Persuaded Search

Teddy Mekonnen, Zeky Murra-Anton and Bobak Pakzad-Hurson

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider sequential search by an agent who cannot observe the quality of goods but can acquire information by buying signals from a profit-maximizing principal with limited commitment power. The principal can charge higher prices for more informative signals in any period, but high prices in the future discourage continued search by the agent, thereby reducing the principal's future profits. A unique stationary equilibrium outcome exists, and we show that the principal $(i)$ induces the socially efficient stopping rule, $(ii)$ extracts the full surplus, and $(iii)$ persuades the agent against settling for marginal goods, extending the duration of surplus extraction. However, introducing an additional, free source of information can lead to inefficiency in equilibrium.

Date: 2023-03, Revised 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hrm and nep-mic
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