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45. Treatment date n. of subjects n. of periods n. of matches Fine 31/05/2007 32 26 6 04/06/2007 32 27 2 14/12/2007 32 25 3 Leniency 04/06/2007 32 25 2 05/06/2007 32 26 3 08/06/2007 32 22 3 L-Faire 30/05/2007 32 23 4 No-Report 14/12/2007 32 27 5
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2. The Welfare Implications of the Meeting Design of a Cartel. (2020). Avramovich, Maria C.
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3. Optimal leniency and the organization design of group crime. (2020). immordino, giovanni ; Piccolo, Salvatore ; Roberti, Paolo.
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4. A game of hide and seek in networks. (2020). Bloch, Francis ; Dziubiski, Marcin ; Dutta, Bhaskar.
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5. Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks. (2020). Xiang, Wang.
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7. A game of hide and seek in networks. (2020). Dutta, Bhaskar ; Dziubinski, Marcin ; Bloch, Francis.
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8. A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks. (2019). Dutta, Bhaskar ; Bloch, Francis ; Dziubinski, Marcin.
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9. A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks. (2019). Dutta, Bhaskar ; Bloch, Francis ; Dziubinski, Marcin.
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10. Law enforcement with criminal organizations and endogenous collaboration. (2019). Yahagi, Ken.
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23. Optimal Design and Defense of Networks Under Link Attacks. (2017). Charroin, Liza ; Touati, Corinne ; Bravard, Christophe.
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24. Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks. (2017). Bravard, Christophe ; Touati, Corinne ; Charroin, Liza.
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29. Trust and in-group favoritism in a culture of crime. (2016). Meier, Stephan ; la Cara, Barbara ; Vaccaro, Antonino ; Pierce, Lamar.
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30. Networks and Markets. (2016). Goyal, Sanjeev.
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45. The not so dark side of trust: Does trust increase the size of the shadow economy?. (2012). Méon, Pierre-Guillaume ; DHernoncourt, Johanna ; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume .
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47. Whistle‐Blowing and Incentives in Firms. (2012). Guriev, Sergei ; Friebel, Guido.
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48. Understanding Organized Crime Networks: Evidence Based on Federal Bureau of Narcotics Secret Files on American Mafia. (2010). Patacchini, Eleonora ; Mastrobuoni, Giovanni.
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50. Collusion Theory: Where to Go Next?. (2005). Cabral, Luis.
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