Communication with Forgetful Liars

Philippe Jehiel ()

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: I consider multi-round cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar.s expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium distribution of lies aggregated over all possible realizations of the states. The approach is used to shed light on when the full truth is almost surely elicited, when multiple lies can arise in equilibrium, and when inconsistencies trigger harmful consequences.

Keywords: forgetful liars; lie detection; analogy-based expectations; cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02183313v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02183313v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Communication with forgetful liars (2021)
Working Paper: Communication with forgetful liars (2021)
Working Paper: Communication with forgetful liars (2021)
Working Paper: Communication with Forgetful Liars (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-02183313

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().