Ruling elites' rotation and asset ownership: Implications for property rights

Leonid Polishchuk and Georgiy Syunyaev ()

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: We provide a theory and empirical evidence showing that the rotation of ruling elites in combination with elites' asset ownership could improve property rights protection, and that such association holds for non-democratic political regimes when it is based on elites' concerns about security of their own property rights in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.

Keywords: Endogenous property rights; credible commitment; ``stationary bandit'' (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 O17 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, December 2013, pages 1-36

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.hse.ru/data/2013/12/18/1338037112/43EC2013.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights (2015)
Working Paper: uling Elites' Rotation and Asset Ownership: Implications for Property Rights (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:43/ec/2013

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Shamil Abdulaev () and Shamil Abdulaev ().