Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets

Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz

No 13766, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, "benchmark," amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 I2 J0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01
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Published as Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2010. "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 34-63, May.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets (2010)
Working Paper: Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets (2007)
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