Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets

Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of acyclicity in singleton cores. We show that the absence of simultaneous cycles is a sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Furthermore, acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that guarantees the existence of singleton cores. If firms or workers preferences are acyclical, unique stable matching is obtained through a procedure that resembles a serial dictatorship. Thus, acyclicity generalizes the notion of common preferences. It follows that if the firms or workers preferences are acyclical, unique stable matching is strongly efficient for the other side of the market

Keywords: Stable; matching; Acyclicity; Singleton; cores (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets (2013)
Working Paper: Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we1126

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