Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms

Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti

No 2343R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We analyze digital markets where a monopolist platform uses data to match multiproduct sellers with heterogeneous consumers who can purchase both on and off the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their products to consumers and reveals information to consumers about their values. The revenueoptimal mechanism is a managed advertising campaign that matches products and preferences efficiently. In equilibrium, sellers offer higher qualities at lower unit prices on than off the platform. Privacy-respecting data-governance rules such as organic search results or federated learning can lead to welfare gains for consumers.

Keywords: Data; Data; Privacy; Data Governance; Digital Advertising; Competition; Digital Platforms; Digital Intermediaries; Personal Data; Matching; Price Discrimination; Automated Bidding; Algorithmic Bidding; Managed Advertising Campaigns; Showrooming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D18 D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-com, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic, nep-pay and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2023-04/d2343r.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms (2024)
Working Paper: Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms (2023)
Working Paper: Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms (2022)
Working Paper: Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2343r

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().