Effects of fiscal decentralisation and electoral accountability efficiency evidence from the Italian health care sector

Francesco Porcelli

No 2009/29, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: Data envelopment analysis and panel data stochastic frontier models are used to evaluate the impact of the 1995 renewal of regional political institutions and the 1998 tax reform (introduction of IRAP) on the efficiency of Italian regional governments. Both methodologies are applied to a longitudinal dataset, including financial and health care data disaggregated at the regional level from 1991 to 2005. Then, efficiency scores for the regional governments are used to examine the evolution of technical efficiency in the Italian health care sector. The final results provide new empirical evidence in support of the findings of recent theoretical models concerning the way in which fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability affect the efficiency of governmental activity.

Keywords: accountability; DEA; decentralisation; efficiency; health; IRAP; Italy; panel data; stochastic frontier (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H51 H77 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2009-29

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