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**COORDINATION AT HEADQUARTERS AND FIELD LEVEL BETWEEN
UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES INVOLVED IN PEACE-BUILDING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBILITIES
(JIU/REP/97/4)**

The attached Report of the Joint Inspection Unit is preceded by the Comments of the Director-General. The Comments of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) on the Report will be brought to the attention of the Governing Bodies as soon as they are available.

**COMMENTS OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF FAO ON
JIU REPORT 97/4 "COORDINATION AT HEADQUARTERS AND FIELD LEVEL
BETWEEN UN AGENCIES INVOLVED IN PEACE BUILDING: AN ASSESSMENT
OF POSSIBILITIES"**

The report deals with important issues related to coordination among UN system organizations involved in post-conflict peace-building. It makes valuable recommendations, particularly regarding the need to establish a framework for coordination which should be "overarching and coherent, yet sufficiently flexible to adjust to the unique aspects of each peace building situation" (Recommendation 1) and calling on the Administrative Committee on Coordination to "prepare a declaration on the coordination of peace-building activities for acceptance by the General Assembly" (Recommendation 3).

The report, however, uses a language that is sometimes excessive, especially in its conclusions. For example, the finding that "in practice there are no effective coordination mechanisms for post-conflict building" (p. v, first para.) is an exaggeration, as coordination mechanisms do exist, and have been strengthened with the establishment of the IASC in 1992. While it must be recognized that the IASC and particularly the tool of Consolidated UN Appeals (a tool not assessed in the report) work better to coordinate emergency assistance and not as well to pave the way for rehabilitation, as FAO has had occasion to experience, they do work. Another notable result has been the establishment of a standing agreement that the Emergency Relief Coordinator act as the link with peace-keeping agencies and be the spokesperson to the UN Security Council on emergency relief matters. The Inspectors themselves acknowledge in the body of their report (para. 30) that the "IASC merits further exploration". Regrettably, the report does not do so.

It should be noted, moreover, that most of the report's recommendations are to be superseded by events as the UN Reform proceeds apace and institutional arrangements are made to further strengthen coordination both at Headquarters and field levels. The ACC took important decisions in this regard at its April 1997 session. FAO in particular supports the concept, as discussed and agreed to in the ACC and the IASC, that in complex emergencies the Representative of the Secretary-General be given overall coordination responsibility covering all aspects of peace-building but without operational responsibilities. This was further highlighted in the UN Reform proposals submitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the General Assembly.

If, as alleged by the Inspectors, "some UN organizations involved in post-conflict peace building view their independence as a higher priority than coordination with other agencies" (Conclusion 3), this surely is not the case with FAO and most other members of the IASC. FAO has always recognized the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator when appointed as emergency coordinator or of whichever UN agency invested with leadership; FAO has limited itself to claiming a leadership role only in coordinating assistance to the agricultural sector, which is within its mandate.

The Inspectors also make the welcome point that coordination with the Bretton Woods Institutions should be strengthened and call on the UN system organizations to "formally establish coordination mechanisms between themselves and these financial institutions". This

is a matter that has been amply debated in the IASC, particularly in relation to the World Bank's increasing role in emergency work, but the question has now left this forum and is placed with the World Bank's governing bodies. Moreover, it should be pointed out that formal relationships between the World Bank and FAO are of long standing, as evidenced by the Investment Centre's work with the Bank.

Finally, it may be noted that insufficient attention is given to an essential player in the coordination aspect: the beneficiary country itself. While this oversight is explicitly acknowledged by the Inspectors (p. vi, first para), it is regrettable that no effort was made to correct it. The risk is to misunderstand or gain a partial view of the role of the UN system in conflict situations, particularly with respect to the type of assistance UN specialized agencies may be called upon to provide to those countries affected by complex emergencies and the breakdown of governance. In the case of FAO, it has a special role to play in this context, in giving support to the country's own coordinating capacity in the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector. This is precisely one of the objectives of fielding FAO Emergency Coordinators to affected countries, as was successfully done in recent emergencies.

**COORDINATION AT HEADQUARTERS AND FIELD LEVEL
BETWEEN UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES INVOLVED
IN PEACE-BUILDING: AN ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBILITIES**

Prepared by

**Fatih K. Bouayad-Agha
Boris P. Krasulin**

Joint Inspection Unit



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ACRONYMS

ACC	Administrative Committee on Coordination
CCPOQ	Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The United Nations system continues to risk failing to ensure that increasingly limited resources available for post-conflict reconstruction are used effectively, and ultimately expending even greater resources in humanitarian assistance, as well as future peacekeeping operations if conflicts recur. Without a more serious effort to coordinate peace-building activities between United Nations system organizations and Bretton Woods institutions, Member States continue to marginalize the initial financial investment made during the peacekeeping phase. The United Nations system also fails to capitalize upon the current emphasis on reforming its structure in order to facilitate greater efficiencies in achieving its goals, as well as strengthening the common system. While United Nations system organizations articulate support for improved coordination, the Inspectors found that, in practice, there are no effective coordination mechanisms for post-conflict peace-building at the policy, headquarters and system-wide levels. In addition, there are several barriers to achieving this coordination, including organizations viewing their independence as a higher priority than coordination with another organization. Further, these organizations lack a generally accepted understanding of coordination, as well as well-defined working relationships vis-à-vis each other. Although the concept of post-conflict reconstruction is as old as human conflict, the role of the international community has increased due to an increased sense of solidarity in dealing with these situations. To effectively perform its role in post-conflict peace-building, the United Nations must evolve from a fragmented configuration of competing organizations to an integrated, coordinated system of organizations focused on achieving specific goals.

BACKGROUND

The concept of post-conflict peace-building was consolidated in response to the 1992 Security Council Summit, which asked for "an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping."¹ In response, "An Agenda for Peace"² was issued, which outlined a number of tools available for achieving peace and security, including the concept of post-conflict peace-building. Post-conflict peace-building was defined as the "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict". The concept has received wide recognition, yet in practice, it is a new and evolving concept. Efforts to implement the concept, while surrounded by acknowledged difficulties associated with implementation, call for more integrated and coordinated action; emphasize post-conflict peace-building as a critical element in preventing the recurrence of the conflict; and provide a basis for healing the wounds inflicted during the period of conflict.

Concerned with the increasing number of multilateral and bilateral players involved in peace-building activities, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) asked the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) to conduct a review of the coordination of peace-building activities. In its request, UNESCO noted, "peace-building is becoming one of the more visible components of United Nations agencies programmes". Thus we find in many agencies a multitude of activities that fall within the framework of the "Agenda for Peace." UNESCO's interest in this issue stems from its long-standing commitment and role in promoting peace and most recently, its approach known as "A Culture of Peace". (In its resolution 51/101 of 12 December 1996, the General Assembly

called for a draft declaration and preparation of a programme of action on a culture of peace). The JIU incorporated this review into its work programme because it shared UNESCO's concerns and observed a sharp increase in the number of inter- and intra-State conflicts beginning in the 1980s, resulting in an increasing demand for system resources and involvement in post-conflict peace-building activities. The present report builds on prior work conducted by the Unit on peacekeeping and peace-building.³

This report focuses on issues related only to coordination among United Nations system organizations involved in post-conflict peace-building, yet the Inspectors recognize the preeminent and prominent role in all matters related to reconstruction played by the country emerging from the conflict, as well as all Member States. Therefore, the report did not specifically review the role of the country in coordination and does not make recommendations on this matter, although the Inspectors note that some United Nations system organizations play a special role in supporting the development of a country's coordination capacity. Furthermore, since the coordination of peace-building activities is part of a broader set of general coordination issues of United Nations activities, at times it is necessary for the Inspectors to discuss general coordination issues, which they recognize are beyond the scope of UNESCO's request.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of their interviews and analysis, the Inspectors would like to present their conclusions and recommendations. In their view, the establishment of effective coordination mechanisms, in general, must be viewed as a primary feature of United Nations reform efforts. Specifically, United Nations system organizations involved in post-conflict peace-building must be committed to improving coordination mechanisms as part of an ongoing process to improve the functioning of the system. Effective coordination practices should be permanently embedded in United Nations system structures and processes, and should be accomplished through existing organizations or bodies.

Conclusion 1: Each post-conflict situation will involve a different set of conditions and circumstances, typically related to weakened civil institutions and the lack of a culture of stability and reconciliation. In some cases, there will be no effective Government with which to coordinate. The degree of destruction of institutions and sectors and the political-military situation will vary widely. Given this high degree of variability, conditions and circumstances in a country undergoing reconstruction will change over time, and any framework for coordination must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate such changes.

Recommendation 1:

The coordination framework for post-conflict peace-building must be, *inter alia*, overarching and coherent, yet sufficiently flexible to adjust to the unique aspects of each peace-building situation — the preferred method of coordination will therefore be “ad hoc” based on certain generally agreed upon principles.

Conclusion 2: The agreement ending the conflict provides a good platform for articulating the coordination framework to be used during recovery. Peace-building activities must be reinforced by a series of measures and actions to consolidate peace. Addressing the means for coordination is critical at this point because the manner in which these activities are incorporated into the agreement will be critical to the success of achieving coordination during implementation.

Recommendation 2:

In order to facilitate all actors working together on one strategic plan for recovery, a framework for coordination must be established during the initial reconstruction planning phases. Member States, as represented in the components of the United Nations system, may consider the agreement ending the conflict as a suitable platform for outlining and reinforcing a series of measures and actions to consolidate peace, establish linkage between peacekeeping and peace-building operations, and outline the framework for coordination.

Conclusion 3: The Inspectors identified several barriers to achieving effective coordination of post-conflict peace-building activities that provide some evidence that United Nations system organizations do not realize the benefits and efficacy of a common system. Specifically, the Inspectors found some organizations involved in post-conflict peace-building view their independence as a higher priority than coordination with other organizations. In the view of the Inspectors, such coordination requires a certain degree of subordination to the leadership of another organization. Further, they do not share a generally accepted understanding of coordination and lack well-defined working relationships vis-à-vis each other. Accordingly, the Inspectors conclude there is an urgent need for accepting a set of provisions which would articulate several important aspects of post-conflict peace-building coordination.

Recommendation 3:

The Administrative Committee on Coordination should prepare a declaration on the coordination of peace-building activities for acceptance by the General Assembly and legislative bodies of specialized agencies which should recognize the need for United Nations system organizations to maintain their independence, yet articulate the primacy of the United Nations leadership and reinforce the need for coordination to ensure the maximum utilization of resources and the achievement of objectives. Such a declaration should also

- **Come to an agreement on a generally acceptable understanding of coordination;**
- **Establish clear mandates and guidelines for United Nations system organizations involvement in post-conflict peace-building activities;**

- **Identify organizations, both at the headquarters and field levels, which will assume leadership for coordinating policy issues in post-conflict peace-building activities;**
- **Establish more formal and consistent coordination between United Nations system organizations and Bretton Woods institutions;**
- **Strengthen existing coordinating bodies, such as the ACC, its subsidiary bodies, and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC); and**
- **Build and expand on coordination efforts under way among thematic lines.**

Conclusion 4: Peacekeeping activities have become increasingly multi-functional, including such activities as disarmament of former combatants, election monitoring and infrastructure building. Consequently, the line between peacekeeping and peace-building activities has become blurred. While the two phases are related, the objectives and operational components of peacekeeping and peace-building activities differ significantly. Peacekeeping was originally designed to maintain the peace and involves only United Nations resources, personnel and financing. Peace-building, on the other hand, is designed to build upon the maintenance of peace and involves a wide range of bilateral and multilateral actors, activities, objectives and financing mechanisms. In current practice, peace-keepers no longer solely perform peacekeeping activities, but have become increasingly involved in peace-building. As a result, peacekeeping has moved beyond its original role of creating a "buffer" between the parties involved in the conflict and establishing stability so the reconstruction of the country and its economy can take place in an orderly fashion. In the Inspectors' opinion, peacekeeping and peace-building activities should not be commingled, but maintained as separate, distinct operations. Yet, in their view, there should be clear linkage and a smooth transition between two phases to ensure that the investment made during the peacekeeping phase is retained.

Recommendation 4:

As one element of enhancing coordination, Member States may wish to consider the possibility of carrying out peace-building activities as a separate and distinct operation — "a peace-building operation" — albeit closely linked as a follow-on to the peacekeeping phase.

Conclusion 5: The Inspectors found effective coordination at the field level, under the leadership of either the United Nations Resident Coordinator or Secretary General's Special Representative. However, the Inspectors found no evidence of effective coordination at the policy and headquarters levels of United Nations system organizations. At the United Nations system level, the IASC plays an important role in facilitating the consultative process between organizations involved in relief operations; however, its role and resources are constrained with regard to expanding this role to the continuum of post-conflict peace-building activities. In the considered view of the Inspectors, coordination at all three levels — policy, headquarters and system-wide — is essential, as it is here that strategic policy and resource decisions are made. A recent proposal by the Secretary-General to

establish the Department of Political Affairs as the lead United Nations department for peace-building creates a focal point for coordination at the United Nations headquarters levels, which had been previously lacking. Without effective coordination at the policy, headquarters and United Nations system levels, there is limited or no assurance that activities, responsibilities and resources will be effectively coordinated at the appropriate levels, leaving undue burden on the field level organizations to coordinate. In particular, the Inspectors see the need for more integrated support at the headquarters level for country-level operations. Further, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), a principal organ of the United Nations, is not sufficiently involved in the coordination of peace-building activities, as recently noted by the Secretary-General in his speech before ECOSOC. The Inspectors welcome his proposals to enhance the Council's role in policy coordination and improving the coherence of the Council's machinery.

Recommendation 5:

Policy level

As peace-building is essentially a component of development activities, the coordination role of the ECOSOC in development policies and activities should be enhanced in accordance with Chapter X of the Charter of the United Nations.

Headquarters level

(a) Coordination issues related specifically to peace-building activities should be a regular agenda item to be discussed during the Secretary-General's "cabinet" meetings between United Nations departments.

(b) The secretariats of other United Nations system organizations should also follow the example set by the Secretary-General and establish a lead department for the coordination of policy and strategic decisions among system organizations involved in peace-building.

United Nations system level

(a) To more effectively coordinate United Nations system organizations involved in peace-building, ACC's role should be expanded to include an ongoing coordinator role for post-conflict peace-building activities of the United Nations system. This should be accomplished within existing coordination mechanisms.

(b) The IASC should be strengthened in order for it to play a greater role in the coordination and integration of post-conflict peace-building activities among United Nations system organizations.

Conclusion 6: The Bretton Woods institutions, in particular the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, already play a significant role in financing and providing technical assistance to

countries undergoing post-conflict reconstruction. Coordination between the United Nations system and these financial institutions is not sufficient and continues to be an issue of concern. Consequently, there have been instances where these financial institutions developed their reconstruction strategies without consulting or including United Nations system organizations. Formal mechanisms, such as the exchange of letters, should be used to outline general concurrence among Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations system regarding coordination, with the next step being to develop more specific, detailed operations-oriented procedures. (Such an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Director of the World Bank took place in 1995, outlining the coordination arrangement for Angola.) In his speech before the High-Level Segment of the 1997 Substantive Session of the ECOSOC, the Secretary-General recognized efforts by the ECOSOC to promote closer interaction between United Nations system organizations and Bretton Woods institutions.⁴

Recommendation 6:

Given the increasing role played by Bretton Woods institutions in post-conflict peace-building activities, United Nations system organizations should formally establish coordination linkages, between themselves and these financial institutions to ensure both participation in the planning phases of post-conflict recovery and a sustainable, coordinated relationship throughout reconstruction. These linkages should be developed without the creation of new structures.

INTRODUCTION

1. The Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), at the request of one of its participating organizations, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), included in its work programme a report entitled, "Coordination at headquarters and field level, within the framework of 'An Agenda for Peace', between the United Nations agencies in peace-building: An assessment of the possibilities." In its request letter, UNESCO defined the scope of the review to cover both the general overview of actions in situations where conflict is imminent and also in post-conflict areas. To avoid duplication of other JIU work, this review focussed only on post-conflict peace-building activities. Previously, the JIU presented a report which dealt specifically with situations where conflict is imminent.⁵

2. The Inspectors met with representatives of the United Nations Secretariat in New York, Geneva and Vienna, including the Under-Secretaries-General from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, as well as from the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations; Humanitarian Affairs; and Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis; and the Assistant Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs, who gave both the views of the Department and his experience in peace-building in El Salvador and Guatemala. The Inspectors also met with representatives of UNESCO and a number of United Nations system agencies and representatives from a number of delegations, in particular those who are active in the working group on peace-building activities. In the interest of sharing information and ideas, the Inspectors also met with former United Nations Special Representatives to Angola and Burundi. Taking into account the important role of the Bretton Woods institutions, the Inspectors met with officials from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

3. The basic objectives of the JIU report were to identify existing coordination bodies and mechanisms, obtain views on the effectiveness of these bodies and mechanisms in actual post-conflict peace-building situations, and make recommendations for strengthening post-conflict peace-building coordination without creating new structures or bodies. The Inspectors met with a wide range of actors to explore what is meant by coordination and to determine if there was a common view of this frequently cited term.

4. Since 1988, the Security Council has issued an increasing number of mandates related to peace and security, as well as expanding the types of activities stipulated in these mandates. As a result, these mandates are no longer strictly military in nature, but now include multifaceted involvement in reconstruction. Between 1988 and 1994, the number of resolutions related to peace and security passed by the Security Council increased from 15 to 78, an increase of 420 per cent. During the same period, the number of peacekeeping operations increased from 5 to 17 and the number of troops deployed from approximately 9,600 to 73,400. In 1996, while the number of peacekeeping operations remained constant, the number of troops decreased to approximately 24,700. As the Secretary-General recently noted, this may appear to be a decrease in peacekeeping activities, but in reality, peacekeeping has increased and is more diversified. There are 50,000 troops under NATO operating with IFOR in Bosnia, as well as troops in some of the former Soviet republics and Liberia. The complexity of tasks entrusted to United Nations personnel did not diminish and troops engaged in activities related to diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. As a result, the tasks entrusted to the United Nations in post-conflict peace-building will also continue to increase.

5. In discussing the concept of post-conflict peace-building, we may recall Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, which says:

“With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

(a) Higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;

(b) Solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and

(c) Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”

6. In order for peace-building to be successful, there must be a comprehensive effort to bring all organizations together in a cohesive manner. According to the “Agenda for Peace”, coordination is required at three levels: (1) within the United Nations Secretariat; (2) between United Nations Headquarters and the head of offices of other funds, programmes, offices and agencies of the United Nations system; and (3) in the field. The multifaceted nature of both peacekeeping and peace-building has made it necessary to improve coordination within the Secretariat, so that the relevant departments function as an integrated whole under the control of the Secretary-General’s authority and control. While proposals are made to the General Assembly or the Security Council on peace and security issues, these need to be based on coordinated inputs from the Departments of Political Affairs, Peacekeeping Operations, Humanitarian Affairs and Administration and Management and others involved in post-conflict peace-building activities.

7. The United Nations Task Force on Post-Conflict Peace-building⁶ notes that the concept of post-conflict peace-building should be incorporated into the development strategy of a country as soon as possible. However, in the initial post-conflict phase, the situation is both fragile and transitory, therefore all activities must be approached carefully. Accordingly, while peace-building activities are in many ways development activities, in peace-building strategies deviate from what is viewed as traditional development practice. Specifically,

(a) The selection and establishment of priorities will involve political considerations and addressing problems, which, if left unresolved, can lead to a breach of the peace.

(b) Preferential treatment should be given to former combatants and others directly involved in creating the conflict, to discourage them from resorting to rearming themselves. This will result in a distinction between combatants and other beneficiaries with the same socio-economic needs, a practice typically not acceptable in traditional development.

(c) Reasonable expectations should be set with regard to the allocation of resources. Design and implement activities in such a manner as to minimize distortion and correct inequities through training, technical assistance and credit to ensure long-term sustainability.

8. The Inspectors noted that the nature of post-conflict peace-building is inherently political, a point also noted during the International Colloquium on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Strategies.⁷ In designing a framework for the reconstruction for society emerging from war or acute turmoil, it must be recognized that the needs of this society are qualitatively different from that of a stable society. Specifically, it was reported:

"... this requires a reordering of normal priorities, as well as the incorporation of new ones. Designing a framework for such assistance is in essence a political task, albeit using a variety of tools and a wide array of expertise from all parts of the United Nations system as well as from governments and NGOs. The political nature of this task is determined by the overriding goal, during the fragile post-war and post-chaos stage, of avoiding the recurrence of war or chaos. In almost all post-conflict peace-building this will mean a significant departure from the priorities and allocation of resources that apply in development in non-peace-related situations."⁸

9. **While this report focuses on post-conflict peace-building, the Inspectors wish to acknowledge the concept of preventive diplomacy, particularly in an environment of decreasing resources. The JIU expressed this view previously,⁹ pointing out that the United Nations system potential in this area has not been realized and the Inspectors made recommendations in order to establish a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy.**

10. The Inspectors wish to thank all who offered their time and ideas. The Inspectors regret that not every view can be incorporated into this report given the limitations of space.

II. CURRENT STATE OF COORDINATION IN POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING

11. No United Nations document defines the elements of post-conflict peace-building coordination, which could form the basis for a generally accepted understanding of coordination among those involved in post-conflict peace-building. While some documents make general reference to this concept, they do not articulate the specific elements of coordination in practical and meaningful terms. This is in contrast to "Agenda for Development", which includes the following definition of "coordination":

"Coordination means a clear allocation of responsibilities, and effective division of labour among the many actors involved in development, and a commitment by each of those actors to work towards common and compatible goals and objectives. Individual development actors must strive to make their efforts complementary and contributory, rather than isolated or competing. Coordination, so viewed, must guide the actions of each of these actors and the interactions among them."¹⁰

Even a dictionary definition of coordination states: "to bring into a common action, movement, or condition, or to harmonize,"¹¹ while by no means a comprehensive definition, at its most elementary level indicates a commitment towards some commonality of action.

12. In the opinion of the Inspectors, the definition of coordination used in the "Agenda for Development" provides a good model for constructing a similar operating definition for the coordination of post-conflict peace-building activities. Such an operational definition would include similar elements, namely the allocation of responsibilities, a division of labour among key actors, a commitment to common goals and objectives, and complementary and contributory efforts among actors. This definition of coordination inherently requires a certain degree of subordination of one organization to the leadership of another.

13. In the preparation of the report, the Inspectors found no common operating definition of coordination. Many officials noted that at a minimum, coordination should include transparency of operations and the sharing of information to facilitate the delivery of services and implementation of programmes by the numerous agencies involved in specific components of peace-building. This is encouraging, yet certainly insufficient. They were also concerned that there was no agreement as to what level of information was necessary to share. What was clear was that many officials did not think coordination could realistically include an articulation of the division of labour among organizations or involve decisions regarding the allocation of resources.

14. The Inspectors conclude that because organizations involved in peace-building view their independence as a higher priority than coordination with another organization, they were unable to envisage subordinating their agendas or activities to the leadership of another. Many questioned what organization or position in the system would have the appropriate mandate and authority to provide such coordination. As for the United Nations system organizations, many noted that each responds to the concerns and issues advanced by individual legislative bodies, and this resulted in a form of independence that precluded subordinating to the leadership of another organization. On the other hand, officials from Bretton Woods institutions were more supportive of the division of labour and

allocation of resources concepts, largely because these concepts were successfully being advanced through their reconstruction planning processes in some countries, in particular, Bosnia.

15. The ECOSOC is the principal organ for coordinating the economic and social work of the United Nations system. It serves as a central forum for the discussion of international economic and social issues of a global or inter-disciplinary nature and the formulation of policy on these issues. Many suggested increasing ECOSOC's authority over United Nations system programme resources, estimated at \$5 billion, to include the coordination of post-conflict peace-building. As one of the principal organs of the United Nations system and originally envisaged as playing a significant role in coordinating United Nations resources related to economics, development and social programmes, this recommendation would further enhance ECOSOC's coordination role in providing much needed coordination at the policy level.

16. The United Nations Charter, Chapter X, outlines *inter alia*, the functions and powers of the ECOSOC. Specifically with regard to its role in coordination, Article 63 states the ECOSOC may "coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations." Furthermore, according to the Charter, it provides a critical link between the non-governmental organizations and national organizations. Specifically, Article 71 says the ECOSOC may "... make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned."

17. Recently, the Nordic United Nations Reform Project 1996,¹² issued a set of proposals geared towards strengthening the United Nations in order to fulfil its economic and social mandate, which specifically proposed enhancing ECOSOC's role in coordination and providing policy guidance to the United Nations system, including specialized agencies and the Regional Commissions.

Coordination at the Secretariat level

18. During the course of their review, the Inspectors were told that without adequate, serious efforts to coordinate at the Secretariat level, the United Nations lacked (1) transparency in decisions and the effective exchange of information; (2) harmonization and interaction between operational units within the Secretariat; and (3) a standing interdepartmental framework for coordination and oversight. It was even suggested that without a consolidation of departments at the Secretariat level, it would be difficult to imagine how any meaningful coordination could be achieved, given the manner in which organizations coveted their independence.

19. As part of the Secretary-General's reforms, he proposed establishing the Department of Political Affairs as the lead United Nations department for peace-building, creating a focal point for coordination at the United Nations headquarters levels, which has been previously lacking. The Department will rely upon the Executive Committee on Peace and Security to support peace-building initiatives. During the course of their review, the Inspectors identified the Department of Political Affairs

as a good candidate for centralized coordination of United Nations Secretariat peace-building activities, given the inherently political nature of peace-building.

20. The Inspectors did not attempt to quantify the implications resulting from the absence of effective coordination, but they were frequently told, in general, it results in delays in action and duplication of effort.

21. The ACC has a mandate for system-wide coordination of policy issues, and could be a logical candidate for managing coordination of post-conflict peace-building, in addition to its responsibilities for development. In the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General stressed the role of the ACC in enhancing inter-agency coherence, bearing in mind the important role of economic and social development in post-conflict situations. However, the Committee was not viewed by many as an effective mechanism for coordination because it lacks the necessary political support and visibility. Yet, in January 1997, the Secretary-General, in his letter to members of the ACC, said, "The ACC is an important symbol of the unity of the system. It should however be more than a symbol. It should be a policy- and action-oriented instrument geared to launching and monitoring concrete joint initiatives to accomplish common policy objectives."

22. Among existing coordinating bodies, the Inspectors found no effective mechanisms for coordination at the Secretariat level among United Nations system organizations. Specifically, each organization conducts its own planning, responds to its legislative body, and implements programmes in line with the agenda established by the legislative body. Planning efforts are not conducted on any system-wide basis, so therefore even when information is shared it is often after key objectives have been established. The sharing of information among system-wide organizations tends to be fairly cursory.

23. Based on numerous discussions, the Inspectors found many officials who said the ACC and ECOSOC should assume a greater role in coordinating post-conflict peace-building activities within the United Nations system. However, the Inspectors found no evidence of either body playing an active role in the coordination of post-conflict peace-building activities.

24. The Inspectors observed that the most effective coordination among United Nations system agencies currently appears to be along thematic lines. In fact, the Inspectors identified a number of cases where organizations articulated the details of coordination by means of written agreements. It should be noted that the concept of written agreements to clarify relationships between agencies was established as far back as 1961, with the issuance of ST/SG/14.¹³ Specifically the Inspectors identified memoranda of agreement between WFP and UNHCR, UNICEF and UNHCR, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights and UNESCO. Officials from these agencies told the Inspectors that the purpose of these agreements is to recognize and honour the respective mandates and responsibilities of each organization, yet articulate parameters that build on the comparative advantages of each organization and clarify the division of responsibilities of each organization. The goal, of course, is to maximize resource utilization and increase the speed of resource mobilization.

25. In January 1994, WFP and UNHCR jointly issued the "Memorandum of Understanding on the Joint Working Arrangements for Refugee, Returnee, and Internally Displaced Persons Feeding

Operations." It specifically states the goal of this memorandum of understanding is to "seek further improvements that would lead to a more cost-effective and efficient working partnership between WFP and UNHCR." The Memorandum clarifies the division of responsibilities between both agencies in providing emergency food relief.

26. In October 1995, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and UNESCO signed a Memorandum of Cooperation that provided the framework for further developing and strengthening cooperation in assisting the High Commissioner in a preliminary survey and evaluation of existing human rights education programmes and initiatives. In its resolution 51/101 of 12 December 1996, the General Assembly welcomed with satisfaction this Memorandum of Cooperation.¹⁴

27. In March 1996, UNHCR and UNICEF signed a Memorandum of Understanding, aimed at "encouraging and facilitating systematic, predictable and cooperation action between the two organizations ... and seeks to build on the recognized comparative advantages of each organization and to establish operational modalities of cooperation." This Memorandum maps out the division of responsibilities between the agencies with regard to the various population groups (i.e., refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons and affected local host populations) and the types of cooperative activities. The Memorandum also includes an important clause with regard to resource issues, for example

"Each organization is responsible for mobilizing the resources necessary to discharge the responsibilities set out herein. Should insufficient resources be available for immediate action, the other organization shall be consulted. For certain special operations, a decision may be taken to issue a Joint Appeal. Both organizations will participate in DHA-coordinated inter-agency appeal processes."

28. While at present not operational in a memorandum of understanding or cooperation, under its responsibilities for educational activities within the framework of post-conflict peace-building, UNESCO has expressed its willingness to coordinate a global training effort promoting human development skills of dialogue, negotiation and consensus in post-conflict situations. In 1996, in order to advance the concept of a culture of peace, and the common system of values and behavioural patterns indispensable for constructing peace, UNESCO published the third volume in the Peace and Conflict Issues series.¹⁵ This publication brings together contributions from peace researchers, philosophers, jurists and educators, and deals with the culture of peace and its multiple facets. A fourth volume in the series addresses methods and approaches to conflict resolution.

29. The Inspectors explored another existing forum for coordination, the IASC. Established by General Assembly resolution 46/182 and reinforced by ECOSOC at the July 1993 session and by the General Assembly in resolution 48/57, IASC was established as a primary mechanism for coordinating policy issues relating to humanitarian assistance and for formulating coherent and timely responses to disasters and complex emergencies. The IASC functions as a clearing house for issues, which provides an information exchange mechanism and forum for sharing the different views of organizations. Overall, the IASC deals with three broad categories of issues: (1) strategic and policy

issues relating to specific emergencies; (2) global thematic issues; and (3) operational, administration, and implementation issues. According to resolution 48/57, the IASC will meet at least three to four times a year.

30. While the Inspectors recognize that currently, the jurisdiction of the IASC is largely limited to relief and emergency situations, they are interested in the mandate of the entity and the coordinating role it plays. They were also impressed that the IASC provides a forum for facilitating the consultative process between organizations involved in the relief response structure and involves officials who have the authority to represent their respective organizations to review, endorse and make key recommendations on behalf of their organizations on pertinent matters. In the opinion of the Inspectors, the IASC mechanism merits further exploration and may provide a model for similar efforts in post-conflict peace-building. In April 1997, the ACC affirmed the role of the IASC as the primary mechanism to address large-scale humanitarian crises. The ACC also recognized the need for coherent policy and operational guidance for system organizations involved in peace-building and called on the IASC and other coordinating arrangements to further integrate in order to provide such guidance.

31. During the course of their review, the Inspectors found some consensus regarding the coordination of post-conflict peace-building activities at the field level. Most believed that coordination, as defined by the sharing of information, at the field level under the United Nations Resident Coordinator system, worked well. Specifically, they reported that information was frequently shared among United Nations system agencies in the field and there was an attempt to resolve situations where conflict or duplication was occurring.

32. The Inspectors found a majority of officials who noted that the same mechanisms established to coordinate activities during a crisis — Secretary-General's Special Representative, Special Envoy, and Humanitarian Coordinator — have the potential for being used to coordinate peace-building activities in the field. There were, however, concerns raised over increasing the power or control of the Secretary-General's Special Representative. In contrast, some questioned whether United Nations Resident Coordinator should be the coordinator of peace-building activities, in spite of its current role coordinating development and humanitarian activities.

III. CURRENT CONCEPTS IN UNITED NATIONS POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING

33. The measures involved in post-conflict peace-building include demilitarization, control of small arms, institutional reform, democratization, improved police and judicial systems, monitoring of human rights, electoral reform, civilian police, as well as social, economic and humanitarian assistance. Due to the multifaceted nature of post-conflict peace-building, a large number of multilateral actors, both inside and outside of the United Nations system, are typically involved. Given this multiplicity, the need for coordination becomes more acute.

34. Peace-building activities generally fall within the mandates of the various programmes, funds, offices and organizations of the United Nations system with responsibilities in the economic, social, humanitarian and human rights fields. Therefore, while integration and coordination of activities is given much lip service, in practice, each organization tends to protect its own interest or maintain its own perspective. As a result, coordination often operates in a vacuum.

35. In December 1995, the United Nations Task Force on Post-Conflict Peace-building produced a preliminary "Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities."¹⁶ The Task Force was interested in identifying those tools at the disposal of the United Nations system, both those that have actually been carried out in post-conflict operations, as well as other activities that would be desirable, but have not been included in peace-building activities.

36. In early 1996, the Inter-Agency Working Group on the Role of the United Nations System in Post-Conflict Situations prepared a report, which effectively catalogues the wide range of activities that comprise post-conflict peace-building.¹⁷ The report clearly portrays the great potential for overlap between the agencies of the United Nations system and why the need for structured coordination is necessary to avoid duplication, overlap and even working at cross-purposes.

37. The Informal Open-ended Working Group on An Agenda for Peace, with active participation from delegations of China, Cuba, Egypt, the European Union, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, has also been studying coordination issues. The subgroup working on coordination issues underlined the need to strengthen the role of the General Assembly in improving coordination, in accordance with its role and responsibilities under the Charter. It advocates the need for the various substantive departments of the Secretariat to coordinate their activities through information sharing, consultations and joint action. It also calls for both short-term and long-term programmes, within the United Nations system, to be coordinated in order to consolidate peace and development. Specifically it states, "Coordination is therefore required within the United Nations system as a whole, and between the United Nations Headquarters and the head offices of United Nations funds, programmes, offices and agencies." The subgroup also encouraged improved coordination with other actors involved in the transition from peacekeeping to peace-building, including the Bretton Woods institutions.

38. There are typically two situations in which peace-building activities are most likely to occur. The first situation is when a comprehensive settlement has been negotiated and long-term political, economic, and social provisions to address the root causes of the conflict, and verification of its implementation is entrusted to a multi-functional peacekeeping operation. In this situation, the United Nations has an entree and the parties have accepted the United Nations peace making and

peacekeeping role. The peacekeepers may already be involved in preliminary peace-building activities, including, possibly, the reintegration of former combatants into productive civilian activities. For example, in El Salvador, former combatants were given land in exchange for their arms and UNESCO's Culture of Peace actions give special emphasis to the education of former combatants because many of them missed out on formal education as a result of being forced into military service. The timing and modalities of the departure of the peacekeeping operation and the transfer of peace-building functions to others must be managed in conjunction with the established Government. The United Nations, of course, can express its views to maximize the investment made during the peacekeeping exercise.

39. The second situation is when peace-building, whether preventive or post-conflict, is undertaken in relation to a potential or past conflict without any peacekeeping operations being deployed. By definition, this is a more difficult situation because the United Nations does not have a mandate and its role in identifying requirements and proposing activities is unclear. If the measures are largely in the economic, social and humanitarian fields, then the resident coordinator can make such proposals. However, the resident coordinator is precluded from being involved with such activities as security, civilian police or human rights activities.

40. Post-conflict peace-building activities are often discussed in terms of their relationship to the continuum of activities and phases related to peace and security. Post-conflict peace-building is usually the first phase after the "termination" of the peacekeeping phase. However, the notion of a discrete "termination" point is too simplistic. In fact, many officials told the Inspectors that in their experience, such a transition period is typically poorly defined.

41. The Inspectors conclude that in order for post-conflict peace-building to be effective, it must build on investments made during the peacekeeping period. In fact, the Inspectors were told that often during the peacekeeping period, there has been success with some activities that typically would have been done during the peace-building phase. In fact, recently a former Secretary-General's Special Representative for Rwanda has urged that consideration be given to utilizing peacekeepers for reconstruction activities, even if on a limited basis. He believes that this generates goodwill between the United Nations and the local community and allows the peace-keepers to be responsive to the needs of a devastated country.¹⁸ However, while this provides some evidence for the natural linkage with post-conflict peace-building and peacekeeping, peace-building operations should be separate and distinct albeit with a bridge between the two phases to ensure a smooth transition.

42. Many officials involved in peace-building advocated using the agreement that ends the conflict as the platform for articulating peace-building objectives and integrating coordination mechanisms into these objectives. While this point goes beyond the original scope of the report, in the opinion of the Inspectors, it is noteworthy and conceptually critical to the theme of this report.

43. This concept of using the agreement that settles the conflict as a platform for identifying the coordination mechanisms has received increasing support from experts in the field of peace-building. In late 1996, at a seminar hosted by the United States Institute of Peace, experts presented their research, which concluded that the international community's more successful peace operations have occurred in cases such as Cambodia, El Salvador and Namibia where "provisions for a peace process

and a political settlement were detailed, extensive and most importantly, agreed to by all the parties to the conflict, as well as the major regional and global powers." Specifically, it was noted by one expert that "multilateral interventions have a much greater chance of succeeding when they are linked to a genuine political settlement and an ongoing sustained political process for obtaining it."¹⁹

44. In the Inspectors' view, the basic agreement settling a conflict should be managed in order to build a good foundation for post-conflict peace-building. Peace-building activities must be reinforced by a series of measures and actions to consolidate peace. The coordination of activities becomes very important at this point because the manner in which these activities are incorporated into the agreement will be critical to implementation. In practice, these remain no more than concepts and the Inspectors found no evidence of this in practice.

45. Having said this, the agreement settling the conflict should include the following elements in order to support the concept of sustainable peace-building efforts. At a minimum, the agreement should include five major elements:

(a) Identifying the issues to be addressed, objectives to be achieved, and possibly the timetables for achieving the objectives;

(b) Identifying the types of skills required and the specific entities that can provide these skills;

(c) Identifying the specific United Nations system organizations to be involved and the activities each will be responsible for implementing, based on the over-arching objectives as a framework;

(d) Articulating the division of labour among the various organizations, with the expressed goal of avoiding duplication and overlap of effort, and determining who has overall leadership responsibility, both at the headquarters and field levels;

(e) Establishing a link between peacekeeping and peace-building "phases" and providing the description of a mechanism that ensures continuity, thus preserving and building upon the investment made during the peacekeeping phase.

IV. THE ROLE OF BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS IN POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING

46. Both the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) play a significant role in financing and providing technical assistance to countries undergoing post-conflict reconstruction. Coordination between the United Nations system and these financial institutions is not sufficient and continues to be an issue of concern.

47. According to the 1989 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, one of the primary purposes of the institution is to:

"Assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries."²⁰

48. Likewise, the IMF has responded to the increasing need for international assistance in post-conflict countries. In October 1995, the IMF's Interim Committee endorsed the Executive Board's decision on expanding the scope of the IMF's involvement in post-conflict situations, including a definition of the circumstances under which it could provide emergency support in a context of coordinated international assistance.

49. The Inspectors were told that the World Bank and IMF have a long-standing working relationship and similarly share a long-term perspective in their projects. The institutions actively coordinate, both as a matter of practicality and policy. However, officials from both institutions acknowledged that coordination between themselves and the United Nations system is comparatively less active, particularly at the headquarters level. They indicated they supported improving coordination with the United Nations system.

50. In 1992, the JIU issued a report on the United Nations system cooperation with multilateral financial institutions.²¹ The Inspectors reported that they identified little organizational co-operation between the United Nations system agencies and multilateral organizations. Yet, they pointed out that significant collaborative initiatives and a variety of cooperative operational programmes were under way. The Inspectors also acknowledged the increasingly competitive field of technical assistance and cooperation, previously dominated by United Nations system organizations. Yet they noted how the United Nations system agencies were becoming increasingly marginalized by these other players. The key to better cooperation and coordination among partners is performance, specifically the bottom line of "impact and delivery."

51. During the course of preparing this report, the Inspectors found that many of the same issues identified in 1992 remain today. Furthermore, the United Nations system agencies may increasingly risk losing opportunities to be involved in decisions and arrangements related to coordination made during the planning phases. This lapse in United Nations involvement may be occurring because the

resources of the Bretton Woods institutions eclipse those of the United Nations system in post-conflict peace-building. As a result, when Bretton Woods institutions take the leadership role in developing reconstruction strategies, United Nations system organizations are not viewed as "donors" but as implementing organizations. Consequently, they are not integrated into the planning process. Simply put, due to the lack of resources, the United Nations system is not always invited to participate in planning efforts conducted by the Bretton Woods institutions. Also, as the United Nations tends to put an increasing proportion of its resources into short-term, emergency relief, less resources remain for investment in long-term reconstruction efforts.

52. Recently, the "Nordic United Nations Reform Project 1996" issued proposals that advocated improving coordination between the United Nations system and Bretton Woods institutions. Specifically the Project stated there should be greater coordination between the United Nations system and Bretton Woods institutions and stated the following:

"Possible ways to strengthen collaboration would be the further development of mechanisms to enhance cooperation, the joint implementation of the programmes of action of the major United Nations conferences, the preparation of reports by the Institutions and the United Nations, and the sharing of information and greater coordination of the United Nations and the Institutions at the field level. It must be recognized, however, that optimum cooperation will only be achieved when the United Nations improves its overall performance and gains more credibility and relevance in the economic and social fields."²²

53. Bretton Woods officials informed the Inspectors of on-going efforts to increase and improve coordination mechanisms between the United Nations system organizations and Bretton Woods institutions. World Bank officials told the Inspectors that letters of agreement had been exchanged between the United Nations, World Bank and IMF on coordination of post-conflict reconstruction in Angola in 1995. These letters were not made available to the Inspectors for review, therefore they cannot comment on the contents. However, for the most part, formal agreements between the United Nations system agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions committing them to specific goals and objectives, as well as a division of labour are not typical practice. As another example, the World Bank has a long-standing formal relationship with FAO, as evidenced by the Investment Centre's work in Bosnia and Angola.

54. However, post-conflict peace-building or reconstruction does not come under the jurisdiction of one organization in the Bank and instead, is handled by each regional group. One official, specifically involved in external relations, noted that multi-agency coordination is definitely an issue of interest. However, World Bank officials believe that within the United Nations system, often much time is spent discussing coordination issues with little done in practice, which results in overlap and working at cross-purposes. Relief and humanitarian assistance organizations have begun to cooperate with the World Bank and are certainly interested in being involved in reconstruction efforts earlier in the process. World Bank officials told the Inspectors there is definitely resistance to establishing any mechanism between United Nations system organizations and Bretton Woods institutions that is fixed and over-arching.

55. To illustrate why coordination is necessary to avoid duplication and overlap of effort, World Bank officials noted several areas. For example, the institution is moving into some new areas, including demining and demobilization — areas in which the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs also has significant responsibility. However, World Bank officials explained that they are unaware of the Department's approach and, while cooperation is improving between the two organizations, there is still a struggle over jurisdiction and approach.

56. In another area, World Bank officials noted the expansion of some United Nations system organizations into what has traditionally been the domain of others. For example, the World Bank sees UNHCR moving more into development activities, moving beyond emergency relief. This raises the issue of an organization developing capacity when the necessary skills and mission may already exist in other agencies. Some World Bank officials are concerned that relief organizations compete with each other for short-term resources and goals, which also complicates the ability to coordinate effectively.

57. In general, Bretton Woods institutions command significantly more resources than United Nations system agencies. Accordingly, in the opinion of the Inspectors, the continued lack of coordination with Bretton Woods institutions could marginalize the United Nations role in post-conflict peace-building. For example, the Inspectors were informed of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Post-Conflict Reconstruction Fund and the reconstruction strategy, otherwise referred to as "the blueprint", drawn up by the World Bank and European Union. This blueprint covers the implementation of an initial tranche of US\$ 5.1 billion to be implemented in 11 sectors for the reconstruction of Bosnia. Because United Nations system agencies were not seen as donors, they were not invited to work on the development of the blueprint. World Bank officials explained that the blueprint's key value was to keep the donors focused on the goals and objectives of reconstruction (agreed upon by the donors and country) and to impose some discipline on a system that can become very political. The concept of a blueprint aims to avoid parallel fundraising and "cannibalization" of increasingly scarce donor funds.

58. Over the past two years, the IMF has developed a policy articulating its role in post-conflict peace-building. With regard to coordination with the United Nations system, the current policy requires the IMF to contact the United Nations Resident Coordinator in the field. At the senior levels, the Managing Director of the IMF and key United Nations officials exchange information periodically. Currently this is not a formal process, however. The Inspectors were informed that the Managing Director of the IMF has expressed a strong interest in working more closely with United Nations system organizations, particularly in post-conflict peace-building. Like the World Bank, the IMF supports a flexible mechanism for coordination but resists anything fixed or standardized. Its experience in post-conflict countries has shown that the process of international coordination has benefited from the leadership of one agency or country, with different players performing this role in different cases. The IMF Board has endorsed such a flexible approach. However, the IMF Board has also noted that participation, particularly in the early phases of planning and preparation, would increase the IMF's ability to coordinate. As one official told the Inspectors, the IMF was not invited to participate in the formulation of the peace plan for El Salvador and therefore, was not able to provide advice on the macroeconomics. The same official believes that in Angola and Cambodia, IMF involvement has been more effective because of early involvement. Because the IMF is largely concerned with establishing

the macroeconomic framework in the reconstruction of a country, it is critical for the Fund to be involved early in planning, as well as implementation.

59. IMF officials told the Inspectors that while the institution sees itself as an important player in post-conflict reconstruction, it does not intend to provide the leadership. Therefore it tends to be quite agnostic about who provides leadership — just as long as someone does lead. In three recent situations, the leaders were different. In Cambodia, the United Nations took the lead role, in Haiti, the World Bank and the United States took the lead, and in Bosnia, the World Bank and the European Union are providing the leadership. These relationships appear to be appropriate given expertise, resources and interests.

60. The IMF's experience is that coordination at the country level has been good. Officials told the Inspectors their view is that more coordination at the United Nations Headquarters level, as well as tracking and information exchange, would be desirable.

V. TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH TO POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING

61. On the basis of their interviews and analysis, the Inspectors would like to present their conclusions and recommendations. In their view, the establishment of effective coordination mechanisms, in general, must be viewed as a primary feature of United Nations reform efforts. Specifically, United Nations system organizations involved in post-conflict peace-building must be committed to improving coordination mechanisms as part of an ongoing process to improve the functioning of the system. Effective coordination practices should be permanently embedded in United Nations system structures and processes, and should be accomplished through existing organizations or bodies.

62. Each post-conflict situation will involve a different set of conditions and circumstances, typically related to weakened civil institutions and the lack of a culture of stability and reconciliation. In some cases, there will be no effective Government with which to coordinate. The degree of destruction of institutions and sectors and the political-military situation will vary widely. Given this high degree of variability, conditions and circumstances in a country undergoing reconstruction will change over time, and any framework for coordination must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate such changes. Therefore the Inspectors recommend that the coordination framework for post-conflict peace-building must be, *inter alia*, over-arching and coherent, yet sufficiently flexible to adjust to the unique aspects of each peace-building situation — the preferred method of coordination will therefore be “ad hoc” based on certain generally agreed upon principles.

63. The agreement ending the conflict provides a good platform for articulating the coordination framework to be used during recovery. Peace-building activities must be reinforced by a series of measures and actions to consolidate peace. Addressing the means for coordination is critical at this point because the manner in which these activities are incorporated into the agreement will be critical to the success of achieving coordination during implementation. In response, the Inspectors recommend that a framework for coordination must be established during the initial reconstruction planning phases. Member States, as represented in the components of the United Nations system, may consider the agreement ending the conflict as a suitable platform for outlining and reinforcing a series of measures and actions to consolidate peace, establish linkage between peacekeeping and peace-building operations, and outline the framework for coordination.

64. The Inspectors identified several barriers to achieving effective coordination of post-conflict peace-building activities that provide some evidence that United Nations system organizations do not realize the benefits and efficacy of a common system. Specifically, the Inspectors found some organizations involved in post-conflict peace-building view their independence as a higher priority than coordination with other organizations. In the view of the Inspectors, such coordination requires a certain degree of subordination to the leadership of another organization. Further, they do not share a generally accepted understanding of coordination and lack well-defined working relationships vis-à-vis each other. Accordingly, the Inspectors conclude that there is an urgent need for accepting a set of provisions which would articulate several important aspects of post-conflict peace-building coordination. Therefore, they recommend that the ACC should prepare a declaration on the coordination of peace-building activities for acceptance by the General Assembly and legislative bodies of specialized agencies which should recognize the need for United Nations system

organizations to maintain their independence, yet articulate the primacy of the United Nations leadership and reinforce the need for coordination to ensure the maximum utilization of resources and the achievement of objectives. Such a declaration should also:

- Come to an agreement on a generally acceptable understanding of coordination;
- Establish clear mandates and guidelines for United Nations system organizations involvement in post-conflict peace-building activities;
- Identify organizations, both at the headquarters and field levels, which will assume leadership for coordinating policy issues in post-conflict peace-building activities;
- Establish more formal and consistent coordination between United Nations system organizations and Bretton Woods institutions;
- Strengthen existing coordinating bodies, such as the ACC, its subsidiary bodies, and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC); and
- Build and expand on coordination efforts under way among thematic lines.

65. Peacekeeping activities have become increasingly multi-functional, including such activities, as disarmament of former combatants, election monitoring and infrastructure building. Consequently, the line between peacekeeping and peace-building activities has become blurred. While the two phases are related, the objectives and operational components of peacekeeping and peace-building activities differ significantly. Peacekeeping was originally designed to maintain the peace and involves only United Nations resources, personnel and financing. Peace-building, on the other hand, is designed to build upon the maintenance of peace and involves a wide range of bilateral and multilateral actors, activities, objectives, and financing mechanisms. In current practice, peacekeepers no longer solely perform peacekeeping activities, but have become increasingly involved in peace-building. As a result, peacekeeping has moved beyond its original role of creating a "buffer" between the parties involved in the conflict and establishing stability so the reconstruction of the country and its economy can take place in an orderly fashion. In the Inspectors' opinion, peacekeeping and peace-building activities should not be commingled, but maintained as separate, distinct operations. Yet, in their view, there should be clear linkage and a smooth transition between two phases to ensure the investment made during the peacekeeping phase is retained. The Inspectors recommend that as one element of enhancing coordination, Member States may wish to consider the possibility of carrying out peace-building activities as a separate and distinct operation — "a peace-building operation" — albeit closely linked as a follow-on to the peacekeeping phase.

66. The Inspectors found effective coordination at the field level, under the leadership of either the United Nations Resident Coordinator or Secretary-General's Special Representative. However, the Inspectors found no evidence of the same at the policy and headquarters levels of United Nations system organizations. At the United Nations system level, the IASC plays an important role in facilitating the consultative process between organizations involved in relief operations; however, its role and resources are constrained with regard to expanding this role to the continuum of post-conflict

peace-building activities. In the considered view of the Inspectors, coordination at all three levels — policy, headquarters and system-wide — is essential, as it is here that strategic policy and resource decisions are made. A recent proposal by the Secretary-General to establish the Department of Political Affairs as the lead United Nations department for peace-building creates a focal point for coordination at the United Nations headquarters levels, which has been previously lacking. Without effective coordination at the policy, headquarters and United Nations system levels, there is limited or no assurance that activities, responsibilities and resources will be effectively coordinated at the appropriate levels, leaving an undue burden on the field level organizations to coordinate. In particular, the Inspectors see the need for more integrated support at the headquarters level for country-level operations. Further, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), a principal organ of the United Nations, is not sufficiently involved in the coordination of peace-building activities, as recently noted by the Secretary-General in his speech before ECOSOC. The Inspectors welcome his proposals to enhance the Council's role in policy coordination and improving the coherence of the Council's machinery.

Policy level

As peace-building is essentially a component of development activities, the coordination role of the ECOSOC in development policies and activities should be enhanced in accordance with Chapter X of the United Nations Charter.

Headquarters level

(a) Coordination issues related specifically to peace building activities should be a regular agenda item to be discussed during the Secretary-General's "cabinet" meetings between United Nations departments.

(b) The secretariats of other United Nations system organizations should follow the example set by the Secretary-General and establish a lead department for the coordination of policy and strategic decisions among system organizations involved in peace-building.

United Nations system level

(a) To more effectively coordinate United Nations system organizations involved in peace-building, ACC's role should be expanded to include an ongoing coordinator role for post-conflict peace-building activities of the United Nations system. This should be accomplished within existing coordination mechanisms.

(b) The IASC should be strengthened in order for it to play a greater role in the coordination and integration of post-conflict peace-building activities among United Nations system organizations.

67. The Bretton Woods institutions, in particular the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, already play a significant role in financing and providing technical assistance to countries undergoing post-conflict reconstruction. Coordination between the United Nations system and these financial

institutions is not sufficient and continues to be an issue of concern. Consequently, there have been instances where these financial institutions developed their reconstruction strategies without consulting or including United Nations system organizations. Formal mechanisms, such as the exchange of letters, should be used to outline general concurrence among Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations system regarding coordination, with the next step being to develop more specific, detailed operations-oriented procedures. (Such an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Director of the World Bank took place in 1995, outlining the coordination arrangement for Angola.) In his speech before the High-Level Segment of the 1997 Substantive Session of the ECOSOC, the Secretary-General recognized efforts by the ECOSOC to promote closer interaction between United Nations system organizations and Bretton Woods institutions.²³ Given the increasing role played by Bretton Woods Institutions in post-conflict peace-building activities, United Nations system organizations should formally establish coordination linkages, between themselves and these financial institutions to ensure both participation in the planning phases of post-conflict recovery and a sustainable, coordinated relationship throughout reconstruction. These linkages should be developed without the creation of new structures.

Notes

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3. "Military Component of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations" (JIU/REP/95/11); "Strengthening of the United Nations System Capacity for Conflict Prevention" (JIU/REP/95/13).
4. Statement by the Secretary-General to the High-Level Segment of the 1997 Substantive Session of the Economic and Social Council (SG/SM/97/138, 3 July 1997).
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21. JIU/REP/92/1.

22. "Strengthening the UN through Change: Fulfilling Its Economic and Social Mandate", The Nordic UN Reform Project 1996, December 1996.

23. Statement by the Secretary-General to the High-level Segment of the 1997 Substantive Session of the Economic and Social Council (SG/SM/97/138, 3 July 1997).
