On the Nature, Modeling, and Neural Bases of Social Ties

Frans van Winden (), Mirre Stallen and Richard Ridderinkhof

No 6950, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper addresses the nature, formalization, and neural bases of (affective) social ties and discusses the relevance of ties for health economics. A social tie is defined as an affective weight attached by an individual to the well-being of another individual (?utility interdependence?). Ties can be positive or negative, and symmetric or asymmetric between individuals. Characteristic of a social tie, as conceived of here, is that it develops over time under the influence of interaction, in contrast with a trait like altruism. Moreover, a tie is not related to strategic behavior such as reputation formation but seen as generated by affective responses. A formalization is presented together with some supportive evidence from behavioral experiments. This is followed by a discussion of related psychological constructs and the presentation of suggestive neural findings, based on the existing literature. We conclude with some suggestions for future research.

Keywords: Social ties; Affect; Modeling; Neuroeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D64 D87 H41 I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-neu and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: On the Nature, Modeling, and Neural Bases of Social Ties (2008)
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