Partially sighted persons and the public debt elephant

John Considine and David Duffy

Constitutional Political Economy, 2006, vol. 17, issue 4, 237-249

Abstract: Recent data on the accumulation patterns of public debt across OECD countries suggests a synthesis is possible between the theoretical and empirical approaches to public debt and also between the traditional and more recent political economy explanations of public debt accumulation. The inductive approach of recent political economy explanations is combined with the intertemporal constraints highlighted in the Ricardian–Barro theory to present a reinterpretation of cross-country debt accumulations patterns. Like the elephant in the blind men and the elephant fable, the conclusion is glaringly obvious. Formal and informal budgetary constraints matter. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006

Keywords: Public debt; Budgetary rules; Political economy; H6; B2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:17:y:2006:i:4:p:237-249

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-006-9005-x

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