Evolving to the impatience trap: the example of the farmer-sheriff game

David Levine, Salvatore Modica (), Federico Weinschelbaum and Felipe Zurita

No 2012-033, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a two- population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations.

Keywords: Microeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game (2011)
Working Paper: Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game (2011)
Working Paper: Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game (2011)
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