Attitudes toward Private and Collective Risks in Individual and Strategic Choice Situations
Geoffrey Brennan,
Werner Güth (),
Luis G. Gonzalez and
Maria Levati
Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group
Abstract:
Idiosyncratic risk attitudes are usually assumed to be commonly known and restricted to own payoffs. However, the alternatives faced by a decision maker often involve risks for others' payoffs as well. Motivated by the importance of other-regarding preferences in social interactions, this paper explores idiosyncratic attitudes toward own and others' risks. We elicit risk attitudes in an experiment involving choices with and without strategic interaction.
Keywords: Other-regarding concerns; Random price mechanism; Public goods experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D63 D81 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2005-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
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Journal Article: Attitudes toward private and collective risk in individual and strategic choice situations (2008) 
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