EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Statistical prediction of the outcome of a noncooperative game

James Bono () and David Wolpert

No 2009-20, Working Papers from American University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Conventionally, game theory predicts that the mixed strategy profile of players in a noncooperative game will satisfy some equilibrium concept. Relative probabil- ities of the strategy profiles satisfying the concept are unspecified, and all strategies not satisfying it are implicitly assigned probability zero. As an alternative, we re- cast the prediction problem of game theory as statistically estimating the strategy profile, from "data" that consists of the game specification. This replaces the focus of game theory, on specifying a set of "equilibrium" mixed strategies, with a new focus, on specifying a probability density over all mixed strategies. We explore a Bayesian version of such a Predictive Game Theory (PGT). We show that for some games the peaks of the posterior over strategy profiles approximate quantal response equilibria. We also show how PGT provides a best single prediction for any noncooperative game, i.e., a universal refinement. We also show how regula- tors can use PGT to make optimal decisions in situations where conventional game theory cannot provide advice.

Keywords: Quantal Response Equilibrium; Bayesian Statistics; Entropic prior; Maximum entropy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C11 C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.17606/ztj8-af39 First version, 2009 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:amu:wpaper:2009-20

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from American University, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Meal ().

 
Page updated 2025-02-14
Handle: RePEc:amu:wpaper:2009-20
            
pFad - Phonifier reborn

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


Alternative Proxies:

Alternative Proxy

pFad Proxy

pFad v3 Proxy

pFad v4 Proxy