A trust game in loss domain

Ola Kvaløy, Miguel Luzuriaga () and Trond Olsen
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Miguel Luzuriaga: Neu-Ulm University of Applied Sciences

Experimental Economics, 2017, vol. 20, issue 4, No 6, 860-877

Abstract: Abstract In standard trust games, no trust is the default, and trust generates a potential gain. We investigate a reframed trust game in which full trust is default and where no trust generates a loss. We find significantly lower levels of trust and trustworthiness in the loss domain when full trust is default than in the gain domain when no trust is default. As a consequence, trust is on average profitable in the gain domain, but not in the loss domain. We also find that subjects respond more positively to higher trust in the loss domain than in the gain domain.

Keywords: Trust; Reciprocity; Framing; Defaults; Reference points; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: A trust game in loss domain (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9514-7

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