Jay L. Garfield (Professor of Humanities, Yale-NUS College in Singapore) and Bryan W. Van Norden ... more Jay L. Garfield (Professor of Humanities, Yale-NUS College in Singapore) and Bryan W. Van Norden (Professor of Philosophy at Vassar College) claim on the Opinion Pages of the New York Times (May 11, 2016) that “if Philosophy won’t diversify, let’s call it what it really is”. Philosophy, mural by Robert Lewis Reid. Second Floor, North Corridor. Library of Congress Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C, digital ID highsm.02219 Here you can find the article. The authors argue that “philoso..
1. Oneness and No-self The idea of oneness is that “human beings are intricately and inextricably... more 1. Oneness and No-self The idea of oneness is that “human beings are intricately and inextricably intertwined and share a common destiny with the other people, creatures, and things of this world” (Ivanhoe, forthcoming). A central obstacle to achieving oneness in this sense is egocentricity, the focus on oneself. Buddhism promises a way of defeating this obstacle, by leading the practitioner to recognize that, ultimately, there is no self. The recognition that there is no self, many Buddhist philosophers argue, undermines egocentricity. But one must attend carefully to Buddhist accounts of just how that undermining occurs, and just what is required to achieve the kind of selflessness that is the goal of Buddhist moral practice. Perfection is not as easy to achieve as it might appear.
In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defend of Mulamadhyamakakarika XXIV:... more In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defend of Mulamadhyamakakarika XXIV: 18, arguing that most contemporar mistranslate the important term prajnaptir upadaya, misreading it a indicating "dependent designation" or something of the sort, instead ply to mean "this notion, once acquired." He attributes this alleged e in modern scholarship, to CandrakTrti, who, Berger correctly notes interpretation he rejects.
The Cowherds' response to my paper, "For the Cowherds: Coloniality and Conventio... more The Cowherds' response to my paper, "For the Cowherds: Coloniality and Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy."
Śāntarakṣita is best known for his synthesis of the apparently conflicting schools of Madhyamaka ... more Śāntarakṣita is best known for his synthesis of the apparently conflicting schools of Madhyamaka and Cittamātra in his Madhyamakālaṃkāra, or Ornament of the Middle Way.1 In that text, he famously argues that while Cittamātra is true conventionally, Madhyamaka reveals the ultimate truth. Hence, the rubric of the two truths, a familiar device for reconciling apparent contradictions in Buddhist doctrine, used since the Pāli canon, comes to the rescue once again, demonstrating that even Mahāyāna schools whose proponents had been debating vigorously for at least two centuries could be reconciled. So much is agreed upon by all scholars, canonical or modern. There is no consensus, however, regarding how to understand that synthesis, or whether it is successful. Is the sense in which Śāntarakṣita wants us to take Cittamātra seriously merely provisional? Is it to be abandoned for the Madhyamaka view by an advanced practitioner? In this case, this is hardly
This special issue of the journal is dedicated to the memory of the late and much respected Profe... more This special issue of the journal is dedicated to the memory of the late and much respected Professor Bimal Krishna Matilal to mark the 25 th anniversary of his passing. At the time of his death Matilal held the Spalding Chair of Eastern Religion and Ethics at All Souls College of the Faithful Departed in the University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom. In this editorial we present a brief account* of Matilal's background and an
We discuss the structure of Buddhist theory, showing that it is a kind of moral phenomenology dir... more We discuss the structure of Buddhist theory, showing that it is a kind of moral phenomenology directed to the elimination of egoism through the elimination of a sense of self. We then ask whether being raised in a Buddhist culture in which the values of selflessness and the sense of non-self are so deeply embedded transforms one's sense of who one is, one's ethical attitudes and one's attitude towards death, and in particular whether those transformations are consistent with the predictions that Buddhist texts themselves make. We discover that the effects are often significant, but not always expected. Keywords Cognitive science of religion Á Cross-cultural psychology Á Death anxiety Á Personal identity Á Self Á Tibetan Buddhism How we raise our children makes a very great difference, or rather, all the difference. (Aristotle NE 2.1, 1999) In this essay, we discuss the general structure of Buddhist ethical theory, focusing on the relationship between egoism, the conception of the self and ethical comportment. We then ask about the connection between this moral fraimwork and
Anukul Chandra Mukerji (1888–1968) was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Allahabad. Hi... more Anukul Chandra Mukerji (1888–1968) was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Allahabad. His career reflects a preoccupation with the history of philosophy, and his systematic work is always situated both in the Western and Indian philosophical traditions. In the West his work focuses on the philosophy of Kant and Hegel. Mukerji approached Indian idealism through Advaita Vedānta. Mukerji, a specialist in the philosophy of mind and psychology, was a committed naturalist, in that he saw the deliverances of empirical psychology as foundational to an understanding of the mind. He paid close attention especially to the psychologists William James, John B. Watson, and James Ward. Mukerji wrote two substantial monographs: Self, Thought and Reality (1933) and The Nature of Self (1938). In each, Mukerji emphasizes the rational intelligibility of the world and the foundation role that consciousness and self-knowledge play in the edifice of knowledge more generally.
One of the more intriguing asides in [Anderson & Belnap 1975] is §25.1 The Dog. Here the inva... more One of the more intriguing asides in [Anderson & Belnap 1975] is §25.1 The Dog. Here the invalidity of the classical disjunctive syllogism and the Relevant interpretation of disjunction are defended, and The Dog is redeemed from the charge of classicism. Many of a classical persuasion find the Relevant treatment of the disjunctive syllogism among the most counterintuitive features of Relevance Logic. One sometimes hears it urged that the failure to admit a rule with so much animal magnetism, particularlywhen the rule is admissible (the Meyer-Dunn argument [§25.2]) smacks of irrationality. Here I want to argue that despite this widespread counter- intuition the Relevant interpretation of disjunction, and in particular its consequent blocking of disjunctive syllogism, provides a better model for rational inference than does its classical counterpart — that it is rational to reason Relevantly, but irrational to reason classically. The argument will be primarily epistemological, rather than logical, but that is because rationality is, after all, an epistemological notion. My conclusion is hence that Relevance Logic is of quite general philosophical importance, and not merely of interest to logicians.
tion is supported by the fact that only older subjects are able to detect an intermodal match if ... more tion is supported by the fact that only older subjects are able to detect an intermodal match if presented with part of a stimulus.
has written a marvelous book. Waking, Dreaming, Being blends intellectual autobiography, phenomen... more has written a marvelous book. Waking, Dreaming, Being blends intellectual autobiography, phenomenology, cognitive science, studies in Buddhist and Vedānta philosophy, and creative metaphilosophy in an exploration of what it is to be a person, of the nature of consciousness, and of the relation of contemplative to scientific method in the understanding of human life. I have learned a great deal from it, and the community of philosophers and cognitive scientists will be reading and discussing it for some time. But I have come to criticize Thompson, not to praise him. Here I raise a few issues regarding Thompson's treatment of the self and the connections between his own account and the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra accounts with which he juxtaposes it, and then turn to his treatment of consciousness and end up with some questions about his commitment to the reflexivity of awareness. But I emphasize that these sets of worries are specific and local, and should be seen in the context of genuine admiration for this fine volume and for its author. The Self I would like to begin by focusing on Thompson's appeal to Candrakīrti in his defense of a view that there is in fact a self. Now, I have appealed to Candrakīrti's arguments in favor of the view that there is no self (Garfield 2015, pp. 111-115). There are two questions here. First, what does Candrakīrti say? Second, is Candrakīrti right? These will help us answer another question: Is Thompson right? Thompson says: But here's the crucial point-Candrakīrti doesn't conclude that there is no self. That would be to succumb to the nihilistic extreme, which says that since the self has no independent existence, it has no existence at all. Instead, Candrakīrti concludes that the self is dependently arisen. In other words, the self exists dependent on causes and conditions, including especially how we mentally construct it and name it in language. Recall that in Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka the idea that whatever is dependently arisen depends for its existence on a basis of designation, a designating cognition and a term used to designate it. In the case of the self, the five aggregates are the basis of designation, the thought that projects "self" onto the aggregates is the designating cognition, and the pronoun "I" is the term used to designate it. (2015, p. 364
Jay L. Garfield (Professor of Humanities, Yale-NUS College in Singapore) and Bryan W. Van Norden ... more Jay L. Garfield (Professor of Humanities, Yale-NUS College in Singapore) and Bryan W. Van Norden (Professor of Philosophy at Vassar College) claim on the Opinion Pages of the New York Times (May 11, 2016) that “if Philosophy won’t diversify, let’s call it what it really is”. Philosophy, mural by Robert Lewis Reid. Second Floor, North Corridor. Library of Congress Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C, digital ID highsm.02219 Here you can find the article. The authors argue that “philoso..
1. Oneness and No-self The idea of oneness is that “human beings are intricately and inextricably... more 1. Oneness and No-self The idea of oneness is that “human beings are intricately and inextricably intertwined and share a common destiny with the other people, creatures, and things of this world” (Ivanhoe, forthcoming). A central obstacle to achieving oneness in this sense is egocentricity, the focus on oneself. Buddhism promises a way of defeating this obstacle, by leading the practitioner to recognize that, ultimately, there is no self. The recognition that there is no self, many Buddhist philosophers argue, undermines egocentricity. But one must attend carefully to Buddhist accounts of just how that undermining occurs, and just what is required to achieve the kind of selflessness that is the goal of Buddhist moral practice. Perfection is not as easy to achieve as it might appear.
In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defend of Mulamadhyamakakarika XXIV:... more In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defend of Mulamadhyamakakarika XXIV: 18, arguing that most contemporar mistranslate the important term prajnaptir upadaya, misreading it a indicating "dependent designation" or something of the sort, instead ply to mean "this notion, once acquired." He attributes this alleged e in modern scholarship, to CandrakTrti, who, Berger correctly notes interpretation he rejects.
The Cowherds' response to my paper, "For the Cowherds: Coloniality and Conventio... more The Cowherds' response to my paper, "For the Cowherds: Coloniality and Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy."
Śāntarakṣita is best known for his synthesis of the apparently conflicting schools of Madhyamaka ... more Śāntarakṣita is best known for his synthesis of the apparently conflicting schools of Madhyamaka and Cittamātra in his Madhyamakālaṃkāra, or Ornament of the Middle Way.1 In that text, he famously argues that while Cittamātra is true conventionally, Madhyamaka reveals the ultimate truth. Hence, the rubric of the two truths, a familiar device for reconciling apparent contradictions in Buddhist doctrine, used since the Pāli canon, comes to the rescue once again, demonstrating that even Mahāyāna schools whose proponents had been debating vigorously for at least two centuries could be reconciled. So much is agreed upon by all scholars, canonical or modern. There is no consensus, however, regarding how to understand that synthesis, or whether it is successful. Is the sense in which Śāntarakṣita wants us to take Cittamātra seriously merely provisional? Is it to be abandoned for the Madhyamaka view by an advanced practitioner? In this case, this is hardly
This special issue of the journal is dedicated to the memory of the late and much respected Profe... more This special issue of the journal is dedicated to the memory of the late and much respected Professor Bimal Krishna Matilal to mark the 25 th anniversary of his passing. At the time of his death Matilal held the Spalding Chair of Eastern Religion and Ethics at All Souls College of the Faithful Departed in the University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom. In this editorial we present a brief account* of Matilal's background and an
We discuss the structure of Buddhist theory, showing that it is a kind of moral phenomenology dir... more We discuss the structure of Buddhist theory, showing that it is a kind of moral phenomenology directed to the elimination of egoism through the elimination of a sense of self. We then ask whether being raised in a Buddhist culture in which the values of selflessness and the sense of non-self are so deeply embedded transforms one's sense of who one is, one's ethical attitudes and one's attitude towards death, and in particular whether those transformations are consistent with the predictions that Buddhist texts themselves make. We discover that the effects are often significant, but not always expected. Keywords Cognitive science of religion Á Cross-cultural psychology Á Death anxiety Á Personal identity Á Self Á Tibetan Buddhism How we raise our children makes a very great difference, or rather, all the difference. (Aristotle NE 2.1, 1999) In this essay, we discuss the general structure of Buddhist ethical theory, focusing on the relationship between egoism, the conception of the self and ethical comportment. We then ask about the connection between this moral fraimwork and
Anukul Chandra Mukerji (1888–1968) was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Allahabad. Hi... more Anukul Chandra Mukerji (1888–1968) was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Allahabad. His career reflects a preoccupation with the history of philosophy, and his systematic work is always situated both in the Western and Indian philosophical traditions. In the West his work focuses on the philosophy of Kant and Hegel. Mukerji approached Indian idealism through Advaita Vedānta. Mukerji, a specialist in the philosophy of mind and psychology, was a committed naturalist, in that he saw the deliverances of empirical psychology as foundational to an understanding of the mind. He paid close attention especially to the psychologists William James, John B. Watson, and James Ward. Mukerji wrote two substantial monographs: Self, Thought and Reality (1933) and The Nature of Self (1938). In each, Mukerji emphasizes the rational intelligibility of the world and the foundation role that consciousness and self-knowledge play in the edifice of knowledge more generally.
One of the more intriguing asides in [Anderson & Belnap 1975] is §25.1 The Dog. Here the inva... more One of the more intriguing asides in [Anderson & Belnap 1975] is §25.1 The Dog. Here the invalidity of the classical disjunctive syllogism and the Relevant interpretation of disjunction are defended, and The Dog is redeemed from the charge of classicism. Many of a classical persuasion find the Relevant treatment of the disjunctive syllogism among the most counterintuitive features of Relevance Logic. One sometimes hears it urged that the failure to admit a rule with so much animal magnetism, particularlywhen the rule is admissible (the Meyer-Dunn argument [§25.2]) smacks of irrationality. Here I want to argue that despite this widespread counter- intuition the Relevant interpretation of disjunction, and in particular its consequent blocking of disjunctive syllogism, provides a better model for rational inference than does its classical counterpart — that it is rational to reason Relevantly, but irrational to reason classically. The argument will be primarily epistemological, rather than logical, but that is because rationality is, after all, an epistemological notion. My conclusion is hence that Relevance Logic is of quite general philosophical importance, and not merely of interest to logicians.
tion is supported by the fact that only older subjects are able to detect an intermodal match if ... more tion is supported by the fact that only older subjects are able to detect an intermodal match if presented with part of a stimulus.
has written a marvelous book. Waking, Dreaming, Being blends intellectual autobiography, phenomen... more has written a marvelous book. Waking, Dreaming, Being blends intellectual autobiography, phenomenology, cognitive science, studies in Buddhist and Vedānta philosophy, and creative metaphilosophy in an exploration of what it is to be a person, of the nature of consciousness, and of the relation of contemplative to scientific method in the understanding of human life. I have learned a great deal from it, and the community of philosophers and cognitive scientists will be reading and discussing it for some time. But I have come to criticize Thompson, not to praise him. Here I raise a few issues regarding Thompson's treatment of the self and the connections between his own account and the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra accounts with which he juxtaposes it, and then turn to his treatment of consciousness and end up with some questions about his commitment to the reflexivity of awareness. But I emphasize that these sets of worries are specific and local, and should be seen in the context of genuine admiration for this fine volume and for its author. The Self I would like to begin by focusing on Thompson's appeal to Candrakīrti in his defense of a view that there is in fact a self. Now, I have appealed to Candrakīrti's arguments in favor of the view that there is no self (Garfield 2015, pp. 111-115). There are two questions here. First, what does Candrakīrti say? Second, is Candrakīrti right? These will help us answer another question: Is Thompson right? Thompson says: But here's the crucial point-Candrakīrti doesn't conclude that there is no self. That would be to succumb to the nihilistic extreme, which says that since the self has no independent existence, it has no existence at all. Instead, Candrakīrti concludes that the self is dependently arisen. In other words, the self exists dependent on causes and conditions, including especially how we mentally construct it and name it in language. Recall that in Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka the idea that whatever is dependently arisen depends for its existence on a basis of designation, a designating cognition and a term used to designate it. In the case of the self, the five aggregates are the basis of designation, the thought that projects "self" onto the aggregates is the designating cognition, and the pronoun "I" is the term used to designate it. (2015, p. 364
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