Then he makes answer: "Hush! oh, hush, my darling!
Life is so sweet to me,
So full of hope, you need not bid me guard it,
If such a thing might be!

"If such a thing might be—but *not* through falsehood.
I could not come to you;
I dare not stand here, in your pure, sweet presence,
Knowing myself untrue."

"It is no sin!" the wild voice interrupts him.
"This is no open strife.
Have you not often dreamt a nobler warfare
In which to spend your life?

"Oh! for my sake—*though but for my sake*—wear it!
Think what my life would be
If you, who gave it first true worth and meaning,
Were taken now from me!

"Think of the long, long days, so slowly passing!
Think of the endless years!
I am so young! Must I live out my lifetime
With neither hopes nor fears?"

He speaks again, in mournful tones and tender,
But with unswerving faith:
"Should not love make us braver, aye, and stronger,
Either for life or death?

"And life is hardest. Oh, my love! my treasure!
If I could bear your part
Of this great sorrow, I would go to meet it
With an unshrinking heart.

"Child! child! I little dreamt in that bright summer,
When first your love I sought,
Of all the future store of woe and anguish
Which I, unknowing, wrought.

"But you'll forgive me? Yes, you will forgive me,
I know, when I am dead!
I would have loved you—but words have scant meaning.
God love you more instead!"

Then there is silence in the sunny garden,
Until, with faltering tone,
She sobs, the while still clinging closer to him,
"Forgive me—go—my own!"

So human love, and faith by death unshaken,
Mingle their glorious psalm,
Albeit low, until the passionate pleading
Is hushed in deepest calm.

BOOKS.

MR. DARWIN'S DESCENT OF MAN.*

[FIRST NOTICE.]

EVEN to readers who are not naturalists, Mr. Darwin's works are full of fascination and instruction. No writer of the day arranges his facts so lucidly, with so unquestionable a sincerity, and so undisguised a candour when he has difficulties to confess. Though Mr. Darwin has shocked the deepest prejudices and prepossessions, he seems to live in a region far above the temper of controversy, and to aim at nothing but the nearest approach to scientific hypothesis that it is in his power to make. There is not a word of harsh criticism in his volumes, and, as far as a reader can judge, not a trace of disposition to disguise the objections to the views which he is disposed to take. It is hard to conceive of a scientific style at once so dispassionate and so full of intellectual vitality. There is nothing of the dreary prolixity of a mind too full to keep its materials subordinate to the question under discussion, and yet nothing of the dogmatic vehemence of one that cannot bear to doubt the truth of its own conclusions. Every chapter advances the theory of the book, and yet every chapter deepens the confidence of the reader in his author's candour and grasp.

We need hardly say that it is not the object of the present reviewer to criticize Mr. Darwin's scientific statements, which are, no doubt, quite beyond the criticism of any but the most accomplished naturalists and physiologists,—a kind of criticism which would not be very suitable to these columns. All we now propose to do is to give some idea of the kind of arguments on which Mr. Darwin relies for his conclusion that man is to be classed among the order of the Quadrumana, and that the most immediate ancestor from which we can trace his descent is one of the Catarhine or old-world anthropomorphous apes,—and then to criticize that part of his argument which alone we are competent to criticize, that which professes to account for the extraordinary development of his moral faculties on the hypothesis of what is called 'evolution.' Mr. Darwin points out that in the human embryo the difference from the ape does not show itself till quite the later stages of development—the convolutions of the brain, for instance, reaching about the same stage in the human fœtus of seven months' growth as in the adult ape; and the great toe, one of the most characteristic differences between man and the ape, being in the early stages of development projected from the side of the foot at an angle precisely similar to that which marks "the permanent condition of this part in the Quadrumana." Further, man even in his maturity has in his body rudimentary organs,—*i.e.*, organs which are no longer fully developed or useful, and are therefore mere traces of a close physical connection with creatures in which these organs are not rudimentary, but fully developed. Thus man has a rudimentary tail, sometimes, though rarely, somewhat more than rudimentary,—has some vestige apparently of the pointed ear which some of the lower animals erect when listening,—has rudiments of the hair with which they are covered,—and has those rudimentary muscles (occasionally developed) that give the power of twitching the skin like a horse. (Mr. Darwin mentions a family in which the power of contracting the superficial muscles on the scalp still exists to so great an extent that those who possess it can pitch heavy books from their heads by the twitching of the scalp alone.) Man has, again, the rudiment of the third eyelid, or "nictitating membrane," which is not *developed* in any but the lower mammals, not in any of the quadrumana; and he has various other rudiments of organs fully developed in the lower order of animals, but now useless to man, and mere signs and traces of his ancestry. Mr. Darwin argues that the fact that the embryo of a man and of an ape are only distinguishable at the latest stages, and that at still earlier stages of development the embryos of a man, and of a dog, a seal, a bat, a reptile, are indistinguishable, taken with the fact that even in fully developed men there are still rudiments of organs found fully developed only lower down in the order of nature,—in the ape, or the bird, or even the fish,—would be mere "snares laid to entrap our judgment," if they are not to be interpreted as implying community of descent. Nor do we see what answer can be made to this argument. If man has no hereditary connection whatever with the lower order of animals, the stages in which the human embryo seems to anticipate not man as he is, but one of the lower animals, and the rudimentary traces left in his body of organs like theirs which are undeveloped, would seem to be a sort of false modesty or mock-humility of nature, a set of intellectual sign-posts advisedly put to lead our understanding astray.

From the traces of physical origin Mr. Darwin passes to the class of qualities in which the lower orders of animals have least in common with man,—the mental; and has no difficulty in showing what all who have attended to the subject have long admitted, that the germs of all our intellectual characteristics and of some at least of our moral characteristics are to be found among the lower animals. Mr. Darwin holds that the more complex instincts are often found, as in the case of ants and beavers, along with a very high amount of general intelligence; but he does not deny that very often intelligence supplants instinct, and suggests, as his explanation, that "as the intellectual powers become highly developed, the various parts of the brain must be connected by the most intricate channels of intercommunication; and as a consequence, each separate part would perhaps tend to become less well fitted to answer in a definite and uniform, that is, instinctive, manner to particular sensations and associations." That explanation, we think, is hardly compatible with the well-known power of human beings to perform, almost as reflex and involuntary acts, operations at first requiring the most concentrated intellectual effort,—such as the higher feats of music and drawing. As far as we can see, the development of the brain in man gives us a far higher power of executing complex operations once studied and mastered without any effort of attention, and yet with perfect accuracy, than any of the lower animals possesses; so that it is not easy to suppose that we lose instincts from any inadequacy of the brain to answer "in a definite and uniform, that is, instinctive manner to particular sensations and associations." Rather, we should say, that beings with the power to lay *an intellectual basis for their own instincts*, which intellectual basis they can re-

* *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex.* By Charles Darwin, M.A., F.R.S., &c. 2 vols. Murray.

cover at pleasure, are so far superior to beings which have only instincts to which they do not possess the key, that the latter are withdrawn in proportion as the power to construct the former is given. For the rest, we have no criticism to pass on Mr. Darwin's interesting evidence for the existence of almost all our intellectual powers in germ among the higher orders of the animals beneath us in general intelligence. Only what Mr. Darwin means by "in germ" and what we mean by "in germ" is, we suspect, somewhat different. The hypothesis of 'evolution' is to our minds a mere hypothesis of gradual accession and rise; but the addition of new power is not the less real because it is gradual; and it seems to us to be no causal explanation of the high intelligence of man to show that a much lower form of intelligence is found in the animals from which his stock originally diverged, any more than it is a causal explanation of the hand of a man to show that it is in some sense the equivalent of what in a very distant ancestry was used as a foot.

Mr. Darwin's hypothesis as to the evolution of a conscience is, however, to us the most interesting and original speculation of his first part, on the *Descent of Man*. It seems to us a remarkable proof of the depth and width of his genius that the greatest of our naturalists should come what seems to us so much nearer the kernel of the psychological problem, than many of his eminent predecessors who have given their chief attention to the relation between psychology and physiology.

Mr. Darwin finds, and we believe quite rightly, the germ of conscience wherever and whenever two distinct motives compete for the practical guidance of any creature's mind which has the power to compare them together, and discriminate the worth of the two. He tells us that maternal swallows sometimes desert their brood when the migrating instinct comes upon them while they are out of sight of their young, and suggests that *if* after that instinct is gratified they have the power to recall the nestlings they have left to perish, they must be torn by a genuine remorse. He tells us of a heroic baboon which came down to rescue a young and timid one left behind by the troop, and which was insulated on a block of rock, surrounded by dogs and calling to its companions for aid. The old hero descended alone (like a Hector or Achilles) from the band, went slowly up to the isolated infant baboon, coaxed him to come down, and led him away in triumph, the dogs being too much astonished to make an attack. This conquest of the disinterested feeling for the deserted infant baboon over all personal fear, clearly may have been, for anything we have any right to object to the contrary, as distinct a moral act as that of Grace Darling in rescuing the shipwrecked crew in the life-boat. So far we entirely agree with Mr. Darwin, and hold that if any of the lower orders of animals deliberately prefer the worthier of two motives, because it is the worthier, such an animal is distinctly a moral being.

But Mr. Darwin seems to us to spoil his analysis by trying to find an *explanation* of the superiority of one motive to another. We do not find any fault with his view that animal sympathy has been the result of 'natural selection,' on the ground that the gregarious animals bound together by it would be so much safer than those in which each cared only for itself. That is true,—though how the primeval love of parents for their offspring, which is, we suppose, the first source of the sympathy and united action of a herd,—can be ascribed to an accidental variation, we cannot even conceive,—nor do we suppose that Mr. Darwin would use the word 'accidental' in such connection in any but a very relative sense. But we do find fault with his rationale of the method in which 'weaker' but worthier motives are converted into triumphant ones, by virtue of their greater permanence:—

"At the moment of action, man will no doubt be apt to follow the stronger impulse; and though this may occasionally prompt him to the noblest deeds, it will far more commonly lead him to gratify his own desires at the expense of other men. But after their gratification, when past and weaker impressions are contrasted with the ever-enduring social instincts, retribution will surely come. Man will then feel dissatisfied with himself, and will resolve with more or less force to act differently for the future. This is conscience; for conscience looks backwards and judges past actions, inducing that kind of dissatisfaction, which if weak we call regret, and if severe remorse. . . . . The imperious word *ought* seems merely to imply the consciousness of the existence of a persistent instinct, either innate or partly acquired, serving him as a guide, though liable to be disobeyed. . . . . If any desire or instinct, leading to an action opposed to the good of others still appears to a man, when recalled to mind, as strong as, or stronger than, his social instinct, he will feel no keen regret at having followed it; but he will be conscious that if his conduct were known to his fellows, it would meet with their disapprobation; and few are so destitute of sympathy as not to feel discomfort when this is realized."

The whole drift of this explanation is to get rid of the *new* element in conscience,—the sense of authority,—by referring it to the greater ideal *permanence* of the motive which comes into collision with an animal impulse. Hunger is shortlived; social feeling permanent,—therefore there will be a dissatisfaction and sense of remorse when the keener temporary pain is over and the milder but permanent pain returns; and the memory of this *persistence* of the latter pain will, in some future struggle, turn the scale against the more violent onset of the former pain. Now that analysis is, we venture to say, erroneous, and the error is mainly due, we believe, to the assumed necessity of finding nothing new in the conscience which cannot in some sense or other be traced back to its parentage in the lower animal life. Mr. Darwin's rationale would only account for the preference of the more persistent over the less persistent motive; it would give no account at all of the reason why we should prefer one of two equally persistent motives, one (say) purely intellectual, one of sympathy,—one, the desire to know, the other, the desire to serve,—of which we might regard the former as, if anything, the *more* independent of all temporary conditions, since it would apply to all conceivable states of individual life, while the beneficent motive applies only to states of *social* existence, and yet the conscience would generally sanction the latter, unless it could justify the purely intellectual motive by a subsequent store of beneficent results. Again, it does not in the least explain why the sympathetic motive *is* the more persistent. Suppose the conflict to have been between the satisfaction of a man's own hunger and the exactly equal hunger of a friend,—both equally temporary states and equally certain to pass away. Why should regret for having gratified my own appetite instead of his (now also gratified) be felt? The reason why I forget my own want after it is satisfied, and do not forget his after it is also satisfied, can only be that there was some higher claim on me in the one rather than the other. There is nothing at all *necessarily* more 'enduring' in the claim of a friend's hunger (long ago satisfied) on me, than there is in the claim of my own hunger (long ago satisfied) on me, unless I had *at the time* some imperious intimation that a self-sacrifice was right. Mr. Darwin's assumption that the social instinct is permanent and the selfish one temporary, is the assumption of a real moral discrimination in another form. There is no conceivable reason why I should subsequently regret my own temporary suffering from past hunger less than that of my neighbour, unless there is a reason why at the moment I ought to prefer one to the other.

This is a minute criticism, but it touches, we think, the only real fault of Mr. Darwin's philosophy—that he conceives 'evolutions' less as the history of progressive additions to the lower forms of life, than as explaining what is really the equivalent of the past state, and could not have helped coming out of it. The conscience can never be got out of a mere conflict of motives, for it is a conflict, and something more,—a conflict with something to tell how the conflict 'ought' to end. The theory of evolution will, as far as we can see, be proved to be really true, in the sense that man is the lineal descendant of animals far his inferior in physical and intellectual nature, and with hardly more than the merest rudiments of his moral nature; but 'evolution' will never explain more than the *method* how, after little, came more, and then much. It cannot show that much came out of the less, the less out of little, and little out of nothing.

TALES OF OLD JAPAN.*

WHETHER regarded from the outside or from the inside, from an artistic or from a literary point of view, this book must be considered one of the most remarkable productions ever submitted to the English reader. Our first glance shows us a tea-kettle which has developed the head, tail, and limbs of a badger, and is dancing on a tight-rope while it holds up an umbrella. We open the first volume, and meet with a picture of a man who seems to have had an ink-bottle broken upon him, and to be much distressed because the black streams are coursing down his legs. Turning to the text for an explanation of the mystery, we are overwhelmed with unpronounceable names, and before we have conquered this first difficulty, the strangeness of the contents shows us that we are in a new world. What can this place be where murder is an hourly occurrence and is only varied by suicide, where the owners of land have more than feudal power, where foxes and badgers practise magic arts upon mankind, and where families keep the centenary of a cat's death? The mixture of legend, history, and modern experience makes it difficult to class all these oddities under one single head, and the fact that Japan has so long been closed to Europeans, that previous writers on the country have been contented with a superficial view, necessarily adds to our perplexity. We may safely assume that the habits of an Eastern nation are

* *Tales of Old Japan*. By A. B. Mitford, Second Secretary to the British Legation in Japan. 2 vols. London: Macmillan. 1871.

France waved the banner of the free,
When it fell from the hands of Italy:
Alas! she fails,—but England, thou
Hast a daughter of starry brow,
Whose arms receive thy setting sun;
She, in a forest vast and lone,
With awful gladness hears intone
Niagara, and the Amazon!
Freedom before her mountain citadel
Placed you, two giants, each her wakeful sentinel!

RODEN NOEL.

BOOKS.

MR. DARWIN'S DESCENT OF MAN.*

[SECOND NOTICE.]

WE will try and state in this paper the general impression in reference to the Creative force ever present in nature, which seems to be best warranted by the careful study of our great philosophical naturalist's work on the origin of man. Whether he himself regards it as one tending to eliminate the idea of design, as understood in the sense of the older natural theology, we do not feel quite sure; probably he might say that the view he here gives us rather tends to modify than to eliminate the old conception of design,—to extend it to the general scheme of things, but to render it difficult, if not impossible, to find design in the details of every individual natural phenomenon. In a remarkable passage of his second volume, he assails the Duke of Argyll's conception of design in the following words:—

"It would even appear that mere novelty, or change for the sake of change, has sometimes acted like a charm on female birds, in the same manner as changes of fashion with us. The Duke of Argyll says,—and I am glad to have the unusual satisfaction of following for even a short distance in his footsteps—'I am more and more convinced that variety, mere variety, must be admitted to be an object and an aim in Nature.' I wish the Duke had explained what he here means by Nature. Is it meant that the Creator of the universe ordained diversified results for his own satisfaction, or for that of man? The former notion seems to me as much wanting in due reverence as the latter in probability. Capriciousness of taste in the birds themselves appears a more fitting explanation. For example; the males of some parrots can hardly be said to be more beautiful, at least according to our taste, than the females, but they differ from them in such points, as the male having a rose-coloured collar instead of, as in the female, 'a bright emeraldine narrow green collar;' or in the male having a black collar instead of 'a yellow demi-collar in front,' with a pale roseate instead of a plum-blue head. As so many male birds have for their chief ornament elongated tail-feathers or elongated crests, the shortened tail, formerly described in the male of a humming-bird, and the shortened crest of the male goosander almost seem like one of the many opposite changes of fashion which we admire in our own dresses."

To this the Duke of Argyll might fairly reply that Mr. Darwin, in explaining the external variety of the universe by the taste for variety in the sentient creatures of the universe, may very likely have adopted the true scientific course,—that is, the one indicating the true antecedent in order of causation and of time; but that, as far as getting at a satisfying reason goes, he has only reached a cause which will seem to most men more needful of explanation and more worthy of it, than the effect itself. The introduction of varieties into the external world and their perpetuation there, are due, says Mr. Darwin, to the following causes: — (1) The inherent tendency to vary in slight details from the parental type which all hereditary laws show, and which, curiously enough, seems to be shown much more in the male than female offspring of all species; (2) the tendency to fix these varieties which arises either from any inherent advantage in the rivalries of life which they may bestow on the individuals possessing them (Natural Selection), or from the preference they may excite either by their beauty or by the mere fascination of change itself in the minds of the other sex, a preference which wins for their owners the chance of more numerous or healthy offspring to perpetuate them (Sexual Selection). Granted; but, first, to what must we attribute this inherent tendency towards tentative variety, tried, as it were, in all directions,—a tendency which Mr. Darwin calls 'accidental' variation, but which seems to us, tried as it is, and systematically in all the races of creation, just as little accidental as the variations with which a mathematician deals in solving the problems of maxima and minima, when he examines and rejects all that do not lead him to the solution at which he is aiming. Thus:—

"The muscles of the foot were found by Professor Turner not to be strictly alike in any two out of fifty bodies; and in some the deviations were considerable. Professor Turner adds that the power of performing the appropriate movements must have been modified in accordance with the several deviations. Mr. J. Wood has recorded the occurrence of 295 muscular variations in thirty-six subjects; and in another set of the same number, no less than 558 variations, reckoning both sides of the body as one. In the last set not one body of the thirty-six was 'found totally wanting in departures from the standard descriptions of the muscular system given in anatomical text-books.' A single body presented the extraordinary number of twenty-five distinct abnormalities. The same muscle sometimes varies in many ways; thus, Professor McAlister describes no less than twenty distinct variations of the *palmaris accessorius*." (Vol. I., p. 109.)

And Mr. Darwin goes on to say that so remarkable is this tendency to vary within defined limits from the type or norm, that an old anatomist has written a book on the "beau-ideal of the various viscera, the ideal liver, kidneys, &c." Here we have then, a very positive evidence of the constantly tentative character, as we may call it, of the Creative force in the direction of all conceivable variety of detail,—mischievous variations being quickly extinguished by 'natural selection' and beneficial variations being perpetuated and accumulated by the same means. The tendency to vary within the limits of a certain uniformity is deeply implanted in the Creative force itself.

Next we have, as Mr. Darwin has shown in this book, a very strong subsidiary selecting cause, due to the preferences of animals of both sexes for certain qualities in the other sex, chiefly strength and beauty, but also, within a very limited degree, for variety of type itself. Sometimes it would appear that variety horrifies, as in the case of the pied raven of the Faroe Isles, of which Mr. Darwin tells us that the ravens tinged with white are persecuted with much clamour by the ordinary black ravens. On the other hand, he thinks that the variety of that male humming-bird which has a shorter tail than the female, and of that male goosander which has a shorter crest, has been perpetuated owing to the mere preference of the female birds for a change of fashion. Anyhow, there is ample evidence that varieties which greatly add to the beauty of birds are very often perpetuated in spite of their being most inconvenient and, to some extent, really mischievous, simply from the fascination they exert on the other sex. The most inconveniently long tail of the peacock, which must be as bad as a Court dress that cannot be taken off, is the commonest instance of such a variety. Mr. Darwin shows by ample evidence that these beauties are regarded, by their possessors at least, as a vast advantage in the sight of their mates, since they take the most minute precautions, by elaborately exhibiting the most beautiful feathers to the hens at the proper angles for catching the light, that they shall be fully admired. Mr. Darwin himself is astonished at the extent and development of the taste for delicate beauty in birds; and he attributes directly to it the marvellous development of Nature's art:—

"I know of no fact in natural history more wonderful than that the female Argus pheasant should be able to appreciate the exquisite shading of the ball-and-socket ornaments and the elegant patterns on the wing-feathers of the male. He who thinks that the male was created as he now exists, must admit that the great plumes, which prevent the wings from being used for flight, and which, as well as the primary feathers, are displayed in a manner quite peculiar to this one species during the act of courtship, and at no other time, were given to him as an ornament. If so, he must likewise admit that the female was created and endowed with the capacity of appreciating such ornaments. I differ only in the conviction that the male Argus pheasant acquired his beauty gradually, through the females having preferred through many generations the more highly ornamented males; the æsthetic capacity of the females having been advanced through exercise of habit, in the same manner as our own taste is gradually improved."

Now, is it not quite open to the Duke of Argyll, or any one else who listens to Mr. Darwin's denunciation of the notion that the Creator of the universe had "ordained diversified results for his own satisfaction," to ask whether the objective law of tentative variation, which experiments, as it were, on varieties of organization of every kind and in every direction, and the subjective law of taste for beauty as apart from use, which does, in fact, imply a taste for variety,—beauty chiefly consisting in harmony, or variety in unity,—are not clearly, on his own showing, of the very essence and principle of what he calls 'evolution,' and, therefore, certainly attributable in fact, — whether or not we appreciate the true motive,—to the ordination of the Creator of the universe. Possibly, indeed, it may convey a false impression to say that it is either "for his own satisfaction or for that of man" that the Creator ordains this constant variety, and love of variety. But at all events, there stands the great *double* law of variation, ensuring variety, and not only variety, but the perpetuation of all varieties which are beneficial, and even of many which are not, in the direct sense, beneficial, which may even be, in a very limited sense, injurious, for the sake of that higher benefit which the development of

* *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex.* By Charles Darwin, M.A., F.R.S., &c. 2 vols. London: Murray.

beauty, as a new principle in the universe, ensures. Thus, even though it conveys a false impression to speak of the variety of the universe as being created "for God's own satisfaction" in the sense that it is any delight to him to look upon it, it clearly must be in some sense or other for his satisfaction, since it fulfils the great central law of creation.

Again, it is worth noting that Mr. Darwin's own conception of 'evolution' does not imply that the highest intellectual phenomena necessarily come last in the order of creation. It is a result of his investigation that the mental qualities characteristic of the highest order of created beings are so little a consequence of mere developed organization, that they are clearly anticipated, as it were, in one of the very lowest orders, though not fully combined and co-ordinated with æsthetic and moral development:—

"A difference in degree, however great, does not justify us in placing man in a distinct kingdom, as will perhaps be best illustrated by comparing the mental powers of two insects, namely, a coccus or scale-insect and an ant, which undoubtedly belong to the same class. The difference is here greater, though of a somewhat different kind, than that between man and the highest mammal. The female coccus, whilst young, attaches itself by its proboscis to a plant; sucks the sap, but never moves again; is fertilized and lays eggs; and this is its whole history. On the other hand, to describe the habits and mental powers of a female ant would require, as Pierre Huber has shown, a large volume; I may, however, briefly specify a few points. Ants communicate information to each other, and several unite for the same work, or games of play. They recognize their fellow-ants after months of absence. They build great edifices, keep them clean, close the doors in the evening, and post sentries. They make roads, and even tunnels under rivers. They collect food for the community, and when an object too large for entrance is brought to the nest, they enlarge the door, and afterwards build it up again. They go out to battle in regular bands, and freely sacrifice their lives for the common weal. They emigrate in accordance with a preconcerted plan. They capture slaves. They keep Aphides as milch-cows. They move the eggs of their aphides, as well as their own eggs and cocoons, into warm parts of the nest, in order that they may be quickly hatched; and endless similar facts could be given. On the whole, the difference in mental power between an ant and a coccus is immense; yet no one has ever dreamed of placing them in distinct classes, much less in distinct kingdoms." (Vol. I., pp. 186-7.)

Thus the ants, with a nervous centre less than a pin's point, and belonging to the same order as a creature hardly endowed with animal life at all, seem to anticipate the strict organization of military and Slave States, and appear to owe their success to closely sifted and 'selected instincts,' acting on creatures too weak to accomplish anything except by the most extraordinary industry and the most wonderful co-operation. We may say that they are in some sense the prototypes of races like the Egyptians, who appear, on the higher level of humanity, to have accomplished like great results by like means. In the same way, Mr. Darwin shows that certain species of birds, especially the Bower-birds, under the imperious influence of the instinct which has chiefly been concerned in introducing the love of beauty into the universe,—the pairing instinct,—have positively anticipated many of the complex phenomena of pleasure-loving human society, having not only fixed upon regular places for social meeting, but highly and artificially ornamented them with shells and other ornaments, the disposition of which they constantly vary and improve. In some sense, we may call these temporary efforts at ornamental architecture, accompanied as they are by the most wonderful selective instincts for the beautiful, anticipations in the lower animal world of the sort of sudden flush of artistic civilization among the Greeks, whose civilizing impulses were certainly more or less deeply connected with the love of beauty. Between these cases of the wonderful flowering of the highest instincts of the animal world, we seem to find great gaps filled up by much more ordinary races; nor does the physical approximation to man seem necessarily to involve the preservation of the most wonderful powers acquired by lower races. Horses and dogs, though they may have the germs of higher affections in them, show nothing like the organizing instincts of ants; and even the highest apes show nothing like the sense and love of beauty evinced by many tribes of birds. Yet when we come to the highest stage, and Mr. Darwin gives us his account of the probable genesis of human character, he suggests, most wisely, as it seems to us, that weakness was again probably one of the first conditions of the higher development of human reason. He thinks the gorilla much less likely to have been the direct ancestor of man than the orang, because the gorilla is too strong to need the protection of large social groups, and immense strength is therefore a disadvantage for the purpose of intellectual development. And the first great source of firm cohesion and progress among a group so formed, he supposes to have been the moral feeling that the welfare of others has claims over us to our own cost. Curiously enough,—though, as it has been wittily remarked, Mr. Darwin ought to have called his book not the 'Descent' but the 'Ascent of Man,' not his 'fall' but his 'rise,'—he finds himself after explaining his rise compelled to reintroduce a new doctrine of his fall. He shows that the instincts of the higher animals are far nobler than the habits of savage races of men, and he finds himself, therefore, compelled to re-introduce,—in a form of the substantial orthodoxy of which he appears to be quite unconscious,—and to introduce as a scientific hypothesis,—the doctrine that man's gain of *knowledge* was the cause of a temporary but long-enduring moral deterioration, as indicated by the many foul customs, especially as to marriage, of savage tribes. What does the Jewish tradition of the moral degeneration of man through his snatching at a knowledge forbidden him by his highest instinct, assert beyond this?

On the whole, then, Mr. Darwin's investigation presents us with a Creative force, constantly and apparently to human eyes *tentatively* producing all possible variations in the specific living forms of every kind which it has brought into existence with a view, as it were, to see whether any of them will have the advantage over others,—creating very high forms of intellectual instinct at the very threshold of the world of life,—gradually mingling the love of beauty with the instinct of self-preservation, and fashioning out of that love of beauty some of the most wonderful of the artistic instincts of the world,—rooting, however, all its greatest achievements, both intellectual and moral, in the sense of weakness, and overcoming this sense of weakness only by the most wonderful and noble of all the forces of the universe, disinterested affection,—finally, when this moral affection is once fairly generated, gradually depriving the higher beings of the instincts by which the lower had been preserved, and giving them in the place thereof the power to create and mould their own instincts, and even to spoil and grievously sin against such instincts as were left them, if they would,—in other words, giving them love, reason, freedom, conscience, the power to sin. Is this in any sense whatever,—even conceivably an atheistic philosophy? Is not intellect ingrained in the creative force from the first? Is not the love of beauty deeply enfolded in it? Is not the authority of conscience wholly bestowed by it? Is not St. Paul's paradox of weakness being stronger than strength, and in some sense the foolishness of God than the wisdom of men, almost implied in it? Is there any one really great puzzle in it except the apparent *tentativeness* of the method,—as if the Creative force found it necessary to try everything before producing what it foresaw? And is not this seeming tentativeness probably the merest seeming? Can we not easily believe that the value of this seemingly exhaustive process may prove to have been infinitely greater, that its beneficent results for a future still far beyond our comprehension may prove to have been infinitely greater, than that of any creative process in which all the links and possibilities of the intermediate stages of development should have been less fully revealed? For our own parts, we find Mr. Darwin's investigation of the origin of man a far more wonderful vindication of Theism than *Paley's Natural Theology*, though we do not know, so reticent is his style, whether or not he so conceives it himself.

BJÖRNSON'S TALES.*

To the ladies and gentleman who have introduced us to the *Fisher Girl* and *Love and Life in Norway* we are indebted for very great pleasure, and pleasure of almost a unique kind. English people have written of Norway either at first or second hand, but the novelty of the subject and the glamour of strangeness have tinctured their accounts of scenery inhabitants and customs with a poetical and *couleur-de-rose* sentiment; and though the salient points both of the country and of the social life may have been caught and described with more or less accuracy, the interiors—the details especially of domestic life—have necessarily been sealed books to them. In these stories the case is reversed; the grandeur and picturesqueness come out only in their true proportions, but we learn to know the mind and characters of the people and their relations to and bearing upon each other; and we see and become familiar with their dirty seaport towns—not as travellers, but as residents,—as well as with their mountains and forests. Not that the prose prevails; very far from it. A countryman alone can understand the national characteristics, and genius only paint them as they are painted here. The motive

* *Love and Life in Norway.* Translated from the Norwegian of Björnstjerne Björnsen by the Hon. Augusta Bethell and Augusta Plesner. London: Cassell.

The Fishing Girl. Translated from the Norwegian of Björnstern Björnsen by Augusta Plesner and Frederika Richardson. London: Cassell.

The Fisher Girl. Translated from the Norwegian of Björnstjerne Björnson by Sivert and Elizabeth Hjerleid. London: Trübner.