Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium

Mikhail Drugov

No 10021, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper studies a dynamic bargaining model with informational externalities between bargaining pairs. Two principals bargain with their respective agents about the price they will pay for their work while its cost is agents' private information and correlated between them. The principals benchmark their agents against each other by making the same offers in the equilibrium even if this involves delaying or advancing the agreement compared to the autarky. When principals compete in complements this pattern is reinforced while under competition in substitutes the principals trade off the benefits of differentiation in the product market against the cost of the agents' rent.

Keywords: Adverse selection; Bargaining; Competition; Delay; Externalities; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 D83 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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