Electoral rules, forms of government and redistributive policy: Evidence from agriculture and food policies

Alessandro Olper and Valentina Raimondi ()

Journal of Comparative Economics, 2013, vol. 41, issue 1, 141-158

Abstract: We investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on public policy outcomes using a new dataset on agriculture and food policies from 74 countries over the 1960–2005 period. Using both cross-sectional and panel data analyses we find robust evidence that the specific nature of democratic institutions has important consequences for public policy. Proportional democracies and presidential democracies – compared to majoritarian and parliamentary democracies – give more public support to agriculture and less to food consumers. The magnitude of these constitutional effects are stronger for import-competitive sectors and staple food crops. The effects seem independent from the ideology orientation of governments.

Keywords: Electoral rules; Forms of government; Agriculture and food policy; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 P16 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:41:y:2013:i:1:p:141-158

DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2012.03.002

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