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Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups?. (2014). Nordvik, Frode.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:bny:wpaper:0025.

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  1. Good mine, bad mine: Natural resource heterogeneity and Dutch disease in Indonesia. (2018). Poelhekke, Steven ; Pelzl, Paul.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20180073.

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  2. Good mine, bad mine: Natural resource heterogeneity and Dutch disease in Indonesia. (2018). Poelhekke, Steven ; Pelz, Paul.
    In: OxCarre Working Papers.
    RePEc:oxf:oxcrwp:214.

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  3. Good Mine, Bad Mine: Natural Resource Heterogeneity and Dutch Disease in Indonesia. (2018). Poelhekke, Steven ; Pelzl, Paul.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7284.

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  4. Oil and Civil Conflict: On and Off (Shore). (2017). Tesei, Andrea ; Nordvik, Frode ; Andersen, Jørgen.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:810.

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  5. Oil and Civil Conflict: On and Off (Shore). (2017). Tesei, Andrea ; Nordvik, Frode ; Andersen, Jørgen.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6346.

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  6. Oil and Civil Conflict: On and Off (Shore). (2017). Tesei, Andrea ; Nordvik, Frode ; Andersen, Jørgen.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bny:wpaper:0050.

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References

References cited by this document

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