EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Individualism–collectivism, governance and economic development

Andreas Kyriacou

European Journal of Political Economy, 2016, vol. 42, issue C, 91-104

Abstract: While an individualist society prizes personal control, autonomy and individual accomplishments, a collectivist one puts a premium on loyalty and cohesion and imposes mutual obligations in the context of in-groups. It has been argued that, in contrast to collectivism, individualism will promote economic development directly by sharpening individual incentives to invest, innovate and accumulate wealth. In this article, I argue that the individualist–collectivist dimension can also affect development through its impact on the quality of government. The in-group favoritism inherent to collectivist societies is likely to engender corruption, nepotism and clientelism in the public sphere. In individualist societies, the relative weakness of in-group pressures and an emphasis on personal achievement and worth will contribute towards a more meritocratic and efficient public sector to the benefit of long-run growth. Empirical evidence is provided suggesting that insofar as individualism affects economic development it does so because it promotes good governance.

Keywords: Culture; Individualism; Collectivism; Governance; Economic development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 O43 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268015001123
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Individualism-Collectivism, Governance and Economic Development (2015) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:42:y:2016:i:c:p:91-104

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.11.005

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung

More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-01-21
Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:42:y:2016:i:c:p:91-104
            
pFad - Phonifier reborn

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


Alternative Proxies:

Alternative Proxy

pFad Proxy

pFad v3 Proxy

pFad v4 Proxy