Information Acquisition in Rumor Based Bank Runs
Zhiguo He () and
Asaf Manela
No 18513, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We study information acquisition and dynamic withdrawal decisions when a spreading rumor exposes a solvent bank to a run. Uncertainty about the bank's liquidity and potential failure motivates depositors who hear the rumor to acquire additional noisy signals. Depositors with less informative signals may wait before gradually running on the bank, leading to an endogenous aggregate withdrawal speed and bank survival time. Private information acquisition about liquidity can subject solvent-but-illiquid banks to runs, and shorten the survival time of failing banks. Public provision of solvency information can mitigate runs by indirectly crowding-out individual depositors' effort to acquire liquidity information.
JEL-codes: E61 G01 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-cta and nep-mac
Note: CF ME
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
Published as Journal of Finance, Volume 71, Issue 3 June 2016 Pages 1113–1158
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Journal Article: Information Acquisition in Rumor‐Based Bank Runs (2016) 
Working Paper: Information Acquisition in Rumor-Based Bank Runs (2012) 
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