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FAO REGIONAL CONFERENCE FOR AFRICA

Thirty-first Session¹

New dates to be confirmed

Building Resilient Food and Agriculture Systems in the Context of Climate Change, Conflicts and Economic Downturns: Addressing the Humanitarian - Development - Peace Nexus in Africa

Executive Summary

The prevalence of undernourishment (PoU) in sub-Saharan Africa has been on the rise in the past five years, reaching 22.0 percent in 2019 (up from 21.2 percent in 2015). As a result, there were 235 million undernourished people in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019, an increase of 15.6 percent compared to 2015. Sub-Saharan Africa now stands out as the only region of the world where the number of extreme poor increased (from 276 million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015). Progress towards meeting the World Health Organization (WHO) global nutrition targets is too slow at regional level to meet any of the targets. The rise of food insecurity was widespread; reports² indicate that climate variability and extremes, conflict, and economic slowdowns and downturns, have been the main drivers – oftentimes-overlapping ones – of rising food insecurity and persistent malnutrition since 2014.

The situation has been further compounded by the worst desert locust outbreak in 25 years and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which are causing wide-ranging and severe negative impacts on food security. A recent joint analysis by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) identified 15 African countries that are on the frontline of impending COVID-19-driven food crises, as the pandemic's effects exacerbate pre-existing drivers of hunger.

With 70 to 80 percent of smallholder farmers dependent on agriculture and renewable natural resources for their income, employment, food, nutrition and wellbeing, Africa's agriculture and food sector is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Over the last 10 years, climate extremes affected an average of 16 million people and caused an estimated USD 0.67 billion³ in damage in Africa annually. This has led to greater pressures on limited natural resources such as land and water, provoking local disputes that also negatively impact food and nutrition security.

¹ Rescheduled from 23-27 March 2020, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe

² FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2019. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2019; and FAO. 2018. The Africa Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition.

³ FAO. 2018. The Africa Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition.

Conflict serves as the leading cause of food insecurity and contributor to malnutrition in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2018, there were 90 conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa – totalling a quarter of all conflicts worldwide. For countries in the region where data is available, the prevalence of undernourishment is about two and a half times higher in countries affected by a protracted crisis than those countries in other development contexts.

Economic slowdowns and downturns were also a contributing factor to the rise in hunger and persistent malnutrition. Between 2014 and 2017, many countries, particularly those that export agricultural commodities, faced falling commodity prices.

While distinct, these three factors also overlap and interconnect, as their impacts on household food security and nutrition are often executed through the same channels and with similar results. Building resilient food and agriculture systems is crucial for the achievement of all the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), notably SDGs 1 and 2.

There is an urgent need to build resilience in a coordinated, coherent and efficient manner, working across humanitarian, development and peace approaches.

Resilience provides a conceptual and analytical framework for achieving a tangible collective outcome that brings together actors across the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus to ensure food security and sustainable agri-food systems in the face of shocks and crises. Humanitarian short-term response is a key component of the resilience-building framework, helping to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current shocks and disasters. Ultimately, building viable agricultural livelihoods that are resilient to crises is central to attain and secure development gains, medium-term outcomes and long-term development goals.

Matters to be brought to the attention of the Regional Conference

The Regional Conference may wish to:

1. recognize that the rise of both chronic and acute food insecurity and persistent malnutrition in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years is largely driven by the combined impact of climate variability and extremes, conflict, and economic slowdowns and downturns;
2. recognize that the deteriorating food security situation has been exacerbated by the severe desert locust outbreak in East Africa and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
3. provide advice on how structural changes in assistance (from all sources) can build resilience across the HDP nexus.

Queries on the content of this document may be addressed to:

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I. Introduction

1. Although hunger in sub-Saharan Africa declined for a prolonged period of time, the prevalence of undernourishment (PoU) rose in 2015 from 21.2 percent to 22.0 percent in 2019 (Table 1). This increase was stronger in Central and Southern Africa. Today about 235 million people suffer from undernourishment in sub-Saharan Africa, up from 203 million in 2015 and 222 million in 2018 (Table 2). By far, the largest number of the undernourished live in Eastern Africa, and the biggest increase in the number of undernourished in 2015-2019 occurred in Eastern and Western Africa (Table 2). Acute malnutrition (amongst children under five years of age) across the regions is persistent.⁴ In 2019, emergency situations, in the shape of conflict, weather extremes and economic downturns left 73 million people in sub-Saharan Africa in a situation of acute food insecurity.⁵

TABLE 1

PREVALENCE OF UNDERNOURISHMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND SUBREGIONS, 2000–2019

Region/subregions	2000	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Percentage point change from 2015 to 2019
Sub-Saharan Africa	28.4	21.3	21.2	21.4	21.4	21.4	22.0	0.8
Central Africa	41.7	30.4	28.2	28.8	28.7	29.0	29.8	1.6
Eastern Africa	39.2	28.9	26.9	27.1	26.8	26.7	27.2	0.3
Southern Africa	5.9	5.4	7.0	8.0	7.0	7.9	8.4	1.4
Western Africa	16.0	12.1	14.3	14.2	14.6	14.3	15.2	0.9

Source: FAO

TABLE 2

THE NUMBER OF UNDERNOURISHED IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND SUBREGIONS, 2000–2019

Region/subregions	2000	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Change from 2015 to 2019 (million)
Sub-Saharan Africa	181.7	178.3	203.0	210.5	216.3	221.8	234.7	31.7
Central Africa	40.1	40.0	43.5	45.8	47.2	49.1	51.9	8.4
Eastern Africa	100.9	98.1	104.9	108.4	110.4	112.9	117.9	12.9
Southern Africa	3.1	3.2	4.4	5.1	4.5	5.2	5.6	1.2
Western Africa	37.6	37.0	50.3	51.2	54.2	54.7	59.4	9.1

Source: FAO

2. While the prevalence of stunted – as opposed to undernourished – children continues to decline slowly, the actual number slowly increases each year. The prevalence of stunting ranges from 29.0 percent in Southern Africa to 34.5 percent in Eastern Africa. The number of children suffering from acute malnutrition in the region was 10.6 million in 2019, or 6.31 percent, and most of these wasted children (8.41 million) were in Eastern and Western Africa. Progress towards meeting the WHO global nutrition targets is too slow at regional level to meet any of the targets.⁶

⁴ Young, H., & Marshak, A. 2018. Persistent global acute malnutrition. Boston, MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

⁵ FSIN. 2020. 2020 Global Report on Food Crises. Joint Analysis for Better Decisions. Rome, Food Security Information Network.

⁶ FAO. 2018. The Africa Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition.

3. Similarly, sub-Saharan Africa now stands out as the only region of the world where there was an increase in the number of extreme poor, with the number up from 276 million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015.
4. The rise of food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa since 2014 was widespread. Analyses⁷ and policy documents from member countries, which include various FAO publications (e.g. the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World and the 2015 Committee on World Food Security ‘Framework for Action for Food Security and Nutrition in Protracted Crises’, and the annual Global Report on Food Crises), have identified three main causes: climate variability and extremes, conflict, and economic slowdowns and downturns. These drivers, which often overlap, are also interconnected, making food security even more challenging. For example, populations in Africa’s drylands, notably the Sahel and Horn of Africa, are increasingly exposed to natural hazards and climate-related disasters, food chain crises and conflicts – which frequently overlap and come together as protracted crises. The deteriorating food security situation has been exacerbated by the severe desert locust outbreak in East Africa and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
5. This paper provides an assessment of the impact of these factors on food and nutritional security and highlights how building resilient food and agriculture systems is crucial for the achievement of the SDGs, notably SDGs 1 and 2. It urges countries and governments to take note of the need to build resilience in a coordinated, coherent and efficient manner, working across humanitarian, development and peace approaches.

II. The Consequences of Climate Variability and Extremes in Food Security and Nutrition

6. Climate variability and extremes cause deaths, displace people and leave many destitute and hungry. With 70 to 80 percent of smallholders with livelihoods dependent on agriculture and renewable natural resources (including fisheries, fish farming, forest products and services), employment, food, nutrition and wellbeing, Africa’s agriculture and food sector is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change.⁸ Overall, it is estimated that the agriculture sector absorbs more than 26 percent of the total damage and loss from climate extreme events (and this rises to more than 80 percent when caused by drought).⁹ Over the last 10 years, climate extremes affected an average of 16 million people and caused USD 0.67 billion in damage in Africa annually.¹⁰ Evidence presented in the 2018 United Nations report¹¹ shows that in countries with a high exposure to climate extremes, the number of undernourished is more than double that of countries without high exposure.
7. African ecosystems are already being negatively affected by climate change and future impacts are expected to be substantial. Populations are facing increased exposure to climate variability and extremes including extreme temperature, heat waves, droughts, tropical storms, heavy rains and floods, which are further contributing to land degradation, loss of biodiversity and desertification (Figure 1).¹²

⁷ From three editions of FAO Reports on the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World and the Africa Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition

⁸ Moyo, S. (2016). Family farming in sub-Saharan Africa: its contribution to agriculture, food security and rural development. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) Working paper No. 150.


⁹ FAO (2018b). The Impact of Disasters and Crises on Agriculture and Food Security.

¹⁰ FAO and ECA. 2019. 2018 Africa Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition. Addressing the Threat from Climate Variability and Extremes for Food Security and Nutrition. Rome, FAO.

¹¹ FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2018. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018. Building climate resilience for food security and nutrition. Rome.

¹² Ibid.

FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF EXTREME METEOROLOGICAL, HYDROLOGICAL AND CLIMATOLOGICAL DISASTERS IN AFRICA, 1980–2017*



Source: International Disasters Database (EM-DAT) available at <https://www.emdat.be/>. EM-DAT classifications are: climatological includes droughts and wildfire; meteorological includes storms and extreme temperatures; hydrological includes landslides and floods.

8. Droughts can have devastating effects on agricultural output and when temperatures exceed certain thresholds – even for short periods during the developmental stage – they are likely to damage yields.^{13, 14} One study shows that droughts and extreme temperature events can reduce national agricultural production by, on average, 9-10 percent across the world and that recent droughts have a larger effect than earlier ones.¹⁵
9. In 2019 alone, 26 million people were in need of urgent food assistance due to climate shocks in sub-Saharan Africa, including 13.2 and 11.2 million in Eastern and Southern Africa, respectively.
10. Recent El Niño episodes are illustrative of the damage that comes with climate extreme events. Classified as one of the most intense and widespread of the past 100 years, the 2015-2016 El Niño harmed crop and livestock production, and therefore agricultural livelihoods, around the globe, threatening food security and nutrition of 60 million people.¹⁶ In Southern Africa, one of the most affected regions, aggregate cereal production declined by 21 percent in 2015 and then 12 percent in 2016. Production of coarse grains, mostly maize, which accounts for nearly 80 percent of the subregional cereal output, dropped by 32 percent in 2015 and 22 percent in 2016. Following a new El Niño episode in 2018-2019, an estimated 41.2 million people in 13 Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states were food insecure in 2019, an increase of 28 percent compared to 2017-2018, and 7.4 percent higher than during the severe El Niño-induced drought of 2015-16. Similarly, in 2018 Mozambique suffered from late onset of rains, dry spells and erratic rainfall, leaving 1.8 million people in need of urgent food assistance. In March and April 2019, Cyclones Idai and Kenneth caused significant crop losses in some of the most productive central and northern regions of the country, with serious impact on food security in 2019.

¹³ Tubiello, F.N., Soussana, J.-F.O. & Howden, S.M., 2007. Crop and pasture response to climate change. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 104:19686–19690.

¹⁴ Deryng, D., Conway, D., Ramankutty, N., Price, J. & Warren, R. 2014. Global crop yield response to extreme heat stress under multiple climate change futures. *Environmental Research Letters*, 9: 034011. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/9/3/034011.

¹⁵ Lesk, C., Rowhani, P. & Ramankutty, N. 2016. Influence of extreme weather disasters on global crop production. *Nature*, 529. doi:10.1038/nature16467.

¹⁶ FAO. 2016. 2015–2016 El Niño Early action and response for agriculture, food security and nutrition. Report. Working Draft (July 2016) Update #9. Rome.

In Zimbabwe, the impacts of the two cyclones in the 2018/19 season and devastating drought during the 2019/20 main season, compounded by hyperinflation and economic instability, have left some 7.7 million people experiencing severe acute food insecurity in early 2020 – over two-thirds of whom are in rural areas.

11. Poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion compound the effects of climate vulnerability and extremes, affecting vulnerable groups such as women, young children, the elderly and socially isolated more intensely.

III. The Consequences of Conflict in Food Security and Nutrition

12. Conflict is a leading cause of food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2019, conflict left nearly 37 million in need of urgent food assistance. While a declining trend was observed in the incidence and intensity of conflicts since the early 2000s, there has been an uptick in violence in recent years that mirrors the global increase in conflict. In 2018, there were 90 conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, a quarter of all conflicts worldwide.¹⁷ For countries in the region where data is available, the prevalence of undernourishment is about two and a half times higher in countries affected by a protracted crisis than in other development contexts. Nutrition outcomes are also worse: almost 122 million, or 75 percent, of stunted children under 5 years of age live in conflict-affected countries.
13. Most conflicts affect mainly rural areas. They can damage agriculture, disrupt food production, food systems, cause loss of assets and incomes, and negatively affect intra-household food distribution, consumption and safety. Conflicts also undermine social, human, natural, physical and economic assets. The disruption or destruction of agricultural livelihoods are major drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition, both acute and chronic.
14. The gender dimension is important in assessing how conflict affects food security and nutrition, as men and women often have different roles and responsibilities in securing adequate food and nutrition at the household level. Men and boys are more likely to be engaged in the fighting, and are at greater risk of being forcibly recruited into military groups. The engagement of men in conflict puts greater pressure on women in managing access to food, nutrition and health care of the household.
15. There are numerous examples where conflict, coupled with other weather or health shocks, caused food security crises. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the second half of 2018, conflict in several parts of the country, combined with localized floods and an outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease resulted in 13 million people being in need of urgent food assistance. Several years of conflict in South Sudan has disrupted agriculture and attendant income-generating activities, thus spiking inflation; approximately 6.1 million people needed urgent food assistance in 2018. In the Lake Chad Basin, nine years of conflict have affected north-eastern Nigeria, Chad, the Niger (Diffa region) and Cameroon's Far North province. Somalia has experienced many years of conflict, climate and economic shocks. Over the past eight seasons, Somalis have been hit by back-to-back climatic events, which have particularly affected the country's rural populations. The Central African Republic saw disruption of economic activities due to conflict, leaving 1.9 million in need of urgent food assistance in 2018.

IV. The Consequences of Economic Slowdowns and/or Downturns on Food Security and Nutrition

16. Economic slowdowns and downturns were a contributing factor to the rise in hunger in 2015-2019 in many countries, in particular commodity-exporting countries that experienced falling commodity

¹⁷ IMF, 2019. Regional Economic Outlook, Sub-Saharan Africa, recovery amid elevated uncertainty

prices.¹⁸ The consequent decline in revenue and foreign exchange put pressure on the balance of payments and in several cases led to a significant depreciation of the currency. This in turn caused price inflation, especially in countries that rely on international markets for food imports.

17. Job losses and reduced consumer spending lead to lower household incomes, in turn reducing food security and nutrition. Higher prices have a similar impact because rising prices reduce household purchasing power. Amplifying the effects of economic slowdowns are the reduction of public services and social assistance as government revenues fall.
18. Because food constitutes such a large proportion of household expenditure with the poor, even small price increases can dramatically increase food insecurity and poverty. In the face of lower incomes and/or higher prices, households may reduce expenditure on non-essential items. Many households will resort to buying cheaper, lower quality foods, reducing spending on nutrient-dense foods, such as animal products and fruits and vegetables and, ultimately, reducing the amount of food they consume.
19. Reducing consumption and dietary diversity leads to reduced calorie, protein and micronutrient intake, increasing the risk of undernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies which, in turn, lead to stunting and maternal undernutrition, poor foetal growth, low birth weight and poor baby growth. Undernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies are also associated with higher child and maternal morbidity as well as impaired cognitive and physical development, poor performance in school and ultimately lower productivity and wages in adulthood.^{19,20,21} Empirical evidence indicates that a fall in per capita GDP leads to greater child mortality and that in sub-Saharan Africa, girls' mortality increases more than that of boys.²²
20. In addition, households often reduce spending on health and education to help maintain food consumption patterns. They may also have to sell assets, use up savings, withdraw children from school, exploit natural resources in an unsustainable manner or beg or steal. Some household members may migrate to look for employment or to return to their village.
21. The impact of economic crises is likely to be worse for women, who typically have lower wages and are often the first to lose their jobs.²³ For example, female-headed households generally have fewer resources, less education and smaller networks and as a result are more likely to suffer income losses because of food price shocks.^{24,25} During economic slowdowns and downturns, women's

¹⁸ FAO, AU and ECA. 2019. Africa Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition. Containing the Damage of Economic Slowdowns and Downturns to Food Security in Africa. Rome, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

¹⁹ Walton, E. & Allen, S. 2011. Malnutrition in developing countries. Symposium: Nutrition. Paediatrics and Child Health, 21(9): 418-424.

²⁰ Darnton-Hill, I. & Cogill, B. 2010. Maternal and Young Child Nutrition Adversely Affected by External Shocks Such as Increasing Global Food Prices. The Journal of Nutrition. Supplement: The Impact of Climate Change, the Economic Crisis, and the Increase in Food Prices on Malnutrition.

²¹ Ferreira, F.H.G. & Schady, N. 2009. Aggregate Economic Shocks, Child Schooling, and Child Health. The World Bank Research Observer, 24(2): 147-181.

²² Baird, S., Friedman, J. and Schady, N. 2011. Aggregate Income Shocks and Infant Mortality in the Developing World. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(3): 847-856.

²³ UNAIDS. 2012. Impact of the global economic crisis on women, girls and gender equality. Geneva, Switzerland, United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.

²⁴ Kumar, N. and Quisumbing, A.R. 2011. Gendered Impacts of the 2007-08 Food Price Crisis. Evidence Using Panel Data from Rural Ethiopia. IFPRI Discussion Paper 01093. Washington, DC, International Food Policy Research Institute.

²⁵ Holmes, R., Jones, N. and Marsden, H. 2009. Gender vulnerabilities, food price shocks and social protection responses. Background note. London, Overseas Development Institute.

participation in the labour force may increase substantially²⁶ in order to generate income. The greater workload reduces the time they have available to engage in household work and child-care, adding to the negative impact on children.

22. Youth are also particularly vulnerable to the impacts of economic crises as they are often employed in casual or seasonal jobs that come with low wages. Working poverty is generally higher for youth than for adults. In sub-Saharan Africa nearly 67 percent of all young workers live in poverty.²⁷ Consequently, many youth are food insecure even when they work.
23. The impact of climate variability and extremes, conflict, and economic slowdowns and downturns, has been compounded by the outbreak of desert locust in late 2019 in East Africa and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The areas most affected by desert locust are central and northern Somalia, northern and eastern Kenya as well as southern, eastern and northern Ethiopia. Although large-scale aerial and ground control operations carried out by governments, with the support of FAO, have mitigated the impact of the locusts on pastures and crops, serious concerns still remain for rural livelihoods in the subregion.
24. The COVID-19 pandemic, one of the greatest global shocks in generations, is causing serious economic downturns and hampering people's ability to access food. The pandemic continues to disrupt livelihoods and drive poverty and hunger, with the situation most acute in countries already experiencing food crises or extremely vulnerable to shocks. A recent joint analysis by FAO and WFP identified 15 African countries that are on the frontline of impending COVID-19-driven food crises, as the pandemic's knock-on effects aggravate pre-existing drivers of hunger.

V. Building Resilience to Climate Variability, Conflict and Extremes, and Economic Downturns

25. While distinct, conflict, climate variability and extremes, and economic downturns impact household food security and nutrition through the same channels and with similar results. For example, conflict and/or climate extremes disrupt economic activities, in particular in rural areas, which can result in economic downturns. All three can increase food insecurity and social and political instability, and contribute to further conflict through diverse pathways.
26. For example, in areas of the Sahel, climate-related shocks have pushed pastoralists, who often have little power within state structures, to migrate earlier and for longer periods, and using different routes from traditional ones. This migration can fuel local conflicts over key natural resources, such as pasture and water, inciting more violence. Thus, not only are the food insecurity drivers overlapping, but they can negatively reinforce each other.
27. International cooperation and support are important for managing these crises and shocks, which often have causes and effects that are regional or even global. FAO works to enhance resilience by supporting countries to adopt a multi-hazard and cross-sectoral approach to (i) govern crisis and disaster risks; (ii) monitor crisis and disaster risks, coupled with early warning; (iii) reduce community vulnerabilities to crises and disasters; and (iv) prepare for and respond to crisis and disasters.
28. Enhancing the resilience of agriculture livelihoods, food security and nutrition is only possible by strengthening governance structures, and including immediate and long-term agriculture, food security and nutrition considerations into policies, legislation and the larger enabling environment

²⁶ Bhalotra, S. and Umaña-Aponte, M. 2009. Distress work amongst women? Micro data evidence from 66 developing countries on women's work participation as an insurance device. Bristol, UK, Department of Economics, University of Bristol.

²⁷ ILO. 2018. World Employment Social Outlook. Trends 2018. Geneva, Switzerland.

for governance. Governments must strengthen national capacity and governance to promote risk reduction and crisis management policies, strategies and plans. Following a meeting of African ministers of agriculture in mid-April 2020 to discuss ongoing responses and additional priority actions to minimize the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on food security, a Task Force was set up to oversee implementation of key action points including providing coordinated and systematic support to new food insecurity “hotspots”, resulting from COVID-19, with focus on countries facing multiple threats, such as Eastern Africa with the desert locust infestation

29. Monitoring systems coupled with early warning are a key part of predicting the likelihood of occurrence of climate hazards and their impacts on livelihoods, food security and nutrition. They are particularly useful when timely alerts help trigger accurate decision-making and early actions at all institutional levels, including in communities. Within the framework of the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative and the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, FAO, WFP and other partners support the *Cadre Harmonisé*, an information and early warning system for food security and nutrition in the Sahel. As part of the Global Humanitarian Response Plan for COVID-19, FAO is setting up data collection and analysis to monitor risk factors in local food supply chains and identify emerging trends in 20 African countries.
30. It is crucial to ensure that smallholder producers and processors have access to the technology and tools needed for farmers to apply proven good practices, for example, through farmer field schools, while investing in climate-proofed infrastructure from the local to national levels. Evidence also shows that nature-based solutions (such as planting mangrove forests to protect coastal areas from flooding, land restoration, soil and water conservation) are important tools to reduce vulnerability, and thereby prevent and mitigate the impact of climate events.
31. There is a robust body of evidence based on the African experience showing that social protection programmes are effective in helping reduce poverty and food insecurity, improving nutrition through dietary diversification, human capital by enabling households to invest in education and health, and facilitating social, economic and political inclusion for the poorest and most vulnerable. Impact evaluations confirmed that cash transfer programmes increased food expenditure of participating households by between 10 and 30 percent in Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In many cases households increased expenditures on animal source foods, especially meat and dairy, thereby improving nutrition. In addition, beneficiary households invested in farm activities leading to higher outputs and improving food consumption from home production.
32. Even as social protection in the form of long-term institutional programmes is now becoming more common, the value of such programmes in addressing emergency and crisis situations is also increasingly recognized. Social assistance programmes that protect populations affected by conflict, climate shock or an economic downturn are referred to as ‘Risk Sensitive Shock-responsive Social Protection Programmes’. Where social protection schemes are in place, FAO provides support in linking these schemes to risk analysis and hazard warning to ensure they are more responsive.
33. FAO supports national authorities in developing more nascent social protection schemes. For example, working with the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, alongside WFP and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), FAO assisted in developing a holistic social protection scheme, informed by extensive lessons and experiences in humanitarian cash-based programmes. FAO is supporting extended access to risk-sensitive and shock-responsive social protection in various food crisis contexts, as part of the COVID-19 response.

VI. Enhancing the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) Nexus

34. Shifting from delivering humanitarian assistance to ending needs by reducing risks and vulnerabilities, and supporting prevention efforts are core to the HDP nexus. and malnutrition. Thus, the nexus calls for strengthened policy and operational coherence by humanitarian, development

and peace actors²⁸ building on global agendas such as the 2030 Agenda, the World Humanitarian Summit, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recommendation on the HDP nexus, and regional agendas such as the Agenda 2063, the agenda for sustainable peace, security and development in Africa, the Malabo Declaration, etc. There is a need to collaborate more effectively across sectors using a systems approach, to address the multiple drivers of fragility and vulnerability through the combined work of various partners. The Common Country Analysis, the development of the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and the formulation of collective outcomes, offers a platform to the stakeholders across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors to come up with a participatory and inclusive joint analysis and programme.

35. Investing in a sound **joint multi-dimensional analysis** of the situation is critical in terms of current and potential risks and vulnerabilities related to the political, economic, social, environmental and security dimensions. This should also include key cross-cutting issues such as gender, youth and protection issues (including do no harm). This will help to set priorities based on evidence, data and/or science. FAO has, or contributed to develop analytical tools that can forge a better situation analysis. Furthermore, the development of conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive programming tools can improve greatly the situational analysis along with other existing tools both internal and external.
36. **Joint programming** among the humanitarian, development and peace actors (government, United Nations, donors, as well as local, national and international humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors, communities) is key to achieve a tangible collective outcome that brings together short-term response, medium-term outcomes and long term-development goals²⁹. This will bring coherence, complementarity and synergy among multi-mandated institutions capitalizing on their comparative advantages and mandates³⁰. The joint approach should be grounded on a 'whole-of-society' approach to leave No One Behind. Furthermore, the Government role is important in this process, but abiding by the humanitarian principles. FAO has a strong comparative advantage to support and build on food systems to offer different outcomes relevant to addressing social inequalities, gender, youth, food crisis, etc.
37. Humanitarian relief, development programmes and contributions to local peace are not linear processes: they are all needed at the same time, depending on the context and whilst respecting principled humanitarian action. Achieving the right mix of humanitarian, development and peace approaches, and how they are integrated, is critical. A nexus approach should never be a reason not to deliver timely and principled humanitarian assistance where needed, nor a reason to scale back development assistance. Similarly, the peace aspect should be framed in community-based approaches that address root causes, rather than in terms of security alone. Critically, a more deliberate and consistent integration of conflict sensitivity and enhancing local capacities for peace will be required to genuinely deliver an HDP ('triple') nexus approach. However, this is not simply a programmatic or conceptual approach; it also relates to ongoing structural shifts across the aid architecture that are changing how aid is planned and financed.

VII. Key Messages

38. The collaboration between humanitarian, development and peace actors encouraged by HDP nexus approaches can further help ensure a greater awareness of the wide range of risks people face, as well as facilitate acknowledgment of the overlaps and interlinkages between climate and human-made risks. However, delivering a triple-nexus approach that interacts with and addresses the drivers

²⁸ DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, OECD 2019

²⁹ Adapted from the HDP companion piece (final draft of 19/01/2019)

³⁰ UNSDG & IASC. Key messages on the Humanitarian-Development Nexus and its links to Peace, 22 March 2019

of fragility goes beyond these frameworks as they currently stand. More deliberate and consistent integration of conflict sensitivity and enhancement of local capacities for peace is necessary, along with thought and investment into how to address complexity and the needs of vulnerable groups during both their daily lives and during crises.

39. Such prospects can include improving natural resource management between identity groups, or supporting social cohesion through agricultural activities that increase contact between people. Emphasizing stronger collaboration while also focusing on achieving collective outcomes is critical to address the vulnerability and risks facing communities in crisis-prone countries. FAO has considerably stepped up its engagement with the Peace Building Fund (PBF) over recent years, partnering with a number of other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in implementing PBF projects. Some of the good practices include the use of Dimitra community listening clubs as a tool for conflict resolutions in the Sahel.
40. Structural shifts in overseas development assistance (ODA) need to occur to build effective resilience along the HDP nexus. For example, many interventions contributing to resilience and sustaining peace are supported by both ODA and national efforts. Even so, ODA support for efforts to prevent conflict and sustain peace remain limited. Much of the ODA flowing to countries in conflict or with a protracted crisis takes the form of humanitarian assistance, not on actions across the nexus. Similarly, on a yearly average, less than 5 percent of all humanitarian funding has gone to disaster preparedness and prevention, and less than one percent to those countries most in need. Investment in disaster risk reduction from ODA disbursements was in the range of 0.4 percent in 2010 and 2011 across all sectors.
41. Humanitarian assistance must be better integrated with development support through multi-year planning processes that in turn require longer-term donor commitments. More ODA should also be directed at food and agriculture, including in support to addressing all forms of malnutrition, in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, as the available evidence suggests that they receive only a small proportion of funds. Finally, a sustainable impact of food security and nutrition-related interventions on peace is more likely when implemented as part of a broader, multi-sectoral set of interventions before, during and after conflict. In this regard, FAO's comprehensive and holistic COVID-19 Response and Recovery Programme is designed to proactively and sustainably address the socio-economic impacts of the pandemic. In line with the UN approach to "build back better," and in pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals, it aims to mitigate the immediate impacts of the pandemic while strengthening the long-term resilience of food systems and livelihoods.
42. Over the longer term, governments must invest strategically to strengthen the country's and the population's resilience to shocks. There needs to be a greater focus on reducing dependence on a few commodities and spatial inequalities. Investing in a diversified economy and promoting inclusive structural transformation are key for longer-term social stability and broad, inclusive growth.
43. International and regional partnerships are vital to manage and to reduce risks in the face of climate variability and extremes, which themselves can contribute to conflict by undermining livelihoods, food security and nutrition. The Global Network against Food Crises, launched at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 by the European Union, FAO and WFP, is an alliance working to combat food crises from humanitarian and development perspectives and tackle their root causes, whilst also considering improving the prospects for local peace. This partnership aims to promote enhanced coordination among all relevant stakeholders through consensus on analyses and strategic programming to promote a more efficient use of resources to meet growing needs and strengthen joint responses and lasting solutions to food crises.