An Experiment on Retail Payments Systems

Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari and Stefania Bortolotti

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: We develop a novel theoretical and experimental framework to study adoption and use of cash versus electronic payments in retail transactions. The design allows us to assess the behavioral impact of sellers’ service fees and buyers’ rewards from using electronic payments. In the experiment, buyers and sellers faced a coordination problem, independently choosing a payment method before trading. Sellers readily adopted electronic payments but buyers did not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards significantly increased adoption and use of electronic payments. Buyers’ economic incentives played a pivotal role in the diffusion of electronic payments but cannot fully explain their adoption choices.

Keywords: money; coordination; pricing; transactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E1 E4 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mac
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/e ... ers/CCB-Payments.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: An Experiment on Retail Payments Systems (2016)
Working Paper: An Experiment on Retail Payments Systems (2014)
Working Paper: An experiment on retail payments systems (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:15-13

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Megan Luetje ().