Cooperation and discrimination within and across language borders: Evidence from children in a bilingual city

Silvia Angerer, Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Philipp Lergetporer and Matthias Sutter

No 200, ifo Working Paper Series from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Abstract: We present experimental evidence from a bilingual city in Northern Italy on whether the language spoken by a partner in a prisoner’s dilemma game affects behavior and leads to discrimination. Running a framed field experiment with 828 six- to eleven-year old primary school children in the city of Meran, we find that cooperation generally increases with age, but that the gap between cooperation among in-group members and cooperation towards children speaking another language is considerable and increasing with age. This gap is due to both, in-group favoritism and language group discrimination.

JEL-codes: C91 C93 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation and discrimination within and across language borders: Evidence from children in a bilingual city (2016)
Working Paper: Cooperation and discrimination within and across language borders: Evidence from children in a bilingual city (2016)
Working Paper: Cooperation and discrimination within and across language borders: Evidence from children in a bilingual city (2015)
Working Paper: Cooperation and Discrimination Within and Across Language Borders: Evidence from Children in a Bilingual City (2015)
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