Public order and private payments: Evidence from the Swedish soccer league

Sten Nyberg and Mikael Priks

Journal of Public Economics, 2017, vol. 153, issue C, 1-8

Abstract: Should organizers of events share the associated costs of maintaining public order? We address this question by using unique data from the Swedish soccer league where co-payment for police were introduced for some clubs only. The difference-in-differences analysis shows that co-payments increased private guards by 40% and suggests a reduction of unruly behavior by 20%. The results are consistent with our model, where co-payments alleviate under-provision in efforts by organizers to combat problems such as hooliganism due to externalities and free-riding on police services. The model also sheds light on the critique that co-payments could lead financially constrained organizers to provide less security.

Keywords: Natural experiment; Co-payments for police; Free-riding; Externality; Hooliganism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 H49 K42 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Public Order and Private Payments: Paying for Police Services at Events (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:153:y:2017:i:c:p:1-8

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.07.005

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