Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly

Burkhard Schipper

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2009, vol. 33, issue 12, 1981-1990

Abstract: We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round à la Vega-Redondo, F., [1997. The evolution of Walrasian behavior. Econometrica 65, 375-384]. Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents' previous output. Firms make mistakes and deviate from their decision rules with a small probability. Applying stochastic stability analysis, we find that the long run distribution converges to a recurrent set of states in which imitators are better off than are optimizers.

Keywords: Profit; maximization; hypothesis; Bounded; rationality; Learning; Stackelberg; Quasisubmodularity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot oligopoly (2005)
Working Paper: Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly (2005)
Working Paper: Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:33:y:2009:i:12:p:1981-1990

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