Stability of Mixed Equilibria

Ziv Gorodeisky ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We consider stability properties of equilibria in stochastic evolutionary dynamics. In particular, we study the stability of mixed equilibria in strategic form games. In these games, when the populations are small, all strategies may be stable. We prove that when the populations are large, the unique stable outcome of best-reply dynamics in 2 x 2 games with a unique Nash equilibrium that is completely mixed is the mixed equilibrium. The proof of this result is based on estimating transition times in Markov chains.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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