Exogenous Targeting Instruments with Heterogeneous Agents

John Spraggon

McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications from McMaster University

Abstract: This paper investigates the ability of ambient pollution instruments to induce a group of heterogeneous agents to choose a target outcome. Six controlled laboratory sessions were conducted with heterogeneous agents facing ambient pollution instruments with lump sum or proportional fines and bonuses. Sessions are compared with a study of these exogenous targeting instruments and homogenous agents using complete information and certainty [25]. The data show that contracts can indeed be developed that induce heterogeneous groups to choose the target outcome; however, substantial inefficiency and inequality were observed.

Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2003-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:mceelp:2003-02

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