Individualism–collectivism, governance and economic development
Andreas Kyriacou
European Journal of Political Economy, 2016, vol. 42, issue C, 91-104
Abstract:
While an individualist society prizes personal control, autonomy and individual accomplishments, a collectivist one puts a premium on loyalty and cohesion and imposes mutual obligations in the context of in-groups. It has been argued that, in contrast to collectivism, individualism will promote economic development directly by sharpening individual incentives to invest, innovate and accumulate wealth. In this article, I argue that the individualist–collectivist dimension can also affect development through its impact on the quality of government. The in-group favoritism inherent to collectivist societies is likely to engender corruption, nepotism and clientelism in the public sphere. In individualist societies, the relative weakness of in-group pressures and an emphasis on personal achievement and worth will contribute towards a more meritocratic and efficient public sector to the benefit of long-run growth. Empirical evidence is provided suggesting that insofar as individualism affects economic development it does so because it promotes good governance.
Keywords: Culture; Individualism; Collectivism; Governance; Economic development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 O43 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Individualism-Collectivism, Governance and Economic Development (2015) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:42:y:2016:i:c:p:91-104
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.11.005
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