Puerto Rico [7]	587	587	587	100.0	--	--
Rhode Island [8]	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina [1], [9]	14,874	12,963	12,906	99.6	57	0.4
South Dakota	3,159	3,059	2,939	96.1	122	4.0
Tennessee	17,927	14,884	14,444	97.0	440	3.0
Texas	85,972	62,651	59,380	94.8	1,399	2.2
U.S. Virgin Islands [10]	13	8	8	100.0	--	--
Utah	9,087	5,820	5,798	99.6	22	0.4
Vermont	2,753	2,753	2,723	98.9	30	1.1
Virginia	41,063	33,045	31,880	96.5	1,165	3.5
Washington	134,777	64,632	63,954	99.0	678	1.0
West Virginia	2,549	2,167	2,162	99.8	5	0.2
Wisconsin [11]	17,642	14,057	13,530	96.3	527	3.7
Wyoming	1,976	1,714	1,704	99.4	10	0.6
U.S. Total	1,249,601	911,614	889,837	97.6	19,060	2.1

UOCAVA Table 3 Calculation Notes:

**UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted** uses question B5a.

**UOCAVA Ballots Returned** uses question B9a.

**UOCAVA Ballots Counted, Total** uses question B14a.

**UOCAVA Ballots Counted, % of Returned** uses question B14a divided by B9a.

**UOCAVA Ballots Rejected, Total** uses question B18a.

**UOCAVA Ballots Rejected, % of Returned** uses question B18a divided by B9a.

UOCAVA Table 3 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

[1] Georgia, Iowa, Oregon, and South Carolina reported that data on FWABs were included in the EAVS items related to UOCAVA absentee ballots because FWABs cannot be distinguished from regular UOCAVA absentee ballots.



[2] Kootenai County in Idaho responded “Data not available” to the number of UOCAVA ballots returned (B9a) and reported 317 UOCAVA ballots counted (B14a). Because of these responses, the total number of UOCAVA ballots received at the state level was lower than the total number of UOCAVA ballots counted, and the percentage of counted ballots exceeded 100% in Idaho.

[3] Louisiana noted in a survey comment that “[T]he registrar sometimes transmits multiple ballots to voter (i.e. the voter did not [receive] the original ballot or the original ballot is returned as undeliverable).”

[4] Montana noted in a survey comment that “[B]allots issued may exceed voter registration due to replacement ballot issued.”

[5] New York noted in a survey comment that “While the UOCAVA data reflects information provided by the counties, it does not address the variable that voters may return more than one ballot. The following further addresses this variable:

- (1) If voters have electronic access to their ballot, they could potentially download and print the documents more than once and subsequently return them to the county boards.
- (2) Some county boards mail a ballot to every UOCAVA voter, regardless of their transmission preference. Due to this, voters who already received their ballot electronically, completed and returned it, may subsequently receive a physical ballot in the mail. This may result in such voters returning this additional ballot.
- (3) Additional data collected by NYS BOE [New York State Board of Elections] has shown that more than 1700 UOCAVA voters returned multiple ballots, although the data does not report how many ballots each of these voters returned.”

[6] The Northern Mariana Islands and the U.S. Virgin Islands reported that items related to rejected UOCAVA absentee ballots did not apply.

[7] Puerto Rico reported that data in items related to rejected UOCAVA absentee ballots did not apply.

[8] Rhode Island noted in a survey comment that “[A]ccording to RI general law all UOCAVA mail ballots are consolidated into one mail ballot category.”

[9] South Carolina noted in a survey comment that “UOCAVA ballots counted equals UOCAVA ballots returned before deadline. No data available on UOCAVA ballots that may have been challenged.”

[10] The U.S. Virgin Islands reported that items related to rejected UOCAVA absentee ballots did not apply, with a survey comment that “[T]he five voters did not return their ballots that were sent to them.”

[11] In Wisconsin, other methods of transmitting UOCAVA ballots include online ballot delivery, fax, or email. There were some UOCAVA voters who voted at the polls on Election Day, rather than by UOCAVA absentee ballot; these voters are not included in Section B but are included in the numbers for Section D. Wisconsin does not have a postmark requirement for absentee ballots; absentee ballots must be received by the local clerk before polls close on Election Day. Many Wisconsin jurisdictions track the return of ballots received after Election Day, but they are not required to do so. Counts reported for “Ballot not received on time/missed deadline” represent the ballots that have been tracked in this way. In Wisconsin, ballots missing a postmark are counted if they otherwise qualify; therefore, there are no ballots rejected for this reason.

UOCAVA Table 4: Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB)

State	Total FWABs Received	FWABs Counted		FWABs Rejected		FWABs Not Categorized	
		Total	% of Total Received	Total	% of Total Received	Total	% of Total Received
Alabama	254	190	74.8	64	25.2	0	0.0
Alaska	155	97	62.6	58	37.4	0	0.0
American Samoa	0	0	--	0	--	0	--
Arizona	236	186	78.8	50	21.2	0	0.0
Arkansas	45	43	95.6	2	4.4	0	0.0
California [1]	3,474	1,723	49.6	1,575	45.3	176	5.1
Colorado	150	146	97.3	4	2.7	0	0.0
Connecticut [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	87	64	73.6	23	26.4	0	0.0
District of Columbia	380	309	81.3	71	18.7	0	0.0
Florida	1,726	833	48.3	883	51.2	10	0.6
Georgia [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Guam	0	0	--	0	--	0	--
Hawaii	12	12	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Idaho	30	12	40.0	23	76.7	-5	-16.7
Illinois	1,156	916	79.2	240	20.8	0	0.0
Indiana	1,534	1,170	76.3	40	2.6	324	21.1
Iowa [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	169	141	83.4	27	16.0	1	0.6
Kentucky [4]	106	--	--	--	--	106	100.0
Louisiana	30	28	93.3	2	6.7	0	0.0
Maine	106	97	91.5	9	8.5	0	0.0
Maryland	943	491	52.1	452	47.9	0	0.0
Massachusetts	647	646	99.8	1	0.2	0	0.0
Michigan [5]	949	329	34.7	620	65.3	0	0.0
Minnesota	506	333	65.8	173	34.2	0	0.0
Mississippi	3	3	100.0	1	33.3	-1	-33.3
Missouri	301	301	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Montana	61	56	91.8	5	8.2	0	0.0
Nebraska	81	80	98.8	1	1.2	0	0.0
Nevada	222	221	99.5	1	0.5	0	0.0
New Hampshire	86	85	98.8	1	1.2	0	0.0
New Jersey	9,333	9,269	99.3	55	0.6	9	0.1
New Mexico [6]	131	83	63.4	48	36.6	0	0.0
New York	3,088	1,637	53.0	1,424	46.1	27	0.9



State	Total FWABs Received	FWABs Counted		FWABs Rejected		FWABs Not Categorized	
		Total	% of Total Received	Total	% of Total Received	Total	% of Total Received
North Carolina	921	910	98.8	11	1.2	0	0.0
North Dakota	29	29	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Northern Mariana Islands [7]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio [8]	789	466	59.1	313	39.7	10	1.3
Oklahoma	207	162	78.3	45	21.7	0	0.0
Oregon [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	242	235	97.1	7	2.9	0	0.0
Puerto Rico	0	0	--	0	--	0	--
Rhode Island [9]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	14	12	85.7	2	14.3	0	0.0
Tennessee	456	232	50.9	224	49.1	0	0.0
Texas	2,839	912	32.1	1,925	67.8	2	0.1
U.S. Virgin Islands [10]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utah [2]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Vermont [11]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia [12]	448	448	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Washington	898	894	99.6	4	0.4	0	0.0
West Virginia	45	39	86.7	6	13.3	0	0.0
Wisconsin [13]	137	56	40.9	48	35.0	33	24.1
Wyoming	1	1	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
U.S. Total	33,027	23,897	72.6	8,438	25.6	692	2.1

UOCAVA Table 4 Calculation Notes:

**Total FWABs Received** uses question B23a.

**FWABs Counted, Total** uses question B24a.

**FWABs Counted, %** uses question B24a divided by question B23a.

**FWABs Rejected, Total** uses the sum of questions B25a, B26a, and B27a.

**FWABs Rejected, %** uses the sum of questions B25a, B26a, and B27a, all divided by B23a.

**FWABs Not Categorized, Total** uses question B23a minus the sum of questions B24a, B25a, B26a, and B27a.

**FWABs Not Categorized, %** uses question B23a minus the sum of questions B24a, B25a, B26a, and B27a, all divided by question B23a.

UOCAVA Table 4 Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- Negative numbers in the Not Categorized FWABs category indicate that the sum of counted and rejected FWABs account for more than the total number of FWABs received as reported by the state.
- The EAVS tracks data on FWABs that were rejected because they were received after the ballot receipt deadline (B25), because the voter's regular absentee ballot was received and counted (B26), and for other reasons (B27).

[1] In California, a large number of FWAB rejections occurred because regular vote-by-mail ballots were already returned and counted for the same voter, and because of missing signatures, incomplete information, or receipt after deadline.

[2] Connecticut and Utah reported that data on items related to FWABs were not available.

[3] Georgia, Iowa, Oregon, and South Carolina reported that data on items related to FWABs were not available because FWABs cannot be distinguished from regular UOCAVA absentee ballots.

[4] Kentucky reported that data on items related to counted and rejected FWABs were not available. This state also noted in a survey comment that "[R]eject reason not tracked."

[5] Michigan noted in a survey comment that "[A]ll FWABs received were either counted, received a regular ballot that was counted, or arrived late."

[6] In New Mexico, the reason for rejection is not tracked by counties at this time.

[7] The Northern Mariana Islands reported that data on items related to FWABs were not available, with a survey comment that "[T]he election statute does not allow for Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot."

[8] Ohio noted for multiple counties that the "[T]otal in B23a does include B26a. Source information [for military/overseas voters] for B26a is not tracked. Because of this, B23b + B23c will not always equal B23a."

[9] Rhode Island noted in a survey comment that "[A]ccording to RI general law all UOCAVA mail ballots are consolidated into one mail ballot category."

[10] The U.S. Virgin Islands reported that data on items related to FWABs were not available.

[11] Vermont reported that data on FWABs were not available.

[12] Local election officials in Virginia do not enter information relating to rejected FWABs into the state's central system and only enter information on FWABs that are accepted and counted.

[13] In Wisconsin, many jurisdictions track the return of ballots received after Election Day but are not required to do so. The counts reported in "Total number of FWABs rejected because it was received after the ballot receipt deadline" [B25a] are limited to ballots in jurisdictions that recorded these in the statewide database.



# Chapter 5. Survey Methodology and Procedures

Since 2004, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has conducted the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) following each federal general election. The project collects data on election policies, voter registration, voting by individuals covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), mail voting, in-person voting, poll workers and polling places, provisional voting, election technology, and turnout. All U.S. states, U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia are included in the EAVS.<sup>1</sup> The EAVS helps the EAC meet its mandate under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and the review of procedures with respect to the administration of federal elections.

The EAVS collectively consists of two surveys administered separately: The Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), which collects data on state election policies and procedures, was administered from August to December 2020. The information collected through the Policy Survey helps provide context to the data reported through the EAVS. The EAVS, which collects data about registrations, voters, and ballots in the 2020 general election, was administered from December 2020 to July 2021. The data collected through the EAVS allow states to satisfy their data reporting requirements established by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and UOCAVA and provide a detailed snapshot of how general elections are administered in the United States every two years.

This report relies on EAVS data submitted and certified by 50 states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories. Data for each state were collected at the jurisdiction level, with 6,460 of the 6,460 jurisdictions nationwide (100%) submitting at least partial data in 2020.<sup>2</sup> Appendix A of this chapter shows the number of jurisdictions and the response rate by state (overall and for each section of the EAVS).

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data. Puerto Rico provides EAVS data only in presidential election years, as it does not hold elections for federal candidates in midterm election years. American Samoa did not participate in the 2016 EAVS. The Northern Mariana Islands participated in the EAVS for the first time in 2020.

<sup>2</sup> What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For the 2020 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to counties. The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin reported data on the township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, because this information was only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state. See Appendix A in this chapter for a breakdown of the number of jurisdictions reported in each state. Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are included with Maui’s data.

## Survey Questions

The 2020 Policy Survey consisted of 80 questions (41 required questions, 23 follow-up questions based on a state's responses to the required questions, and 16 optional comments boxes). Of these, 58 were single-select or multiselect questions, 20 were open-ended with a text response, and two were hybrid single-select and text questions.

The 2020 EAVS consisted of 407 questions (217 required, 79 follow-up questions based on a jurisdiction's responses to the required questions, 77 optional questions based on whether a jurisdiction had additional data to provide, and 34 optional comments boxes). Of these questions, 253 were fill in the blank with a numerical response, 37 were item descriptions, 65 were single-select questions, and 52 were open-ended with a text response.

The content of the questions in the EAVS has largely been unchanged since the 2008 survey, although questions are periodically removed, updated, or reordered. The Policy Survey was significantly reorganized in 2018 and was converted to a set of closed-ended questions. The 2020 Policy Survey was significantly revised and expanded from the 2018 survey. The full set of EAVS and Policy Survey questions can be found at <https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys>.

The following sections detail the data collected by these surveys and the changes that were made to the questions from the 2018 versions. In 2020, the primary changes to the survey questions involved:

- Adding Policy Survey questions that could be used to validate EAVS items.
- Removing a redundant EAVS question, adding one new EAVS question, and adding two sub-questions to an existing EAVS question.
- Clarifying instructions to make completion easier for election officials and to improve data quality.

### Policy Survey

Since 2008, the EAVS has been accompanied by a survey that collects information on states' election policies and practices to provide greater context for the jurisdiction-level data collected through the EAVS. This originally took the form of the Statutory Overview, which consisted of open-ended questions on statutory requirements for various parts of the election process, asking states to report information on their election laws and policies. However, the open-ended format made it difficult to interpret states' statutory language, identify patterns in election practices, and draw meaningful comparisons between states.

Beginning with the 2018 EAVS, the Statutory Overview was significantly redesigned and renamed the Policy Survey. The survey now uses closed-ended questions and is intended to capture states' broad policies rather than to represent a comprehensive overview of state statutory language. This allows for greater ease in interpreting the results, creating comparisons across states, and providing



context in understanding the EAVS data. The Policy Survey questions are designed to map onto the EAVS data questions so that the two surveys can be used in concert.

The 2020 Policy Survey collected information on election infrastructure; how the state answers the EAVS; voter registration and list maintenance; election technology; mail voting; in-person voting before Election Day; vote centers; UOCAVA voting; provisional voting; election certification, recounts, and audits; voter identification; and how criminal convictions affect voting. The 2020 Policy Survey was significantly revised and expanded compared to the 2018 survey. New additions to the Policy Survey included:

New Question for 2020	Description
Q1, Q1a, Q2, Q2a, Q2b, and Q2c	Information on a state's election infrastructure, including the name, title, and duties of the chief state election official; the names and EAVS responsibilities of state election offices; the names and EAVS responsibilities of local election offices; whether any jurisdictions had been added or consolidated since the 2018 EAVS; and contact information (including the office name, physical address, mailing address, phone number, website, and email address) for all state and local election offices within the state.
Q6a and Q6b	Information on how a state implements its automatic or automated voter registration process, including how individuals could decline to be registered.
Q7b	Features incorporated into a state's online registration system.
Q8	Online voting information search tools available on the state's election website.
Q10	Preregistration of voters before they turn 18 years of age.
Q11, Q11a, Q11b	Whether the state designates certain voters as inactive, and if so, what actions would result in an active voter being designated as inactive and what actions would result in an inactive voter being designated as active.
Q12	Whether state officials, local officials, or both are responsible for modifying or removing voter registration records.
Q13, Q13a	Whether the state sends confirmation notices, whether the confirmation notices are sent pursuant to the NVRA, pursuant to state statute, or formal administrative rule or guidance, and which types of voters are sent confirmation notices.
Q14	What data sources a state uses to identify potentially ineligible voters on their voter registration rolls.
Q15, Q15a	Policy on voting system testing and certification and what type of testing and certification is required.
Q16, Q16a	Whether electronic poll books are used in the state and whether testing and certification for those electronic poll books is required.
Q21	How long a state tracks mailed ballots for inclusion in its EAVS Section C data.
Q22	What types of markings satisfy the state's postmark requirement for mailed ballots.
Q23	Which voters may receive ballots electronically.
Q30	The deadline for overseas UOCAVA voters to return their ballots. This question was designed to match a question on domestic military UOCAVA voters that had been in the 2018 Policy Survey but was renumbered and redesigned for 2020 (Q29).



New Question for 2020	Description
Q31	Whether UOCAVA ballots have different postmark requirements for mailed ballots.
Q32, Q32a, Q32b	Whether the state uses provisional ballots, and if so, what circumstances warrant a voter being provided a provisional ballot and the deadline for adjudicating provisional ballots.
Q33	State's election certification deadline.
Q35a	What type(s) of audits a state conducts.
Q36a	Deadline for a voter to present valid identification if they do not have identification at the polls and must take further action to prove their identity.

Questions that were significantly revised from the 2018 Policy Survey included:

Significantly Revised from 2018	Description
Q5	Government entities that transmit data to the centralized state database. This question had been Q3 and Q4 in 2018. For 2020, this question was collapsed from three to two subcategories, including a binary yes/no question on whether the government entity transfers data and a single-select, follow-up question with how frequently the data transmission occurs.
Q6	Whether the state registers individuals to vote automatically or via an automated process. This question had previously been Q5 in 2018. The 2020 question clarified the definition of "automatically" and "automated process," provided examples of automated processes, and included a space for comments.
Q6a	Which state agencies participate in automatic or automated voter registration. This question had previously been Q5a in 2018. In 2020, this was changed to a multiselect question with additional answer options that better align with state practices.
Q7	Whether the state has online registration. This question had previously been Q6 in 2018. The 2020 question clarified the definition of online registration and added an answer option for states that could only process registration updates through online registration.
Q7a	Whether a registrant needed a state-issued form of identification in order to register online. This question had previously been Q6a in 2018. The 2020 question clarified that any state-issued identification, not just driver's licenses, would apply to this question.
Q9	Whether a state has same-day voter registration (SDR). This question had previously been Q7 in 2018. The 2020 question included a clarification that an overlap between the availability between the mail balloting period and the close of voter registration should not be considered SDR.
Q9a	The type of SDR offered by the state. This question had previously been Q7 in 2018. The 2020 question was changed from a single-select question to a multiselect question.



Significantly Revised from 2018	Description
Q20	Deadlines for mail voters to return their ballots. This question had previously been Q11 in 2018. The 2020 question restructured the answer options to provide greater clarity, eliminated the answer option for mailed ballots postmarked after Election Day, and included a comments section.
Q24	Types of in-person early voting permitted in a state. This question had previously been Q12 in 2018. The 2020 question asked for what terminology a state used to describe in-person early voting and clarified that hand delivery of mailed ballots by voters should not be considered early voting.
Q24a	Whether an excuse was required for early voting. This question had previously been Q12a in 2018. The 2020 question was updated to match the wording of Q24.
Q25	Whether a state used vote centers. This question had previously been Q13 in 2018. The 2020 question clarified that polling locations that function as a vote center, even if the terminology is not the same, should be included in this question.
Q26	Which Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) submission methods are permitted in the state. This question had previously been Q14 in 2018. The 2020 question clarified that postal mail does not need to be specified, as this mode of submission is required in all states.
Q27	Whether FPCA registration is permanent or temporary. This question had previously been Q15 in 2018. The 2020 question included updated wording to clarify that it applies to how long an FPCA registers a person as a UOCAVA voter.
Q28	How long a voter remains eligible to receive a UOCAVA ballot after registering with an FPCA. This question had previously been Q15 in 2018. The 2020 question provided more extensive answer options.
Q29	Deadline for domestic military UOCAVA voters to return their ballots. This question had previously been Q17 in 2018. The 2020 question was revised to match the format of Q20, which collects data on the deadline for voters to return mailed ballots, and the instructions were updated to specify that the question applies to domestic military UOCAVA voters rather than all UOCAVA voters.
Q32c	How a state would handle a provisional ballot cast in the wrong precinct. This question had previously been Q18 in 2018. The 2020 question included an instruction about the definition of a partially counted provisional ballot.
Q34	Reasons for conducting post-election recounts of ballots. This question had previously been Q19 in 2018. The 2020 question added a definition of “election recount” and included updated answer options.
Q35	Statutory requirements for audits. This question had previously been Q20 in 2018. The 2020 question included revised terminology, a definition of “audit,” and the addition of an answer option for other types of post-election tabulation audits.
Q36	Voter identification requirements for non-first-time voters. This question had previously been Q21 in 2018. The 2020 question included additional answer options and clarified that non-government, non-photo identification options could include proof of residence.
Q37	Which populations become ineligible to vote because of disqualifying criminal convictions. This question had previously been Q22 in 2018. The 2020 question included revised question wording and was changed to a multiselect question.

Significantly Revised from 2018	Description
Q37a	How long people with disqualifying felony convictions lose their ability to vote. This question had previously been Q23 in 2018. The 2020 question was changed to a multiselect question, added an answer option for payment of outstanding fines, and the answer options were reworded to be mutually exclusive.
Q37b	How people with disqualifying felony convictions can have their voting rights restored. This question had previously been Q24 in 2018. The 2020 question was changed to a multiselect question, the wording of the answer options was clarified, and a comment section was added.

The following questions had no change except for renumbering and, for some, the addition of a comment section:

2020 Numbering	2018 Numbering	Description
Q3	Q1	How the state answers the EAVS.
Q4	Q2	Whether the state has a top-down, bottom-up, or hybrid voter registration database.
Q4a	Q2a	How often bottom-up or hybrid databases transmit information to the state voter registration database.
Q17	Q8	Whether an excuse is required for mail voting.
Q18	Q9	Whether the state, or any jurisdiction within the state, conducted an all-vote-by-mail election for the November 2020 general election.
Q18a	Q9a	Whether the all-vote-by-mail system was used statewide or only in certain jurisdictions for the 2020 general election.
Q19	Q10	Whether permanent mail voting is permitted.
Q19a	Q10a	Which voters are permitted to register as permanent mail voters.
Q25a	Q13a	How vote centers operate within the state.

The 2018 Policy Survey questions on audits of polling place procedures, audits of voting machines, and types of ballots audited were removed for 2020.

## Section A: Voter Registration

Section A of the EAVS collects data on voter registration. This includes the number of persons registered and eligible to vote in the November 2020 general election, active and inactive voters, voters who used SDR, registration forms processed between the close of registration for the 2018 general election and the close of registration for the 2020 general election, confirmation notices sent pursuant to the NVRA, and voters removed from the voter registration rolls.



In 2020, changes to this section included the addition of sub-questions on the number of SDRs received on Election Day (A2b) and before Election Day (A2c), in addition to the total provided in A2a. The instructions in this question were also revised to clarify that all SDRs received for the 2020 general election should be reported. In addition, the instructions for A4–A7 were revised to clarify that online voter registrations reported in A4c, A5c, A6c, and A7c should only include registration forms that were completed and submitted through a web-based online registration form system and that SDRs should be categorized according to the mode used to submit the registration application. The instructions for A8 were revised to include a more accurate definition of the term “confirmation notice” and to clarify that notices sent between the close of registration for the November 2018 general election and the close of registration for the November 2020 general election should be reported in this question.

## Section B: UOCAVA

Section B of the EAVS collects data on voters covered by UOCAVA. This includes the number of registered UOCAVA voters; FPCAs received and rejected; UOCAVA ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected; and Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) received, counted, and rejected. Most questions in Section B were divided by type of voter (uniformed services members and overseas citizens) and by method of ballot transmission and return (postal mail, email, and other).

In 2014, the UOCAVA section of the EAVS was expanded to include questions from the Federal Voting Assistance Program’s (FVAP) Post-Election Quantitative Survey. The goal of combining surveys was to reduce the burden on election officials by asking them to answer a single set of questions about UOCAVA voting rather than answering two surveys that captured many of the same data points. The current format of Section B is the result of a memorandum of understanding between the EAC and FVAP that allows both agencies to collect, share, and evaluate data on the voting experiences of citizens covered under UOCAVA and to fulfill their congressionally mandated requirements to study UOCAVA voters.

In 2020, changes to this section included the addition of question B27. Previously, the questions in the EAVS relating to FWABs only asked for data on FWABs rejected from being received after the ballot receipt deadline or because the voter’s regular absentee ballot was received and counted. The addition of B27 allows states to report data on FWABs rejected for other reasons, in total (B27a), for uniformed services voters (B27b), and for overseas citizen voters (B27c). A space was also provided to collect a description of the reasons the FWABs reported in B27 were rejected. In addition, the instructions for question B8 were updated to clarify that ballots transmitted by “other mode” could include fax and online ballot delivery portals.

## Section C: Mail Voting

Section C of the EAVS collects data on mail voting. This includes the number of mailed ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected, as well as the number of ballots sent to permanent mail voters.

In 2020, changes to this section included a clarification to the instructions of C1 that all mailed ballots transmitted for the November 2020 general election should be included in this question, and a clarification to the instructions of C2 that ballots transmitted in an all-vote-by-mail state or jurisdiction should not be included in the count of mailed ballots transmitted to permanent absentee voters.

## Section D: In-Person Voting and Polling Operations

Section D of the EAVS collects data on in-person voting. This includes the number of ballots cast through in-person voting before and on Election Day, the number of precincts and polling places, and the number of poll workers and the level of difficulty involved in recruiting poll workers. This section was previously called “Total Votes Cast and In-Person Voting” and was renamed in 2020 to reflect the removal of a redundant question about the total votes cast and to better align with the section’s focus on in-person voting and the polling operations to support in-person voting.

The removal of the 2018 question on total votes cast caused the questions in Section D to be renumbered. The removed question on total votes cast was redundant with question F1a on the number of votes cast and counted. In addition, the instructions in questions D5–D7 were updated to clarify the definition of a poll worker and to specify how poll workers should be counted. The instructions for D6 were updated to specify that each early voting poll worker should be counted once regardless of how many early voting shifts they worked, and the instructions for D7 were updated to specify that each poll worker should be counted only once, regardless of how many shifts they worked.

## Section E: Provisional Ballots

Section E of the EAVS collects data on provisional voting, including provisional ballots submitted, provisional ballot adjudication, and reasons for rejection.

In 2020, changes to this section included a clarification of the instructions in E1b–d that the number of provisional ballots submitted should be recorded. A definition of provisional ballots counted in part was added to the instructions of E1c.

## Section F: Voter Participation and Election Technologies

Section F of the EAVS collects data on voter participation and election technologies. This includes total participation in the 2020 general election, how many ballots were cast and counted by mode of participation, the source of participation data, use of electronic and paper poll books, voting equipment used, and the location where votes are tallied. Respondents were also provided the opportunity to share general comments regarding their state’s or jurisdiction’s Election Day experiences, noteworthy successes, and challenges they overcame when administering the November 2020 general election.

In 2020, changes to this section included a clarification of how participation should be counted in question F1. The 2018 question collected data on the number of voters who participated; this instruction was updated for 2020 to clarify that voters who cast a ballot that was counted should be



reported in this question. In addition, question F1e removed the instruction that provisional voters who were given credit in their vote history should be included in this question. The instructions for question F8 were updated to include a more complete description of scanners.

## Data Collection Procedures

In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the EAC submitted the questions for the 2020 Policy Survey and the EAVS for review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and for public comment. Public comments were collected from October 8, 2019, to December 6, 2019, and from February 11, 2020, to March 12, 2020. The questions were approved under OMB Control No. 3265-0006, expiration date March 31, 2023. The survey questions were made available publicly on the EAC's website on July 8, 2020. Targeted communications with state points of contact (POC) responsible for completing the surveys began on July 7, 2020, and continued regularly throughout the data collection period. These targeted communications aimed to keep states aware of data collection deadlines and resources available to assist them with completing the survey.

The following sections describe each aspect of the EAVS data collection process in more detail.

### Needs Assessment

To better understand how state-level officials respond to the EAVS and where they need support, the EAC undertook a systematic assessment of the needs of EAVS POCs in October and November 2019. The goal of these interviews was to better understand each state's EAVS reporting process (including how data is collected, which templates are used, the state's use of technical assistance resources, and data quality) and how improvements could be made to the 2020 EAVS. All state POCs that completed the 2018 EAVS were invited to participate and interviews with 34 states were completed. The EAC created semi-structured interview guides for each participant that also left room for the moderator to probe further.

The information collected through these needs assessment conversations helped the EAC's outreach plan design, shaped the training opportunities provided to each state, and identified states that needed specialized support to complete the EAVS. Based on these conversations, the EAC made improvements to the design and usability of the data collection templates, added supplementary instructions to clarify how respondents were to use the missing data codes in the survey, and released the EAVS data collection templates earlier than in previous years to afford POCs more time to compile their data submissions. During these needs assessment calls, the EAC also encouraged state POCs to review and provide comments on the draft 2020 survey questions, which at the time were available on the Federal Register.

### Policy Survey

Invitations to complete the 2020 Policy Survey were sent to all 56 states, territories, and districts on August 3, 2020. The Policy Survey data are collected in advance of EAVS data collection to reduce respondent burden and to allow the EAC to create data validation rules for the EAVS data. The Policy Survey was completed through an online survey; this survey had undergone usability testing with POCs from nine states and territories in June and July 2020, and edits to the survey based on the

results of this testing were completed in advance of the survey's launch.<sup>3</sup> Periodic reminders were issued to POCs during the data collection period. All 56 states, territories, and districts submitted their Policy Survey data by December 15, 2020. When the answer options within a question did not fully capture a state's policy, POCs were encouraged to provide comments with further explanation.

The 2020 Policy Survey had a series of questions about the contact information of state and local election offices. The EAC collected this contact information from state election websites and official registers in May and June 2020. This information was pre-populated into the online Policy Survey data collection tool and was provided to POCs to review and correct as they completed the Policy Survey. Because this data contains personally identifiable information (PII), it is not part of the public data release.

Once received, each Policy Survey submission was reviewed for completeness. Through these reviews and through further reviews conducted once each state's EAVS submission was received, the EAC made Policy Survey corrections for 37 states before the end of the EAVS data collection period.

For the first time, the EAC incorporated a state's Policy Survey submission directly into the EAVS data collection template validations in 2020. This means that a state's 2020 EAVS data collection templates could not be released until the state's Policy Survey submission was finalized.

## EAVS

The EAVS data collection period was opened to 46 states on November 9, 2020. The data collection was opened to the 10 remaining states once their Policy Survey submissions were received and their templates were finalized; all data collection templates were released to states by December 18, 2020. The EAVS data collection period ended in July 2021. Data submissions from all 56 states were received by that date, with a response rate of 100% of states. After providing final data, states' chief election officials certified their Policy Survey and EAVS as complete and correct to the best of their knowledge.

To build on the needs assessment conversations that were completed in October and November 2019, the EAC completed pre-survey outreach calls with officials from states that had new designated POCs for the 2020 EAVS or that had requested further follow-up after the needs assessment calls. Fifteen states were invited to participate in the outreach calls, and 10 states completed calls in August of 2020. During these interviews, the EAC provided an overview of the project timeline and the types of data collected in the Policy Survey and the EAVS, notified the POCs of the help desk support and other resources that would be provided as part of the 2020 EAVS, probed POCs on data issues from the 2018 EAVS, and whether the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic was impacting the state's election policies or could affect its ability to submit EAVS data in a timely

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<sup>3</sup> Fifty-three states completed the Policy Survey via the online survey. Three states completed the survey via a paper instrument; for these states, the Policy Survey technical assistants entered the data from the paper instrument into the online survey and asked the state to review for accuracy and submit the data.



manner. These conversations helped ensure that the EAC was prepared to provide adequate support to states as they completed their EAVS data collection.

### Data Collection Templates

Given the diversity in how states respond to the EAVS, creating data templates that accommodate the needs of all states and all local jurisdictions is especially challenging. The 2020 EAVS data were collected using two data collection templates:

- The Excel template was a flat data format that allowed POCs to copy and paste large amounts of data, such as from a report generated from the state's centralized election database. Each EAVS item was listed in a column in the Excel template and each EAVS jurisdiction within the state was listed in a row. States with multiple jurisdictions were required to submit their data through the Excel template.
- The online template was an item-by-item survey hosted online that guided respondents through entering their responses. This template was primarily intended to be used by jurisdictions that entered EAVS data, although some states entered data into the online template on behalf of some or all of their jurisdictions. The data from the online template was exported to an Excel file that matched the format of the Excel data collection template.

Usability testing of the draft online template was completed with nine local election officials between July and August 2020, and edits to the survey based on the results of this testing were completed in advance of the online template's launch.

The EAC pre-populated data into the online template for four states and into the Excel template for one state. Pre-fill data was provided by state POCs via the Excel template or via an email or phone request that provided detail on which items were to be populated.

Both data collection templates employed a variety of error-checking data validations to reduce response burden and to increase data quality.

### Data Validation

One of the key issues associated with any data collection project is ensuring that the data collected are as accurate as possible. Given the number of survey questions, their complexity and granularity, and the variety of approaches in how state and local jurisdictions provide responses, it can be easy to make data entry mistakes or report data in an incorrect survey item. All 2020 EAVS data collection templates included built-in internal and external validation checks that flagged specific types of potential errors within a data submission.

The validation checks were designed to flag common data issues so that respondents were aware of them before submitting their data to the EAC. In response to these validations, states and jurisdictions were encouraged to review their data, correct it if needed, and use the comments fields to explain any peculiarities and give context to the data that were being reported.



In addition, once a state submitted data for review by the EAC, additional data reviews were conducted by trained data analysts. These reviews checked for missing data, internal math and logic issues, conflicts with Policy Survey responses, and significant changes compared to 2016 EAVS data.<sup>4</sup> The results of this review were provided to state POCs in a written memo, along with a file that had sample rates and percentages calculated using their draft submission. These sample rates and percentages were provided to assist POCs with identifying results that did not align with their expectations, so they could be corrected in the final submission.

A complete list of all validation checks that were built into the data collection templates and additional data validations that were conducted for draft submissions can be found in Appendices B and C of this chapter. In general, there were five types of data validations.

### **Math Validations**

Many items in the EAVS asked respondents to report a total and then divide that total into subcategories. The math validations within the templates checked that the sum of the subcategories equaled the reported total of the overall category. For example, if the total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted in the 2020 general election did not match the sum of the number of voters who used different modes of voting, then the respondent was asked to review the numbers reported in these items.<sup>5</sup>

### **Logic Validations**

Logic validations identified when a value in the survey was incompatible with a response provided in another related question in the survey. For example, if the number of mailed ballots counted by a jurisdiction exceeded the number of mailed ballots that had been returned by voters, then the respondent was asked to review these items.<sup>6</sup>

### **Policy Survey Validations**

These validations identified instances in which an EAVS item conflicted with the Policy Survey data that had been submitted by the state. For example, if a state reported having an online voter registration system through which an individual could submit a voter registration application, but reported “does not apply” to EAVS items relating to the number of voter registration forms submitted through online sources, then the validations would highlight that a conflict existed between the respondent’s EAVS and Policy Survey data and would ask the respondent to review the EAVS items and contact the EAC if the Policy Survey response needed to be updated.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The 2016 EAVS was used as a point of comparison in the data reviews, because it was the most recent presidential election.

<sup>5</sup> The total number of voters participating in the 2020 general election was reported in item F1a in the 2020 EAVS. The number of voters who participated using different modes of voting were items F1b through F1h.

<sup>6</sup> The number of mailed ballots counted by a jurisdiction was reported in item C3a in the 2020 EAVS. The number of mailed ballots returned by voters was reported in item C1b.

<sup>7</sup> Data on states’ policies regarding online voter registration were reported in item Q7 in the Policy Survey. The number of total, new, duplicate, and rejected registrations received through online registration systems were reported in items A4c, A5c, A6c, and A7c, respectively, of EAVS.



## Missing Items

With the exception of comment boxes and “other” subcategories for reporting data beyond what was specified in a question, all items in the EAVS required a response. An alert appeared if a response to a required item was not provided. For example, if a respondent reported the total number of registered voters in their jurisdiction but not the number of active and inactive registered voters, the latter items would be flagged with a request that the respondent should report “does not apply” (if their state does not have an applicable law or policy), “data not available” (if the data for an item is not tracked), or zero (if no instance of an item occurred) rather than leave the item blank.<sup>8</sup>

## Valid Skips

For the first time, in 2020, the EAC introduced a valid skip code to the EAVS data. This code was automatically filled in by the template validations when an item did not require an answer because of a response to a previous item in the survey. The use of the valid skip code is distinct from the use of the “does not apply” code (for when a jurisdiction does not have a law or policy in place that allows for the type of election participation in the question) and the “data not available” code (for when the data for a type of election participation is not tracked). For instance, if a jurisdiction indicated in EAVS question F5a that it did not use direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines without a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), then items F5b through F5d, relating to the make and model of equipment, the number deployed, and the usage of the equipment, were filled as “valid skip” by the template validations.

## Technical Assistance

Technical assistance was provided through the duration of the Policy Survey and the EAVS data collection periods. Help desk support was provided for 20 hours each week from August 3, 2020, to December 31, 2020, and for 50 hours each week from January 4, 2021, to March 30, 2021. State and local EAVS respondents could request assistance via email or phone. A team of trained technical assistants provided support on all aspects of the survey data collection processes. A total of 812 support tickets were received from all 56 states, territories, and districts. The most common inquiries were related to accessing the data collection templates, re-opening online templates that had been submitted prematurely, how data transferred between the online template and the Excel template, and questions about survey definitions (including SDR, how to classify registration forms in questions A3–A7, and what types of voting should be counted as in-person early voting for purposes of EAVS).

After the first round of EAVS data was collected in March 2021, a group of subject matter experts (SME) from the EAC conducted an extra quality control review via video conference. All states and territories were invited to participate and 51 out of 56 participated. The extra quality check was necessary due to the new voting options throughout the country for the 2020 general election and due to challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Thirty-eight of the states and territories that were interviewed requested data changes or added/amended footnotes to this report.

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<sup>8</sup> The total number of registered voters for the 2020 general election was reported in item A1a in the EAVS. The number of active registered voters was item A1b. The number of inactive registered voters was item A1c.

## Resources for EAVS Respondents

In addition to providing direct, customized technical assistance, the EAC made a wide variety of written and video training resources available to survey respondents on demand. A website was established to house these resources and to provide a secure place for state EAVS POCs to upload data submissions and other documents for the EAC to review.

The resources on this website included PDF copies of the Policy Survey and EAVS questions; a link to the online template; six videos that outlined the questions and instructions in the six sections of the EAVS; three video webinars that provided guidance on the overall EAVS process, on collecting data from local jurisdictions, and for state POCs new to EAVS data collection; eleven newsletters that were released between August 2020 and March 2021; an extensive user guide that provided step-by-step instructions for both data collection templates; a policy guide approved by the EAC Commissioners that provided information to election officials responsible for completing EAVS; and an Excel crosswalk that documented survey changes from 2018 to 2020.

The website also contained a section that was restricted to state POCs. This section had copies of the state's 2016 and 2018 EAVS and the state's Statutory Overview or Policy Survey data available for download, a table that tracked the online template progress for each jurisdiction within the state, and the capacity for POCs to upload files for the EAC to review.

## Data Reporting and Calculations

In 2020, most EAVS data were reported at the local jurisdiction level. For the purposes of this report, for states that have multiple jurisdictions, state totals were calculated by summing the data from all jurisdictions within a state. National totals were calculated by summing the state-level totals.

Whenever possible, this report uses percentages and rates rather than raw numbers to make comparisons across states and across election years. For these calculations, items were combined as necessary to create the numerator and denominator and to produce a percentage or rate. For example, the following formula was used to calculate the percentage of transmitted mailed ballots that were returned by voters for the 2020 general election:

$$\frac{\text{Total number of mailed ballots returned by voters (C1b)}}{\text{Total number of mailed ballots transmitted by election offices (C1a)}} \times 100$$

Percentages at the national level were calculated using casewise missing data deletion at the state level. Only states that had data for both the numerator and denominator for a calculation were included when reporting percentages at the national level. Responses of “does not apply,” “data not available,” and “valid skip” were considered missing for purposes of creating these calculations. Casewise deletion was used in the analysis for this report to avoid overinflating the denominator of the calculations. This is especially applicable when states do not track data for a particular item, or when election policy differences mean that not all states can provide data for an item. For example, online registration is not available in every state, so the calculation of the nationwide percentage of registrations that were received online will only use data from states that reported at least one online



registration. Otherwise, the national percentage would include in the denominator (in this case, the total number of registrations received) data from states that do not have online registration, thus underestimating the percentage of online registrations that were received.<sup>9</sup>

This decision rule means that there were instances in which the percentages reported at the national level for a given calculation in this report did not use data from every state. Because each category was calculated independently of others and only states that reported data in both the numerator and the denominator were included in the analysis, casewise deletion also created instances in which percentages do not sum to 100%. Those cases in which data were not available for every state to calculate the percentage at the national level are noted in the footnotes throughout this report.

## Recommendations for Analyzing and Interpreting the EAVS Data

The most up-to-date version of the 2020 EAVS and Policy Survey data can always be found on the EAC's website (<https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys>). If the EAC is notified by a state of an error or omission in the state's data, the agency will issue the updated EAVS and Policy Survey data sets on its website with an errata note of changes that have been made to the newly issued data sets. Updated data sets will be issued on a quarterly basis.

There are four types of data missingness codes used in the 2020 Policy Survey and EAVS data:

- Valid skip (-77): This code indicates that no response is expected based on a previous survey response. For instance, in the Policy Survey, if a state answered “no” to Q7 to indicate that it does not provide an option for voters to register to vote online, then items Q7a and Q7b, which collect further information on the specifics of a state's online registration system, would be marked as -77. In the EAVS, if a state indicates in item A4c, the total number of registration forms submitted online, that this question does not apply, then items A5c, A6c, and A7c, which collect data on new, duplicate, and rejected registrations submitted online, would be marked as -77.
- Does not apply (-88): This code indicates that a question does not apply to a state, because the state does not have an applicable policy in place. For instance, a response of -88 in item A4c of the EAVS indicates that the state does not have online registration.
- Data not available (-99): This code indicates that the data for an item cannot be tracked. For instance, a response of -99 in item A4c of the EAVS indicates that the state accepts online voter registrations but cannot track the number of these registrations that were submitted by voters.
- Refused (-100): This code indicates that a response was expected but was not provided. This code is *only* used in the Policy Survey data.

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<sup>9</sup> The total number of registration applications received between the close of registration for the 2018 general election and the close of registration for the 2020 general election was collected in item A3a. The total number of registration applications received online between the close of registration for the 2018 general election and the close of registration for the 2020 general election was collected in item A4c. The application of casewise deletion means that only states that reported at least one registration in both of these items on a statewide level were included in the calculation of the percentage of registration applications received through online sources.

When summing the EAVS data, either on a state or a national level, analysts should take care to treat these missingness codes as missing items and not as negative numbers.

Users of the EAVS data are also encouraged to refer to the comments that accompany all of the EAVS items and many of the Policy Survey items. During data collection, the EAC encouraged all respondents to use these comments to provide context to their responses. In many cases, these comments contain valuable information about how state and jurisdiction respondents formulated their responses, why some responses do not align with the data validations outlined in this chapter, or context about how the 2020 general election was conducted in a state or jurisdiction. If data users have further questions about the data that have been submitted, they are encouraged to contact states or jurisdictions directly with further questions.

The EAC also encourages data users to take care when calculating percentages to ensure that the correct EAVS items are used. Appendix D of this chapter contains recommendations for how to calculate EAVS rates using the 2020 data. These recommendations align with how rates were calculated throughout this report.

This report used the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimates for the 2019 citizen voting age population (CVAP) instead of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as possible. The CVAP estimates for 2020 were not available by the time this report was finalized. Once they are released by the U.S. Census Bureau, the 2020 CVAP estimates can be found at <https://data.census.gov/>. Data analysts should import both the state- and county-level geographies and merge them into the EAVS data using the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code. For states that have subcounty jurisdictions, these jurisdictions will need to be aggregated at the county level in order to merge in the CVAP data.<sup>10</sup> For this report, the state-level CVAP was used for Alaska and Puerto Rico, as both reported as a single EAVS jurisdiction. Finally, the Census Bureau does not provide CVAP estimates for the U.S. territories (with the exception of Puerto Rico), so no CVAP estimate was available for American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

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<sup>10</sup> These are the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Additionally, the state of Illinois reported six cities independently of their corresponding counties (i.e., Bloomington, Chicago, Danville, East St. Louis, Galesburg, and Rockford), and Missouri reported Kansas City independently of its corresponding county.



## Methodology Appendix A: Survey Response Rates

State	EAVS Response Rate	Section A Response Rate	Section B Response Rate	Section C Response Rate	Section D Response Rate	Section E Response Rate	Section F Response Rate
Alabama	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Alaska	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
American Samoa	98.4	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	94.4
Arizona	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Arkansas	90.2	99.5	77.4	83.5	88.1	82.5	97.3
California	99.2	100.0	98.2	99.9	99.8	99.9	98.9
Colorado	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Connecticut	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Delaware	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
District of Columbia	99.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	94.7	100.0	100.0
Florida	99.4	100.0	98.7	99.9	99.2	96.4	99.8
Georgia	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Guam	98.1	93.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.9
Hawaii [1]	99.1	100.0	99.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	97.1
Idaho	99.4	98.8	99.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Illinois	99.1	99.6	99.7	99.8	99.7	98.6	97.9
Indiana	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
Iowa	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
Kansas	69.0	67.4	86.8	77.3	62.3	95.9	48.0
Kentucky	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Louisiana	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Maine [2]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Maryland	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Massachusetts	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Michigan	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Minnesota	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
Mississippi	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
Missouri	99.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.4
Montana	99.6	100.0	98.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Nebraska	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Nevada	99.8	100.0	99.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
New Hampshire	99.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.3
New Jersey	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
New Mexico	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.7	100.0	100.0
New York	97.5	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.7	100.0	91.1
North Carolina	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.7

State	EAVS Response Rate	Section A Response Rate	Section B Response Rate	Section C Response Rate	Section D Response Rate	Section E Response Rate	Section F Response Rate
North Dakota	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Northern Mariana Islands	96.2	100.0	90.0	100.0	94.7	100.0	96.7
Ohio	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Oklahoma	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Oregon	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Pennsylvania	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
Puerto Rico	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Rhode Island	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
South Carolina	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
South Dakota	99.9	100.0	99.8	99.9	98.8	99.8	100.0
Tennessee	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Texas	99.4	100.0	99.6	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.2
U.S. Virgin Islands	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Utah	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.8
Vermont	98.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	93.0
Virginia	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Washington	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
West Virginia	99.7	100.0	98.8	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
Wisconsin	99.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.9
Wyoming	99.9	100.0	99.6	100.0	99.8	100.0	100.0
U.S. Total	99.1	99.4	99.4	99.4	99.2	99.7	98.2

Survey Response Rate Calculation Notes:

**EAVS Response Rate** uses responses to all items listed below.

**Section A Response Rate** uses responses to questions A1a, A1b, A1c, A2a, A2b, A2c, A3a, A3b, A3c, A3d, A3e, A3f, A3g, A3h, A3i, A3j, A4a, A4b, A4c, A4d, A4e, A4f, A4g, A4h, A4i, A4j, A4k, A4l, A5a, A5b, A5c, A5d, A5e, A5f, A5g, A5h, A5i, A5j, A5k, A5l, A6a, A6b, A6c, A6d, A6e, A6f, A6g, A6h, A6i, A6j, A6k, A6l, A7a, A7b, A7c, A7d, A7e, A7f, A7g, A7h, A7i, A7j, A7k, A7l, A8a, A8b, A8c, A8d, A8e, A8f, A8g, A8h, A9a, A9b, A9c, A9d, A9e, A9f, A9g, A9h, A9i, and A9j.

**Section B Response Rate** uses responses to questions B1a, B1b, B1c, B2a, B2b, B2c, B3a, B3b, B3c, B4a, B5a, B5b, B5c, B6a, B6b, B6c, B7a, B7b, B7c, B8a, B8b, B8c, B9a, B9b, B9c, B10a, B10b, B10c, B11a, B11b, B11c, B12a, B12b, B12c, B13a, B13b, B13c, B13d, B14a, B14b, B14c, B15a, B15b, B15c, B16a, B16b, B16c, B17a, B17b, B17c, B18a, B18b, B18c, B19a, B19b, B19c, B20a, B20b, B20c, B21a, B21b, B21c, B22a, B22b, B22c, B23a, B23b, B23c, B24a, B24b, B24c, B25a, B25b, B25c, B26a, B26b, B26c, B27a, B27b, and B27c..

**Section C Response Rate** uses responses to questions C1a, C1b, C1c, C1d, C1e, C1f, C1g, C1h, C1i, C2a, C3a, C4a, C4b, C4c, C4d, C4e, C4f, C4g, C4h, C4i, C4j, C4k, C4l, C4m, C4n, C4o, C4p, C4q, and C4r.

**Section D Response Rate** uses responses to questions D1a, D1b, D2a, D3a, D3b, D3c, D4a, D4b, D4c, D5, D6, D7a, D7b, D7c, D7d, D7e, D7f, D7g, and D8.



**Section E Response Rate** uses responses to questions E1a, E1b, E1c, E1d, E1e, E2a, E2b, E2c, E2d, E2e, E2f, E2g, E2h, E2i, E2j, E2k, E2l, and E2m.

**Section F Response Rate** uses responses to questions F1a, F1b, F1c, F1d, F1e, F1f, F1g, F1h, F2, F3a, F3b, F3c, F3d, F4a, F4b, F4c, F4d, F5a, F5b\_1, F5c\_1, F5b\_2, F5c\_2, F5b\_3, F5c\_3, F5d\_1, F5d\_2, F5d\_3, F5d\_4, F6a, F6b\_1, F6c\_1, F6b\_2, F6c\_2, F6b\_3, F6c\_3, F6d\_1, F6d\_2, F6d\_3, F6d\_4, F7a, F7b\_1, F7c\_1, F7b\_2, F7c\_2, F7b\_3, F7c\_3, F7d\_1, F7d\_2, F7d\_3, F7d\_4, F7d\_5, F8a, F8b\_1, F8c\_1, F8b\_2, F8c\_2, F8b\_3, F8c\_3, F8d\_1, F8d\_2, F8d\_3, F8d\_4, F8d\_5, F9a, F9c\_1, F9c\_2, F9c\_3, F9d\_1, F9d\_2, F9d\_3, F9d\_4, F9d\_5, F10a, F10c\_1, F10c\_2, F10c\_3, F10d\_1, F10d\_2, F10d\_4, F11a, F11d\_1, F11d\_2, F11d\_3, F11d\_4, F11d\_5, F12a, F12b, F12c, F12d, and F12e.

Survey Response Rate Data Notes:

**General Notes:**

- Response rates are calculated as the percentage of jurisdictional responses within a state that were not left blank (i.e., had a numerical response of zero or greater or a response of “data not available,” “does not apply,” or “valid skip”).
- Item descriptions and optional survey comments were not included in the response rate calculation.

[1] Information for Kalawao County, Hawaii was reported with Maui County.

[2] Maine reported its UOCAVA data on a statewide level, not a jurisdiction level.



## Methodology Appendix B: Data Collection Template Validation Rules

Table 1: Math Validation Rules

Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of A1b + A1c should equal A1a	The sum of active (A1b) and inactive (A1c) registered voters should be equal to the total number of registered voters (A1a).
The sum of A2b + A2c should equal A2a	The sum of SDRs received on Election Day (A2b) and SDRs received prior to Election Day (A2c) should be equal to the total number of SDRs received (A2a).
The sum of A3b–j should equal A3a	The sum of the numbers you report in A3b–j should equal the total number of registration forms you report in A3a.
The sum of A4a–l should equal A3a	The sum of the numbers you report in A4a–l should equal the total number of registration forms you reported in A3a.
The sum of A5a–l should equal A3b	The sum of the numbers you report in A5a–l should equal the total number of registration forms you reported in A3b.
The sum of A6a–l should equal A3d	The sum of the numbers you report in A6a–l should equal the total number of registration forms you reported in A3d.
The sum of A7a–l should equal A3e	The sum of the numbers you report in A7a–l should equal the total number of registration forms you reported in A3e.
The sum of A5a + A6a + A7a should not exceed A4a	The amounts you report in A5a, A6a, and A7a should not exceed the total number of registration forms received by mail, fax, or email you reported in A4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5b + A6b + A7b should not exceed A4b	The amounts you report in A5b, A6b, and A7b should not exceed the total number of registrations in person at the election/registrars office you reported in A4b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5c + A6c + A7c should not exceed A4c	The amounts you report in A5c, A6c, and A7c should not exceed the total number of registration forms submitted online you reported in A4c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5d + A6d + A7d should not exceed A4d	The amounts you report in A5d, A6d, and A7d should not exceed the total number of registration forms received from motor vehicle offices you reported in A4d. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5e + A6e + A7e should not exceed A4e	The amounts you report in A5e, A6e, and A7e should not exceed the total number of registration forms received from public assistance offices you reported in A4e. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5f + A6f + A7f should not exceed A4f	The amounts you report in A5f, A6f, and A7f should not exceed the total number of registration forms received from state-funded agencies you reported in A4f. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.



Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of A5g + A6g + A7g should not exceed A4g	The amounts you report in A5g, A6g, and A7g should not exceed the total number of registration forms received from armed forces recruitment offices you reported in A4g. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5h + A6h + A7h should not exceed A4h	The amounts you report in A5h, A6h, and A7h should not exceed the total number of registration forms received from other agencies designated by the state but not mandated by the NVRA you reported in A4h. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5i + A6i + A7i should not exceed A4i	The amounts you report in A5i, A6i, and A7i should not exceed the total number of forms received from registration drives from advocacy groups or political parties you reported in A4i. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5j + A6j + A7j should not exceed A4j	The amounts you report in A5j, A6j, and A7j should not exceed the total number of forms received from "Other" sources you reported in A4j. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5k + A6k + A7k should not exceed A4k	The amounts you report in A5k, A6k, and A7k should not exceed the total number of forms received from "Other" sources you reported in A4k. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5l + A6l + A7l should not exceed A4l	The amounts you report in A5l, A6l, and A7l should not exceed the total number of forms received from "Other" sources you reported in A4l. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A8b–h should equal A8a	The amounts you report in A8b–h should equal the total number of confirmation notices sent to registered voters you reported in A8a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A9b–j should equal A9a	The amounts you report in A9b–j should equal the total number of voters removed you reported in A9a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B1b–c should equal B1a	The amounts you report in B1b–c should equal the total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters you reported in B1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B2b–c should equal B2a	The amounts you report in B2b–c should equal the total number of FCPAs received from UOCAVA voters you reported in B2a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B3b–c should equal B3a	The amounts you report in B3b–c should equal the total number of rejected FPCAs from UOCAVA voters you reported in B3a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B5b–c should equal B5a	The amounts you report in B5b–c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of B6b–c should equal B6a	The amounts you report in B6b–c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by postal mail you reported in B6a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B7b–c should equal B7a	The amounts you report in B7b–c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by email you reported in B7a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B8b–c should equal B8a	The amounts you report in B8b–c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by other methods you reported in B8a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B6a, B7a, and B8a should equal B5a	The amounts you report in B6a, B7a, and B8a should equal the total number of ballots transmitted to all UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B6b, B7b, and B8b should equal B5b	The amounts you report in B6b, B7b, and B8b should equal the total number of ballots transmitted to all uniformed services voters you reported in B5b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B6c, B7c, and B8c should equal B5c	The amounts you report in B6c, B7c, and B8c should equal the total number of ballots transmitted to all overseas citizen voters you reported in B5c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B9b–c should equal B9a	The amounts you report in B9b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office you reported in B9a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B10b–c should equal B10a	The amounts you report in B10b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by postal mail you reported in B10a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B11b–c should equal B11a	The amounts you report in B11b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by email you reported in B11a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B12b–c should equal B12a	The amounts you report in B12b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by other methods you reported in B12a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B10a, B11a, and B12a should equal B9a	The amounts you report in B10a, B11a, and B12a should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office you reported in B9a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B10b, B11b, and B12b should equal B9b	The amounts you report in B10b, B11b, and B12b should equal the total number of transmitted ballots returned by all uniformed services voters you reported in B9b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.



Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of B10c, B11c, and B12c should equal B9c	The amounts you report in B10, B11c, and B12c should equal the total number of transmitted ballots returned by all overseas citizen voters you reported in B9c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B13b–d should equal B13a	The amounts you report in B13b–d should equal the total number of ballots returned undeliverable you reported in B13a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B14b–c should equal B14a	The amounts you report in B14b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots counted by your office you reported in B14a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B15b–c should equal B15a	The amounts you report in B15b–c should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA ballots returned by postal mail you reported in B15a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B16b–c should equal B16a	The amounts you report in B16b–c should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA ballots returned by email you reported in B16a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B17b–c should equal B17a	The amounts you report in B17b–c should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA ballots returned by other methods you reported in B17a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B15a, B16a, and B17a should equal B14a	The amounts you report in B15a, B16a, and B17a should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots counted by your office you reported in B14a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B15b, B16b, and B17b should equal B14b	The amounts you report in B15b, B16b, and B17b should equal the total number of uniformed services voters' ballots counted by your office you reported in B14b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B15c, B16c, and B17c should equal B14c	The amounts you report in B15c, B16c, and B17c should equal the total number of overseas citizen voters' ballots counted by your office you reported in B14c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B18b–c should equal B18a	The amounts you report in B18b–c should equal the total number of rejected UOCAVA ballots you reported in B18a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B19b–c should equal B19a	The amounts you report in B19b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected because they were received after the deadline you reported in B19a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B20b–c should equal B20a	The amounts you report in B20b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of a problem with the voter signature you reported in B20a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of B21b–c should equal B21a	The amounts you report in B21b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected for lack of a postmark you reported in B21a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B22b–c should equal B22a	The amounts you report in B22b–c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected for other reasons reported in B22a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B14a and B18a should equal B9a	The sum of B14a and B18a should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned by voters that you reported in B9a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B14b and B18b should equal B9b	The sum of B14b and B18b should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned by uniformed services voters that you reported in B9b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B14c and B18c should equal B9c	The sum of B14c and B18c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned by overseas citizen voters that you reported in B9c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B19a, B20a, B21a, and B22a should equal B18a	The amounts you report in B19a, B20a, B21a, and B22a should equal the total number of rejected UOCAVA ballots you reported in B18a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B19b, B20b, B21b, and B22b should equal B18b	The amounts you report in B19b, B20b, B21b, and B22b should equal the total number of rejected ballots from uniformed services voters you reported in B18b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B19c, B20c, B21c, and B22c should equal B18c	The sum of the amounts you report in B19c, B20c, B21c, and B22c should equal the total number of rejected ballots from overseas citizen voters you reported in B18c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B23b–c should equal B23a	The amounts you report in B23b–c should equal the total number of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B23a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B24b–c should equal B24a	The amounts you report in B24b–c should equal the total number of FWABs counted you reported in B24a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B25b–c should equal B25a	The amounts you report in B25b–c should equal the total number of FWABs rejected because they were received after the deadline you reported in B25a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B26b–c should equal B26a	The amounts you report in B26b–c should equal the total number of FWABs rejected because the voter’s regular absentee ballot was received and counted you reported in B26a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.



Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of B27b–c should equal B27a	The amounts you report in B27b–c should equal the total number of FWABs rejected for other reasons you reported in B27a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B24a, B25a, B26a, and B27a should equal B23a	The amounts you report in B24a, B25a, B26a, and B27a should equal the total number of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B23a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B24b, B25b, B26b, and B27b should equal B23b	The sum of the amounts you report in B24b, B25b, B26b, and B27b should equal the total number of FWABs returned by uniformed services voters you reported in B23b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B24c, B25c, B26c, and B27c should equal B23c	The sum of the amounts you report in B24c, B25c, B26c, and B27c should equal the total number of FWABs returned by overseas citizen voters you reported in B23c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of C1b–i should equal C1a	The amounts you report in C1b–i should equal the number of total mailed ballots transmitted you reported in C1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of C4b–r should equal C4a	The amounts you report in C4b–r should equal the total number of mailed ballots rejected you reported in C4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of D3b–c cannot exceed D3a	The sum of the amounts you report in D3b–c cannot exceed the total number of physical polling places for Election Day in your jurisdiction you reported in D3a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of D4b–c cannot exceed D4a	The sum of the amounts you report in D4b–c cannot exceed the total number of physical polling places for early voting in your jurisdiction you report in D4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of D7b–g should equal D7a	The numbers you report in D7b–g should equal the total number of poll workers in your jurisdiction you reported in D7a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of E1b–e should equal E1a	The amounts you report in E1b–e should equal the total number of voters who submitted provisional ballots you reported in E1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of E2b–m should equal E2a	The amounts you report in E2b–m should equal the total number of rejected provisional ballots you reported in E2a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
E1d should be equal to E2a	The amount you report in E1d should equal the total number of rejected provisional ballots you reported in E2a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of F1b–h should equal F1a	The sum of the amounts you report in F1b–h should equal the total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted you reported in F1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

Table 2: Logic Validation Rules

Validation Rule	Error Text
If A1c = Does Not Apply, then A1a = A1b	Because your state does not differentiate between active (A1b) and inactive voters (A1c), then A1a should equal A1b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why those two items differ.
A2a cannot exceed A1a	The amount of SDRs you report in A2a cannot exceed the total number of registered voters you report in A1a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in A2a exceeds the value in A1a.
B3a cannot exceed B2a	The number of rejected FPCAs you report in B3a should not exceed the total number of FPCAs received you reported in B2a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B3a exceeds the value in B2a.
B4a cannot exceed B3a	The number of FPCAs rejected because they were late you report in B4a should not exceed the total number of FPCAs rejected you reported in B3a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B4a exceeds the value in B3a.
B9a cannot exceed B5a	The number of ballots returned you report in B9a should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B9a exceeds the value in B5a.
B9b cannot exceed B5b	The number of ballots returned from uniformed services members you report in B9b should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to uniformed services members you reported in B5b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B9b exceeds the value in B5b.
B9c cannot exceed B5c	The number of ballots returned from overseas citizen voters you report in B9c should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to overseas citizen voters you reported in B5c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B9c exceeds the value in B5c.
B13a cannot exceed B5a	The number of ballots returned as undeliverable you report in B13a should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B13a exceeds the value in B5a.
B14a cannot exceed B9a	The total number of ballots counted you report in B14a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B9a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B14a exceeds the value in B9a.
B14b cannot exceed B9b	The total number of ballots counted you report in B14b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by uniformed services members you reported in B9b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B14b exceeds the value in B9b.
B14c cannot exceed B9c	The total number of ballots counted you report in B14c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by overseas citizen voters you reported in B9c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B14c exceeds the value in B9c.



Validation Rule	Error Text
B15a cannot exceed B10a	The number of ballots counted you report in B15a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by postal mail by UOCAVA voters you reported in B10a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B15a exceeds the value in B10a.
B15b cannot exceed B10b	The number of ballots counted you report in B15b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by postal mail by uniformed services members you reported in B10b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B15b exceeds the value in B10b.
B15c cannot exceed B10c	The number of ballots counted you report in B15c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by postal mail by overseas citizen voters you reported in B10c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B15c exceeds the value in B10c.
B16a cannot exceed B11a	The number of ballots counted you report in B16a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by email by UOCAVA voters you reported in B11a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B16a exceeds the value in B11a.
B16b cannot exceed B11b	The number of ballots counted you report in B16b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by email by uniformed services members you reported in B11b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B16b exceeds the value in B11b.
B16c cannot exceed B11c	The number of ballots counted you report in B16c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by email by overseas citizen voters you reported in B11c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B16c exceeds the value in B11c.
B17a cannot exceed B12a	The number of ballots counted you report in B17a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by other modes by UOCAVA voters you reported in B12a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B17a exceeds the value in B12a.
B17b cannot exceed B12b	The number of ballots counted you report in B17b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by other modes by uniformed services members you reported in B12b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B17b exceeds the value in B12b.
B17c cannot exceed B12c	The number of ballots counted you report in B17c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by other modes by overseas citizen voters you reported in B12c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B17c exceeds the value in B12c.
C2a cannot exceed C1a	The number of mailed ballots transmitted to permanent absentee voters you report in C2a cannot exceed the total number of mailed ballots transmitted in C1a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C2a exceeds the value in C1a.
The sum of C3a and C4a should equal C1b	The sum of the amounts you report in C3a and C4a should equal the number of absentee returned by voters you report in C1b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the sum of C3a and C4a do not match the value in C1b.
If D1a > 0, then D3a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because you reported in-person Election Day voting at a physical polling place in D1a, you should also report the number of Election Day polling places in D3a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.



Validation Rule	Error Text
If D1a > 0, then F1b > 0	Because you reported in-person Election Day voting in D1a, you should also report the number of these ballots that were counted in F1b. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
If D1b > 0, then D4a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because you reported in-person early voting at a physical polling place in D1b, you should also report the number of early voting polling places in D4a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
If D1b > 0, then F1f > 0	Because you reported in-person early voting in D1b, you should also report the numbers of these ballots that were counted in F1f. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
If D5a > 0 or D6a > 0, then D7a > 0	Because you reported using poll workers in D5a and/or D6a, you should provide the total number of poll workers used in the jurisdiction in D7a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
The sum of B14a and B24a should equal F1c	The sum of counted absentee UOCAVA ballots reported in B14a and counted FWABs reported in B24a should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA votes reported in F1c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the sum of B14a and B24a do not match the value in F1c.
C3a should equal F1d	The number of counted absentee ballots reported in C3a should equal the total number of counted mail votes reported in F1d. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the C3a does not match the value in F1d.
If E1b > 0 or E1c > 0, then F1e > 0	Because you reported a number of provisional ballots counted or partially counted in E1b and/or E1c, you should provide data on the number of voters who cast a provisional ballot that was counted in F1e. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1a cannot exceed A1a	The total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted, as reported in F1a, cannot exceed the total number of registered voters as reported in A1a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1b cannot exceed D1a	The number of voters who voted in-person on Election Day and whose votes were counted, as reported in F1b, cannot exceed the total number of in-person ballots cast in Election Day, as reported in D1a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1d cannot exceed C1a	The number of voters who cast a mailed ballot that was counted, as reported in F1d, cannot exceed the total number of mailed ballots transmitted, as reported in C1a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1e cannot exceed E1a	The number of voters who cast a provisional ballot that was counted, as reported in F1e, cannot exceed the total number of provisional ballots cast, as reported in E1a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1f cannot exceed D1b	The number of voters who cast a ballot during in-person early voting that was counted, as reported in F1f, cannot exceed the total number of ballots cast during in-person early voting, as reported in D1b. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
If F5a = Yes, then F5b_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using DREs without VVPAT in F5a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F5b.



Validation Rule	Error Text
If F5a = Yes, then F5c_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using DREs without VVPAT in F5a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F5c.
If F6a = Yes, then F6b_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using DREs with VVPAT in F6a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F6b.
If F6a = Yes, then F6c_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using DREs with VVPAT in F6a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F6c.
If F7a = Yes, then F7b_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using ballot marking devices in F7a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F7b.
If F7a = Yes, then F7c_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using ballot marking devices in F7a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F7c.
If F8a = Yes, then F8b_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using scanners in F8a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F8b.
If F8a = Yes, then F8c_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using scanners in F8a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F8c.
If F9a = Yes, then F9b_1other ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using punch card machines in F9a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F9b.
If F9a = Yes, then F9c_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using punch card machines in F9a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F9c.
If F10a = Yes, then F10b_1other ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using lever machines in F10a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F10b.
If F10a = Yes, then F10c_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using lever machines in F10a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F10c.
If F11a = Yes, then F11d_1, F11d_2, F11d_3, F11d_4 and F11d_5 cannot be blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter "Data Not Available." If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0." If this question does not apply to you, please enter "Does Not Apply" and explain in the comments section.

Table 3: Policy Survey Validation Rules

Policy Survey Question	If Selected in Policy Survey	Expected Response in EAVS
Q7: Does your state have online registration?	Q7 = Yes (any of the two "yes" options)	A4c, A5c, A6c and A7c ≠ Does Not Apply *Items A4c, A5c, A6c, and A7c report data on online registration.
Q9: Does your state have same-day registration (SDR)?	Q9 = Yes	A2a ≠ Does Not Apply *Item A2a reports data on SDRs.

Policy Survey Question	If Selected in Policy Survey	Expected Response in EAVS
Q9a: Under which circumstances can a voter in your state register on the same day that they cast a ballot?	Q9a_1= Selected (On Election Day)	A2b ≠ Does Not Apply *Item A2b reports data on SDRs received on Election Day.
	Q9a_2= Selected OR Q9a_3= Selected (During in-person early voting OR during an overlap between early voting and close of voter registration)	A2c ≠ Does Not Apply *Item A2c reports data on SDRs received before Election Day.
Q10: Does your state allow persons to preregister to vote before they are 18 years of age?	Q10 = Yes	A3c ≠ Does Not Apply *Item A3c reports data on new preregistrations of persons under age 18.
Q11: Does your state differentiate between active and inactive voters in your voter registration records?	Q11= Yes	A1c ≠ Does Not Apply *Item A1c reports data on inactive registrants.
Q13: Does your state send confirmation notices?	Q13_1 = Selected OR Q13_2 = Selected OR Q13_3 = Selected (any of the three “yes” options)	A8a ≠ Does Not Apply *Item A8a reports data on confirmation notices.
Q18a: Does your whole state use an all-by-mail system?	Q18a = Statewide	F1g ≠ Does Not Apply *Item F1g reports data on ballots cast in all-by-mail jurisdictions.
Q19: Will your state allow some or all registered voters to request to be a permanent absentee voter?	Q19 = Yes (any of the two “yes” options)	C2a≠ Does Not Apply *Item C2a reports data on mailed ballots transmitted to voters on a permanent mail registration list.
Q24: What terminology does your state use to describe the process of allowing individuals to cast their ballots in person prior to Election Day?	Q24_4 = Selected (No in-person voting is allowed prior to Election Day)	D1b, D4a, D4b, D4c, D6a, and F1f = Does Not Apply *Items D1b, D4a-c, D6a, and F1f report data on in-person early/absentee voting before Election Day.
Q32: Does your state use provisional ballots?	Q32 = Yes	E1a, E1b, E1c, E1d, E1e, E2a, and F1e ≠ Does Not Apply *Items E1, E2, and F1e report data on provisional ballots.



Policy Survey Question	If Selected in Policy Survey	Expected Response in EAVS
Q37: Do convicted or incarcerated individuals lose eligibility to vote?	Q37_4 = Selected (No one; criminal convictions do not limit a person's right to vote)	A9d ≠ Does Not Apply  *Item A9d reports data on voters removed from voter registration rolls due to a disqualifying felony conviction.

Table 4: Special Conditions

If	Expected EAVS Response
F5a = No	Rest of items in F5 filled as Valid Skip (-77)
F5a = Yes	At least: F5b_1; F5c_1; F5d_1; F5d_2; F5d_3; F5d_4; F5d_5 should have a response
F6a = No	Rest of items in F6 filled as Valid Skip (-77)
F6a = Yes	At least: F6b_1; F6c_1; F6d_1; F6d_2; F6d_3; F6d_4; F6d_5 should have a response
F7a = No	Rest of items in F7 filled as Valid Skip (-77)
F7a = Yes	At least: F7b_1; F7c_1; F7d_1; F7d_2; F7d_3; F7d_4; F7d_5 should have a response
F8a = No	Rest of items in F8 filled as Valid Skip (-77)
F8a = Yes	At least: F8b_1; F8c_1; F8d_1; F8d_2; F8d_3; F8d_4; F8d_5 should have a response
F9a = No	Rest of items in F9 filled as Valid Skip (-77)
F9a = Yes	At least: F9b_1; F9c_1; F9d_1; F9d_2; F9d_3; F9d_4; F9d_5 should have a response
F10a = No	Rest of items in F10 filled as Valid Skip (-77)
F10a = Yes	At least: F10b_1; F10c_1; F10d_1; F10d_2; F10d_3; F10d_4; F10d_5 should have a response
F11a = No	Rest of items in F11 filled as Valid Skip (-77)
F11a = Yes	At least: F11d_1; F11d_2; F11d_3; F11d_4; F11d_5 should have a response

## Methodology Appendix C: Post-Submission Validations and Sample Rates

Table 1: Sample Rates and Outlier Thresholds

EAVS Rate	Calculation	Threshold for Flagging Result for Further Review
Percent of total registrants by CVAP	$\frac{A1a}{CVAP} \times 100$	<50% >130%
Percent of registrations that were new and valid	$\frac{A3b}{A3a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percent of registrations that were duplicates	$\frac{A3d}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of registrations that were rejected	$\frac{A3e}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of registrations that were within-jurisdiction changes	$\frac{A3f}{A3a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percent of registrations received by mail	$\frac{A4a}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of registrations received in-person	$\frac{A4b}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of registrations received online	$\frac{A4c}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of registrations received at motor vehicle agencies	$\frac{A4d}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of registrations removed as percent of total registrants	$\frac{A9a}{A1a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percent of FPCAs that were rejected	$\frac{B3a}{B2a} \times 100$	<0.5% >99%
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned	$\frac{B9a}{B5a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that were counted	$\frac{B14a}{B9a} \times 100$	<10% >100%
Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that were rejected	$\frac{B18a}{B9a} \times 100$	<0.5% >90%
Percent of FWABs counted	$\frac{B24a}{B23a} \times 100$	<10% >100%
Percent of FWABs rejected	$\frac{(B25a + B26a + B27a)}{B23a} \times 100$	<0.5% >90%
Percent of mailed ballots returned	$\frac{C1b}{C1a} \times 100$	<5% >95%



EAVS Rate	Calculation	Threshold for Flagging Result for Further Review
Percent of mailed ballots counted	$\frac{C3a}{C1b} \times 100$	<10% >100%
Percent of mailed ballots rejected	$\frac{C4a}{C1b} \times 100$	<0.5% >90%
Percent of provisional ballots rejected	$\frac{E1d}{(E1b + E1c + E1d + E1e)} \times 100$	<0.5% >95%
Percent of turnout by CVAP	$\frac{F1a}{CVAP} \times 100$	<35% >95%
Percent ballots cast in-person on Election Day	$\frac{F1b}{F1a} \times 100$	<10% >90%
Percent ballots cast by mail	$\frac{(F1d + F1g)}{F1a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percent ballots cast in-person early	$\frac{F1f}{F1a} \times 100$	<1% >95%
Percent ballots cast by UOCAVA voters	$\frac{F1c}{F1a} \times 100$	<0.1% >50%
Percent ballots cast that were provisional	$\frac{F1e}{F1a} \times 100$	<0.01% >25%

Table 2: Comparisons to the 2016 EAVS Data

EAVS Rate	Calculation	Threshold for Flagging Result for Further Review
2020 total registrations as percentage of 2016's registrations	$\frac{A1a [2020]}{A1a [2016]} \times 100$	<50% >150%
2020 registrations received as percentage of 2016's	$\frac{A3a [2020]}{A5a [2016]} \times 100$	<25% >200%
2020 registrations removed as percentage of 2016's	$\frac{A9a [2020]}{A11a [2016]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2020 UOCAVA registrants as percentage of 2016's	$\frac{B1a [2020]}{B19a [2016]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2020 UOCAVA ballots transmitted as percentage of 2016's	$\frac{B5a [2020]}{B1a [2016]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2020 UOCAVA ballots returned as percentage of 2016's	$\frac{B9a [2020]}{B2a [2016]} \times 100$	<10% >200%

EAVS Rate	Calculation	Threshold for Flagging Result for Further Review
2020 UOCAVA ballots counted as percentage of 2016's	$\frac{B1a [2020]}{B8a [2016]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2020 mailed ballots transmitted as percentage of 2016's	$\frac{C1a [2020]}{C1a [2016]} \times 100$	<10% >500%
2020 mailed ballots returned as percentage of 2016's	$\frac{C1b [2020]}{C1b [2016]} \times 100$	<10% >500%
2020 mailed ballots counted as percentage of 2016's	$\frac{C3a [2020]}{C4a [2016]} \times 100$	<10% >500%
2020 provisional ballots cast as percentage of 2016's	$\frac{E1a [2020]}{E1a [2016]} \times 100$	<10% >500%
2020 total turnout as percentage of 2016's	$\frac{F1a [2020]}{F1a [2016]} \times 100$	<50% >150%



## Methodology Appendix D: How to Calculate Selected EAVS Rates

The EAVS item numbers in this table correspond to the question numbering for the 2020 EAVS. To determine item numbering for previous EAVS surveys, please refer to the survey instrument and data codebook for each year.

EAVS Rate	Calculation
Total CVAP registration rate	$\frac{A1a}{CVAP} \times 100$
Active CVAP registration rate	$\frac{A1b}{CVAP} \times 100$
Percentage of registrations that were new and valid	$\frac{A3b}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of registrations that were duplicates	$\frac{A3d}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of registrations that were rejected	$\frac{A3e}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of registrations that were within-jurisdiction changes	$\frac{A3f}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registration forms that were received by mail	$\frac{A4a}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registration forms that were received in person at election or registrar offices	$\frac{A4b}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registration forms that were submitted by individual voters through web-based online registration systems	$\frac{A4c}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registration forms that were received through motor vehicle agencies	$\frac{A4d}{A3a} \times 100$
Voter registration removal rate as a percentage of total registrants	$\frac{A9a}{A1a} \times 100$
Percentage of FPCAs that were rejected	$\frac{B3a}{B2a} \times 100$
Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters	$\frac{B9a}{B5a} \times 100$
Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters and counted	$\frac{B14a}{B9a} \times 100$
Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters and rejected	$\frac{B18a}{B9a} \times 100$
Percentage of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters that were counted	$\frac{B24a}{B23a} \times 100$



EAVS Rate	Calculation
Percentage of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters that were rejected	$\frac{(B25a + B26a + B27a)}{B23a} \times 100$
Percentage of transmitted mailed ballots that were returned by voters	$\frac{C1b}{C1a} \times 100$
Percentage of transmitted mailed ballots that were returned and counted	$\frac{C3a}{C1b} \times 100$
Percentage of transmitted mailed ballots that were returned and rejected	$\frac{C4a}{C1b} \times 100$
Percentage of provisional ballots that were counted, either in full or in part	$\frac{(E1b + E1c)}{(E1b + E1c + E1d + E1e)} \times 100$
Percentage of provisional ballots that were rejected	$\frac{E1d}{(E1b + E1c + E1d + E1e)} \times 100$
Voter turnout rate by CVAP	$\frac{F1a}{CVAP} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast at a physical polling place on Election Day	$\frac{F1b}{F1a} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast as mailed ballots	$\frac{(F1d + F1g)}{F1a} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast at an in-person early voting location	$\frac{F1f}{F1a} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast by UOCAVA voters	$\frac{F1c}{F1a} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast by provisional voters	$\frac{F1e}{F1a} \times 100$





