Dividend Policy Decisions and Ownership Concentration: Evidence from Thai Public Companies

Christian Wolff and J. Thomas Connelly

No 13854, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this paper we examine the relationship between ownership concentration and dividend policy for Thai publicly listed companies. High family ownership firms have higher dividend payouts than low family ownership firms, which we interpret to mean high family ownership firms follow a more rational dividend policy. This finding is consistent with the prediction that agency conflicts between the managers and shareholders are lower at firms with a controlling shareholder. The evidence is robust through different econometric specifications, robust when the level used to determine the extent of family ownership (family control) is lowered to 10 percent of the outstanding shares, and robust to the inclusion of the ownership wedge as a proxy for the severity of agency conflicts.

Keywords: Family ownership; Control; Payout policy; Agency conflicts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-sbm
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Journal Article: Dividend Policy Decisions and Ownership Concentration: Evidence from Thai Public Companies (2023)
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