Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms

Tommaso Valletti and Frago Kourandi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marc Bourreau

No 9827, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We propose a two-sided model with two competing Internet platforms, and a continuum of Content Providers (CPs). We study the effect of a net neutrality regulation on capacity investments in the market for Internet access, and on innovation in the market for content. Under the alternative discriminatory regime, platforms charge a priority fee to those CPs which are willing to deliver their content on a fast lane. We find that under discrimination investments in broadband capacity and content innovation are both higher than under net neutrality. Total welfare increases, though the discriminatory regime is not always beneficial to the platforms as it can intensify competition for subscribers. As platforms have a unilateral incentive to switch to the discriminatory regime, a prisoner's dilemma can arise. We also consider the possibility of sabotage, and show that it can only emerge, with adverse welfare effects, under discrimination.

Keywords: Innovation; investment; Net neutrality; Platform competition; Two-sided markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L51 L52 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ict, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms (2015)
Working Paper: Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms (2015)
Working Paper: Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms (2014)
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