Ambiguity and Excuse-Driven Behavior in Charitable Giving

Thomas Garcia, Sébastien Massoni and Marie Claire Villeval

No 12869, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. Behavior in a laboratory experiment suggests that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to act less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation – rather than its benefits – are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.

Keywords: ambiguity; excuse-driven behavior; social preferences; charitable giving; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - revised version published in: European Economic Review , 2020,124, 103412

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Related works:
Journal Article: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2020)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2020)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2018)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2018)
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